The Great Depression of 2008-12: And So It Begins?

Its important to have more than a 'comic book' understanding of what happens during a real Great Depression if in fact we are having one.

The dollar will be devalued. Significantly. Stocks will crash (and may be crashing slowly now in the manner of 1930-33), gold will soar, and US government bonds will crash about two years into the future.

USA 2008: The Great Depression - The Independent UK

There is a difference between a bear market rally and a trend change. There is a difference between trading brains and a bull market. Let's allow the market to show us what we've got to work with.

The Paulson Plan: a Foray into a Financial Iraq

We were asked if we favor the Paulson plan. After all, several noted academic economists have come out and spoken in favor of it. Wall Street complains that it will increase regulation and lessen their profits. Well, Wall Street complains all the time, but especially loudly when it has been caught with its hand in the cookie jar, and some economists will say just about anything for some of the cookie crumbs. The Banks protested the adoption of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 in much the same manner, with false protestations while they privately were promoting it by incenting endorsements from economists and politicians.

Treasury Secretary Paulson softened his delivery this morning by couching the plan in terms of just 'a template' and a 'basis for discussion.'

Its important to realize that this study had its genesis in a Bush Administration effort to lighten regulation on Wall Street that has been underway for some time. The Bush cabinet is taking the opportunity of the Bear Stearns collapse to quickly bring this forward under the title "Financial Stability Act" in much the same way they were able to quickly bring out the "Patriot Act" after the 911 tragedy.

The next Presidential Administration will have to live with the problems created by eight years of Bush mismanagement. It would be better to leave sweeping changes to them, rather than follow yet another blank check proposal from a group in Washington that have proven over and over that they cannot, or will not, do what is required to act in the public interest.

When you have a massive failure in a critical system, you do not go to those on whose watch it occurred, with their proactive involvement, with strong elements of deception and fraud involved, with innocent people being victimized, and ask them what should be done to fix the system so it doesn't happen again.

We just have to ask how many times can someone lie to you, and cheat you, and take some of the goodness of life from you and your children, before you wise up and show them the door?

Not even a template. Not even a basis for discussion. No bonanza for the lobbying interests such as they had when the Banks went after the repeal of Glass-Steagall. And especially not something to distort and delay the real action that is required.

Are we in favor of this plan? No. Hell no.


It would be Congress and the president essentially giving a blank check to a regulator over which they have very little power,'' said Michael Greenberger, a professor at the University of Maryland in Baltimore and a former CFTC official. Paulson's proposal will ``allow Wall Street to do whatever they want until a crisis occurs, at which point the Fed would intervene.'' Bloomberg News

The Fed oversaw this meltdown,” said Michael Greenberger, a law professor at the University of Maryland who was a senior official of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission during the Clinton administration. “This is the equivalent of the builders of the Maginot line giving lessons on defense.”

"During the late 1990s, Wall Street fought bitterly against any attempt to regulate the emerging derivatives market, recalls Michael Greenberger, a former senior regulator at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission...“After that, all was forgotten,” says Mr. Greenberger, now a professor at the University of Maryland. "At the same time, derivatives were being praised as a boon that would make the economy more stable."

Speaking in Boca Raton, Fla., in March 1999, Alan Greenspan, then the Fed chairman, told the Futures Industry Association, a Wall Street trade group, that “these instruments enhance the ability to differentiate risk and allocate it to those investors most able and willing to take it.” Although Mr. Greenspan acknowledged that the “possibility of increased systemic risk does appear to be an issue that requires fuller understanding,” he argued that new regulations “would be a major mistake.”

“Regulatory risk measurement schemes,” he [Greenspan] added, “are simpler and much less accurate than banks’ risk measurement models."``

Mr. Greenberger, still concerned about regulatory battles he lost a decade ago, says that Mr. Greenspan “felt derivatives would spread the risk in the economy.”

“In reality,” Mr. Greenberger added, “it spread a virus through the economy because these products are so opaque and hard to value.” A representative for Mr. Greenspan said he was preparing to travel and could not comment."

The Political and Economic Continuum: Where Are We Today, Where Are We Going?

