The Fed's Game Plan: What Ben Bernanke Is Thinking

Bernanke's game plan is becoming more apparent. Based on a reading of his papers and his public statements, here is a distilled view of what we think is his game plan.

1. Grow the money supply quickly and abundantly

2. Stabilize the Banking System to avoid destructive banking failures

3. Do not withdraw the monetary stimulus prematurely to fight inflation.

4. Manage 'confidence' aggressively to dampen the expectation of inflation later, and a panic liquidation now.

Each of these legs of his policy is a reaction to lessons he believes the Fed learned from the Great Depression.

As you consider the specific things he is doing, it is likely that they will fit very nicely into this framework.

He is obviously fighting the 'last war,' the last great battle that the Fed is known to have waged, and lost. For it did lose, as there was no lasting recovery until the world suffered through the Second World War.

Whether he will be successful or not remains to be seen. It is important to bear in mind that the Fed is absolutely confident that they know how to stop inflation once it gets started, even if it becomes rather serious.

The over-arching theme is that this is an emergency, and so long term niceties like moral hazard and systemic reform will be left for later: the ends justify the means.

William Poole says that this is a dangerous approach, because longer term consequences like inflation appear with a one to two year lag after a significant monetary stimulus such as we have just seen.

The timing of the Fed's dampening of inflation will be critical, and perhaps constrained by the real economy. How can the Fed tighten sufficiently if the real economy remains sluggish?

Bernanke is determined to err on the side of too much stimulus, given the trauma of the Fed's experience in the Great Depression. Coupled with the Fed's confidence in their ability to stop any monetary inflation, this raises a higher level of probability in the most likely outcome of the Fed's latest and greatest monetary experiment.

We cannot help but wonder what he thinks the Fed will be doing this time that will be different than 2003-2007 when they reflated the financial system after a market crash the last time without meaningful reforms, resulting in the stock market and housing bubbles.

Whatever happens, it will certainly provide the raw material for economic papers yet unwritten.

2008 Was the Third Worst Year for US Stocks Since 1896

1931 was the worst, but notice that 1930 was not far behind.

Black Swan Dive: Life On the Tails

The worst case scenario is if the Dollar, Bond, and Equities start going down together as the world repudiates the US Dollar Reserve Currency and Credit Bubble.

This is not a probable scenario.

The last time it happened was in 1933 in the trough of the Great Depression.

But we may have the opportunity to see something as once-in-a-lifetime and memorable as John Law's Banque Générale and the Mississipi Bubble.

Let's hope the Federal Reserve can reach deeper in its pockets for a better class of tricks than just front running the dollar and the bonds until they fall over.

Certainly anything is possible, but it does appear as though the US Long Bond is hitting a 'high note' of improbable valuation unless the world accepts a single currency dollar regime.

Did the New Deal Fail?

Most people informed by our modern educational system would respond that the New Deal was ineffective, and that only World War II resolved the Great Depression with its massively non-productive consumption. This is sometimes called "military Keynesianism."

As evidence of this they will point to the renewed slump in US GDP and the equity markets that occurred in 1937.

Here is some perspective on what caused that slump from Paul Kasriel.

In 1937, CPI inflation was running in excess of 4%. So, in 1937, the Fed doubled reserve requirements to soak up excess reserves and prevent even higher inflation. It worked. The economy entered the second leg of the Great Depression in 1937 and deflation re-appeared.

The New Deal was so "ineffective" that the Fed panicked and doubled reserve requirements in a draconian pre-emptive response because they feared inflation! And this was with the unremitting opposition to the reforms of the New Deal by the Republican minority, the Business interests, and their appointees on the Supreme Court.



In a fiat regime inflation and deflation are primarily a policy decision, or perhaps more clearly, the end result of a series of policy, fiscal, and political decisions. Japan is a good example of that combination. There is a lag between the implementation of policy decisions and the desired result. There are also secular events such as a oil embargo or an asset crash that may significantly impact prices and measures of the money supply, although somewhat unevenly.

They are not perfectly controllable, and there is difficulty stimulating aggregate demand and the velocity of money. It cannot be done by monetary policy alone but an accumulation of decisions by the entire national leadership.

But where there is no exogenous constraints such as a monetary standard inflation and deflation are a choice among priorities, essentially a policy decision.

