The Legacy of the Fed and the US Experiment with Fiat Currency In One Chart

Please notice that the CPI really 'gets some legs' when Nixon closed the gold window and released the modern monetary theory from its next to last restraint, the bond vigilantes being the last thin blue line.

And below that a quote on the modern monetary system, in which I detect the root of Paul Krugman's confusion about money.

To his credit, Krugman does recognize the liquidity trap, which sets him head and shoulders apart from the Austerians. He just does not understand the markets and how they work in practice rather than theory, and the absolutely compelling need for reform. But that puts him in with most regulators, central bankers, and the herd of academic economists.

Shifting Mandates: The Federal Reserve’s First Centennial
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff

For presentation at the American Economic Association Meetings, San Diego,
January 5, 2013

Session: Reflections on the 100th Anniversary of the Federal Reserve

Read the entire paper in PDF form here.


h/t Bill P and Business Insider

"The current world monetary system assigns no special role to gold; indeed, the Federal Reserve is not obliged to tie the dollar to anything. It can print as much or as little money as it deems appropriate [History suggests that while they technically can print as much as they wish, there is an effective upper bound along with a law of diminishing returns in there somewhere. Weimar and John Law, amongst others, tended to show that. - Jesse]

There are powerful advantages to such an unconstrained system. Above all, the Fed is free to respond to actual or threatened recessions by pumping in money. To take only one example, that flexibility is the reason the stock market crash of 1987—which started out every bit as frightening as that of 1929—did not cause a slump in the real economy.

While a freely floating national money has advantages, however, it also has risks. For one thing, it can create uncertainties for international traders and investors. Over the past five years, the dollar has been worth as much as 120 yen and as little as 80.

The costs of this volatility are hard to measure (partly because sophisticated financial markets allow businesses to hedge much of that risk) [O brave New World, that has such derivative sophisticates in it. - Jesse] but they must be significant. Furthermore, a system that leaves monetary managers free to do good also leaves them free to be irresponsible—and, in some countries, they have been quick to take the opportunity." [Yes, THOSE countries may experience a financial collapse because of a monetary credit bubble, no doubt because of a lack of economic sophisticates. - Jesse]

Paul Krugman, The Goldbug Variations, 22 November 1996

Why Paul Krugman Should Not Be Treasury Secretary

As you may have heard, there is a petition making the rounds to suggest to Obama that he appoint Paul Krugman to be Treasury Secretary. As if. Obama is a CEO president, and no idealistic progressive.

I wanted to memorialize this column by Paul Krugman because I have the feeling that five years from now he will have forgotten that he wrote it, or handwave it away, suggesting that it was merely a sarcastic fancy or some clever political ploy.

To me this speaks to the silliness, careerism, and political immaturity that infests the heart of the economics profession. There are no politics so petty, and yet so vicious and yet silly, as those that often infest academic departments.

What Krugman suggests here is that in response to the Republicans taking the nation's credit rating and debt hostage, that Obama should take the nation's currency hostage and threaten to use seignorage to erase the debt and thereby render the debt ceiling moot. If this were a pickup football game, it is the equivalent of calling 'Statue of Liberty play!'

While I feel his pain and frustration at the current political climate in Washington, this is not some minor league blogger spinning their latest fantasy, but a Nobel prize winning economist writing in the NY Times who is using his bully pulpit to endorse extreme economic nonsense.

For him to say that it is 'silly but benign' to threaten to take the step of overtly monetizing the nation's debt without market involvement to evade the debt ceiling, and to institutionalize the notion that the currency is nothing more than the squeaky toy of the Treasury, is almost as incredible as it is reckless and immature.

But it does demonstrate that all too often we tend to become what we despise.

Be Ready To Mint That Coin
By Paul Krugman
January 7, 2013

Should President Obama be willing to print a $1 trillion platinum coin if Republicans try to force America into default? Yes, absolutely. He will, after all, be faced with a choice between two alternatives: one that’s silly but benign, the other that’s equally silly but both vile and disastrous. The decision should be obvious.

