25 August 2009

Next Head of the European Central Bank a Goldman Sachs Alumnus or Buba's Head Boy?


The German patience with the EU is admirable.

And in the States, the patience with the rule of Wall Street and the hagiographic praise of Chairman Ben is ... remarkable.

One might even be tempted to call him 'maestro,' at least until the next bubble collapses.

Central Banking Publications
Weber Aims High
25 August 2009

So far, the front runner to succeed Jean-Claude Trichet as head of the European Central Bank, when his term ends in 2011, has been Mario Draghi, the shrewd current governor of the Banca d'Italia and Goldman Sachs alumnus (don't all boo at once).

But insiders are keeping a close eye on Axel Weber, president of the Bundesbank. If Draghi were to fall under a bus on the Via Nazionale (easily done, by the way), or if he were to give in to the blandishments of those who are urging him to dive into the treacherous waters of Italian politics, then Weber is positioning himself as the clear fall-back choice.

This would not go down well at the Elysée, where the thought of a German running the ECB makes President Sarkozy see red. Yet why not? Isn't it their turn, at last?

The efforts of French diplomats, allied to their enviable higher education and elite training, have ensured that Frenchmen have sat at the top of many of the great official international institutions for far longer than Germans (or indeed Brits). A Frenchman has occupied the post of IMF managing director for a total of 34 years since the founding of the Fund 65 years ago, while a German has been in the job for only four years. A Frenchman has been president of the European Commission for 14 years, while no German has held the post since Walter Hallstein, who retired in 1967. No German has headed up the EBRD in London, while Frenchmen have run it for 15 years. No German has led the OECD, and so on.

It would be understandable if Germans felt it was time to have their own man at the ECB. After all, it is German public opinion that in the end is critical for the long-term success of the euro. If German taxpayers are called on to bailout backsliding countries unable to discipline their economies (like Italy), they would be much more likely to do so with good grace if their own man or woman was seen to be minding the shop. So anybody committed to the success of the euro should be rooting for a German candidate, n'est-ce pas?

Enter politics. To reach the top job at the ECB, Weber needs to be nominated by the chancellor. Angela Merkel is fully expected to win the general election next month, possibly with a greatly increased personal mandate.

Now, observe a curious fact. For an institution known in the past for lambasting governments' deficit spending, the Bundesbank has been remarkably quiescent recently. Its big guns have fallen silent. Indeed, Weber has praised German economic policy. In a recent interview with Die Zeit online, Weber noted that the GDP recovery in the second quarter owed much to the support measures deployed by the government, the support of the state banking sector and the ECB's monetary easing. Meanwhile, Merkel has roundly criticised other central banks, such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, while supporting the Bundesbank. They are both singing from the same hymn sheet.

Meanwhile, Weber has been quietly appointing his own people to several key positions while some Bundesbank board directors of an independent cast of mind appear to be heading for the exit.

The odds are still on Draghi. He is what the Italians call "furbo" – variously translated as smart, cunning or foxy. The French will be cheering him on. But the Italian fox will be on the outlook for a German greyhound coming up on the inside lane.

Saving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation


If they declare those payments to be on profit after bonuses they may find a groundswell of support on Wall Street. There is nothing like sticking it to the regional banks to consolidate the power of the few.

Look for another program from the Fed/Treasury to 'save FDIC' as part of the overall effort to maintain confidence and prevent a certain armageddon.

American Banking News
FDIC’s Deposit Fund May Need 25% of U.S. Banking Profit in 2010
August 23rd, 2009

With the 80th bank failure occurring in just the first eight months of 2009, the U.S. banking industry’s fee burden from the FDIC is continuing to be pressured as the Deposit Insurance Fund shrinks. Richard Bove, an analyst with Rochdale Securities, told Reuters in a report that the FDIC’s Insurance Fund may need to collect an amount that would equate to about 25 percent of U.S. bank industry pretax income in 2010 to stay afloat.

In the report Bove predicted another 150 to 200 additional U.S. banks failures before the current banking crisis ends. The FDIC will likely use special assessments against banks in order to raise the extra funds needed to secure the Deposit Insurance Fund’s integrity. Bove believes special assessments in 2010 could reach $11 billion in addition to the regular fees banks already pay.

