03 March 2008

IRX index, Interest Rates, the Yield Curve and US Equities


Someone asked us to comment on the IRX index, and its relationship to the SP 500.

The IRX index is the discount rate of the 13 week Treasury bill. It is called the discount rate because it has no coupon, but matures to its full face value. But it does have an effective interest rate, and this is what the IRX index is.

So to understand the IRX we need a little understanding of Treasury Bills.

U.S. Treasury bills (T-bills) are among the safest short-term financial instruments denominated in dollars because these debt obligations are perceived to have virtually no default risk. Moreover, because T-bills mature in less than one year, with most maturing in a matter of months, they do not have a significant interest rate risk component, either. This is a major difference between T bills and T bonds and notes which are of longer durations.

There are four major influences on the price and yield (discount rate) of Treasury bills:

  • Demand for risk-free fixed-income securities in general as opposed to other short term investment choices. For example, a "flight to safety" caused by concerns about default or liquidity risk in other financial markets may cause investors to shift to T-bills to avoid risk.
  • Supply of T-bills by the U.S. government--for example, federal budget surpluses in 1998-2000 temporarily reduced the supply of some Treasury securities issues.
  • Economic conditions may influence rates-- T-bill rates typically rise during periods of business expansion and fall during recessions.
  • Monetary policy actions by the Federal Reserve--Fed actions that affect the Federal funds rate likely will influence interest rates for short-term instruments like T-bills.
  • Inflation and inflation expectations also are factors in determining interest rates--for example, periods of relatively high (low) rates of inflation usually are associated with relatively high (low) interest rates on T-bills.
Here is a graph showing the 3 month discount rate going back to 1934. The primary value of this is to show what a truly dramatic event the inflation of the 1970's had been, and how remarkable and historic the steps taken by Fed Chairman Paul Volker had been to bring it back under control and prevent it from growing and evolving into something more dangerous.












Here is a graph showing the profound effect that the Fed Fund Target Rate, with changes anticipated by the Effective Funds Rate, has on the 13 week T Bill rate in the secondary markets. The 13 week T Bill discount rate is called by the Fed the 3 month Treasury Bill secondary market rate. There is an index that tracks this yield that is called the IRX. The short term rates move lower with recession and higher with business expansions. This is not only the result of Fed actions, but also the demands of business as stated in the four influences above.













    If we include the Ten Year Treasury Note Yield to the Chart, we can see the long end of the yield reacting to the perceptions of inflation. But perhaps more importantly we can see Yield Curve Inversions on the chart. These are times when the long end of the curve, represented by the Ten Year note, has a yield less than the effective interest rate of the short end of the curve, as represented either by Effective Fed Funds or the 3 Month T Bill Discount Rate.













    If we add the SP 500 to this chart, we can now see the interaction of a relatively broad stock market index with the short end and the long ends of a the yield curve. Of special interest is the clear presaging that a yield curve inversion provides for an economic recession and a stock market bear market. Note the timing of the inversion, the recession, and the approximate stock market market bottom.













    We find the example above just a little 'short' because it does not reflect the real SP 500 adjusted for inflation, but merely the nominal number. Of course the interest rates shown are not real rates, but the nominal rates. With inflation, the real interest rate has probably gone negative. The problem we have in most of these instances is that the CPI in our opinion is no longer a valid measure of inflation, having been corrupted by the Clinton and Bush administrations. So we will deflate the SP 500 by gold.













    The chart above helps to illustrate the sad truth that the economic recovery after the bursting of the tech bubble was just a mirage caused by what we call The Great Reflation. The clever boys at the Fed, thinking they had learned their lesson from the Great Depression, were determined to pile on the monetary stimulus early and heavily. Alas, although it triggered a housing bubble and a reflating of the stock bubble, it was coopted and misspent by a corrupt financial sector. There is also a strong case to be made that one cannot reflate their way out of a bust following a boom, by attempting to recreate the boom. The recovery must come from reform, hard work, and savings.

    It becomes difficult if not impossible for most people to pick out relationships on charts like these, unless they have a mathematical background or many years studying complex graphs. And personally we like to use the math anyway, because we find the eye deceives where the numbers tell the truth.

    Let's just say that we're in for a rough time of it in equities in the US, and we are in a recession now. Why couldn't the Fed have kept rates low? Why did they have to raise the Fed funds rate and trigger the yield curve inversion? Why not just keep things as they were. The answer is clearly contained in the first chart. There are too few instances wherein you can unleash the inflation genie from the bottle, and hope to get it back in again gracefully. Volker did a remarkable job AND was exceptionally fortunate. It may not be so easy the next time, and the alternative is, for bankers at least, hyperinflation and the abyss.