Comparison of 1928-32 and 2007-11

There are important differences in the nature of the declines. The current series looks like a bear market in the form of 1973-4 whereas 1929-32 was much more precipitous. This may be attributed to the extraordinary actions of the FED and Treasury. However, this may only soften the blow and not the outcome, most likely adjusted for inflation.




The Intraday Volatility matches up nicely so far as we have aligned them Peak to Peak without regard to pricing. It will be in the market action going forward where the model will be assessed here.

The Grapes of Wrath

Bloomberg
California May Pay With IOUs for Second Time Since Depression
By Michael B. Marois and William Selway

Dec. 5 (Bloomberg) -- California, the world’s eighth largest economy, may pay vendors with IOUs for only the second time since the Great Depression, State Finance Director Mike Genest said.

In a letter to legislative leaders Dec. 2, Genest said the state “will begin delaying payments or paying in registered warrants in March” unless an $11.2 billion deficit is closed or reduced. California, which approved its budget less than three months ago, may run out of cash by March, state officials say.

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger warned that he may issue the warrants, which are a promise to pay with interest, to suppliers and contractors as the seizure in credit markets may make it too costly to borrow.

“It’s getting worse very quickly,” Schwarzenegger, a 61- year-old Republican, told reporters Dec. 1 after declaring a fiscal emergency and ordering the Legislature into a special session to find ways to close the deficit. “It’s like an avalanche in that it gains momentum. And that’s what we’re in right now, so it’s a real crisis.”

California is reeling more than any other state from budget woes that pushed the nation’s governors to seek help from Congress. States say federal money is needed to ease the pain from spending cuts and tax increases that would be a further blow to an economy in the throes of a recession.

The warrants would be given to landscapers, carpet cleaners, construction firms, food services companies and other state vendors. They would pay an interest rate of as much as 5 percent, based on state law. California last issued the IOUs in 1992 when lawmakers and then-Governor Pete Wilson deadlocked on a budget for 61 days past the start of the fiscal year...

Money Supply, Paul Krugman, and the Great Depression

We like Paul Krugman and enjoy reading his columns. But every so often he writes a column that is so off his normal standards that it makes us wonder if he is on vacation and the task of producing the column has been delegated to a graduate assistant.

Here is one such example.

NY Times
Was the Great Depression a monetary phenomenon?
By Paul Krugman
November 28, 2008, 1:47 pm



Has anyone else noticed that the current crisis sheds light on one of the great controversies of economic history?

A central theme of Keynes’s General Theory was the impotence of monetary policy in depression-type conditions. But Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, in their magisterial monetary history of the United States, claimed that the Fed could have prevented the Great Depression — a claim that in later, popular writings, including those of Friedman himself, was transmuted into the claim that the Fed caused the Depression.

Now, what the Fed really controlled was the monetary base — currency plus bank reserves. As the figure shows, the base actually rose during the great slump, which is why it’s hard to make the case that the Fed caused the Depression. But arguably the Depression could have been prevented if the Fed had done more — if it had expanded the monetary base faster and done more to rescue banks in trouble.

So here we are, facing a new crisis reminiscent of the 1930s. And this time the Fed has been spectacularly aggressive about expanding the monetary base:



And guess what — it doesn’t seem to be working.

I think the thesis of the Monetary History has just taken a hit.

We have mixed emotions on this one since we think the monetarist approach is a too one-dimensional to explain what happened then and now, and agree with Keynes that monetary policy alone is incapable of dealing with a complex economic event such as we are now facing. We also do not believe that the Fed 'caused' the Great Depression.

However, to try and make the case that the Fed can "only" control reserves and the currency base, the monetary base, is an old canard trotted out by the likes of Greenspan and his ilk when they wish to make the case that things are happening, like enormous bubbles, that are beyond the Fed's control. This is a Clintonian use of the word 'control' and is always and everywhere rubbish.

The Fed's power, its influence, is profound, and ever moreso in this era of aggressive financial engineering. Krugman uses the narrow argument of literal control to point to the Adjusted Monetary Base as his sole metric and say, "See the monetary base went up in the Depression in his Chart 1, just as it is today in Chart 2. Therefore there was no error from the Fed at that time because it was all that they could do."

