Showing posts with label Credit Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Credit Crisis. Show all posts

28 July 2009

Janet Yellen Channels Ronald Reagan: "Deficit's Don't Matter"


"You know, Paul, Reagan proved deficits don't matter."Dick Cheney to Paul O'Neill

The mainstream media is reporting that Fed governor Janet Yellen, a noted dove on inflation as Fed governors go, just told a gathering of bankers in Idaho that "deficits do not cause inflation" and summarily dismissed any concerns in that regard.

So, consulting the source material which is included just below, I am struggling to understand what she is saying, and to believe that she said it with a straight face, and was not just jawboning.

What Janet Yellen seems to be saying is:
First, that deficits do not matter unless they are 'structural' and not temporary. It does not matter how much, for example, we give to the banks. When the crisis is over, the deficits will remain, but will not grow larger, and will be offset by higher taxes, that will come from the improved economy.

Secondly, that developing countries have independent central banks that know how to and are willing to fight inflation, as opposed to the central banks of undeveloped countries where the government impedes their ability to fight inflation and to monetize the debt.

Thirdly, monetary inflation only occurs where excess demand for goods and services is generated. Until that point, unless there is this demand, increased money supply does not generate inflation. We might call this the reverse Laffer, in that it is a Demand side view of inflation that tends to discount the supply side completely.
One would not think that the US had recently seen the collapse of an enormous housing bubble, following the collapse of a large but less enormous stock bubble. Janet brushes this off faster than a stock strategist on CNBC.

Although she received her Ph.D. from Yale in 1971, she surely must have subsequently studied the stagflation of the 1970's in the US, where demand remained relatively stable but a supply shock on the oil side, together with the egregious monetary policy of a pliable Fed that had been accommodating Richard Nixon, finally triggered a rather nasty stagflation that the hairy-knuckled resolve of tall Paul Volcker was finally able to overcome.

Janet Yellen is greatly mistaken, but almost emblematic of the thinking in some circles that can see only the demand side of the equation, which is most common in a layperson relating to their common domestic experience. What is frightening in a way is that she is not some blogger out on the net, or a talking head for the extended infomercial that is financial reporting in the US, but is a Fed governor.

And she is no outlier. Her thinking underpins the basis for Bernanke's strategy of packing the banks with liquidity, monetizing their assets, but maintaining control of that added liquidity by having the ability to attract bank reserves into the Fed where they can be managed through the ability to pay interest on those reserves.

Can the Sorcerer's apprentices keep a steady hand on this latest monster from their laboratory? Every time they try this, something unexpected happen, and we go to the brink, to be rescued by another patch, another new experiment, designed to save us from the last one gone wrong.

Her arrogance toward 'developing countries' is absolutely appalling, and sure to come back to haunt her at some later date. If one looks at the performance of the dollar and its long term purchasing power under the Fed, it appears that Janet is a proud member of the subjective idealist school of behavioural economics. What we do not admit to be real cannot exist, and will not hurt us.

So, we can inflate our way to prosperity, provided that we control the perception of the results of our actions. Jigger the CPI so its no longer valid, suppress long term interest rates by buying the curve selectively and suppressing gold (See Gibson's Paradox by Larry Summers), and coerce the world's central banks through various means to support our monetary inflation step for step. After all, everything is relative. Until it is not.

OMG. Our entire financial system is based on the sufferance and good will of potential adversaries to do what is in our best interests because the fragility of our currency frightens them. And well they might be fearful, when they read this from Ms. Yellen, and see how many true believers in the omnipotence of the Fed take it seriously.


Large deficits don't cause inflation: Fed's Yellen
By Greg Robb
Jul 28, 2009, 1:06 p.m. EST

(MarketWatch - Washington) -- Concern that the massive federal budget deficit will cause inflation is misplaced, said Janet Yellen, the president of the San Francisco Federal Reserve on Tuesday. Deficits don't cause inflation, she said. Instead, the worry is that they might cause interest rates to rise. "Right now, private investment spending is extremely weak, so financing for the large federal deficits is readily available. But once private spending recovers, the competition for funds between the government and private sectors could drive interest rates up," Yellen said in a speech to bankers in Idaho.

Jesse here. The relevant quote from Janet Yellen's speech to the bankers in Idaho is excerpted below from the San Francisco Fed's website.

