Why Is the Fed Creating Excess Reserves in the Banking System and Paying Interest on Them?

There have been some interesting side discussions at various venues including Naked Capitalism about the recent essay which I had posted titled When At First You Don't Succeed, Bring in the Reserves.

Let me clarify some points.

Yes, banking reserves in the US are a function of the Fed's Balance Sheet, by definition, because they are in the narrowest sense merely an accounting function, an entry on the books of the Fed reflecting actions undertaken by the Fed.

With purpose, I put the formal definitions of Reserve Bank Credit and Reserve Balances at the bottom of each chart. I had hoped this would make that point clear.

The essence of the essay was to point out the enormous increase in bank reserves which the Fed has created through their "New Deal for Wall Street" style banking programs. Because of this, the Fed has created a new function by which it pays interest on banking reserves, which to my knowledge it has never done before.

It is a new function at the Fed, and it does serve a important purpose. The purpose is to place a 'floor' under interest rates, in the face of a surfeit of liquidity which the Fed has created, and which shows up in the Adjusted Monetary Base, the Reserve Bank Credit figures, and so forth.

Now, some people have taken issue with my bringing the notion of excess Reserves to your attention for a variety of reasons. Even the mighty NY Fed has written a paper which attempts to defuse the notion that the excess reserves are indicative of anything that might be impeding lending.

Let me be clear about this.

The excess reserves are absolutely indicative of the Fed's having added substantial amounts of liquidity to the financial system. If the Fed were not paying interest on reserves, this liquidity would crush their target interest rates, since the banks are loath to hold reserves that are not generating some return. This is what they do, generate a return on capital. Capital has a price, even if it is an opportunity cost.

By establishing a floor, the Fed is setting a more blatant artificial level for interest rates, moreso than merely tinkering with drains and adds to the system. They are offering a riskless rate of return, and crowding out other competing requests for capital. Not necessarily a bad thing, but a reality of what they are doing.

What would happen if the Fed raised the interest rate it pays on reserves to let's say, twenty percent?

Economic activity in the US would grind to a halt, as banks placed every available dollar idly with the Fed's program, eschewing all other deals, liquidating assets if necessary, to place capital where it would receive the highest risk adjusted return. In essence, the Fed would 'crowd out' all other transactions that offered a lower risk adjusted return.

What if the Fed subsequently lowered the interest rate from twenty percent to zero? It would then enable more lending from the banks, as they sought to deploy their capital at higher risk adjusted rates.

There are some by the way that claim the excess reserves are so high because there is no demand for loans. This is a point of view only supported by those who a) have no understanding of finance and b) are seeking to support an extremely odd and mistaken view of the economy which seeks to justify their bets on a serious deflation.

There is always a demand for loans as long as there is economic activity; what varies is the price! Money is not particularly inelastic; that is, there is a rather high threshold at which people say, "I have too much!" It is rather a question of price, relative to return. Make the opportunity cost high enough and they will come (or be fired).

I hereby assert that I will borrow ALL funds the Fed might loan to me with no collateral at zero interest, and gladly so, as long as the short term US Treasury bills are paying more than 25 basis points interest. I reserve the right to defer on this offer if the Fed should make the policy error of hyperinflation a reality.

I hate to make points like this in the extreme with distorted examples, but sometimes it is what it requires to pierce through obfuscation to common sense.

So to summarize, what is the Fed likely to do if economic activity falters?

They are likely to lower interest rates paid on excess reserves closer to zero. They could even charge a 'haircut' on excess reserves which would highly motivate the banks.

These are all things which have been discussed before, often in the context of consumers! In fact, it is well known among bankers that as the Fed lowers interest rates money flows out of lower paying instruments like bank deposits and money markets, and into higher paying instruments that might be deemed too risky at high rates of riskless return. Such higher paying instruments are known as "stocks" and "corporate bonds." As former central banker Wayne Angell gleefully chortled in 2004, the Fed can indeed drive the public out of their savings and money market funds and into the equity markets by manipulating interest rates.

Does the Fed always 'create' excess reserves? It may be more correct to ask, does the Fed always create money, since excess reserves are an accounting function.

No. Banking reserves normally lag the creation of money, which is accomplished by lending, either from banks or more recently by neo-banks like Fannie, Freddie, GMAC, GE and so forth.