Here are two other charts that help to provide a better view of what really happened.



Please note in the above chart that after the British abandoned the gold standard, the Federal Reserve RAISED the discount rate for US banks in the spring of 1931 from 1.5 to 3.5 percent, or 200 basis points.



To emphasize the policy error look at this estimate of real interest rates leading into the bottom of the Great Depression in 1933. Nine out of ten economists might notice that, relative to the price deflation which was obviously occurring, that the increase in Discount Rate was motivated by other than monetary and domestic considerations.

Finally, let's take a look at a broader money supply for the period, M1, against the change in GDP.



Please notice the decline in M1 tracking the changes in GDP.

So, what might the Fed had done differently?

It is obvious that devaluing the dollar was the right thing to do. To that end, the Fed might have cut the discount rate to less than one percent, instead of raising it, which was likely in response to the movement of the British pound and the Bank of England's abandonment of the gold standard. They also might have lent in size to any bank requiring deposits, so that there would be no more bank failures for banks that were in otherwise reasonably good shape, that is, because of depositor runs.

And this is where we do part company with Mr. Friedman and Ms. Schwarz and join Lord Keynes in his observation that it requires fiscal and legislative actions to repair an economic shock such as the country was experiencing in the early 1930's.



Notice that Government Purchase drop, and rather sharply, into the trough of 1933, along with aggregate demand. This would have been the point where Keynes would have likely observed that supply money was not enough, but was only a first step in stabilizing the system. The 'real cure' was to get people working again, to provide wages and gainful employment, to encourage consumption and economic activity.

As an aside, notice that net exports were negative and remained so throughout the period of 1929 through 1933. Much has been made of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, and indeed exports did nominally decrease. But the proportion of decline to imports makes it clear that protectionism was rampant throughout the rest of the world, and had not been caused by anything the United States was doing per se.

We don't have the chart at hand, and will continue to look for it, but the United States was one of the last of the developed nations to emerge from the Depression with positive GDP growth. We think that this was caused by exactly the phenomenon that Keynes observed, which was a lack of government fiscal and legislative activity to promote economic activity, as well as a relatively open market for imports and a "business first" bias, to the disadvantage of the unemployed working people.

In conclusion we would say that contrary to what Mr. Krugman asserts it is apparent that the Fed made a significant policy error in raising the discount rate in early 1931. It is less clear what latitude they might have had to do more to stem the tide of bank failures because of depositor fears, but they clearly could have done more to react to the contracting money supply. We have heard that they only were able to think in termed of the monetary base and had no statistics beyond that with which to guide their efforts.

We think that this is a weak rationale at best for their failure as bankers to respond to the obviously dire situation of the economy which evident in and of itself. We would not accuse them of lacking imagination, inventiveness, determination, and a spirit of pragmatic activism. In fact, they strike us as 'clubbable men' acting for their club.

We shall see this time perhaps if monetary activism alone is sufficient, especially if the Republicans and corporate banking interests have their way. But it does not appear to be the case since making money available to lend does not solve the problem of helping to create an economic environment in which profits might be made.

Indeed, we can imagine an outcome in which misbegotten monetary policy results in an oligopoly of corporate interests and an economy that is permanently frozen in a series of de facto monopolies based on central planning, not all that dissimilar to the experience of the Soviet Union prior to its dissolution and some countries in which a hundred or so powerful families control the government and its economy in a state of permanent corruption and malaise.

Tall Paul Delivers a Dismal Diagnosis for the US Economy

As much as we admire Paul Volcker, we can't help but notice that he, like so many others, did not have all that much to say while Greenspan and his merry banksters were running around setting fire to the economy while President Zero fiddled.

Also, he is not offering much in the way of innovation or suggestions for the incoming administration, at least so far.

Perhaps they should trigger a nasty inflation and then they can roll Volcker out to fix it. Hmmm, that seems to be in the works.

The 1930's script says that we have a Republican minority and a conservative Supreme court that block the many attempts of an incoming Democratic president to help the general public survive a devastating economic downturn, after a decade of seriously greasing the elites' monetary skids, pushing us to the brink of domestic insurrection, until it takes a world war to pull us out.

Wow, déjà vu!

