Notes on the Currency War - 'Old as Babylon and Evil as Hell'

Below is an excerpt from a much longer article which you can read in its entirety here.

It is an interpretation told from a certain perspective, but overall does a fairly decent job of laying out the general boundaries for the currency war that has been brewing in the background since 1971 with the collapse of Bretton Woods.

It is more visible to us now because it started manifesting more overtly in the 1990's and since then has slowly been gaining momentum.

If an analyst does not understand this, is not aware of it even if they do not agree with this particular interpretation, then they have a poor grasp of the major trends that are driving so much financial and political activity in the world today.

And fortunately or unfortunately, gold and silver are deeply involved as the traditional supra-national world currencies.

To put the entire thing in a nutshell, in 1971 the US arbitrarily ended the Bretton Woods Agreement by closing the 'gold window,' and placed the world on an entirely fiat reserve currency which the US controlled. Since the US is making monetary policy to suit its own domestic agenda, and increasingly so over the past twenty years, the stresses that this creates in the world have become unacceptable to many other countries, some of which are in a position to push back against this.

This tension between the dollar and the rest of the world is either going to end in an acceptable and workable compromise, or will result in a split of the world into regions of power and financial influence, most likely three or four. This will be accompanied by conflict on all the usual levels: diplomatic, economic, and military. We are seeing this today.

Compromise is being thwarted by a neo-conservative, militaristic and nationalistic group in the States, with clients in other countries, that view an American hegemony as the natural and highly desirable outcome of the end of the Cold War.  However, this is a patriotic cover story for what is essentially a bid for more money and power for a privileged few who have no patriotism and little decency, who serve only themselves and their patrons.  To quote Edward Abbey, their motives are 'old as Babylon and evil as hell.'

Signorelli, Sermons and Deeds of the Antichrist

Whether you agree with this or not does not matter so much, because it is painfully obvious to those thought leaders in countries like the BRICs that this is the situation.   And they are acting on this, and the US is reacting in response. But from reading the literature of the neoliberal economists and neoconservative politicians, it seems hard to come to any other conclusion based on facts and specific actions which have been taken by the US, the UK, Canada, Germany and Japan.

 

In some ways the situation in Europe, with Germany and a few northern countries driving the ECB and its monetary policy, is a microcosm of the type of tyranny of monetary policy which is held globally by the US Dollar.  This does not even have to be purposeful, but is the natural outcome of a fiat currency held as the major exchange mechanism over a region without political and fiscal unity.  It is inevitable by its very construction, and manifests in other economic problems such as those described in Triffin's Dilemma.  

 

So why do some people keep promoting these types of unsustainable mechanisms?  As always, money and power.  Controlling the reserve currency enables a form of financial neo-colonialism in securing and controlling the payments and politics of the indebted nations.  We are seeing a fine example of this now in Greece, but the US set the pattern for this, particularly in South America, long ago.

And the money masters rationalize this, as Polyani noted, "by indulging in prejudice and sentimentalism. The improvidence of the poor is a law of nature, for servile, sordid, and ignoble work would otherwise not be done.  Also what would become of the fatherland unless we could rely on the poor? 'For what is it but distress and poverty which can prevail upon the lower classes of the people to encounter all the horrors which await them on the tempestuous ocean or on the field of battle?'"

 

The role of the many is to suffer, labor, and die for the select few, however they may choose to define themselves, and assert and maintain their dominance.   This is nothing new, but again, a theory 'old as Babylon and evil as hell.'  Exceptionalism is the very rationale for evil, and pride,  the father of sin.

 

I do not think it is too much to say that we are experiencing a type of 'world war.' This seems to be the settling of differences and adjustments that tends to follow major economics shifts, as we had seen in the first half of the 20th century.  The gilded age, the great financial bubble, interspersed by almost twenty years of horrific carnage.  And the sociopathic few, those black holes of the human spirit, are unleashing the madness once again.