This essay from the International Herald Tribune is a sound analysis of where we are now and where we have been. It reinforces our notion that the old ways of approaching problems have failed. A new school of economics will rise out of the ashes of the economic failure to come as Keynesianism rose out of the Great Depression, as monetarism rose out of stagflation.

With regard to free market capitalism, we still think it is the best approach to a well-functioning society, but would like to see a return to it at least here in the United States. Sociopathic elements always try to corrupt the game, replacing the meritocracy with oligopoly and competition with monopolistic croney capitalism. Freedom is not a goal; it is a way of life.

The solution seems obvious: a society of laws that respects the rights of the individual to both excel or just get by in a meritocracy, with an equitable distribution of goods with a reasonable variation based on effort and ability, enforced with equal justice. The trick seems to be not imagining a solution, but rather in implementing it, achieving it, and keeping it.

The dynamic tension is not between the traditional right and traditional left in politics. That is largely a matter of preference between the amounts of tradition and progress, and the rate of societal change. The genuine conflict is between the power of the state and of the individual, between the will to power of an elite and the broad rights of the individual to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The extremes of both Left and Right meet in the same place: Stalin and Hitler, the all-consuming state and the complete diminishment of the rights of the Individual.

"The issue today is the same as it has been throughout all history, whether man shall be allowed to govern himself or be ruled by a small elite." - Thomas Jefferson

"Sell not virtue to purchase wealth, nor Liberty to purchase power." Benjamin Franklin

"The only sure bulwark of continuing liberty is a government strong enough to protect the interests of the people, and a people strong enough and well enough informed to maintain its sovereign control over the government." - Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Benjamin Franklin was approached by a group of citizens asking what sort of government the delegates had created. His answer was: "A republic, if you can keep it."

The failure of neo-liberalism
By Phillip Blond
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
LANCASTER, England

More and more, it appears that in the 21st century we are returning to the economics of the 19th, where wealth was overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of a few owners and astute speculators.

Neither the Right nor the Left seem capable of creating a society in which all benefit from increased prosperity and economic security.

Right-wing claims that free markets will enrich all sections of society are palpably false, while the traditional European welfare state appears to penalize innovation and wealth-creation, thereby locking the poor and unskilled into institutionalized poverty and unemployment.

Thus in the new age of globalization, both ideologies create the same phenomenon: an underclass caught between welfare and low wages, a heavily indebted middle class increasingly subject to job and pension insecurity and a new class of the super rich who escape all rules of taxation and community.

It was in Britain that neo-liberalism first emerged in its decisive form. Confronted with union militancy and the apparent bankruptcy of the welfare state, the Conservative party under Margaret Thatcher was elected in 1979. In America, Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, and the Anglo-Saxon countries have pursued and advocated free market liberalization ever since.

Today, its reach extends as far as communist China, which, while eschewing political freedom, fervently preaches economic liberalization. This year even the French acknowledged free market supremacy, electing a president who has persistently denounced the costs of Gallic welfarism and praised the economic advantages of the Anglo-Saxon model.

But the benefits of free market liberalization depend on who you are, where you are and how much money or assets you had to begin with.

In terms of economic development, free market fundamentalism has been a disaster. The free market solutions applied to Russia during the Yeltsin years succeeded only in mass impoverishment, the creation of a hugely wealthy oligarchical class and the rise of an authoritarian government.

Similarly, the growth rates of Latin America and Africa, which had been higher than other developing nations, dropped by over 60 percent after they embraced IMF-sponsored neo-liberalism in the 1980's, and have now ground to a halt.

On an individual level, a similar story pertains. Real wage increases in the top 13 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have been below the rate of inflation since about 1970.

Thus wage earners - rather than asset owners - have faced a persistent 30-year downward pressure on their standard of living. It comes as no surprise to learn that the golden age for the wage worker, expressed as a percentage share of GDP, was between 1945 and 1973, and not under economic liberalization.

Nobody questions that trade increases prosperity, and that the liberalization of credit and financial services allow hitherto excluded groups to supplement their wages by buying shares or houses and thus participating in the asset economy.

But the real story of neo-liberal success is not the extension of assets to all, but the huge and disproportionate share of wealth attained by the very rich. In the United States, between 1979 and 2004 the wealthiest 1 percent saw an increase in their share of national income of 78 percent, whereas 80 percent of the population saw an overall decrease in their income share by 15 percent. That's a wealth transfer from the large majority to a tiny minority of some $664 billion.