Let me now address another issue that is garnering attention—inflation. This is a subject rife with contradiction. Almost without exception, my business contacts report downward pressure on wages and prices. At the same time, they tell me they worry that the United States is on the threshold of serious inflation. They see large federal budget deficits today and more looming on the horizon. They also note that the Fed has pumped up bank reserves and expanded its balance sheet to fund its financial support programs. They worry that this may amount to financing deficits with money creation. Surely, they say, these things will eventually have to lead to higher inflation.

I’ll begin with budget deficits. The gap in the federal budget for the current and the next fiscal years are projected to exceed $1 trillion, far larger than anything we’ve ever seen before. But a large part of these current deficits are temporary. A portion stems from the impact of the weak economy on the budget. In a recession, tax collections fall and spending on programs such as unemployment insurance rise automatically. A significant portion is due to the fiscal stimulus that has been put in place over the next few years to address the recession. Antirecessionary fiscal policy, in my view, is entirely appropriate. Since that stimulus is temporary by design, the resulting deficits will shrink as the stimulus phases out. But federal deficits will not disappear completely even when the economy has recovered and the stimulus program has phased out. On the contrary, these ongoing or “structural” deficits are anticipated to stretch indefinitely into the future and to escalate over time in a manner that ultimately is not sustainable. The long-term projected structural budget deficit mainly reflects the impact of an aging population and rapidly rising health-care costs on spending for federal entitlement programs, particularly Medicare and Medicaid.

Economists have known, worried, and warned the public about the damaging consequences of escalating long-term budget deficits in the United States for decades. It’s high time for our country to tackle the problem head-on. But the main concern with these deficits relates to productivity and living standards, and not high inflation. Large budget deficits do not cause high inflation automatically. In fact, since World War II, large deficits have been associated with high inflation only in developing countries. That’s because developing countries often have central banks that are under the sway of the government, which sometimes induces them to print money to finance government spending. The connection isn’t found in countries such as ours with advanced financial systems and independent central banks. Remember that, in the 1980s, the United States ran large deficits just as inflation was coming down. And Japan has had huge deficits through much of the past two decades, yet its problem is persistent deflation—precisely the opposite of inflation. The United States and most other industrialized countries have central banks with long traditions of independence and deep-seated support for keeping politics out of monetary policy. In those countries, the monetary authorities generally have stuck to their inflation objectives, even when governments ran large budget deficits.

In advanced countries, the problem isn’t that large deficits cause inflation. Rather it’s that they raise long-term interest rates, thereby crowding out private investment, which holds back advances in productivity and living standards. Right now, private investment spending is extremely weak, so financing for the large federal deficits is readily available. But once private spending recovers, the competition for funds between the government and private sectors could drive interest rates up. A decline in productivity growth is a serious problem—one we should strive to avoid—but it is not the same as inflation.

So what about the Fed’s unprecedented balance sheet expansion? Our strong steps to avert financial and economic meltdown have caused our assets to more than double, from under $900 billion at the start of the recession to over $2 trillion now. This expansion is largely financed by increases in excess reserves that banks deposit with us.

Now we come to the crux of the issue: Will this expansion of credit and bank reserves create high inflation? My answer is no. And the reason again is because of current economic conditions. Monetary policy fosters inflation when it loosens the stance of policy enough to create excess demand for goods and services. Right now, we have exactly the opposite—an excess supply of goods and services. We need more demand—not less—to offset slack in labor and product markets. We have seen a noticeable slowdown in wage growth and reports of wage cuts have become increasingly prevalent. Businesses are cutting prices to boost sales. As a result, core inflation—a measure that excludes volatile food and energy prices—has drifted below 2 percent, a level that I and most of my colleagues consider consistent with price stability. With unemployment already substantial and likely to rise further, and industrial capacity utilization at record low levels, downward pressure on wages and prices isn’t likely to go away soon. I expect core inflation to remain below 2 percent for several more years.

Of course, the economy will eventually recover and we will need to withdraw monetary accommodation. If we were to fail to do so, we would indeed have higher inflation. The Fed is keenly aware of this. We have the tools to tighten policy when the time is right and we have the will to use them. First, many of our emergency programs are already tapering off as market conditions improve. Second, many of the assets that we have accumulated during the crisis—such as Treasury and mortgage-backed agency securities—have ready markets and can be easily sold. Finally, the Fed can push up the federal funds rate and tighten policy by raising the rate of interest paid to banks on the reserves they deposit with us—authority granted by Congress last year. An increase in the interest rate on reserves will induce banks to lend money to us rather than to other banks, thereby pushing up rates in the interbank market and, by extension, other interest rates throughout the economy. This is an important tool because, even if the economy rebounds nicely, the credit crunch might not be fully behind us and some financial markets might still need Fed support. This tool will enable us to tighten credit conditions even if we maintain a large balance sheet for a time. The experience of central banks in Europe, Japan, and Canada suggests that this approach can be effective.