 

"The Fed effectively acts as the world’s central bank, but sets monetary policy only in its own interest. Under the pressure and the orders of financial oligopolies, it fixes interest rates and prints money to suit itself, sending economies across the globe into tailspins...

These policies aren’t enacted with the express goal of kicking the global South in the stomach, but this outcome is a necessary and predictable result of the domination of the global financial order by a sole country whose interest is to keep its hegemonic status. Other measures are taken precisely toward this end. This latest round of financial warfare has to be seen in the context of financial imperialism in general. Countries struggling for sovereignty are also being hit by sanctions, speculative currency attacks, commodity price manipulation, biased evaluations from US ratings agencies, massive fines on some banks for what the US has deemed inappropriate practices, and the prohibition of certain banks from participating in the international banking system...

Not only does the dollar enable the US empire, but also protecting the dollar’s status is a major reason for US imperial wars. American financial and military strength is based upon the fact that the dollar is the world’s reserve and international trade currency, creating a global demand for dollars which allows the US to print as many greenbacks as it likes. It then pumps them into the overbloated finance capital system and uses them to fund its criminal wars...

Without this international demand for dollars, the dollar would “correct,” and US hegemony would eventually, inevitably, come to an end. Therefore the US pressures and attacks countries that attempt to free themselves from the dollar’s yoke, not only because they’re guilty of lèse-majesté, but in order to force the world to maintain the status of the dollar and thus preserve US domination...

Although it has so far been unsuccessful, the idea of rebalancing the world monetary system is extremely threatening to the US, and goes a long way toward explaining recent US wars and warmongering, which may otherwise seem irrational...

The dollar is rallying less because of any supposed US recovery than because of higher global demand for dollars due to investors’ risk aversion, in the wake of the Fed pulling the plug on QE. Parenthetically, the US economy is definitely not recovering..."

Michèle Brand and Rémy Herrera, Dollar Imperialism 2015

"Plunderers of the world, when nothing remains on the lands to which they have laid waste by wanton thievery, they search out across the seas. The wealth of another region excites their greed; and if it is weak, their lust for power as well.

Nothing from the rising to the setting of the sun is enough for them. Among all others only they are compelled to attack the poor as well as the rich. Robbery, rape, and slaughter they falsely call empire; and where they make a desert, they call it peace."

Tacitus, Agricola

Not exceptional, except in its delusions. It is a story of an otherwise decent people made capable of doing monstrous things, drunk on rhetoric and power, led on by the madness of the few and their visions of empire.   It is a story old as Babylon, and evil as hell.

The Legacy of the Fed and the US Experiment with Fiat Currency In One Chart

Please notice that the CPI really 'gets some legs' when Nixon closed the gold window and released the modern monetary theory from its next to last restraint, the bond vigilantes being the last thin blue line.

And below that a quote on the modern monetary system, in which I detect the root of Paul Krugman's confusion about money.

To his credit, Krugman does recognize the liquidity trap, which sets him head and shoulders apart from the Austerians. He just does not understand the markets and how they work in practice rather than theory, and the absolutely compelling need for reform. But that puts him in with most regulators, central bankers, and the herd of academic economists.

Shifting Mandates: The Federal Reserve’s First Centennial
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff

For presentation at the American Economic Association Meetings, San Diego,
January 5, 2013

Session: Reflections on the 100th Anniversary of the Federal Reserve

Read the entire paper in PDF form here.


h/t Bill P and Business Insider

"The current world monetary system assigns no special role to gold; indeed, the Federal Reserve is not obliged to tie the dollar to anything. It can print as much or as little money as it deems appropriate [History suggests that while they technically can print as much as they wish, there is an effective upper bound along with a law of diminishing returns in there somewhere. Weimar and John Law, amongst others, tended to show that. - Jesse]

There are powerful advantages to such an unconstrained system. Above all, the Fed is free to respond to actual or threatened recessions by pumping in money. To take only one example, that flexibility is the reason the stock market crash of 1987—which started out every bit as frightening as that of 1929—did not cause a slump in the real economy.