For those new to this, here’s the story. First of all, we have the weird and destructive institution of the debt ceiling; this lets Congress approve tax and spending bills that imply a large budget deficit — tax and spending bills the president is legally required to implement — and then lets Congress refuse to grant the president authority to borrow, preventing him from carrying out his legal duties and provoking a possibly catastrophic default.

And Republicans are openly threatening to use that potential for catastrophe to blackmail the president into implementing policies they can’t pass through normal constitutional processes.

Enter the platinum coin. There’s a legal loophole allowing the Treasury to mint platinum coins in any denomination the secretary chooses. Yes, it was intended to allow commemorative collector’s items — but that’s not what the letter of the law says. And by minting a $1 trillion coin, then depositing it at the Fed, the Treasury could acquire enough cash to sidestep the debt ceiling — while doing no economic harm at all...

Read the rest here.

Platinum Coin: Crossing the Monetary Rubicon

You may be reading more and more commentary about the platinum coin solution, and arguments why it doesn't really matter if the US does it or not.

To summarize the concept, the Treasury creates one special platinum coin, with a stated face value of $500 billion or so.

They trot down to the Fed and deposit the special coin(s), redeeming that amount of US notes and voila. It is a overt monetization, but the platinum coin adds a novel touch, and a bit of shiny misdirection.

Some mainstream economists seem to be toying with the idea of climbing aboard the train with the Modern Monetary Theorists. Enthusiasm Builds for Trillion Dollar Coin . Paul Krugman has a typically obtuse take on this in a recent column titled Monetary Rage.

I am not going to argue the pros and cons of this approach at this time. I have said quite a bit about this, and MMT, before. For me it shows that economic silliness is not the exclusive domain of the Austerians.

But I do want to firmly draw your attention as to why this particular solution and approach to the debt is important, and why it raises concern among many, even though that concern is often scorned and ridiculed by the economic savants. And by the way, this is very reminiscent of the same reactions to Alan Greenspan's policies, TARP, and the housing bubble with many of the same players in similar roles.

From a Bloomberg story entitled: Why We Must Go Off the Platinum Cliff.

"In case you're not familiar with this idea: In general, the Treasury Department is not allowed to just print money if it feels like it. It must defer to the Federal Reserve's control of the money supply. But there is an exception: Platinum coins may be struck with whatever specifications the Treasury secretary sees fit, including denomination.

This law was intended to allow the production of commemorative coins for collectors. But it can also be used to create large-denomination coins that Treasury can deposit with the Fed to finance payment of the government's bills, in lieu of issuing debt."

Currently it is against the laws of the land for the Treasury to issue debt, and for the Fed to buy it directly, as opposed to running that debt through the test and discipline of the markets. I researched this a number of years ago, and do not recall the particular law offhand, but in effect the Treasury cannot sell debt directly to the Fed. It must pass through the marketplace first to be valued.

This is all the difference between a democracy, as imperfect and occasionally corrupted as it may be, and a diktat by a central authority.

The platinum coin solution uses a statute regarding commemorative coins to evade that law of money. If the Treasury creates money out of nothing on its own volition, whether it be by assigning a purely whimsical value to a platinum coin, a wooden nickel, or a magic money wand, and deposits that symbolic object with the Fed, it is a game changer. It is purely arbitrary monetization.

And that step requires debate and a proper law, if the country chooses to accept it.

Now one might argue that this sort of overt monetization means nothing. And the MMTers have plenty of convoluted arguments why it does not matter, at least to them. And if anyone objects to their sophistry, they are ridiculed. They might say that the Fed is monetizing the debt already, and inflation has not resulted. But that is not the point. The Fed are pretending that they are NOT doing it, and are thereby maintaining appearances and some level of deniability.

But what people forget, or rather, what they would like us to forget, is that a modern fiat currency is based on the full faith and credit of the issuer, and the willingness of people in the market place to trust them, their word as contract, and the integrity of their actions.

