Rosenberg's Seven Point Plan for Recession Investing

Here is something that may be of interest from David Rosenberg of Gluskin Sheff as reported by CNBC.

I lean on this a bit, unwilling and unable as I am to give investment advice on the particulars. And like most general advice, it is certainly not tailored to one's particulars, which is all important.

I should add that this is targeted to a recession. And if you believe we are in for a recession, this may work.  If we experience a more singular, unusual event, something other than recession, with features of a currency collapse, some portions of this portfolio will perform very badly.

Bonds and bond funds in particular tend to get decimated in times of rising interest rates and/or high inflation. Income is of little use unless the principal is protected.

And yet it is also good to remember that Japan lost its AAA rating in 2002, and its bonds continued on as rates fell. Is the US going to go the way of Japan? There are some very important differences, and after all, it is largely a policy choice. Choose deflation and austerity but without the safety nets for the people, and within ten years your house will burn.

It should be pointed out that finding legitimate investments in some of these general categories is no simple trick.

Personally I still like gold, and to a lesser extent silver, for a relatively safe portfolio of my own. At some point mining stocks with low debt and high dividends may be among the best investments. But I also like portfolio theory in its diversification feature. Never bet the ranch on any one thing unless you are uniquely positioned in terms of knowledge.

A more general theme that is not mentioned, but might be implied, is self-sufficiency, to the extent that such a thing is possible in our interconnected world. No man is an island, or can they be.

1) Focusing on yield, particularly on “high-quality corporates” though he allows for the inclusion of what others might call “junk” bonds from companies with “A-type” balance sheets and “BB-like yields.”

2) Stocks that provide reliable dividends including preferred shares.

3) Whether in stocks or bonds, focusing on companies that have low debt-to-equity ratios, high liquid asset ratios and good balance sheets without heavy debt.

4) Hard assets such as oil and gas royalties and real estate investment trusts, with a focus on income stream.

5) Sectors or companies that have “low fixed costs, high variable costs, high barriers to entry/some sort of oligopolistic features, a relatively high level of demand inelasticity” including utilities, consumer staples and health care.

6) Alternative assets that are “not reliant on rising equity markets and where volatility can be used to its advantage.”

7) Precious metals. Specifically, he says gold as compared to mining output, the Fed’s balance sheet and money supply all indicate that it is far from a bubble, and in fact could rise to $3,000 before it becomes overvalued.

Peter Warburton's financial disaster investment portfolio.

The search is on for the perfect hedge

What would be the ideal characteristics of such a numéraire? First, it would be in fixed physical supply. Second, it would be resistant to weather-related influences. Third, its ownership would be diffuse, rendering futile any attempt to restrict supply through a non-competitive structure. Fourth, it must be freely tradable. Fifth, there would be no futures or options markets attached to it.

Finally, I list some of the candidates, in no particular order. Each seems promising, yet none of them seems to me to satisfy fully all five of the requirements above.

Arable land with a dependable climate

Oil-refining capacity

Electricity generating capacity

Water-treatment capacity

Drinking water, bottled or piped

Coastal access, harbours and ports

Palladium/platinum/diamonds

Real estate in long-standing, distinctive locations

Antiques, fine art, stamps and coins

Commodities without futures and options markets

Could these be the winning investments of the early years of the 21st century?

I should add that I think that "Antiques, fine art, stamps and [collectible] coins" are rather awful investments in most times of distress. They do perform well in times of rising inflation without systemic disruption, but can be remarkably illiquid, and are probably the domain for the specialist collector for whom investment is a secondary concern.

For the most part collectibles are not suitable for 95+ percent of the people. Like most investments that can offer some examples with spectacular gains, the risks are commensurately high and heavily weighted to non-insiders. Bullion makes much more sense than collectible coins for a disaster hedge.

If one reads Adam Fergusson's book, When Money Dies, you can see that in the Weimar experience, people traded their antique furniture for turnips. I like liquidity, portability, and wide acceptance. Gold and silver may become the ultimate hedge if their ownership becomes more widespread and therefore more freely traded hand to hand, and they do not become official money standards, with prices and ownership terms set firmly by government.

Slouching Towards Bethlehem: Double Dip or Banana Split?

"If the 2010 contraction we are now monitoring in consumer demand for discretionary durable goods scales to the full economy as faithfully as the "Great Recession" did, the second dip will, at minimum, be 33% more painful than the first dip and will extend at least half again as long."

This is the case for trouble dead ahead, a worse decline in consumer activity and therefore GDP than the first, and the likelihood of further quantitative easing from the US Federal Reserve to patch over the inability of the political process to reform the financial system and balance the real economy because of their myriad conflicts of interest. These policy errors favoring a small minority will most likely result in a stagflation of the most pernicious and corrosive kind, high unemployment and a rising price of essentials, that may ultimately test the fabric of society. Obsession and sociopathy are not generally ruled or limited by the equilibrium of common sense and ordinary appetite, so I would not expect the powerful minority to draw back from the brink of this crisis voluntarily: a classic scenario for exogenous change. I would enjoy the moral irony of all this if I was watching from the distant future.