The FDIC last levied a special assessment in the second quarter of five basis points on each FDIC-insured bank’s assets. The assessment is scheduled for collection on September 30.

When the FDIC released its final statement detailed the second quarter assessment it projected that the Deposit Insurance Fund would remain low, but positive through 2009 and begin to rise in 2010. However, FDIC Chairman Blair Sheila Blair said in that same statement an additional assessment may be required as early as the fourth quarter of 2009.

The Deposit Insurance Fund ended the first quarter of the year with a balance of roughly $13 billion. Since that time the FDIC has had to digest several large bank failures, such as Colonial BancGroup, which cost the fund about $4 billion.

The Deposit Insurance Fund holds a fraction of the $52 billion it had just a year ago, raising the odds of an upcoming special assessment to near certainty.

As seen recently on americanbankingnews.com, the FDIC is exploring its options for brining in investors to buy-up failed banks, thus easing the burden on the insurance fund. Investment from private equity firms has been the showcased proposal so far. The FDIC is set to vote August 26 on a relaxed set of guidelines that would entice private equity firms to invest in failed banks.


24 August 2009

Henry Kaufman: The Road to Financial Reformation


Henry Kaufman is giving a very interesting interview with Kathleen Hays regarding his new book, "The Road to Financial Reformation."

Henry Kaufman Interview Regarding Financial Reform - Bloomberg Television 24 August

Or here on Youtube Henry Kaufman Interview Aug 24

Henry will also be presenting his ideas at a public lecture at the Museum of American Finance in NYC on September 22.

Sept. 22 Kaufman Lecture

Our financial crisis: What happened? How did we get here? What needs to be done?

Dr. Henry Kaufman — an esteemed economist and statesman — is one of the most preeminent financial figures of the day, with a history of success from the 1980s, when his firm, Salomon Brothers, ruled the bond markets.

In The Road to Financial Reformation, Dr. Kaufman, who has spent a lifetime entrenched in the world of finance, provides an insightful account of the history and impact of post-World War II financial markets on the economy-what happened, how we got to where we are today, and what needs to be done. Drawing on his vast breadth of knowledge and experience, Kaufman reveals the mistakes that got us into this debacle, the consequences — as they have not been fully realized — and how to put our derailed economy back on track. This book details Dr. Kaufman’s warnings and concerns expressed repeatedly throughout the last quarter century, and shows that what he predicted came to pass.

With his breadth of knowledge and experience, Kaufman details that this crisis was foreseeable (he saw it coming), and how we created this history-making financial crisis. He also explains the consequences still to come, and presents solutions on how we can recover and reform the markets.

Why Is the Fed Creating Excess Reserves in the Banking System and Paying Interest on Them?


There have been some interesting side discussions at various venues including Naked Capitalism about the recent essay which I had posted titled When At First You Don't Succeed, Bring in the Reserves.

Let me clarify some points.

Yes, banking reserves in the US are a function of the Fed's Balance Sheet, by definition, because they are in the narrowest sense merely an accounting function, an entry on the books of the Fed reflecting actions undertaken by the Fed.

With purpose, I put the formal definitions of Reserve Bank Credit and Reserve Balances at the bottom of each chart. I had hoped this would make that point clear.

The essence of the essay was to point out the enormous increase in bank reserves which the Fed has created through their "New Deal for Wall Street" style banking programs. Because of this, the Fed has created a new function by which it pays interest on banking reserves, which to my knowledge it has never done before.

It is a new function at the Fed, and it does serve a important purpose. The purpose is to place a 'floor' under interest rates, in the face of a surfeit of liquidity which the Fed has created, and which shows up in the Adjusted Monetary Base, the Reserve Bank Credit figures, and so forth.

Now, some people have taken issue with my bringing the notion of excess Reserves to your attention for a variety of reasons. Even the mighty NY Fed has written a paper which attempts to defuse the notion that the excess reserves are indicative of anything that might be impeding lending.

Let me be clear about this.

The excess reserves are absolutely indicative of the Fed's having added substantial amounts of liquidity to the financial system. If the Fed were not paying interest on reserves, this liquidity would crush their target interest rates, since the banks are loath to hold reserves that are not generating some return. This is what they do, generate a return on capital. Capital has a price, even if it is an opportunity cost.