But at a time when economic activity is contracting, and the credit markets were seizing, the Fed took the lead in money creation by "monetizing" various types of debt. And they are going to enormous pains to maintain 'confidence' in the system and in particular the US dollar and debt. But we may ask, at what point does the confidence game become a con game? I would submit that it is when the Fed and Treasury purposely intervene in markets, beyond their normal interest rate targeting, and statistics and spread disinformation to manage perception.

There are other ways in which the Fed might address the failure of the productive economy to 'pick up the ball and run with it.' But most, if not all, of them involve the monetization of something, which is what happens when the Fed (and US Treasury) are taking the lead in money creation and not the productive economy.

Deflationists do not want to hear this, and central bankers do not wish you to know this, but it is the major factor in a fiat currency that it can be created literally 'out of nothing.'

This is why we have said long ago, and repeated since, that the limiting factor on the Fed's ability to create money is the value of the US Dollar and the sovereign debt.

As long as there is debt which can be monetized, then the Fed can monetize it and create money 'out of nothing.' For now they are acting with some reestraint, and channeling that money primarily to their cronies in the banking system, still able to mask the effects of their monetary inflation. CFTC Moves to Rein In Small Investors From Commodity ETFs

But the time is coming when they will not. And as they did when they demanded $700 billion in bailout money, the financiers will once again make the Administration and the Congress an offer which they think that 'we' cannot refuse, if only because the Congress will not listen if we tell them what we wish them to do, again.

The banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, and the economy brought back into productive balance, before their can be a sustained recovery.

When At First You Don't Succeed, Bring In the Reserves

Someone asked why Bernanke seemed so positive about the US recovery, and what he would do if his prediction turned out to be incorrect.

The first answer is rather straightforward. He is 'jawboning' or trying to increase confidence in the system to motivate businesses to spend and consumers to buy. The Fed can only set the playing field, but the players have to be confident enough to take the field. We think he is underestimating the neglect that the American consumer has taken over the last twenty years in terms of their overall poor condition (real income), and the disrepair of their equipment (household balance sheets), not to mention the rocks and snares and pitfalls remaining on the field from the gangs of New York and the economic royalists.

But let's assume Bernanke's first major gambit does falter. What is he likely to do next?

Beranke's Fed does have a printing press, and he has been using it as we all know. Here is a chart showing the expansion of the credit side of the Fed's Balance Sheet. This is from the top line labeled "Reserve Bank Credit" from the weekly H.41 report which is becoming more popularly followed these days. If one adds the Feds gold holdings, currency in circulation, and Special Drawing Rights, we get the Total Factors Supplying Reserve Funds.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/Current/



So what would Ben do for "Plan B?" Would he merely add more programs, expand the Fed's Credit Items even more aggressively?

There was an important function added to the Fed's bag of tricks during this crisis that has not received sufficient attention perhaps: their ability to pay interest on reserve funds on deposit with the Fed from the Member Banks.

As can be seen from this next chart, this amount is now substantial running close to a trillion dollars. A portion of this would be characterized as 'excess reserves.' The Fed should be able to motivate banks to use these reserve by adjusting the riskless interest rates they pay.

This was a much desired tool by the monetarist Fed because it enabled them to expand their Balance Sheet and add a significant amount of credit to the banks system immediately, but to keep 'a bit of a leash' on the downstream effects of this liquidity even after it was deployed.

As the Fed's interest rate remains sufficiently high, the reserves, especially the excess reserves, remain in the banking system, and are not deployed actively as loans and inflationary additions to the financial system.

The Fed issues an H3 report, Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base. In their latest report, they characterize $708.5 Billion of these reserves as 'Excess Reserves.'

So, what we might expect to see is the Fed, as the banking system stabilizes after perhaps some new programs and credit facilities, begin to slowly unleash these excess reserves by reducing the interest to the Member Banks, which would lower the bar and motivate them to engage in more commercial loan activity.

We think one problem is that the banks have more options than merely keeping their excess capital at the Fed or loaning it out to private companies.

Certainly Goldman Sachs has shown that it can defy all the odds and make millions each day by aggressively playing the equity, bond and credit markets. It is also more likely that banks would be inclined to invest their excess capital through acquisitions of other banks, which might represent a moral hazard in creating fewer, and more "too large to fail" institutions.