The good want power, but to weep barren tears.
The powerful want goodness: worse need for them.
The wise want love, and those who love want wisdom;
And all best things are thus confused to ill.

Shelley, Prometheus Unbound

NBER: Double Dip or Banana Split?
Consumer Metrics Institute
September 21, 2010

We founded the Consumer Metrics Institute precisely because we felt that the economic bureaucrats in Washington were out of touch with the economy that most of us live in. They remind us of those patients sitting in wheelchairs in the "memory impaired" wards at nursing homes: with crystal clear recall of 1937 but no clue about what they ate for breakfast. Thank you, NBER, for making our case.

In contrast, we measure what consumers are actually doing on a daily basis. If, for the sake of argument, we accept that we are not experiencing just "one big scoop," but rather a "double dip" (thereby making the 1930's a "banana split"), we can show evidence that the first dip ended early in 2009. Arguably, we've been monitoring in real-time what could be viewed as two independent consumer demand contraction events that were separated by a stimulus induced "sugar high" last summer. If so, the first dip is ancient history. What is important now is future course of the second dip -- which may just now be revealing itself.

We are far enough "up-stream" in the economic cycle that we can measure changes in consumer demand for discretionary durable goods long before those changes flow "down-stream" to the factories and the GDP. From our up-stream vantage point the "double dip" is not hypothetical, but rather something that we have been watching unfold on a daily basis since January. Now, for the first time, we may have measured what will be the worst of the second dip when it eventually hits the factories -- all because, ironically, our data has started to improve.

Over the 45 days from August 1 to September 15, our Weighted Composite Index has improved substantially, rising from recording a year-over-year contraction rate in excess of 9% to recently registering a contraction rate much nearer to 3%. This is the largest positive movement that we have seen since late 2009. That said, it is important to remember that consumer demand for discretionary durable goods is still contracting, albeit at a slower rate. But the improvement has stopped (at least temporarily) the decline of our 91-day trailing quarter average (our Daily Growth Index):



Our Daily Growth Index reached a -5.86% contraction rate on September 12, which was fully 97% as bad as the worst contraction rate reached during the "Great Recession of 2008" (-6.02% on August 29, 2008). A calendar quarter of comparable GDP growth has occurred among only 1.29% of all quarters of U.S. GDP growth recorded by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, since the spring of 1947. This corresponds to level of contraction that should be expected only once in 19.4 years, and it comes close on the heels of the 2008 contraction that should occur only once in every 21.4 years.

One of the tools that we have used to monitor the 2010 contraction event is a chart that we call our "Contraction Watch," which overlays graphically the day-by-day progression of the current 2010 contraction onto the "Great Recession of 2008":



In the above chart the two contractions are aligned on the left margin at the first day during each event that our Daily Growth Index went negative, and they progress day-by-day to the right, tracing out the daily rate of contraction. This chart conveys important information about the 2010 event, in particular how it differs in profile from the "Great Recession of 2008." It has now lasted three weeks longer than the "Great Recession" and is perhaps only just now forming a bottom. Furthermore, that bottom is very nearly as low as the one experienced in 2008. Even if the 2010 contraction immediately starts to retrace the recovery pattern seen in 2008, we should expect at least another 120 days or so of net contraction before the consumer portion of the economy is growing once again.

We have previously pointed out that the true severity of any contraction event is the area between the "zero" axis in the above chart and the line being traced out by the daily contraction values. By that measure the "Great Recession of 2008" had a total of 793 percentage-days of contraction, and its severity can be visualized as the amount of area covered by red in the chart below:



Similarly, the current 2010 contraction has just reached 592 percentage-days, and its severity can be visualized as the amount of area covered by blue in this chart:



The blue area above already covers about 75% of the area covered by the 2008 "Great Recession", and the curve has only just begun to start back up. Looking ahead, should the 2010 event recover from its bottom exactly like the 2008 event did, it would still experience another 466 percentage-days of contraction before ending -- resulting in a grand total of 1058 percentage-days of contraction for the 2010 event, fully 33% more severe than the "Great Recession of 2008."

That probably bears repeating: if the 2010 contraction we are now monitoring in consumer demand for discretionary durable goods scales to the full economy as faithfully as the "Great Recession" did, the second dip will, at minimum, be 33% more painful than the first dip and will extend at least half again as long. This, of course, assumes that stimuli comparable to those seen in 2008-2009 will be available to cause such a recovery during 2010-2011. Furthermore, the upturn that we measured in 2008 started when unemployment was still at a 6.1% rate, substantially better than we are observing now. Absent fresh consumer stimuli and dropping unemployment rates, the consumer demand contraction we are witnessing now could very well linger even longer.

