02 September 2008

Korea on the Verge of a Currency Crisis Because of Fannie and Freddie


Korea was on full alert about mad cow disease in US beef but was loading up their central bank with debt from Fannie and Freddie?

And their development bank KDB wanted to buy Lehman Brothers, the poster child for insolvency, while they were quietly having their own foreign reserves liquidity crisis?

There is more to this than meets the eye we think.

Maybe the pressure on Hank to pull the trigger on a Fannie and Freddie bailout will become increasingly compelling, especially if foreign central banks start dumping US agency debt as we show in the graph in the blog entry just below this one. Last one out is left holding the bag.

Here is a quotation for Hank to use as an icebreaker on his call to Seoul to let them know what he is deciding to do with their future:

Flounder, you can't spend your whole life worrying about your mistakes! You screwed up - you trusted us! Hey, make the best of it! Maybe we can help (for a price).


The Times
South Korea heads for a Black September with Won problems
American investments threaten currency
Leo Lewis in Seoul
September 1, 2008

The deepening woes at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, badly stretched central bank reserves and a losing battle to support the won are pushing South Korea towards a full-blown currency crisis this month, analysts have said.

Heavy investment by the Korean Government in Fannie, Freddie and other US-related agency bonds has left a potentially huge liquidity problem - perhaps $50 billion (£27.4 billion) - in the foreign reserve portfolio. Some believe that Seoul might have no ammunition left to prevent a significant flight from the won. Fruitless currency intervention by South Korea - increasingly desperate-looking verbal and financial measures to fight the market trend - cost about $20 billion in July alone.

Attempts to prop up the won come as South Korea’s household and corporate sectors are wincing from the pain of high energy prices and inflation. A summer of strikes by lorry drivers and mass street demonstrations calling for President Lee to resign reflect rising public concern that the economy is in trouble.

The intervention efforts have failed to prevent the currency sliding more than 7 per cent against the dollar in the past month. The won is teetering at a 44-month low against the greenback and, with the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves still dwindling, economists at CLSA, the brokerage, say that it is “a game that Korea can literally no longer afford to play”....

Korea’s foreign exchange reserves stand at $247 billion. The International Monetary Fund recommends that emerging market economies should hold nine months’ worth of import cover, which would be about $320 billion.

More worrying, according to economists at HSBC, is the level of Korea’s foreign exchange reserves relative to its short-term debt ratio. Korea’s debt maturing within a year has shot up to $215.6 billion because of hedging against the oil price. While that is nominally within the 100 per cent coverage by forex reserves deemed necessary, the Fannie and Freddie crisis in the United States raises the question of whether any sense of security is illusory.

A large part of Korea’s foreign reserves are not government bonds but the kind of US-based mortgage-related bonds that once looked so solid. Depending on how the Fannie and Freddie situation develops, a significant portion of Korea’s forex reserves could turn out to be extremely illiquid, leaving the country ever more vulnerable to external shock.

“The coverage ratio may in reality be not as comfortable as the authorities would like, meaning they have less with which to defend the currency,” said one senior Asia-based economist.

Although few are predicting a financial meltdown such as the one that hit the region in 1997, recent weeks have exposed some unique vulnerabilities in Asia’s third-largest economy. The danger, Sharmila Whelan, CLSA’s senior economist, said, is that South Korea has not recognised the perils of intervention, given the country’s hefty current account deficit.

“The risk is that once investors realise how tenuous Korea’s reserve position actually is, they will start abandoning Korea in droves and send the currency tumbling,” Ms Whelan wrote in a recent note to clients.

Soaring inflation and a legacy of massive borrowings by households add an additional, potent layer of instability. Government insiders in Seoul have told The Times that there is a “credible risk” that the Korean banking system could be ravaged by a self-generated version of the credit crunch that has hit Wall Street and the City.

Analysts predict a rising tide of nonperforming loans, delinquency ratios and bankruptcies and some of the country’s large mutual savings banks are expected to go bust.


Central Bank Purchases Of US Treasuries and Agencies Debt


Foreign Central Bank purchases of US Treasuries and Agency Debt (Ginnie, Freddie, and Fannie) through the NY Fed Custodial Accounts in 2008. (Thanks to Brad Setser for the graph).





KDB and the Artifice of the Deal, Part 2


In the annals of interesting Wall Street stories this one may rank right up there.

Technically the things that Korean Development Bank CEO Min Euoo Sung is saying are true. He is talking with Lehman. He has spoken with other Korean banks about this deal. He would like to form a consortium to buy a big chunk of Lehman since it is now clear he cannot do it on his own.

The problem with the story is that Lehman is likely to be seriously insolvent and cooler heads in the Korean financial community and government seem to know it after having looked at the books. At least so they have said.

The government has already said "no" to the ambitious plans of Min to buy a place on the financial world stage.

He is viewed as 'reckless' and overly ambitious by the Korean financial community and with good reason, having taking a recent bath in the subprime, showing among the worst performances of Korea's major financial institutions.

He has a certain amount of power, and an affinity to Lehman. He does not seem to have the latitude to make the deal on his own, and the major banks have already said 'no.' We have not checked his biography carefully so we do not know yet how he is wired into the Korean government. Son? Protege? He was both Lehman's and Solly's regional manager at various times.

We'll keep an eye on this one, but our instincts are telling us that this deal is not only dead, but its starting to smell, and won't get up no matter how hard Min flogs it in the media.

A small stake might get done. We'd suggest that $6 billion is the full extent of Min's latitude at most, but more likely he was cut back to $4 billion or less. And its just not enough to get Lehman out of trouble or buy a large enough stake to give a big enough platform for Min to strut his stuff on a bigger stage.

Worst case the financial talking heads will just use this to paint the tape with the headlines as noted. The objective seems to be to offload losing positions on to the public, of whatever nationality, one way or the other.

If this deal falls through, the pundits will opine that Lehman could also do a deal with some other maverick somewhere usually identified as a 'Mideastern type' or another usual suspect for a fast deal in a troubled US company. Does Iraq have a development bank?

We have a funny feeling about this whole situation. Still nothing is so strange as real life. Let's see what happens.