The traditional Left panicked in the face of neo-liberal hegemony and spoke in the 1980's of redistribution, higher taxes and restrictions on capital transfers. But, outside of Scandinavia, they were whistling in the wind: Traditional state-regulated economies appeared locked into high unemployment and low growth.

A new path for the Left was offered by the country that first experienced the new Right: the UK. By the late 1990's, Britain was exhausted by Thatcherism; its public services were failing and the country was socially and economically fragmented. Thus in 1997 New Labor was elected.

Under the guidance of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, the new progressives promised that the benefits of rising prosperity would be applied to the public sector and the poor. Social exclusion would be tackled by opening up education and extending opportunity to all. The rest of the world was once more transfixed by the social experiment taking place in Britain. Could this seemingly exclusive neo-liberal circle be squared for the benefit of all?

Sadly, after 10 years the conclusion has to be no.

Poverty in Britain doubled under Thatcher, and this figure has become permanent under New Labor. The share of the wealth, excluding housing, enjoyed by the bottom half of the population has fallen from 12 percent in 1976 to just 1 percent now. Thirteen million people now live in relative poverty. Social mobility has declined to pre-war levels.

The least able children from the richest 20 percent of the population now overtake the most able children from the bottom 20 percent by the age of seven. Nearly half of the richest group go on to get university degrees while only 10 percent of the poorest manage to graduate. Clearly, the New Left has entrenched class division even more firmly than the neo-liberal Right.

This in a nutshell is the problem: Both Left and Right seem incapable of challenging monopoly capitalism. Neither welfarism nor statism can transform the lives of the poor, and neither, it seems, can neo-liberalism. Only a shared economy can correct the natural tendency of the free market to favor monopolies.

But we can only share if all own. Thus there is a radical and as yet unexplored possibility - that of a general and widely distributed ownership and use of assets, credit and capital. This would dissolve the conflict between capital and labor since it would be a market without monopoly and a state where waged labor - since it was the owner of capital - did not need state welfare.

Phillip Blond is a senior lecturer in philosophy and theology at the University of Cumbria.

The Failure of Neo-Liberalsim

„Niemand ist hoffnungsloser versklavt, als die, die fälschlicherweise glauben, sie seien frei.“
(None are so hopelessly enslaved as those who falsely believe they are free.)

J. W. von Goethe

Gold Forecast 2007-2008: Back to the Abyss

This had been posted on our former site at The Crossroads Cafe.

A new forecast and theme will be done sometime around May for 2008-2009.

On the Road from Samaria

When they manipulated the stock market,
I remained silent;
I was making money and felt superior to the crowd.

When they silenced their critics,
I remained silent;
I was self-righteous and felt they got what they deserved.

When they came for the blue collar workers,
I did not speak out;
I enjoyed my superior social status and the cheap consumer goods.

When they came for my neighbor's possessions
I remained silent;
I was afraid and jealous and glad to see him brought down.

When they grew richer and more powerful
I accepted their lies in silence;
I wanted to gain their favor and be one of them.

When they came for me,
and sent me to a camp as a useless eater
I reaped what I had sown.

On the Road from Samaria, Jesse

Silent Spring: the Calm Before the Storm

"...And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?"

The Second Coming, William Butler Yeats

"In a nod to the debacle in mortgage lending, the administration proposed a Mortgage Origination Commission to evaluate the effectiveness of state governments in regulating mortgage brokers and protecting consumers.

Yet another proposal would, for the first time, create a national regulator for insurance companies, an industry that state governments now oversee.

Administration officials argue that a national system would eliminate the inefficiencies of having 50 different state regulators, who have jealously guarded their powers and are likely to fight any federal encroachment."

Bush Administration Plan Would Concentrate Regulatory Power with the Fed

Predatory Lenders' Partner in Crime
How the Bush Administration Stopped the States From Stepping In to Help Consumers
By Eliot Spitzer
Thursday, February 14, 2008;
The Washington Post
Page A25

Several years ago, state attorneys general and others involved in consumer protection began to notice a marked increase in a range of predatory lending practices by mortgage lenders. Some were misrepresenting the terms of loans, making loans without regard to consumers' ability to repay, making loans with deceptive "teaser" rates that later ballooned astronomically, packing loans with undisclosed charges and fees, or even paying illegal kickbacks. These and other practices, we noticed, were having a devastating effect on home buyers. In addition, the widespread nature of these practices, if left unchecked, threatened our financial markets.

