Guest Post: An Analysis of JPM's Credit Card Business

2009 Credit Card Segment Results: JPMorgan Chase
By Keith Hazelton, The Anecdotal Economist

Credit Card Fee and Interest Income Soar as Nation's Largest Credit Card Company Hammers the Customers Who Bailed It Out in 2008

While we are waiting for the December Federal Reserve G.19 Consumer Credit report due February 5th, which will confirm 2009's complete collapse of Revolving Consumer Credit resulting from millions of the insolvent and near-insolvent 60 percent or so of Americans who carry credit card balances month-to-month but who desperately are trying to reduce the hideous debt-shadow which has remained long after the afterglow has faded from years of restaurant meals, trips to Disney World, flat-screen televisions, college tuitions and entrepreneurial forays, inquiring minds may care to put JPM Morgan Chase's full-year card services results under the microscope.

In JPM's January 15, 2010 earnings release, on pages 18-20 of its Earnings Release Financial Supplement, the nation's largest credit card company by cards and balances details the sorry state of what in better years was its most profitable segment.

JPM's 2009 Card Services segment results are summarized in the table above, which highlights some of the lowlights:

• End of year balances, both held and securitized (so-called Managed Card Assets), fell 14.1 percent in 2009 to $163.4 billion. The number of cards issued (not detailed above) also fell 14.0 percent to 145.3 million from 168.7 million at the end of 2008.


• Notwithstanding a $26.9 billion decline from 2008, JPM's credit card fee income (late fees, overlimit fees, telephone payment fees, balance transfer fees, annual card fees) soared 30.5 percent to $3.6 billion, and net card interest income jumped 26.4 percent to $17.4 billion as the bank clearly scrambled to raise interest rates on as many cardholders as possible ahead of 2010 rule changes.


• Reflecting those abominable fee income and interest income grabs from the very taxpayers who enabled their own misery by allowing JPMorgan Chase to be bailed out in 2008 along with the rest of the "too big to fails," the bank's credit card net revenue as a percentage of average balances grew 15.7 percent in 2009.


• JPM's 2009 total charge volume fell 11.0 percent to $328.3 billion, reflecting the nation's newfound preference for debit cards and cash.


• 2009 charge offs nearly doubled to $16.1 billion (Managed Card basis), representing 9.33 percent of average card balances.

So, JPM Chase in 2009 oversaw the charge-off of $16.1 billion of its own and securitized credit card balances, and its still-solvent card debt-slave customers paid down (or transferred, however unlikely) another $10.8 billion, which equals the $26.9 billion decline in EOY balances.

So far, according to the Fed, 2009 revolving consumer credit balances have plunged more than $100 billion through November, and it looks like JPM Chase, which held a 22 percent card market share in 2008, is accounting for slightly more of the decline than its market share would warrant.

Bank of America, the nation's number two credit card company, which reports 4Q and 2009 results January 20th, has been writing off its managed card balances at an annual rate of more than 13 percent, and we will look forward to seeing its grim full-year results, as well as those of the other dozen or so financial institutions which now control nearly 90 percent of the racket industry.

The nation's big banks in the 1990s and early 2000s wanted to consolidate the then-immensely profitable credit card industry in the worst way, and, as 2009 results will prove, they got it - in the worst way.

And to remind readers where we think revolving consumer credit balances are headed (to $300 billion - $500 billion from the nearly $900 billion last month) over the coming decade, here's a repost of a chart we first published in December.

Consumer Credit Contracting at Record Levels

Total Consumer Credit Outstanding in the US is contracting at a year-over-rate of almost 5 percent, which is a record for the post 1960 economy.



The challenge facing Bernanke and the Obama economic team is how to get the US consumer spending again, if they cannot be paid a living wage, and if they can no longer be encouraged to borrow beyoned their means, by using their homes as a cash machine with variable interest rates, as they were encouraged to do by Fed Chairman Greenspan.

This is as much a public policy question as it is an economic question. Large segment of the population which are homeless and and jobless tend to be destabilizing to the community. The liquidationist school is not without its attraction to the let-them-eat-cake frame of mind, but from a societal perspective it is fraught with peril and unintended consequences.

For now the remedy being utilized by Bernanke and associates is to prop the financial system and allow the dollar to decline while artificially supporting the long bond. They may also be attempting to control certain indicators of monetary inflation such as gold and oil by using position limits exclusively on long positions and 'speculation.' while exempting the naked short selling. Similarly, pumping up equities provides a flowback into financial assets that helps to support the banks.

This is obviously no solution. The Fed is in maintenance mode, trying to coddle the banks through their ongoing crisis despite the recent appearances of vitality, which are an illusion.

The Obama Administration is not engaging in the systemic and financial reform that really is their responsibility. So what we have here is a bit of a mess with no clear way out at least to us, except to weaken the dollar, and perform their particular version of 'pray.'

I believe the colloquial American characterization of Team Obama's current policy might best be described as 'throwing shit at the wall and hoping something sticks.'



Yes, there is often a lag between credit contraction and the appearance of decline in the broader money stock. This may be a direct correlation with a lagged, or a colinearity resulting from the effects of the recession in the real economy on both, again with uneven impacts over time.

There can be no denying that the Fed is promoting money supply growth in ways never seen before in the US. Whether they can be successful is open to question. We think they will keep at it until they break something.

Wall Street has a gun to the head of the public, in the form of derivatives positions that are 'weapons of mass destruction.' For now it is a standoff. But there should be little doubt that this is artificial and unsustainable, and that something has got to give.