Full Text of Janet Yellen's Speech to the Idaho Bankers here.

16 April 2009

Second Largest US Commercial Retail Real Estate Company Files for Bankruptcy


This is the tip of the iceberg, still the early stages of failures in the real economy which has been distorted beyond all reason by the outsized financial sector, a failed regulatory regime under the influence of Wall Street, and reckless financial engineering by the Fed.


AP
Mall operator General Growth Properties files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
Alex Veiga, AP Real Estate Writer
Thursday April 16, 2009, 3:14 pm EDT

LOS ANGELES (AP) -- The nation's second-largest shopping mall owner, General Growth Properties, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection Thursday in a tough bargaining move to restructure its $27 billion in debt.

General Growth, which owns more than 200 malls including four in Colorado, said shoppers at its malls will not be affected by its bankruptcy filing.

The Chicago-based company is paying the price for its aggressive expansion at the height of the real estate boom. General Growth, like many homeowners during the frenzy, bought several properties at top dollar and now is finding lenders unwilling to refinance.

The real estate crisis has been slow to affect the market for retail, hotels and office buildings. But the delinquency rate for commercial loans, while still relatively low, is creeping up and could deepen the economic recession.

"While we have worked tirelessly in the past several months to address our maturing debts, the collapse of the credit markets has made it impossible for us to refinance maturing debt outside of Chapter 11," Chief Executive Adam Metz said in a statement.

The news sent the real estate investment trust's stock down 16 cents, or 15 percent, to 89 cents in midmorning trading. The stock traded last spring as high as $44.23.

The move by the General Growth had been widely anticipated since the fall, when the company warned it might have to seek bankruptcy protection if it didn't get lenders to rework its debt terms. Efforts to negotiate with its creditors ultimately fell short late last month.

Chapter 11 protection typically allows a company to hold off creditors and operate as normal while it develops a financial reorganization plan.

The company had about $29.6 billion in assets at the end of the year, according to documents filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York.

The company noted that some subsidiaries, including its third party management business and joint ventures, were not part of the bankruptcy petition.

General Growth said it intends to reorganize with the aim of cutting its corporate debt and extending the terms of its mortgage maturities. The company has a financing commitment from Pershing Square Capital Management of about $375 million to use to operate during the bankruptcy process.

Last month, General Growth said it got lenders to waive default on a $2.58 billion credit agreement until the end of the year.

But its Rouse Co. subsidiary failed to convince enough holders of unsecured notes worth $2.25 billion as of Dec. 31 to accept a proposal that would let the unit avoid penalties for being behind on its debt payments and give it some time to refinance its debt load.

In February, the company reported lower-than-expected fourth-quarter funds from operations and a dip in revenue amid weaker retail rents.

The company has suspended its dividend, halted or slowed nearly all development projects and cut its work force by more than 20 percent. It also has sold some of its non-mall assets.

15 April 2009

This Is Your Economy on Credit Crack - and Heading for a Crack-Up


Here is a clear and simple explanation of why we may have already passed the point at which the Fed and Treasury will have no choice but to substantially devalue the bonds and reissue a 'new US dollar' as part of a managed default on our sovereign debt.


Ben's Un-shrinkable Balance Sheet
Delta Global Advisors
April 14, 2009

As he stated again clearly today, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve has deluded himself into thinking that when the time comes, he will be able to shrink the size of the Fed's balance sheet and reduce the monetary base with both ease and impunity. He also has deluded himself into thinking inflation will be easily contained.

It is very important that he does not fool you as well.

The Fed believes low interest rates should not be the result of a high savings rate, but instead can exist by decree, a conviction which has directly led consumers to believe their spending can outstrip disposable income.

The result of such thinking has been a rise in household debt from 47% of GDP in 1980 to 97% of total output in Q4 2008. As a result of this ever increasing burden, the Fed has been forced into a series of lower lows and lower highs on its benchmark lending rate. Keeping rates low is an attempt to make debt service levels manageable and keep the consumer afloat. Problem is, this endless pursuit of unnaturally low rates has so altered the Fed's balance sheet that Mr. Bernanke will be hard-pressed to substantially raise rates to combat inflation once consumer and wholesale prices begin to significantly increase.