While a freely floating national money has advantages, however, it also has risks. For one thing, it can create uncertainties for international traders and investors. Over the past five years, the dollar has been worth as much as 120 yen and as little as 80.

The costs of this volatility are hard to measure (partly because sophisticated financial markets allow businesses to hedge much of that risk) [O brave New World, that has such derivative sophisticates in it. - Jesse] but they must be significant. Furthermore, a system that leaves monetary managers free to do good also leaves them free to be irresponsible—and, in some countries, they have been quick to take the opportunity." [Yes, THOSE countries may experience a financial collapse because of a monetary credit bubble, no doubt because of a lack of economic sophisticates. - Jesse]

Paul Krugman, The Goldbug Variations, 22 November 1996

Joseph Stiglitz: Is Mercantilism Doomed to Fail? And With It the US Dollar?

This is Joe Stiglitz' presentation at the INET conference in Berlin last week. He speaks about mercantilism, and I added the tagline about the dollar.

The one point I wish to make emphatically is that only under a fiat currency trade system can these large deficits and surpluses be created, in the same manner as the debt bubbles, and asset bubbles.

This is not a new idea, of the natural balance that hard currencies present in a global trading system. But it has been forgotten, put aside in recent years. My friend Hugo Salinas-Price has written a nice presentation of those ideas in his essay Gold Standard: Protector and Generator of Jobs.

I have written on the topic many times, most recent in The Great Flaw In Free Trade Theory and other Vain Beliefs, Hoaxes, and Follies.

Under a hard currency or asset system of trade, as one country draws down its stock of gold, for example, its gold-backed currency would automatically become devalued since there would be less gold underpinning it.

Conversely, as a country built up a trade surplus, over time so much gold would flow to that country so that its currency would appreciate relative to the currencies of the debtor nations.

These changes in valuation would tend to 'balance' the trade flows naturally, and unilateral mercantilism would fail long before it threatened the stability of the international monetary system.  That is not to say that exploitative trade might not exist, such as under the British Empire.  These took more of a form of colonialism, a kind of mercantilism among master and vassals.  But any trade imbalances between developed nations with their own currencies could only grow large with great difficulty.

A fiat currency regime allows huge imbalances not only to exist, but to grow to dangerous and unsustainable levels that threaten the very system itself.

Some of today's problems are indeed because the US is acting as the 'deficit of last resort' because it owns the world's reserve currency. This is known as Triffin's dilemma.

My thoughts about Triffin's Dilemma and the international trade structure  that as a businessman I was operating within during the 1990's, especially after Bill Clinton allowed China to obtain free trade status after a large currency devaluation and without a floating currency stipulation, was that ultimately the world would be plunged into a currency war that would likely either lead to a unified financial order, possibly a triumvirate of spheres of influence, or the failure of the dollar and a radical restructuring of the global financial power structure.

So far we seem to be on track.

Eisenbeis: What's A Central Bank To Do Besides Printing Money (And Pursue A Hidden Agenda?)

I thought this was a fairly nice thumbnail sketch of the problem facing the world's central banks vis à vis the US dollar as reserve currency and globalization. I have to add that this current impasse was not unforeseen.

I suggest you take a look at a very brief description of Triffin's Dilemma.

The Triffin dilemma is a theory that when a national currency also serves as an international reserve currency, there could be conflicts of interest between short-term domestic and long-term international economic objectives. This dilemma was first identified by Belgian-American economist Robert Triffin in the 1960s, who pointed out that the country whose currency foreign nations wish to hold (i.e. the global reserve currency) must be willing to supply the world with an extra supply of its currency to fulfil world demand for this 'reserve' currency (foreign exchange reserves) and thus cause a trade deficit.

The use of a national currency as global reserve currency leads to a tension between national monetary policy and global monetary policy. This is reflected in fundamental imbalances in the balance of payments, specifically the current account: some goals require an overall flow of dollars out of the United States, while others require an overall flow of dollars in to the United States. Currency inflows and outflows of equal magnitudes cannot both happen at once.

