Guest Post: Grading Alan Greenspan

The Maestro and the Hundred Year Flood
By Keith Hazelton, The Anecdotal Economist

Alan Greenspan’s self-serving “The Crisis,” a 66-page white paper outlining exactly why no part of the extant global financial/liquidity/credit/solvency/deleveraging crisis was the fault of the Federal Reserve whose board he chaired for 18 year or anyone or any other entity for that matter, contains among the many exculpatory assertions, a fascinating, if not stupefying, revelation that, in setting capital adequacy levels, reserves and leverage limits, policymakers:

“…have chosen capital standards that by any stretch of the imagination cannot protect against all potential adverse loss outcomes. There is implicit in this exercise the admission that, in certain episodes, problems at commercial banks and other financial institutions, when their risk-management systems prove inadequate, will be handled by central banks. At the same time, society on the whole should require that we set this bar very high. Hundred year floods come only once every hundred years. Financial institutions should expect to look to the central bank only in extremely rare situations.” (p16-17, all emphasis added.).

No sir, Sir Alan. Hundred year floods come on average only once every hundred years, as any undergraduate who has completed Statistics 101 would recognize, presumably based on many centuries of flood observations in a particular locale.

Now we know if one flips a coin 100 million times, a tabulation of heads/tails results likely will yield a result infinitesimally close to 50/50, so that one may conclude, on average, the actual observation results would prove the statistical probability for each flip that the coin lands heads-up is 50 percent (we conveniently are excluding any possibility of the coin landing, say, balanced vertically on edge.)

We also can be confident in such a large observation, however, that low-probability strings of 10, 20 or 30 consecutive heads-up or tails-up results – while extremely unlikely in 100 flips – would, in fact, be commonplace.

That such occurrences have low probabilities, even extremely low probabilities in smaller observation samples, is immaterial. Regardless of the number of observations, even low probability events are bound to occur, and they are neither randomly nor evenly distributed.

Similarly, nature has no constraints as to the frequency of hundred-year floods, only that on average they should occur once every century, but if it pleases nature to generate 10 hundred-year floods in a century, and none for the next 900 years, albeit a low-probability event, such an observation is completely within the framework of reality.

Neither are there constraints, apparently, on the frequency of meltdowns in the complex, deregulated financial environment we have invented and unleashed upon ourselves, even though, unlike nature, we completely are in control of the frequency and regularity of hundred-year financial disasters.

Which is what is so self-serving about the former Fed chief’s term paper. By defaulting to a “stuff-happens-once-every-hundred-years-so-there’s-no-point-in-trying-to-prevent-it-since-the-negative-effects-of-prevention-would-outweigh-the-flood-cleanup-cost” defense, Sir Alan absolves himself, his fellow FOMC decision-makers and Fed economists, successive Congresses and Administrations, the banking and financial system, China, Japan, Germany and, yes, the American “consumer” from any culpability in the generation-long, debt-fueled party which has induced this hundred-year hangover.

It’s also what’s wrong with economics in general. Since macro-economic theories and policies cannot be experimentally verified – we can’t go back in time to see how different decisions in the past would have altered the present and future – Mr. Greenspan expects to get a pass when he essentially observes that removing the Fed’s easy-money punchbowl earlier in decades past, or perhaps merely serving smaller portions of credit-debt-leverage punch along with deregulation cookies, somehow would have created a worse outcome than the present mess, and he concludes his term paper with an untestable assertion:

"Could the breakdown that so devastated global financial markets have been prevented? Given inappropriately low financial intermediary capital (i.e. excessive leverage) and two decades of virtual unrelenting prosperity, low inflation, and low long-term interest rates, I very much doubt it. Those economic conditions are the necessary, and likely the sufficient, conditions for the emergence of an income-producing asset bubble. To be sure, central banks have the capacity to break the back of any prospective cash flow that supports bubbly asset prices, but almost surely at the cost of a severe contraction of economic output, with indeterminate consequences." (All emphasis added.)

Which is followed by a monstrous, ominous, “be-glad-we-only-have-a-mess-of-this-hundred-year-severity-to-clean-up” whopper:

"The downside of that tradeoff is open-ended."

Cue scary music. Of course the consequences are indeterminate, Sir Alan, and we never will know what our present and our children’s future would have been like had other, more prudent fiscal and monetary policies had been adopted by all participants, but in parsing Mr. G’s conclusion above, we find exactly where, and with whom, the fault resides:

• Excessive leverage of financial institutions? Congresses, Administrations, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC and OTS, without question.


• Two decades of virtual unrelenting prosperity? Apparently is was virtual prosperity, not real prosperity, because it came at a price of excessive, unsustainable leverage among individuals, businesses and governments.