Banana Ben Bernanke has grown the monetary base from just $842 billion in August 2008 to a record high of $1,723 billion as of April 2009. But it's not only the size of the balance sheet that is so daunting; it's the makeup that's becoming truly scary.

Historically speaking, the composition of the Fed's balance sheet has been mostly Treasuries. And the Federal Open Market Committee would typically raise rates by selling Treasuries from its balance sheet into the market to soak up excess liquidity. However, because of the Fed's decision to purchase up to $1 trillion in Mortgage Backed Securities (and other unorthodox holdings), it will not be selling highly-liquid US debt to drain reserves from banks. Rather, it will be unwinding highly distressed MBS and packaged loans to AIG. Not to mention the fact the Fed would have to break its promise of being a "hold-to-maturity investor" of such assets.

Moreover, not only are the new assets on the Fed's balance sheet less liquid but the durations of the loans are being extended. According to Bloomberg, the Fed is contemplating extending TALF loans to buy mortgaged backed securities to five years from three after pressure it received from lobbyists and a failed second monthly round of auctions. That means when it finally decides it's time to fight inflation, the Fed will find it much more difficult to reverse course.

But because of the extraordinary and unprecedented (some would say illegal) measures Mr. Bernanke has implemented, only $505 billion of the $2 trillion balance sheet is composed of U.S. Treasury debt. Today, most Fed assets are derived from the alphabet soup of lending programs including $250 billion in commercial paper, $312 billion of Central Bank liquidity swaps and $236 billion in mortgage-backed securities.

Thus, our economy has become more addicted than ever to low interest rates. But because bank assets will now be collecting income at record low rates, when and if the Fed tries to raise rates it will only be able to do so on the margin. If Bernanke raises rates substantially to fight inflation, banks will be paying out more on deposits than they collect on their income streams. Couple that with their already distressed balances sheets and look out!

Additionally, not only do the consumers need low rates to keep their Financial Obligation Ratio low, but the Federal government also needs low rates to ensure interest rates on the skyrocketing national debt can be serviced. Our projected $1.8 trillion annual deficit stems from the belief that the government must expand its balance sheet as the consumer begins to deleverage. In fact, both the consumer and government need to deleverage for total debt relief to occur, else we're just shuffling debts around and avoiding a healthy deleveraging entirely.

In order to have viable and sustainable growth total debt levels must decrease, savings must increase and interest rates must rise. But that would require an extended period of negative GDP growth-a completely untenable position for politicians of all stripes. Ben Bernanke would like you to believe inflation will be quiescent and he can vanquish it if it ever becomes a problem. Just make sure you don't invest as though you believe him.

06 November 2008

Credit Card Bond Sales Zero As the Credit Markets and Consumption Engines Stalls


Approaching our economic problems through crony capitalist bailouts of a few large banks (speculative investment banks by any other name) without reform is a policy error of the first order. Attempting to maintain the same unworkable status quo while doing nothing for the wage earners and the bulk of consumers is the curse of ideology and a financial sickness unto death.


Bloomberg
Credit Card Bond Sales at Zero, First Time Since 1993
By Sarah Mulholland

Nov. 5 -- Credit card companies were shut out of the market for bonds backed by customer payments in October for the first time in more than 15 years, as investors shunned the debt amid the global credit freeze.

A weakening job market and a looming recession are making it harder for consumers to make monthly payments, eroding confidence among investors about the safety of credit-card-backed bonds. It's the first month since April 1993 that there have been no sales, according to Wachovia Corp. data. Issuers sold $17.1 billion of the debt in October 2007, the data show.

``Nobody is eager to put money to work given the uncertainty in the market,'' said James Grady, a managing director at Deutsche Bank AG's asset management unit. ``When you think it can't get worse, it continues to get worse. There is not a demand'' for these bonds.

Top-rated credit card-backed securities maturing in three years traded at a gap, or spread, of 475 basis points over the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, during the week ended Oct. 30, JPMorgan Chase & Co. data show, 25 basis points higher than the previous week. The debt was trading at 50 basis points more than Libor in January.

The higher cost to sell the bonds makes it more expensive for banks and credit card companies to fund loans to customers. New York-based American Express Co. paid 160 basis points more than Libor at a Sept. 11 sale of the securities compared with 30 basis points over the benchmark at a similar sale in October 2007, Bloomberg data show.