Even though predatory lending was becoming a national problem, the Bush administration looked the other way and did nothing to protect American homeowners. In fact, the government chose instead to align itself with the banks that were victimizing consumers.

Predatory lending was widely understood to present a looming national crisis. This threat was so clear that as New York attorney general, I joined with colleagues in the other 49 states in attempting to fill the void left by the federal government. Individually, and together, state attorneys general of both parties brought litigation or entered into settlements with many subprime lenders that were engaged in predatory lending practices. Several state legislatures, including New York's, enacted laws aimed at curbing such practices.

What did the Bush administration do in response? Did it reverse course and decide to take action to halt this burgeoning scourge? As Americans are now painfully aware, with hundreds of thousands of homeowners facing foreclosure and our markets reeling, the answer is a resounding no.

Not only did the Bush administration do nothing to protect consumers, it embarked on an aggressive and unprecedented campaign to prevent states from protecting their residents from the very problems to which the federal government was turning a blind eye.

Let me explain: The administration accomplished this feat through an obscure federal agency called the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The OCC has been in existence since the Civil War. Its mission is to ensure the fiscal soundness of national banks. For 140 years, the OCC examined the books of national banks to make sure they were balanced, an important but uncontroversial function. But a few years ago, for the first time in its history, the OCC was used as a tool against consumers.

In 2003, during the height of the predatory lending crisis, the OCC invoked a clause from the 1863 National Bank Act to issue formal opinions preempting all state predatory lending laws, thereby rendering them inoperative. The OCC also promulgated new rules that prevented states from enforcing any of their own consumer protection laws against national banks. The federal government's actions were so egregious and so unprecedented that all 50 state attorneys general, and all 50 state banking superintendents, actively fought the new rules.

But the unanimous opposition of the 50 states did not deter, or even slow, the Bush administration in its goal of protecting the banks. In fact, when my office opened an investigation of possible discrimination in mortgage lending by a number of banks, the OCC filed a federal lawsuit to stop the investigation.

Throughout our battles with the OCC and the banks, the mantra of the banks and their defenders was that efforts to curb predatory lending would deny access to credit to the very consumers the states were trying to protect. But the curbs we sought on predatory and unfair lending would have in no way jeopardized access to the legitimate credit market for appropriately priced loans. Instead, they would have stopped the scourge of predatory lending practices that have resulted in countless thousands of consumers losing their homes and put our economy in a precarious position.

When history tells the story of the subprime lending crisis and recounts its devastating effects on the lives of so many innocent homeowners, the Bush administration will not be judged favorably. The tale is still unfolding, but when the dust settles, it will be judged as a willing accomplice to the lenders who went to any lengths in their quest for profits. So willing, in fact, that it used the power of the federal government in an unprecedented assault on state legislatures, as well as on state attorneys general and anyone else on the side of consumers.

The writer is governor of New York.

(When Spitzer wrote this in February of 2008 he was, unbeknownst to him, the target of a intense Federal investigation to find something in his life that would be damaging to his career and his credibility. It succeeded, and he was silenced, and those who watched took a lesson from it. - Jesse)

When they manipulated the stock market,
I remained silent;
I was making money and felt superior to the crowd....

On the Road from Samaria, Jesse

Debt Becomes Death, the Destroyer of Worlds

The chain reaction was initiated by a simple spark igniting high-explosive charges designed to compress the uranium or plutonium core upon detonation. The compressed core goes critical, initiating a chain reaction that persists until the fuel is consumed...

We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed... A few people cried... Most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture the Bhagavad Gita; Vishnu is trying to persuade the prince that he should do his duty, and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form, and says, "Now I am become death, the destroyer of worlds." I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.

Without the radioactive core and nuclear fuel, many would-be weapons of mass destruction are merely large conventional explosions: powerful, but not widely devastating.