    As a final note, we wanted to mention that some years ago a few clever economists found out that its not so much what the inflation rate is that triggers the inflationary spiral, but rather what people think it is. This is not some arcane Clintonian parsing of logic, but a clear connection between perception and behaviour. It is the behaviours that people take in anticipation of inflation that reinforce it like a feedback loop and make it particularly nasty. So if you can control their perception of inflation, the Fed will have a much greater degree of latitude in engineering the economy and money supply since inflation is a major pitfall. What might they do to manage that perception? They aren't being subtle about it, we'll say that much for now. (Hint: three major indicators of inflation are the CPI, broad money measures like M3, and Gold.)

    To summarize, the economy is in a recession, and the SP 500 has more correcting to do by historical standards. Short term rates are moving lower ahead of the recession. The Fed will not be able to raise short term rates until the recession is behind us, which means that the US Dollar has further downside potential unless the G8 countries take some extraordinary actions to help the dollar, most likely by inflating their own currencies. The Fed has a tradeoff between the stock market and the economy on one hand, and the dollar and the Treasuries on the other.

    01 March 2008

    The Big Lie


    "ONE great puzzle about the recent housing bubble is why even most experts didn’t recognize the bubble as it was forming. Alan Greenspan, a very serious student of the markets, didn’t see it, and, moreover, he didn’t see the stock market bubble of the 1990s, either." Robert Shiller, How a Bubble Stayed Under the Radar, NY Times, March 2, 2008

    I recognise that there is a stock market bubble problem at this point, and I agree with Governor Lindsey that this is a problem that we should keep an eye on....We do have the possibility of raising major concerns by increasing margin requirements. I guarantee that if you want to get rid of the bubble, whatever it is, that will do it.” Alan Greenspan, September 24, 1996 FOMC Minutes

    "While everyone enjoys an economic party the long-term costs of a bubble to the economy and society are potentially great. They include a reduction in the long-term saving rate, a seemingly random distribution of wealth, and the diversion of financial human capital into the acquisition of wealth. As in the United States in the late 1920s and Japan in the late 1980s, the case for a central bank ultimately to burst that bubble becomes overwhelming. I think it is far better that we do so while the bubble still resembles surface froth and before the bubble carries the economy to stratospheric heights. Whenever we do it, it is going to be painful, however.” Larry Lindsey, Federal Reserve Governor, September 24, 1996 FOMC Minutes (the same Larry Lindsey who was later fired by G. W. Bush for stating that the Iraq War could cost as much as 200 Billion dollars when Rumsfeld estimated less than 50 billion).

    "As societies grow decadent, the language grows decadent, too. Words are used to disguise, not to illuminate, action...Words are used to confuse, so that at election time people will solemnly vote against their own interests." Gore Vidal, Imperial America, 2004

    His primary rules were: never allow the public to cool off; never admit a fault or wrong; never concede that there may be some good in your enemy; never leave room for alternatives; never accept blame; concentrate on one enemy at a time and blame him for everything that goes wrong; people will believe a big lie sooner than a little one; and if you repeat it frequently enough people will sooner or later believe it." United States Office of Strategic Services, Adolf Hitler, p.51

    "...when one lies, one should lie big, and stick to it. They keep up their lies, even at the risk of looking ridiculous...If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for such time as the State can shield the people from the political, economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.”

    " Joseph Goebbels
    "All this was inspired by the principle...that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility, because the broad masses of a nation...often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods. It would never come into their heads to fabricate colossal untruths, and they would not believe that others could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously. Even though the facts which prove this may be brought clearly to their minds, they will still doubt and waver and will continue to think that there may be some other explanation." Adolph Hitler, Mein Kampf

    "Through clever and constant application of propaganda, people can be made to see paradise as hell, and also the other way round, to consider the most wretched sort of life as paradise." Adolf Hitler

    "...we're going to redesign the current system...you don't have anything to worry about -- third time I've said that. (Laughter.) I'll probably say it three more times. See, in my line of work you got to keep repeating things over and over and over again for the truth to sink in, to kind of catapult the propaganda. (Applause.)" George W. Bush, May 24, 2005