Therefore we might see the first serious moves towards financial reform before the Fed begins to really unleash the liquidity which they have created in the banking system.

There is of course also their monetization of Treasury Debt, to support the stimulus programs being run from the fiscal side of the US financial apparatus. That would be included in the expansion of their Balance Sheet, and we would expect that to continue on at the very least indirectly, if not overtly on the Fed's balance sheet.

An Aside on the Gold Stock of the Fed

By the way, one method the Fed might use to immediately expand its Balance Sheet would be to recognize that their gold stock is significantly undervalued.

In the H.41 Report, the Fed shows a credit of $11 billion dollars in Gold Stock held primarily in New York, Chicago, Atlanta, and San Francisco, with lesser amounts at each of the Regional Banks. This gold is part of the collateral against the Federal Reserve Notes in circulation, and has been valued at an official rate of $42.22 per troy ounce for many years.

1. Gold held "under earmark" at Federal Reserve Banks for foreign and international accounts is not included in the gold stock of the United States; see table 3.13, line 3. Gold stock is valued at $42.22 per fine troy ounce

By calculation the Fed has 261,511,132 fine troy ounces on its books. If the Fed revalued their gold stock at a more reasonable market price of let's say $1000 per ounce, then this would immediately add $261 billion to the Fed's Balance Sheet IF the gold is really held by the Fed without encumbrances.

One has to wonder why the Fed has never taken the revaluation on its Balance Sheet for gold since the value of $42.22 is so clearly an historic artifact. They perform much more market based calculations for the Special Drawing Rights and their Foreign Exchange holdings. One certainly does not need to sell the gold in order to monetize it, since that has already been accomplished, albeit at a much lower rate.

One can only wonder.

Federal Reserve H3.1.2 US Reserve Assets

SP Futures Hourly Chart at Noon

The "W bottom" worked, and equities blew through the Pivot this morning on 'better than expected' housing starts, and a general consensus among the financial spokesmen that the recession is over, although with risks to the downside if stimulus and more importantly monetary support from the Fed, is withdrawn from the financial system too quickly.

Today is option expiration in August. Our high confidence target of 1021 has been met on the chart. Now the market must prove that it can consolidate and move higher.

Our view is that the recession is not over, and that the Fed and Treasury have merely papered over the substantial problems that remain, while alleviating the short term credit crunch issues with absolutely massive injections of liquidity directly into the banks.

Having said all that, stocks can rise without regard to any fundamentals for some time if there is enough will and capital to make it happen. Treasury and the Fed wish this badly because rising stocks will quickly make people forget their mistakes and uneven policy reactions.

Can they do it? We will see. The result *should* be another financial asset bubble at best, a lingering zombie economy very likely at worst.

Should they fail, probably off an exogenous event which can absorb the blame, then the market will fold like an old accordion because there is little commitment underneath it, only paper.

Why the Austrian, Keynesian, Marxist, Monetarist, and Neo-Liberal Economists Are All Wrong

US Personal Income has taken its worst annual decline since 1950.

This is why it is an improbable fantasy to think that the consumer will be able to pull this economy out of recession using the normal 'print and trickle down' approach. In the 1950's the solution was huge public works projects like the Interstate Highway System and of course the Korean War.

Until the median wage improves relative to the cost of living, there will be no recovery. And by cost of living we do not mean the chimerical US Consumer Price Index.

The classic Austrian prescription is to allow prices to decline until the median wage becomes adequate. Given the risk of a deflationary wage-price spiral, which is desired by no one except for the cash rich, the political risks of such an approach are enormous.

On paper it is obvious that a market can 'clear' at a variety of levels, if wages and prices are allowed to move freely. After all, if profits are diminished, income can obviously be diminished by a proportional amount, and nothing has really changed in terms of viable consumption.

The Supply side idealists (cash rich bosses, Austrians, neo-liberal, monetarist, and deflationist theorists) would like to see this happen at a lower level through a deflationary spiral. The Keynesians and neo-classicals wish to see it driven through the Demand side, with higher wages rising to meet the demands of profit in an inflationary expansion. Both believe that market forces alone can achieve this equilibrium. Across both groups runs a sub-category of statism vs. individualism.