The analogy is that the subprime mortgage failure is the spark, a recessionary downturn and credit crunch is the conventional explosion, and the credit derivatives, particularly the credit default swaps, are the nuclear core that amplifies the original misjudgement to massively devastating proportions.

It is hard to believe that something this complex and obviously dangerous was built up over such a long period of time without a few economists noticing it. It is an obvious Ponzi scheme at its simplest. At its most complex, the pointless size and interconnectedness of the Credit Default swaps is almost diabolical. Companies with no substantial ties to the debt of third parties placing enormous wagers on their default that are up to an order of magnitude greater than the total debt involved. Pure, unadulterated, and highly lethal speculation.

Ironically the protective shielding in this case will not be lead and concrete and earth, but gold and silver and other commodities that will endure the coming inferno of paper.

Future generations will ask: what were they thinking?

Indeed.

Bankruptcies in America
Waiting for Armageddon
Mar 27th 2008
The Economist

The recent rise in corporate bankruptcies in America may well be a sign of much worse to come

...If the debt markets are to be believed, companies could be in at least as much trouble as they were in the previous two downturns, in the early 1990s and at the start of this decade, after the dotcom bubble burst. A leading indicator is the spread between yields on speculative “junk” bonds and American Treasury bonds. A year ago, the spread was only about 280 basis points; the long-term average is around 500 points. This month the spread exceeded 800 points for the first time since March 2003, reaching 862 on March 17th.

The bankruptcy rate (in the previous 12 months) for high-yielding bonds has so far edged only modestly higher, to 1.28% from a record low of 0.87% in November. But most forecasters expect it to rise sharply over the coming months. For instance, Moody's, a ratings agency, predicts that the default rate will rise to 5.4% by the end of this year, mostly due to problems in America. (Moody's also expects a rise in European bankruptcies this year, but only to 3.4%, thanks to lower levels of borrowing and less exposure to economic weakness.)

That is a relatively optimistic prediction, for it would merely return the bankruptcy rate close to its long-term average after an abnormally trouble-free period, and it assumes only a mild recession in America. But if there is a severe recession, the default rate “could go to double figures,” admits Kenneth Emery, head of corporate-default research at Moody's.

Other forecasters are much gloomier. FridsonVision, a research firm, publishes a default-rate predictor based on the percentage of bonds trading with a spread of at least 1,000 basis points. On March 19th this was forecasting a default rate on high-yielding American corporate bonds of 8.55% by the end of February 2009, compared with Moody's forecast for American bonds of 6.8% for that date....

A look at the firms with distressed debt shows that problems are rapidly moving beyond the long-term sick (airlines, cars) and the industries immediately affected by the crisis (home builders, mortgage lenders, monoline insurers). Craig Deane of AEG Partners, a restructuring-advisory firm, says he is now seeing troubled companies in retailing, restaurants, manufacturing and food processing...

But perhaps the biggest difference this time will be the effects of the huge market for credit derivatives and other credit-related securities, which often dwarf the amount of debt that a firm has issued, says Henry Owsley of Gordion, another restructuring adviser. The interaction between underlying debt and credit derivatives will complicate bankruptcy and near-bankruptcy no end, he says.

A big concern for company bosses will be the role of speculative investors, especially hedge funds. They can use derivatives to pursue complex strategies that may not be in the best interests of the firm that has issued the underlying debt, says Henry Hu, a law professor at the University of Texas, Austin. In a bankruptcy, a hedge fund could use the voting rights attached to different securities to maximise the overall value of its holdings in the firm at the expense of other investors.

Imagine, for instance, a hedge fund that owns debt secured against a company asset. It may prefer to force the firm into liquidation in order to win that asset rather than engage in a restructuring negotiation that will keep the firm alive. Meanwhile, it can boost its returns by short selling its unsecured debt and its equity. Or suppose that a hedge fund owns credit-default swaps as well as a firm's debt. If the fund makes enough money from the pay-out of the credit-default swaps, it may prefer to use the voting rights on its debt to ensure that the firm goes bust rather than negotiate a way to avoid bankruptcy...

Bankruptcies in America - The Economist

Bush Administration Proposal Would Concentrate Regulatory Power with the Fed

"As nightfall does not come at once, neither does oppression.
In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains
seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all
must be most aware of change in the air - however slight -
lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness."
Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas

It is most likely that this proposal from the Bush Administration is a 'red herring' to try and channel the outrage of the public into ineffective remedies and to confuse and delay the genuine reforms until well after this Adminstration leaves town.