    "...the problem at its root is a flawed business model, and that business model is the product of a government regulatory decision to repeal Glass-Steagall administratively and legislatively, and to seek this tremendous concentration of power; and then the abuse of that power by the investment houses...What we want to do is clean up the system and hold the individuals accountable, and that is what we have tried to do...But there was an understanding that if we were to seek criminal sanctions against either the institution or the most senior people of the institution, the practical impact in our regulatory environment would have been to destroy those institutions, and then structural reform would be meaningless...because the harm to our economy that would result from eliminating a Citigroup or a Merrill Lynch is enormous, and it's disproportionate to the remedy that we want.....It was incredible. It was distressing to me how simple and outrageous it was. It wasn't so complicated that you said, "Wow, at least they're smart in the way they're doing it." It was simple. It was brazen. The evidence of it was overwhelming. It's just that it hadn't been revealed to the public, and that's why could get away with it...Right, we have seen a failure of accountability -- what I call a crisis of accountability -- over the past decade, in many institutions...Over the past decade we've wanted to deregulate, and we've said, "Let's get government out of the business of looking at these issues, and permit industry to control itself, because we can trust them." Maybe that's been a very good thing in some ways. One of the things that is eminently clear from our investigation is that all the compliance departments, all the self-regulation is nothing. They watched it, but they did nothing. So we've got to think this through, and it's not only the financial community. There are a lot of sectors where we have said self-regulation is the answer. We've got to think about it." Eliot Spitzer, The Wall Street Fix, March 16, 2003


    29 February 2008

    The Explosive US Monetary Inflation


    MONEY is primarily a medium of exchange, and a proxy store of value.

    WEALTH is an asset based store of value.

    You convert wealth to money in order to exchange it for some other good, some other asset, whether it is to be saved (durable) or consumed (non-durable). If you exchange assets without using a medium of exchange, that is called barter.

    Many confuse the destruction of wealth with the destruction of money.

    If the amount of money grows faster than the net amount of wealth added by non-monetary methods such as productive effort that is inflation. This is not to be confused by price inflation caused by asset specific imbalances in supply and demand.

    Some items, such as gold and silver, are both wealth and money, since their value is not narrowly contingent on time and place.

    MZM is the best measure of US 'money' that the Federal Reserve provides. It is money in that it is readily available at par value, without time or penalty constraints, excepting inflation.






















    Still unclear? As they say, one picture is worth a 1000 words.



    28 February 2008

    Why Are We Allowing Unbridled Greed to Destroy Our Childrens' Future?


    This started under the Clinton Administration, and reached its full flower under the Bush Administration. It was supported and enabled by those who turned a blind eye to go along to get along in the Federal Reserve and Congress. The heart of this darkness is Wall Street and the corrupt political system in which sacred duty walks the street for hire in the cloak of patriotism, fear-mongering, false piety, and a pathological apathy towards duty, honor and virtue. This is the shame of our generation.



    Note: Gary J. Aguirre is the SEC employee who was fired over an abortive attempt to pursue the Pequod insider trading case.


    GARY J. AGUIRRE
    By Facsimile or Electronic Mail
    February 13,2008



    Senator Christopher Dodd
    Chairman
    United States Senate Committee on
    Banking, Housing and urban Affairs
    728 Hart Senate Office Building
    Washington, D.C. 20510

    Senator Richard C. Shelby
    Ranking Member
    United States Senate Committee on
    Banking, Housing and urban Affairs
    110 Hart Senate Office Building
    Washington, DC 20510


    Re: Hearing on the of State of the United States Economy and Financial Markets


    Dear Chairman Dodd and Ranking Member Shelby:

    As the current credit crisis unfolds, investors and the public must rely upon your Committee to uncover its causes and scope. Your hearing on Thursday, The State of the United States Economy and Financial Markets, offers an opportunity to question those regulators who are responsible for protecting the capital markets from this evolving crisis. I respectfully submit there are two key questions that penetrate to the core of this crisis:

    1) Why did counterparty discipline fail?

    2) Why did the SEC stop an investigation three years ago that could have averted the subprime crisis? (footnote l)

    I will try to put these questions into sharper focus with the context below.

    The myth of counter party discipline

    In essence, the nation has two capital markets: one market is semi-transparent and semiregulated; the other market is opaque and unregulated.

    The semi-transparent market appears on balance sheets. It is subject to SEC regulations requiring disclosure. It includes investment banks and public companies that regularly file SEC forms disclosing their financial operations.

    The opaque market has its own players and its own playing field. The players are hedge funds -also unregulated and opaque- and the proprietary desks of investments banks. As investment banks own more and more hedge funds, their players also become unregulated and opaque. The playing field is the over-the-counter derivatives and instruments, such as subprime debt, which are off the balance sheets.

    The opaque market is experiencing geometric growth. The notional value of the derivative market has increased fivefold since 2003, from around $100 trillion to over $500 trillion. Likewise, hedge funds are having the same geometric growth in assets under management and in sheer numbers. The SEC predicts the assets under managements by hedge funds will grow from $2 trillion to $6 trillion by 2015. Hedge funds currently dominate the trading markets around the world-with only $2 trillion in assets. It is hard to envision the extent to which they will control the markets when their assets grow to $6 trillion, all operating in the shadows.