Unfortunately both groups are wrong.

Both approaches require an ideal, almost frictionless, objectively rational, and honest economy in order to succeed. The Keynesians have a bit of an edge in this, because it is easier to control inflation than deflation in a fiat regime, and the natural growth of inflation tends to satiate the impulse to greed. They don't care if they can buy more as long as they can say they HAVE more. People tend to be irrational, and there is a percentage of the population that is irrationally greedy and obsessively rapacious. People are not naturally 'good.'

The greatest flaw in the many studies that come from each of the schools to prove their point is the brutal way in which they flatten the reality of the markets and make assumptions to allow their equations and analysis to 'work.' They spend most of their energy showing while the 'other school' is a group of ignorant fools, doomed to ignominious failure, in an atmosphere reminiscent of a university departmental meeting.

This has quietly scandalized those from other scientific disciplines who review the work of many of the leading economists. Benoit Mandelbrot was poking enormous holes in the work of the leading economists long before Nassim Taleb made it more widely known. The ugly truth is that economics is a science in the way that medicine was a profession while it still used leeches to balance a person's vapours. Yes, some are always better than others, and certainly more entertaining, but they all tended to kill their patients.

The most intractable part of the current financial crisis, and the ongoing problem of the US economy is the huge tax which is levied on the American public by its corporations, primarily in the financial and health care sectors, and a political system based on lobbyists and their campaign contributions.

There are hidden taxes and impediments to 'free trade' at every turn. The ugly truth is that capitalism-in-practice hates free markets, always seeking to overturn the rules and impose oligopoly if not outright monopoly through barriers to entry, manipulation of the political process, distortion of regulation, predatory pricing, brute force, and the usual slate of anti-trust practices.

Some of these 'hidden taxes' are the bonuses on Wall Street which require an increasing percentage of the financial 'action.' The credit cards fees and penalties levied by banks to support profits in a contracting economy. The Sales General & Administrative portion of the Income Statements of the pharmaceutical industry which only American consumers seem willing to pay. A health care system which is a monument to overspending, outrageous pricing, and greed.

The notion that "if only government would not regulate markets at all everything would be fine" is a variation of Rousseau's romantic notion of the noble savage which no one believes except those who wish to continue to act like savages, and those who get no closer to the real work of an economy than their textbooks. Economic Darwinism works primarily to the advantage of the sharks. Anyone who believes that 'no regulations' works well has never driven on a modern highway at peak periods.

Yes, a certain portion of the population are adult, and generally good and fair. But there is a percentage of the population that is not. And since the 1980's they have been encouraged by the culture of relativism and greed to 'express themselves' and so they have, with a vengeance.

Discussion rarely proceeds very far because of the dialectical nature of American thought. Both extremes are wrong, but they seem to content to merely bash each other, pointing out their errors, while repeating the same mistakes over and again.

The engineering of the economy has become married to the engineering of the political dialogue by the corporate media and their political parties. "The engineering of consent is the very essence of the democratic process, the freedom to persuade and suggest." Edward L. Bernays 1947

The condition of the American economy is strikingly similar to the Soviet state economy of the last two decades of the 20th century. People are trying to sustain a system "as is" that is based on bad assumptions, unworkable constructions, conflicting objectives, and a flagging empire laced heavily with elitist fraud and corruption. The primary difference is that the US has a bigger gun and its hand is in more people's pockets with the dollar as the world's reserve currency. But the comparison seems to indicate that the economy must indeed fail first, before genuine change can begin, because the familiar ideology and practices must clearly fail before they can recede sufficiently to make room for new ways and reforms.

A new school of Economics will rise out of the ashes of the failure of the American economy as happened after the Great Depression. Let us hope that it is better than what we have today.

In the short term, what does all this mean?

There is NO system that will work without substantial, continuing effort, and continual adaptation and commitment to a certain set of goals that are more about 'ends' than ideological process.

Because our system has been abused for so long, and is so distorted and imbalanced and dominated by a relatively few organizations beholden to a self-serving status quo, reform is not an afterthought, it is the sine qua non.

It means that until the banks are restrained, and the financial system is reformed, and balance is restored, there can be no sustained recovery.