Gold Daily and Silver Weekly Charts - More Liquidation on Greece and Facebook

More concern on Greece and what will happen if it leaves the Euro had traders fleeing risk and commodities including gold and silver.

There is also quite a bit of secondary liquidation being done as traders raise cash for 'the Big Flip' when Facebook comes out after the bell on Thursday.

Expectations are for the stock to price in the 30's, and then run up in the secondary market into the 60's at which point those who had the IPO can liquidate if the momentum traders provide liquidity and institutions and mom and pop pick up the slack.

I am still long gold and short stocks. I hold no miners or silver. I am holding about 25% cash in my trading account and thinking about when to deploy it. Unless Europe collapses I think the bottom is very close. I would like to see an 'intraday V' to punctuate it.

SP 500 and NDX Futures Daily Charts - RNN Interviews Bill Black on JPM

Fears about what will happen with Greece and the Euro weighed on stocks.

There is also secondary liquidation as funds raise cash to play the big pop in the Facebook IPO which prices after the bell on Thursday.

Expectations are that the stock will come out in the 30's and pop higher to 50's at which point the momentum traders will start to flip it and hand it off to mom and pop and the pension funds.

Nomi Prins: On JPM, the Whale Man, and Glass-Steagall

This is one of the better commentaries on JPM and the history and imperatives of banking regulation that I have seen recently.

I do not wish to beat this to death, but I have read too many glib economist and stock tout comments sloughing this off as 'no big deal.' Not surprisingly, these were many of the same people who said similar things during the build up of the credit bubble and the financialization of the real economy.

And I also expected something like this to happen in the derivatives markets, following the thefts of customer money at MF Global.  It just happened a little sooner than I had imagined.  Things are progressing quickly.

JPM Chase Chairman, Jamie Dimon, the Whale Man, and Glass-Steagall
By Nomi Prins
May 11, 2012

It was fitting that while President Obama and his Hollywood apostles broke fundraising records at a sumptuous $40,000 per plate dinner at George Clooney’s place, word of JPM Chase’s ‘mistake’ rippled through the news. Not long ago, Dimon’s name was batted about to become Treasury Secretary. But as lines are drawn and pundits take sides in the Jamie Dimon ego deflation saga – or, as I see it - why big banks should be made smaller and then, broken up into commercial vs. speculative components ala Glass Steagall – it’s important to look beyond the size of the $2 billion dollar (and counting) beached whale of a trading loss.

Yes, $2 billion in the scheme of JPM Chase’s book and quarterly earnings is tiny, a ‘trading blip’ as it’s been called by some business press. But that’s not a mitigating factor in what it represents. In this era dominated by a few consolidated and complex banks, the very fact that it’s a relatively small loss IS the red flag.

First - because the loss could (and will) grow. Second, because even if it doesn’t, it’s a blatant example of a big bank incurring un-due risk within a barely regulated, highly correlated financial markets. It only takes another Paulson hedge fund, or a trading desk at Goldman Sachs, to short the hell out of the corporates that JPM Chase is synthetically long, or take whatever the other side really is, to create a liquidity crisis that will further screw those least able to access credit – individuals, small businesses, and productive capital users.

We know this. We’ve seen this. We're in this. There’s no such thing as an isolated trading loss anymore. And yet Jamie Dimon, seated atop the most powerful bank in the world, has smugly led the charge to adamantly oppose any moves to alter the banking framework that allows him, or any bank, to call a bet - a hedge or client position or market-making maneuver - with central bank, government official, and regulatory impunity.

Flashback to the unimaginable in 1933

It’s 1933 and the country has undergone several years of painful Depression following the 1920s speculation that crashed in the fall of 1929. Investigations into the bank related causes began under Republican President, Herbert Hoover and continued under Democratic President, FDR...

Read the rest here.

Partnoy's Complaint: Lawmakers Must Heed the Wisdom of the 1930s

Here is Frank Partnoy's prescription for financial reform. Essentially he says that half measures are not sufficient. Wall Street will always find loopholes in weak regulation, and they have plenty of help in this in the halls of power in Washington, and in the think tanks, universities and the media. 

Even President Obama seems to be in denial about the effectiveness of his reforms, and the health of the US banking system. Obama: JPM One of the Best Managed Banks His own Treasury pressured regulators and lawmakers to create the loophole that allowed the loss in London, and that his administration has a horrible record in investigating and prosecuting bank fraud.

I do not think the US is ready to insist on serious reform. It will take another crisis.   The anti-regulatory slogans are too effectively ingrained in the public psyche. And self-deception is a powerfully addictive state of mind. Especially for those whose expansive lifestyles depend on it.

Financial Times
Rebuild the Pillars of 1930s Wall Street
By Frank Partnoy
May 13, 2012

...JPMorgan’s losses have generated renewed interest in tightening the “Volcker rule”, which would attempt to ban speculative trading by banks. Yet the losses also illustrate why the Volcker rule will not work. The synthetic credit trades were not proprietary bets; they were massive, mismatched hedges. (Well they were prop bets but were masquerading as hedges. But that merely underscores the problem with the Volcker Rule and regulating specific guidelines that can be circumvented by pathological liar as Mr Partnoy indicates in the next paragraph. - Jesse)

The current version of the rule arguably would not have barred these trades (It would have, except for the hedging loophole that JPM had obtained with the assistance of the Fed and the Treasury - Jesse). Moreover, wherever the line between speculating and hedging is drawn, Wall Street will easily find a way to step over it. It would be impossible for regulators to police what is a hedge and what is not.

A better way to stop the cycle of financial fiascos would be to emulate 1930s reforms, when Congress erected twin pillars of financial regulation that supported fair, well-functioning markets for five decades. First was a mandate that banks disclose important financial information. In today’s complex terms, that would mean disclosing not just a value-at-risk number but also worst-case scenarios. The law should require JPMorgan to tell investors what would cause a $2bn loss.

The second pillar was a robust anti-fraud regime that punished officials who did not tell the full truth. Unfortunately, this has been eroded by legislation and judicial decisions that make it more difficult for shareholders to allege fraud. Prosecutors are also reluctant to bring criminal cases, leaving the Securities and Exchange Commission to mount largely toothless civil actions. Instead, the law should punish anyone who defrauds investors by citing one value-at-risk number and then losing 30 times that amount.

By rebuilding these two pillars, regulators could create stronger markets and greater trust. At a minimum, they could wean bank managers, and themselves, off flawed maths. They could stop allowing banks to satisfy disclosure obligations simply by reporting one inevitably inaccurate value-at-risk number. They could give Mr Dimon more than a slap...

Read the entire article from the Financial Times here.