• Low Inflation? An obsession with consumption of low-cost goods imported from low-cost, overseas manufacturers, again fueled with leverage, instead of savings.


• Low long-term interest rates? Why Alan, you remember, it’s the Federal Reserve which sets interest rates, and you were its chairman for 18 years.

The fault then, it would seem, dear Alan, “lies not in our stars, but in ourselves,” and certainly not in the hundred-year flood, to badly paraphrase William Shakespeare’s Caesar.

And it would be amusing – this whole “it’s nobody’s fault, stuff happens” bit about hundred year floods coming only once every hundred years – if not for the physical, emotional and national wealth-destroying carnage of “The Crisis” of the last three years.

Not to mention the many years, if not decades, in our now less prosperous future which will be required to rebuild ourselves from the ground up after such an easily avoidable catastrophe, unlike nature’s hundred-year floods, of our own design.

OK, so it’s only the second draft of his term paper – maybe he’ll revise the final publication to attribute at least some culpability, but don’t count on it. Right now, I give it a "D+."

The Maestro and the Hundred-Year Flood

A Fitting Award for Alan Greenspan

Inhale deeply of the madness and illusions of the financial engineers.

Greenspan was a magnet for the enablers, the spokesman for those primarily responsible for the fraud that led to the series of financial crises. But more Meinhof than Baader, one might say. The monied interests are often not famed economists, having more of a yearning for either raw power or opaque solitude. Their recognition must wait for another day and a different venue.

And as for Bernanke, his time has come, and he may eclipse even Greenspan given a little more tenure at the Fed.

Young Tim is no economist, just a useful pair of hands, the hired help.

For Immediate Release
22 February 2010

Greenspan wins Dynamite Prize in Economics

Alan Greenspan has been judged the economist most responsible for causing the Global Financial Crisis. He and 2nd and 3rd place finishers Milton Friedman and Larry Summers have won the first–and hopefully last—Dynamite Prize in Economics.

In awarding the Prize, Edward Fullbrook, editor of the Real World Economics Review, noted that “They have been judged to be the three economists most responsible for the Global Financial Crisis. More figuratively, they are the three economists most responsible for blowing up the global economy.”

The prize was developed by the Real World Economics Review Blog in response to attempts by economists to evade responsibility for the crisis by calling it an unpredictable, Black Swan event.

In reality, the public perception that economic theories and policies helped cause the crisis is correct.

The prize winners were determined by a poll in which over 7,500 people voted—most of whom were economists themselves from the 11,000 subscribers to the real-world economics review . Each voter could vote for a maximum of three economists. In total 18,531 votes were cast.

Fullbrook cautioned that not all economics and economists were bad. “Only neoclassical economists caused the GFC. There are other approaches to economics that are more realistic—or at least less delusional—but these have been suppressed in universities and excluded from government policy making.”

“Some of these rebels also did what neoclassical economists falsely claimed was impossible: they foresaw the Global Financial Crisis and warned the public of its approach. In their honour, I now call for nominations for the inaugural Revere Award in Economics, named in honour of Paul Revere and his famous ride. It will be awarded to the 3 economists who saw the GFC coming, and whose work is most likely to prevent another GFC in the future.”

Dynamite Prize Citations

Alan Greenspan (5,061 votes): As Chairman of the Federal Reserve System from 1987 to 2006, Alan Greenspan both led the over expansion of money and credit that created the bubble that burst and aggressively promoted the view that financial markets are naturally efficient and in no need of regulation.

Milton Friedman (3,349 votes): Friedman propagated the delusion, through his misunderstanding of the scientific method, that an economy can be accurately modeled using counterfactual propositions about its nature. This, together with his simplistic model of money, encouraged the development of fantasy-based theories of economics and finance that facilitated the Global Financial Collapse.

Larry Summers (3,023 votes): As US Secretary of the Treasury (formerly an economist at Harvard and the World Bank), Summers worked successfully for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which since the Great Crash of 1929 had kept deposit banking separate from casino banking. He also helped Greenspan and Wall Street torpedo efforts to regulate derivatives.

In total 18,531 votes were cast. The vote totals for the other finalists were:

Fischer Black and Myron Scholes 2,016
Eugene Fama 1,668
Paul Samuelson 1,291
Robert Lucas 912
Richard Portes 433
Edward Prescott and Finn E. Kydland 403
Assar Lindbeck 375

The poll was conducted by PollDaddy. Cookies were used to prevent repeat voting.

Note: By way of disclosure, I voted for Fama, Greenspan, and Summers. - Jesse