Trust is a funny thing. One can bend it, twist it, and strain it by their actions over time. But at some point it may break, and the parties expected to maintain that trust may say, 'enough!'

And trust is gone, broken. And retracing one's steps to regain it is not a simple matter of a apologizing for and remediating their latest transgression, but a long slow climb back through what in many cases are years of continuing abuse and broken promises.

It is good to note that when dealing with people's resistance to accepting this monetization and artificiality of value, the MMTers quickly resort to arguments that involve the use of force, legal but even physical, in order to stifle dissent to an arbitrary monetary power.

That is the significance of taking the step of overt monetization at will, which is what the gimmicky platinum coin solution is all about. And those who promote it best understand that this is what they are doing, and be prepared for the consequences.

Taibbi: Secret and Lies of the Bailout

This is a long piece from Matt Taibbi about the financial crisis and the bank bailout.

It is under-reported, too often overlooked, and well worth understanding.

I find it remarkable and almost disturbing that discussions by economists and thought leaders so rarely mention and account for the epic fraud and distortions created by the banking system. They occasionally mention it for the footnote of history, as they did the housing bubble and Greenspan's policy failures, so that they can go back at some future date and say that they did 'speak out.'

Big money has polluted the political process and stifled discussion in the corporate media. And they treat this like some embarrassing cousin whom the family rarely discusses in public.

It is the credibility trap. And it is crippling the Anglo-American economic system.

Rolling Stone
Secret and Lies of the Bailout
By Matt Taibbi
January 4, 2013

It has been four long winters since the federal government, in the hulking, shaven-skulled, Alien Nation-esque form of then-Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, committed $700 billion in taxpayer money to rescue Wall Street from its own chicanery and greed. To listen to the bankers and their allies in Washington tell it, you'd think the bailout was the best thing to hit the American economy since the invention of the assembly line. Not only did it prevent another Great Depression, we've been told, but the money has all been paid back, and the government even made a profit. No harm, no foul – right?

Wrong.

It was all a lie – one of the biggest and most elaborate falsehoods ever sold to the American people. We were told that the taxpayer was stepping in – only temporarily, mind you – to prop up the economy and save the world from financial catastrophe. What we actually ended up doing was the exact opposite: committing American taxpayers to permanent, blind support of an ungovernable, unregulatable, hyperconcentrated new financial system that exacerbates the greed and inequality that caused the crash, and forces Wall Street banks like Goldman Sachs and Citigroup to increase risk rather than reduce it. The result is one of those deals where one wrong decision early on blossoms into a lush nightmare of unintended consequences. We thought we were just letting a friend crash at the house for a few days; we ended up with a family of hillbillies who moved in forever, sleeping nine to a bed and building a meth lab on the front lawn.

How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform

But the most appalling part is the lying. The public has been lied to so shamelessly and so often in the course of the past four years that the failure to tell the truth to the general populace has become a kind of baked-in, official feature of the financial rescue. Money wasn't the only thing the government gave Wall Street – it also conferred the right to hide the truth from the rest of us. And it was all done in the name of helping regular people and creating jobs. "It is," says former bailout Inspector General Neil Barofsky, "the ultimate bait-and-switch."

The bailout deceptions came early, late and in between. There were lies told in the first moments of their inception, and others still being told four years later. The lies, in fact, were the most important mechanisms of the bailout. The only reason investors haven't run screaming from an obviously corrupt financial marketplace is because the government has gone to such extraordinary lengths to sell the narrative that the problems of 2008 have been fixed. Investors may not actually believe the lie, but they are impressed by how totally committed the government has been, from the very beginning, to selling it.

