Definition of a recession
The textbook definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative growth in real GDP. This definition has been problematic in this decade however, because of the tinkering that our government has done with the measures of inflation. As you know, real GDP is GDP deflated by the inflation rate. The official deflator used for GDP is called the GDP chain deflator.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recognized this and determined that there was a recession in the US in 2001 from March through November, even though the quarter to quarter real GDP annualized growth rates for the four quarters of 2001 were -0.5%, 1.2%, -1.4% and 1.6%. As you can see, we did not have two consecutive quarters of real GDP declines. How does the NBER explain this?
"Most of the recessions identified by our procedures do consist of two or more quarters of declining real GDP, but not all of them. According to current data for 2001 [as of October 2003], the present recession falls into the general pattern, with three consecutive quarters of decline. Our procedure differs from the two-quarter rule in a number of ways. First, we consider the depth as well as the duration of the decline in economic activity. Recall that our definition includes the phrase, 'a significant decline in economic activity.' Second, we use a broader array of indicators than just real GDP [including personal income, employment, industrial production and manufacturing/trade sales]. One reason for this is that the GDP data are subject to considerable revision. Third, we use monthly indicators to arrive at a monthly chronology."
The point of this diversion is to define what a recession is, although it cannot be so neatly compartmentalized to such a simple formula, especially in these times of government revision of economic data.
A quick look at the chart at John Williams' excellent site, Shadow Government Statistics will give you the idea of how the notion of Consumer Price Inflation has been distorted by the Clinton and Bush administrations. Inflation has a direct effect on real GDP, and therefore on the formal definition of recessions. Of course, it has a real impact on lots of other things including consumer and voter sentiment, and Social Security and other cost of living increases, which is a strong incentive for the government to down play inflation.
Advance Indicators of Recession
We tend to favor the US Treasury yield curve as a significantly reliable indicator of approaching recessions. Here is a description of the classic definition from Paul Kasriel of Northern Trust:
"...each of the past six recessions (shaded areas) was preceded by an inversion in the spread between the Treasury 10-year yield and the fed funds rate. But there were two other instances of inversion - 1966:Q2
through 1967:1 and 1998:Q3 through 1998:Q4 - immediately after which no recession occurred. It would appear, then, that an inverted yield curve is more of a necessary condition for a recession to occur, but not a sufficient condition. That is, if the spread goes from +25 basis points and to -25 basis points, a recession is not automatically triggered. Rather, whether an inversion results in a recession would seem to depend on the magnitude of the inversion and, to a lesser extent, the duration of it. Recession-signaling aside, the yield curve remains a reliable leading indicatorof economic activity. Although the spread going from +25 basis points to -25 basis points might not result in a recession, it does indicate that monetary policy has become more restrictive." That's the current theory, but has it? Has the growth of US money supply been restrictive?
Has Monetary Policy Been Restrictive?
The most alarming thing to us is that despite the inverted yield curve and the Fed funds tightening we just witnessed over the last few years, from historic lows to the 5+% level, monetary policy has not only NOT been restrictive, it has been what many would define as loose. When one looks at
real interest rates we had been in a prolonged period of negative interest rates, and only recently had been back in the positive area. It appears that we might be slipping back down into the negative again as the Fed tries to forestall the impending recession and the collapse of the stock - housing bubbles.
It appears to us that even while the Fed feigned monetary conservatism with the right hand, with the left hand they were doing all that was in their power to encourage the reckless growth of credit and the lowering of regulatory oversight and market discipline. To use an analogy, they were preaching energy conservation while running every light on in the house, the backyard, the neighbors house, and slipping pennies into the fuse box to keep it all going. Well, here we are.
What we are seeing is true moral hazard, the unintended consequence of the financial engineering being practiced by the wizard's apprentices at the Fed helping to nuture market distortions, asset bubbles, and imbalances that have become too big to correct naturally without systemic risk. Even though one can mask one's action
s with words, and use information selectively and slyly to dampen the alarms and misdirect the public awareness, the chickens will come home to roost, and in this case they are more like the nemesis of retribution for our many economic trespasses. Let us hope that it is not as bad this time as the last time the Fed tried short circuit market discipline and engineer the economy centrally. We believe that the next twenty years or so will provide a rich opportunity for study, and probably the rise another new theory, a new school of economics, that tries to account for exactly what happened and why.
We are old enough to remember that stagflation, now seemingly so familiar, was once considered an improbability, a black swan. In the 1970's stagflation was triggered by an exogenous supply shock in the disruption in the market pricing of crude oil, impacting a slowing economy in monetary inflation from the post-Nixon era and the abandonment of the vestiges of the gold standard. The tonic that time was the tough monetary love of Paul Volcker.
What will they call it when a slowing economy with monetary inflatin is hit with a currency shock, as the dollar is displaced as the reserve currency of the world? We're not sure what they will call what we are about to experience, except on the bigger scale of thing, it will be just another episode in the hubris of arrogant men who consider themselves to be above principle, above the rules.