UK Telegraph
Volcker issues dire warning on slump
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
10:39 PM GMT 17 Nov 2008

Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, has warned that the economic slump has begun to metastasise after a shocking collapse in output over the past two months, threatening to overwhelm the incoming Obama administration as it struggles to restore confidence.

"What this crisis reveals is a broken financial system like no other in my lifetime," he told a conference at Lombard Street Research in London.

"Normal monetary policy is not able to get money flowing. The trouble is that, even with all this [government] protection, the market is not moving again. The only other time we have seen the US economy drop as suddenly as this was when the Carter administration imposed credit controls, which was artificial."

His comments come as the blizzard of dire data in the US continues to crush spirits. The Empire State index of manufacturing dropped to minus 24.6 in October, the lowest ever recorded. Paul Ashworth, US economist at Capital Economics, said business spending was now going into "meltdown", compounding the collapse in consumer spending that is already under way.

Mr Volcker, an adviser to President-Elect Barack Obama and a short-list candidate for Treasury Secretary, warned that it is already too late to avoid a severe downturn even if the credit markets stabilise over coming months. "I don't think anybody thinks we're going to get through this recession in a hurry," he said. (Perhaps Paul needs to send a postcard update to the talking heads at CNBC and Bloomberg - Jesse)

He advised Mr Obama to tread a fine line, embarking on bold action with a "compelling economic logic" rather than scattering fiscal stimulus or resorting to a wholesale bail-out of Detroit. "He can't just throw money at the auto industry."

Mr Volcker is a towering figure in the US, praised for taming the great inflation of the late 1970s with unpopular monetary rigour. He is no friend of Alan Greenspan, who replaced him at the Fed and presided over credit excess that pushed private debt to 300pc of GDP. (Funny how Greenspan has so few friends now, but was so widely lionized by the corporate support structure while he was helping to destroy the economy - Jesse)

"There has been leveraging in the economy beyond imagination, and nobody was saying we need to do something," he said. "There are cycles in human nature and it is up to regulators to moderate these excesses. Alan was not a big regulator." (There were quite a few people warning about a credit bubble but they were largely shouted down, ignored, and dismissed by the cognoscenti, largely fueled by conservative think tanks and corporate funding - Jesse)

Even so, he said the arch-culprit was the bonus system that allowed bankers to draw forward "tremendous rewards" before the disastrous consequences of their actions became clear, as well as the new means of credit alchemy that let them slice and dice mortgage debt into packages that disguised risk. (So let's make sure we try to prolong that system by handing them billions of dollars in taxpayer money without conditions or serious reform - Jesse)

Avoiding a Great Depression: Rescue, Rebalance, Reform

The 1920's were marked by a credit expansion, a significant growth in consumer debt, the creation of asset bubbles, and the proliferation of financial instruments and leveraged investments. The Federal Reserve expanded the money supply and the Republican government pursued a laissez-faire approach to business.

This helped to create a greater wealth disparity, and saddled a good part of the public with debts on consumables that were vulnerable to an economic contraction.

The bursting of the credit bubble triggered the stock market Crash of 1929. The Hoover administration's response was guided by Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon. As noted by Herbert Hoover in his memoirs, "Mellon had only one formula: 'Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.'"

Indeed, the collapse of consumption and credit, and the ensuing 'do nothing' policy of liquidation by the government crippled the economy and drove unemployment up to the incredible 24% level at the climax of the liquidation and deleveraging.

Although some assets fared better than others, virtually everything was caught up in the cycle of liquidation and everything was sold: stocks, bonds, farms, even long dated US Treasuries, all of them collapsing into the bottom in late 1932.

The Federal Reserve made tragic policy errors most certainly with regard to interest rates. They were hampered by a lack of coordinated effort because of the official US policy focus on liquidation and non-interference, along with mass bank failures which rendered their attempts to reflate the money supply as largely futile.

Thrifty management of the credit and monetary levels when the economy is balanced in the manufacturing, service, export-import, and consumption distribution levels is a good policy to follow.

But good policies applied with vigor during a period of economic illness may be like forcing patients seriously ill with pneumonia to swim laps and run in marathons because you think such physical activity is inherently good and beneficial in itself at all times.

Additionally, monetary expansion alone also does not work, as can be seen in the early attempts by the Fed to expand the monetary base without policy initiatives to support expansion and consumption. Hoover's administration raised the income tax and cut spending for a balanced budget.