March 29, 2008
Treasury Dept. Plan Would Give Fed Wide New Power
By EDMUND L. ANDREWS
NY Times

WASHINGTON — The Treasury Department will propose on Monday that Congress give the Federal Reserve broad new authority to oversee financial market stability, in effect allowing it to send SWAT teams into any corner of the industry or any institution that might pose a risk to the overall system.

The proposal is part of a sweeping blueprint to overhaul the nation’s hodgepodge of financial regulatory agencies, which many experts say failed to recognize rampant excesses in mortgage lending until after they set off what is now the worst financial calamity in decades. (the Fed played a critical, pivotal role in permitting if not encouraging the excesses, moreso than any other agency - Jesse)

Democratic lawmakers are all but certain to say the proposal does not go far enough in restricting the kinds of practices that caused the financial crisis. Many of the proposals, like those that would consolidate regulatory agencies, have nothing to do with the turmoil in financial markets. And some of the proposals could actually reduce regulation.

According to a summary provided by the administration, the plan would consolidate an alphabet soup of banking and securities regulators into a powerful trio of overseers responsible for everything from banks and brokerage firms to hedge funds and private equity firms.

While the plan could expose Wall Street investment banks and hedge funds to greater scrutiny, it carefully avoids a call for tighter regulation.

The plan would not rein in practices that have been linked to the housing and mortgage crisis, like packaging risky subprime mortgages into securities carrying the highest ratings.

The plan would give the Fed some authority over Wall Street firms, but only when an investment bank’s practices threatened the entire financial system.

And the plan does not recommend tighter rules over the vast and largely unregulated markets for risk sharing and hedging, like credit default swaps, which are supposed to insure lenders against loss but became a speculative instrument themselves and gave many institutions a false sense of security.

Parts of the plan could reduce the power of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is charged with maintaining orderly stock and bond markets and protecting investors. The plan would merge the S.E.C. with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates exchange-traded futures for oil, grains, currencies and the like. (Separately they are both nearly useless. This just makes them completely useless - Jesse)

The blueprint also suggests several areas where the S.E.C. should take a lighter approach to its oversight. Among them are allowing stock exchanges greater leeway to regulate themselves and streamlining the approval of new products, even allowing automatic approval of securities products that are being traded in foreign markets.

The proposal began last year as an effort by Henry M. Paulson Jr., secretary of the Treasury, to make American financial markets more competitive against overseas markets by modernizing a creaky regulatory system.

His goal was to streamline the different and sometimes clashing rules for commercial banks, savings and loans and nonbank mortgage lenders.

“I am not suggesting that more regulation is the answer, or even that more effective regulation can prevent the periods of financial market stress that seem to occur every 5 to 10 years,” Mr. Paulson will say in a speech on Monday, according to a draft. “I am suggesting that we should and can have a structure that is designed for the world we live in, one that is more flexible.”

Congress would have to approve almost every element of the proposal, and Democratic leaders are already drafting their own bills to impose tougher supervision over Wall Street investment banks, hedge funds and the fast-growing market in derivatives like credit default swaps.

But Mr. Paulson’s proposal for the Fed echoes ideas championed by Representative Barney Frank, the Massachusetts Democrat who is chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.

Both see the Fed overseeing risk across the entire financial spectrum, but Mr. Frank is likely to favor a stronger Fed role and to subject investment banks to the same rules that commercial banks now must follow, especially for capital reserves.

The Treasury plan would let Fed officials examine the practices and even the internal bookkeeping of brokerage firms, hedge funds, commodity-trading exchanges and any other institution that might pose a risk to the overall financial system. (Where was the Fed's ability to examine the off balance sheet abuses of Citigroup while they were most definitely under the Fed's purview for example? - Jesse)

That would be a significant expansion of the central bank’s regulatory mission. (and where does the considerable increase in funding come for this? - Jesse)

When Fed officials agreed this month to rescue Bear Stearns, once the nation’s fifth-largest investment bank, they pointedly noted that the Fed never had the authority to monitor its financial condition or order it to bolster its protections against a collapse.