    Hedge funds love to play with the most dangerous forms of derivatives~credit default swaps (CDS). There are now $42 trillion in CDS. These guarantees differ little from gambling. The potential rewards for insider trading are nearly unlimited, as is the negative impact on the capital markets.

    After the Great Crash, Congress enacted legislation designed to make our markets transparent. The same legislation created the Securities and Exchange Commission. As money flows from the regulated market to the unregulated market, we are now recreating the conditions that existed immediately before the Great Crash.

    The investment banks and hedge funds have come up with a new principle for protecting the capital markets. It is called counterparty discipline. Translated, it means: "Trust us." The term is tossed around as if it were natural law in the financial markets, much like gravity in the physical world.

    In reality, counterparty discipline is a slogan, a myth, which has been sold to regulators by investment banks and hedge funds so they can operate in the shadows without regulation. We hear about counterparty discipline during Congressional hearings from those who wish the opaque, unregulated markets to grow. During financial crises, the same folks talk less about "counterparty discipline." Indeed, we are only told that it "eroded" without explanation why.

    In fact, the theory of counterparty discipline reverses reality. When the markets are moving upward, optimism is high. It is a cliche, but nevertheless true, that upward trading markets are driven by greed. All of our major investment banks, with the possible exception of Goldman Sachs, failed to detect that subprime debt was a time bomb. Why did counterparty discipline fail the investment banks in their moment of need? I respectfully submit this question should be posed to the three regulators who are testifying on Thursday.

    Where is the SEC?

    Over the past two months, the Wall Street journal, the New York Times, Reuters, CNBC and Forbes have all asked a single question: where was the SEC on subprime debt? (footnote 2)

    Significantly, three rears ago, the SEC was conducting an investigation that could have averted the subprime crisis. The investigation focused on Bear Stearns' evaluation of subprime debt, the core issue in the current crisis. The investigation reached a point where Bear Stearns was told it would be charged.

    Then, for no known reason, the investigation was switched off. A recent Wall Street Journal article suggests that the effective prosecution of the Bear Steams case might have averted the subprime crises.4

    The Bear Steams investigation is stunningly similar to the SEC investigation of Pequot Capital Management which I headed. Like Bear Steams, the Pequot investigation appeared to be advancing towards a filing. Like Bear Steams, senior SEC management decided to halt the investigation. Like Bear Steams, the SEC was later forced to focus on the underlying abuse, but only after that abuse grabbed media attention. In Bear Steams, the underlying abuse was overvalued subprime debt. In Pequot, the underlying abuse was widespread insider trading by hedge funds.

    We know why the Pequot investigation was stopped. According to a joint report by the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committees, a major investment bank, Morgan Stanley, retained an influential attorney who intervened at the highest level of the Division of Enforcement to stop the investigation. The two Senate committees concluded that senior SEC officials gave preferential treatment to a member of Wall Street's elite and then fired the lead investigator (me) when he questioned that decision. None of the senior SEC officials who derailed the Pequot investigation were ever disciplined. Was the Bear Steams investigation stopped in a similar way?
    Did another influential attorney, hired by Bear Steams, place a call to a high-level official at the SEC?

    Your Committee has oversight jurisdiction of the SEC. The SEC's mission is to protect the capital markets and investors. It had a chance to protect the capital markets from the current subprime crisis three years ago, when it was investigating whether Bear Steams overvalued subprime debt. Why did the SEC call a halt to the Bear Steams investigation? Who made that decision?


    Sincerely,

    [Gary J. Aguirre]




    CC: Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and urban Affairs.


    1 Michael Siconolfi, Did Authorities Miss a Chance To Ease Crunch?--SEC, Spitzer Probed Bear CDO Pricing in '05, Before Backing Away, Wall S1.J., Dec. 10, 2007, at C1.

    2 Id.; Gretchen Morgenson, 0 Wise Bank, What Do We Do? (No Fibbing Now), N. Y. times,
    January 27, 2008, at 1; Karey Wutkowski, SEC Chief Awaits Final Senate Report on Pequot, Reuters News, February 9, 2007; http://www.cnbc.com/id/22706231/site/14081545/; and Liz Moyer, Credit Crisis: Where Was The SEC? Forbes.com, Feb. 6,2008. Available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/05/ sec-cmos-banking-biz-wall-cx 1m 0206sec.html.

    3 Michael Siconolfi, Did Authorities Miss a Chance To Ease Crunch?--SEC, Spitzer Probed Bear CDO Pricing in '05, Before Backing Away, Wall S1.J., Dec. 10,2007, at Cl.

    4 Id.

    5 Senate Report No. 110-28 (2007), at 684 Available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202007 /Leg%20 110%20080307%20SEC.pdf.




    Copy of Gary J. Aguirre's Original Letter