By establishing a floor, the Fed is setting a more blatant artificial level for interest rates, moreso than merely tinkering with drains and adds to the system. They are offering a riskless rate of return, and crowding out other competing requests for capital. Not necessarily a bad thing, but a reality of what they are doing.

What would happen if the Fed raised the interest rate it pays on reserves to let's say, twenty percent?

Economic activity in the US would grind to a halt, as banks placed every available dollar idly with the Fed's program, eschewing all other deals, liquidating assets if necessary, to place capital where it would receive the highest risk adjusted return. In essence, the Fed would 'crowd out' all other transactions that offered a lower risk adjusted return.

What if the Fed subsequently lowered the interest rate from twenty percent to zero? It would then enable more lending from the banks, as they sought to deploy their capital at higher risk adjusted rates.

There are some by the way that claim the excess reserves are so high because there is no demand for loans. This is a point of view only supported by those who a) have no understanding of finance and b) are seeking to support an extremely odd and mistaken view of the economy which seeks to justify their bets on a serious deflation.

There is always a demand for loans as long as there is economic activity; what varies is the price! Money is not particularly inelastic; that is, there is a rather high threshold at which people say, "I have too much!" It is rather a question of price, relative to return. Make the opportunity cost high enough and they will come (or be fired).

I hereby assert that I will borrow ALL funds the Fed might loan to me with no collateral at zero interest, and gladly so, as long as the short term US Treasury bills are paying more than 25 basis points interest. I reserve the right to defer on this offer if the Fed should make the policy error of hyperinflation a reality.

I hate to make points like this in the extreme with distorted examples, but sometimes it is what it requires to pierce through obfuscation to common sense.

So to summarize, what is the Fed likely to do if economic activity falters?

They are likely to lower interest rates paid on excess reserves closer to zero. They could even charge a 'haircut' on excess reserves which would highly motivate the banks.

These are all things which have been discussed before, often in the context of consumers! In fact, it is well known among bankers that as the Fed lowers interest rates money flows out of lower paying instruments like bank deposits and money markets, and into higher paying instruments that might be deemed too risky at high rates of riskless return. Such higher paying instruments are known as "stocks" and "corporate bonds." As former central banker Wayne Angell gleefully chortled in 2004, the Fed can indeed drive the public out of their savings and money market funds and into the equity markets by manipulating interest rates.

Does the Fed always 'create' excess reserves? It may be more correct to ask, does the Fed always create money, since excess reserves are an accounting function.

No. Banking reserves normally lag the creation of money, which is accomplished by lending, either from banks or more recently by neo-banks like Fannie, Freddie, GMAC, GE and so forth.

But at a time when economic activity is contracting, and the credit markets were seizing, the Fed took the lead in money creation by "monetizing" various types of debt. And they are going to enormous pains to maintain 'confidence' in the system and in particular the US dollar and debt. But we may ask, at what point does the confidence game become a con game? I would submit that it is when the Fed and Treasury purposely intervene in markets, beyond their normal interest rate targeting, and statistics and spread disinformation to manage perception.

There are other ways in which the Fed might address the failure of the productive economy to 'pick up the ball and run with it.' But most, if not all, of them involve the monetization of something, which is what happens when the Fed (and US Treasury) are taking the lead in money creation and not the productive economy.

Deflationists do not want to hear this, and central bankers do not wish you to know this, but it is the major factor in a fiat currency that it can be created literally 'out of nothing.'

This is why we have said long ago, and repeated since, that the limiting factor on the Fed's ability to create money is the value of the US Dollar and the sovereign debt.

As long as there is debt which can be monetized, then the Fed can monetize it and create money 'out of nothing.' For now they are acting with some reestraint, and channeling that money primarily to their cronies in the banking system, still able to mask the effects of their monetary inflation. CFTC Moves to Rein In Small Investors From Commodity ETFs

But the time is coming when they will not. And as they did when they demanded $700 billion in bailout money, the financiers will once again make the Administration and the Congress an offer which they think that 'we' cannot refuse, if only because the Congress will not listen if we tell them what we wish them to do, again.

The banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, and the economy brought back into productive balance, before their can be a sustained recovery.