A combined monetary and government bias to stimulating consumption while restoring balance and correcting the errors that fostered the credit bubble is the more effective course of action.

Today it seems to us that the Fed and Treasury are trying to cure our current problems by filling the banks full of liquidity with the idea that it will eventually trickle down to the real economy through their toll gates.

We believe this will not work. The financial system is rotten, and not only in its toxic and fraudulent assets. It is a weakened, rotten timber that will provide scant leverage for the rescue attempts.

Better to cauterize the bleeds in the financial system and assume a 'trickle up' approach by reaching the econmy through the individual rather than the individual through the banks.

Provide secure FDIC insurance to everyone to a generous degree , and let those banks who must fail, fail. You will encourage reform and savings, we guarantee it. Stimulate work and wages, and then consumption, and the financial system will follow.

While the financial system as it is constituted today remains the centerpiece of our economy, we cannot sustainably recover since it is a source of recurring infection.



Globalists like to cite the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs as a major factor in the development of the Great Depression. This appears to be largely unsubstantiated, and attributable to a dogmatic bias to international trade as a panacea for failing domestic demand.

In fact, before Smoot-Hawley both exports and imports were in a steep decline as consumption collapsed around the world. If the US had declared itself open for free trade, to whom would they sell, and who in the US would buy? Consumption was in a general collapse around the world. Smoot Hawley did not help, but it also did not hurt because it was largely irrelevant.

It is a lesser discussed topic, but the US held the majority of the gold in the world in 1930 as the aftermath of their position as an industrial power in World War I and the expansion that followed. Since the majority of the countries were on some version of the gold standard, one could make a case that the US had an undue influence on the 'reserve currency of the world' at that time, and its mistaken policies were transmitted via the gold standard to the rest of the world.

The nations that exited the Great Depression the soonest, those who recovered more quickly and experienced a shallower economic downturn, were those who stimulated domestic consumption via public works and industrial policies: Japan, Germany, Italy, Sweden.



As a final point, we like to show this chart to draw a very strong line under the fact that the liquidationist policy of the Hoover Administration caused most assets to suffer precipitous declines. Certainly some fared better than others, such as gold which was pegged, and silver which declined but not nearly as much as industrial metals and certainly financial instruments like stocks which declined 89% from peak to trough.

FDR devalued the dollar by 40%, but he never followed Britain off the gold standard, maintaining fictitious support by outlawing domestic ownership. As the government stepped away from its liquidationist approach the economy gradually recovered and the money supply reinflated, despite the carnage delivered to the US economy and the world, provoking the rise of militarism and statist regimes in many of the developed nations.

There is a fiction that the economy never really recovered, and FDR's policies failed and only a World War caused the recovery. In fact, if one cares to look at the situation more closely, the recession of 1937 was a result of the aggressive military buildup for war in the world, the diversion of capital and resources to non-productive goods and services, and of course the general reversal of the New Deal by the US Supreme Court and the Republican minority in Congress.

As an aside, it is interesting to read about the efforts of some US industrialists to foster a fascist solution here in the US, as their counterparts and some of them had done in Europe.

What finally put the world on the permanent road to recovery was the savings forced by the lack of consumer goods during World War II and the rebuilding of Europe and Asia, devastated by war, significantly aided by the policies of the Allied powers.



A Depression following a Crash caused by an asset bubble collapse is a terrible thing indeed. But it does not have to be a prolonged ordeal.

Governments can and do make policy errors that prolong the period of adjustment, most notably instituting an industrial policy that discourages domestic consumption and money supply growth in a desire to obtain foreign reserves through exports.

From what we have seen thus far, we believe that the Russian experience in the 1990's is going to be closer to what lies ahead for the US. Unless the US adopts an export driven, low domestic consumption, high savings policy bias, non-productive military buildup and public works, and discourages population growth we don't believe the Japanese experience will be repeated.

Preventing the banking system from collapsing is a worthy objective. Perpetuating the symptom of fraud and abuse and 'overreach' that was becoming pervasive in the system before the collapse is not sustainable, instead leading to more frequent and larger collapses.

Balance will be restored, and a reversion to the means will occur, one way or the other. It would be most practical to accomplish this in a peaceful, sustainable manner, with justice and toleration.