In two unprecedented moves, the Fed engineered a marriage between JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns, lending $29 billion to JPMorgan to prevent a Bear bankruptcy and a chain of defaults that might have felled much of the financial system.

For the first time since the 1930s, the Fed also agreed to let investment banks borrow hundreds of billions of dollars from its discount window, an emergency lending program reserved for commercial banks and other depository institutions. (the difference is that in the 1930s these actions were precipitated by the action of the President and the Congress - Jesse)

But Mr. Paulson’s proposal would fall well short of the kind of regulation that Democrats have been proposing. Mr. Frank and other senior Democrats have argued that investment banks and other lightly regulated institutions now compete with commercial banks and should be subject to similar regulation, including examiners who regularly pore over their books and quietly demand changes in their practices.

In a recent interview, Mr. Frank said he realized the need for tighter regulation of Wall Street firms after a meeting with Charles O. Prince III, then chairman of Citigroup.

When Mr. Frank asked why Citigroup had kept billions of dollars in “structured investment vehicles” off the firm’s balance sheet, he recalled, Mr. Prince responded that Citigroup, as a bank holding company, would have been at a disadvantage because investment firms can operate with higher debt and lower capital reserves. (only in so far as they were to take advanage of the repeal of Glass-Steagall, an effort led by their former Chairman Sandy Weill, and utilize government guaranteed depositor's money to personally finance their speculation - Jesse)

Senator Charles E. Schumer, Democrat of New York, has taken a similar stance.

“Commercial banks continue to be supervised closely, and are subject to a host of rules meant to limit systemic risk,” Mr. Schumer wrote in an op-ed article on Friday in The Wall Street Journal. “But many other financial institutions, including investment banks and hedge funds, are regulated lightly, if at all, even though they act in many ways like banks.” (Precisely. They ought not to be banks and ought not to have impacted banks IF Glass-Steagall had been in place - Jesse)

Mr. Paulson’s proposal is likely to provoke bruising turf battles in Congress among agencies and rival industry groups that benefit from the current regulations.

Administration officials acknowledged on Friday that they did not expect the proposal to become law this year, but said they hoped it would help frame a policy debate that would extend well after the elections in November. (Prediction - It will go nowhere but will help to confuse and blunt and delay the necessary effective reforms and laws to allow further looting of the Treasury while this Administration leaves town - Jesse)

In a nod to the debacle in mortgage lending, the administration proposed a Mortgage Origination Commission to evaluate the effectiveness of state governments in regulating mortgage brokers and protecting consumers. (LOL. - Jesse)

The bulk of the proposal, however, was developed before soaring mortgage defaults set off a much broader credit crisis, and most of the proposals are geared to streamlining regulation.

This plan would consolidate a large number of regulators into roughly three big new agencies.

Bank supervision, now divided among five federal agencies, would be led by a Prudential Financial Regulator, which could send examiners into any bank or depository institution that is protected by either federal deposit insurance or other federal backstops. It would eliminate the distinction between “banks” and “thrift institutions,” which are already indistinguishable to most consumers, and shut down the Office of Thrift Supervision.

Any effort to merge the Commodity Futures Trading Commission with the S.E.C. is likely to provoke battles.

Yet another proposal would, for the first time, create a national regulator for insurance companies, an industry that state governments now oversee.

Administration officials argue that a national system would eliminate the inefficiencies of having 50 different state regulators, who have jealously guarded their powers and are likely to fight any federal encroachment.

Arthur Levitt, a former S.E.C. chairman who has long pushed for stronger investor protection, said his first impression of the plan was positive. Even though the S.E.C.’s powers might be reduced, Mr. Levitt said, the plan would create a broader agency to regulate business conduct in all financial services. (Levitt was a part of the problem himself - Jesse)

“It’s a thoughtful document,” he said. “I’m intrigued by the fact that it puts an emphasis on investor protection, and that it establishes an agency specifically for that purpose, which would operate across all markets. I think that’s a very constructive first step.”

As a reminder, the Federal Reserve is not elected by the people, is not one of the three branches of our government, is not part of the Civil Service, and is not subject to the kinds of congressional oversight generally available to the Congress over such agencies as the SEC.

SP 500 Bear Market Update - March 28