THEY LIED TO PASS THE BAILOUT

Today what few remember about the bailouts is that we had to approve them. It wasn't like Paulson could just go out and unilaterally commit trillions of public dollars to rescue Goldman Sachs and Citigroup from their own stupidity and bad management (although the government ended up doing just that, later on). Much as with a declaration of war, a similarly extreme and expensive commitment of public resources, Paulson needed at least a film of congressional approval. And much like the Iraq War resolution, which was only secured after George W. Bush ludicrously warned that Saddam was planning to send drones to spray poison over New York City, the bailouts were pushed through Congress with a series of threats and promises that ranged from the merely ridiculous to the outright deceptive. At one meeting to discuss the original bailout bill – at 11 a.m. on September 18th, 2008 – Paulson actually told members of Congress that $5.5 trillion in wealth would disappear by 2 p.m. that day unless the government took immediate action, and that the world economy would collapse "within 24 hours."

To be fair, Paulson started out by trying to tell the truth in his own ham-headed, narcissistic way. His first TARP proposal was a three-page absurdity pulled straight from a Beavis and Butt-Head episode – it was basically Paulson saying, "Can you, like, give me some money?" Sen. Sherrod Brown, a Democrat from Ohio, remembers a call with Paulson and Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke. "We need $700 billion," they told Brown, "and we need it in three days." What's more, the plan stipulated, Paulson could spend the money however he pleased, without review "by any court of law or any administrative agency."

The White House and leaders of both parties actually agreed to this preposterous document, but it died in the House when 95 Democrats lined up against it. For an all-too-rare moment during the Bush administration, something resembling sanity prevailed in Washington.

So Paulson came up with a more convincing lie. On paper, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 was simple: Treasury would buy $700 billion of troubled mortgages from the banks and then modify them to help struggling homeowners. Section 109 of the act, in fact, specifically empowered the Treasury secretary to "facilitate loan modifications to prevent avoidable foreclosures." With that promise on the table, wary Democrats finally approved the bailout on October 3rd, 2008. "That provision," says Barofsky, "is what got the bill passed."

But within days of passage, the Fed and the Treasury unilaterally decided to abandon the planned purchase of toxic assets in favor of direct injections of billions in cash into companies like Goldman and Citigroup. Overnight, Section 109 was unceremoniously ditched, and what was pitched as a bailout of both banks and homeowners instantly became a bank-only operation – marking the first in a long series of moves in which bailout officials either casually ignored or openly defied their own promises with regard to TARP.

Congress was furious. "We've been lied to," fumed Rep. David Scott, a Democrat from Georgia. Rep. Elijah Cummings, a Democrat from Maryland, raged at transparently douchey TARP administrator (and Goldman banker) Neel Kashkari, calling him a "chump" for the banks. And the anger was bipartisan: Republican senators David Vitter of Louisiana and James Inhofe of Oklahoma were so mad about the unilateral changes and lack of oversight that they sponsored a bill in January 2009 to cancel the remaining $350 billion of TARP.

So what did bailout officials do? They put together a proposal full of even bigger deceptions to get it past Congress a second time. That process began almost exactly four years ago – on January 12th and 15th, 2009 – when Larry Summers, the senior economic adviser to President-elect Barack Obama, sent a pair of letters to Congress. The pudgy, stubby­fingered former World Bank economist, who had been forced out as Harvard president for suggesting that women lack a natural aptitude for math and science, begged legislators to reject Vitter's bill and leave TARP alone.

In the letters, Summers laid out a five-point plan in which the bailout was pitched as a kind of giant populist program to help ordinary Americans. Obama, Summers vowed, would use the money to stimulate bank lending to put people back to work. He even went so far as to say that banks would be denied funding unless they agreed to "increase lending above baseline levels." He promised that "tough and transparent conditions" would be imposed on bailout recipients, who would not be allowed to use bailout funds toward "enriching shareholders or executives." As in the original TARP bill, he pledged that bailout money would be used to aid homeowners in foreclosure. And lastly, he promised that the bailouts would be temporary – with a "plan for exit of government intervention" implemented "as quickly as possible."

The reassurances worked. Once again, TARP survived in Congress – and once again, the bailouts were greenlighted with the aid of Democrats who fell for the old "it'll help ordinary people" sales pitch. "I feel like they've given me a lot of commitment on the housing front," explained Sen. Mark Begich, a Democrat from Alaska...

Read the rest here.