18 January 2009

The Fed is Monetizing Debt and Inflating the Money Supply


Here are the latest figures on the growth of the various money supply measures.

See Money Supply: A Primer for a review of measures and their differences.

The charts indicate that the growth in the money supply is due to a significant monetization of debt by the Fed in expanding its balance sheet and deficit spending by the Treasury, rather than organic growth from credit expansion from commercial sources and economic activity. The negative GDP figures confirm this.

You could imagine this as a tug of war if you wish. On one side is the deflationary force of bad debt and falling aggregate demand. On the other is the Treasury, the Fed, and the Congress, using the triple threat of deficit spending, monetization of debt, and stimulus programs. The limits of the power of the Feds are the value of the dollar and the acceptability of Treasury debt.

There is no lack of debt that can be monetized. To think otherwise is fantasy. But there are limitations about how much the dollar can bear, which is why the banks and moneyed interests have shoved their way to the front of the line, and are gorging themselves now with a little help from their friends in the Treasury and the Fed. When the time comes they intend to throw the public agenda under the bus. Its an old script, many times performed with minor enhancements.

If the current trend continues, it will have an inflationary effect on certain financial assets and commodities, and a negative impact on the dollar. There are lags in the appearance of this, but it will come.

Because the Dollar Index (DX) is an outmoded and artificial measure of dollar strength, containing nothing to account for the Chinese renminbi for example, it may not be a true reflection of the progress of this inflation. Time will tell.

A similar case might be made for certain strategic commodities, gold and oil, which are the instrument of government policy. Although it is much less important, silver may be one of the first commodities to break out because the government maintains no significant physical inventory of it as it does for gold and oil.

The huge short interest in silver may be an ignored scandal on the order of the Madoff Ponzi fund, not in dollar magnitude, but likely in terms of regulatory lapse and deep capture.



M1 has become a much less useful measure of the money supply these days because of changes in banking rules and technology. However, M1 is a good intermediate measure of the impact of the growth in the Fed's balance sheet as it feeds through the system.





Growth in MZM frequently results in financial asset expansion once it gains traction.



The US Dollar does not generally react well to aggressive growth in MZM.



The growth of credit, organic growth from economic activity, is sluggish.



The growth in the Monetary Base due to Fed inflationary activity has been nothing short of spectacular, without equal in US monetary history. This makes all Money Multiplier measures that use the AMB in the denominator meaningless for now.



The spike in Treasury settlement failures is one measure of the stress in the financial system. It seems to be quieter now, after spiking in response to seizures in the bonds trading. We will maintain a watch on this.



17 January 2009

The Plot to Overthrow FDR - The History Channel


The beginnings of the Great Depression, and the conflicts that tested the Republic to its foundations, and the commitment to freedom around the world.


Video Documentary The History Channel

The Plot to Overthrow FDR



The American Liberty League


Responses to the Great Depression 1929-1939

16 January 2009

Charts in the Babson Style for the Week Ending 16 January


As a reminder, all US markets will be closed on Monday for a national holiday.





Congressional Budget Offices Estimate TARP Losses at $64 Billion


Congressional Budget Office
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Report


CBO is required by law to report semiannually on OMB’s assessment of expenditures under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Today, CBO released the first of these reports. (For more on the TARP program, this blog post from October includes CBO’s analysis of the financial rescue legislation).

Through December 31, 2008, the Treasury disbursed $247 billion to acquire assets under that program. CBO valued those assets using discounted present-value calculations similar to those generally applied to federal loans and loan guarantees, but adjusting for market risk as specified in the legislation that established the TARP.

On that basis, CBO estimates that the net cost of the TARP’s transactions (broadly speaking, the difference between what the Treasury paid for the investments or lent to the firms and the market value of those transactions) amounts to $64 billion—that is, measured in 2008 dollars, we expect the government to recover about three quarters of its initial investment.

The Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) report on the TARP, issued in early December, only addressed the first $115 billion distributed under the program. CBO and OMB do not differ significantly in their assessments of the net cost of those transactions (between $21 billion and $26 billion), but they vary in their judgments as to how the transactions should be reported in the federal budget.

Thus far, the Administration is accounting for capital purchases made under the TARP on a cash basis rather than on such a present-value basis—that is, the Administration is recording the full amount of the cash outlays up front and will record future recoveries in the year in which they occur. That treatment will show more outlays for the TARP this year and then show receipts in future years.