Supporting that concern is the shape of the 2010 contraction in the above charts, which is significantly different from that of the "Great Recession of 2008." Of particular interest is the fact that in 2010 consumer demand plateaued for some time in a zone between 1% and 3% contraction from about day-25 through about day-180, before falling off the plateau. Since our data is always reflecting year-over-year changes in consumer demand, we had anticipated a sharp dip in our index as an inverted reflection of the stimuli-induced "green shoots" of late last summer. The long plateau described above, however, is not a reflection of any such now lapsed stimuli -- and as such it may be a new normal baseline for a lingering consumer contraction. Before we get too excited about a new recovery we will wait until our Daily Growth Index breaks significantly above the plateau levels visible in the 2010 line within our "Contraction Watch."

We are monitoring the behavior of internet shopping consumers on a daily basis. Those "up-stream" consumer activities will flow "down-stream" to factories and the GDP over the course of weeks or quarters. It's really not unlike being far up a great river and watching a water-level gauge predict that communities further down the river will be flooding catastrophically in a few days or weeks. Although our flood-gauge may have just peaked, unfortunately the damage further downstream remains inevitable -- it simply hasn't arrived yet.

US Economy: Not Yet a Double Dip, But Certainly a 'Stall'

Chart courtesy of EconomPic

Guest Post: A Double Dip Recession? A View from the Consumer Metrics Institute

I have been looking for a commentary to share with you all regarding the most recent US GDP report. I wanted something that went beyond the obvious inventory buildup that boosted the number by almost double, and the shockingly low deflator that was used.

Here is a commentary that seems to capture the big picture of where the US economy stands today, and is able to express it simply and clearly.

Richard Davis of the Consumer Metrics Institute does excellent work, and is available for interviews.

Enjoy.

"The April 30th GDP report issued by the Bureau of Economic Analysis ("BEA") of the U. S. Department of Commerce was a freeze-frame quarterly snapshot of a highly dynamic economy -- an economy that another source indicates was in significant transition while the snapshot was being taken.

Compared to the 4th quarter of 2009, the annualized growth rate of the GDP had dropped by 43%. Depending on your point of view this could be interpreted either as a glass that is "half-full" or a glass that is "half-empty":

1) The "half-full" reading would mean that the GDP numbers confirm that the recovery had at least moderated to a historically normal growth rate. In this scenario the good news would have been that "the economy is still growing," albeit at a historically normal rate. The bad news would have been that a normal growth rate would only warrant normal P/E ratios in the equity markets.

2) The "half-empty" reading would have meant that the near halving of the GDP's growth rate confirmed that (at the factory level) the economy had finally begun to "roll over". If so, the BEA's announcement portends even lower readings in the quarters to follow.

What was clearly missing in the "half-full/half-empty" debate was a feel for whether the level seen in the snapshot's glass was stable or still dropping. At the Consumer Metrics Institute our measurements of the web-based consumer "demand" side economy support the "half-empty" reading of the new GDP data. The new GDP numbers (which are subject to at least two revisions) agree with where our "Daily Growth Index" was on November 24th, 2009, 18 weeks prior to the end of 2010's first calendar quarter -- and when that index was in precipitous decline.

A look at our "Daily Growth Index" also shows that towards the end of November 2009 the "demand" side economic activity was dropping so quickly that a two week change in the sampling period would make a huge difference in the numbers being reported. If the sampling period had shifted to two weeks earlier, the reported GDP number would have been 4.4%, substantially higher. However, if the sampling period had shifted to two weeks later, the GDP growth rate would have been only 2.0%, less than half the reading from only 4 weeks earlier. This is the sign of an economy in rapid transition.

The methodologies used by the BEA when measuring factory production are ill suited to capturing an economy in such rapid transition. In the 4th quarter of 2009 the production side of the economy was topping (reflecting the topping of our measurements on the demand side in August 2009). The first quarter's production environment was at a much more dynamic spot in this particular economic cycle, and the subsequent monthly revisions by the BEA may be significant.

From our perspective the GDP is only confirming where our numbers were in November -- which is, relatively speaking, ancient history. Since then we have seen our "demand" side numbers slip into contraction (on January 15th), and they have recently lingered in the -1.5% "growth" range (see charts below). We have long since recorded the "demand" side activity that has been flowing downstream to the factories during the second quarter of 2010. If the GDP lags our "Daily Growth Index" by 18 weeks again we should see the consumer portion of the 2nd quarter 2010 GDP contracting at a 1.5% clip, less inventory adjustments."

"As you can see from the above chart the current consumer "demand" contraction event is unique: if there is a "second dip" it may very well be unlike anything we have seen recently. Instead of a "call-911" type of event in 2008 or the "hiccup" witnessed in 2006, we may be seeing a "walking pneumonia" type of contraction that has legs.

Our data is significantly upstream economically from the factories and the products measured by the GDP, putting us far ahead of the traditional economic reports. Perhaps our data is too timely; we are so far ahead of conventional economic measures that our story generally differs (either positively or negatively) from the stories being simultaneously reported by more traditional sources."

Charts and commentary courtesy of Richard Davis at the Consumer Metrics Institute.