The Triffin dilemma is usually used to articulate the problems with the US dollar's role as the reserve currency under the Bretton Woods system, or more generally of using any national currency as an international reserve currency.

The problems with any domestic currency operating as the world's reserve currency are well known, and yet the United States decided to pursue this after Nixon closed the gold window. Perhaps that is because the risks to the many were outweighed by the benefits to a few.

I enjoyed the author's flat out statement that "it is undeniable that the world's central banks collectively have flooded world financial markets with liquidity by printing money."

If someone tells you that central banks, in a fiat regime, cannot create money out of nothing, then they simply do not know what they are talking about, no matter how many rhetorical flourishes and convoluted rationales they may produce. They can do it, they are doing it, and they will keep doing it until they reach what they consider to be a sustainable equilibrium, or they exhaust their ability to print based on the limits I have previously described.

The problem is that none of the equilibria they have produced in the last twenty years have been sustainable, except for a few years, and the half life of the monetary bubbles appears to be contracting.

The US dollar is at the end of its rope as the reserve currency for the world. Nothing could be more clear.   What will be done about this is another matter.  The Anglo-American banking cartel will enter the next phase of the evolution of money resisting change every step of the way.  What they most desire is to maintain and extend their control of a worldwide fiat currency, not even in the interests of their own people, but for the benefit of a few.

Institutional Risk Analyst
What's a Central Bank to Do?
By Bob Eisenbeis, Cumberland Advisors
April 25, 2011

Faced with largely the same set of facts when it comes to their inflation outlook, some of the world's major central banks have come to markedly different conclusions about the appropriate policy.

The ECB began to exit from its accommodative policy by increasing its policy rate by 25 basis points to 1.25% on April 7. The ECB noted that growth was improving moderately, but inflation had increased to 2.6% and was up from 2.45% the previous month. The rise was largely due to increases in energy, food, and commodity prices. The concern was the potential second round effects and that these increases could become embedded in inflation expectations.

The same day, the Bank of England kept its policy rate at 0.5%, despite the fact that inflation had been running well above its target rate of 2% for more than a year and was likely to remain so through 2011. Again, the Committee noted that the near term path for inflation was higher due to energy, imported commodities and other goods. Concern was also expressed about inflation expectations having risen in the UK, the US and the euro area relative to what they had been before the financial crisis. Finally the UK real economy was softer than that of the EU generally with output having declined by 0.5% in the fourth quarter of 2010.

While the FOMC will meet this week, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke and Vice-Chair Janet Yellen have already signaled that they view the recent increases in commodity, energy and food prices as transitory. Governor Yellen in particular provided an extremely thorough and detailed dissection of the inflation data and her views on the real economy and employment in her April 11th speech in New York. She indicated clearly that the causes of the run-up in food, energy and commodity prices were rooted in increases in global demand, combined with energy supply shocks and uncertainty about oil flow from the Middle East. Like the Chairman, she expressed the view that the increases were transitory.

Most notably she attempted to debunk the widely discussed view that accommodative policies in the US were the cause of the increase in global prices. She was very clear that the main concern was for the US expansion and employment situation, that the current stance of policy was appropriate, and that QE II would be completed as scheduled. So we don't expect any notable news coming from this week's FOMC meeting.

These three views on the appropriate stance of policy and how individual-country central banks may think about policy shows a growing disconnect between traditional approaches to monetary policy and globalization. For example, the US economy historically has been largely isolated from the rest of the world. International markets were not particularly significant (exports and imports were roughly balanced and accounted for less than 13% of GDP). Inflation was largely a domestic issue and could be directly affected by changes in US policy rates. From the 50s through 70s, the main channel for monetary policy was through housing: when interest rates exceeded the Reg Q ceilings that banks and thrifts could pay for funds, the supply of funding to housing was cut off. Then construction declined and the effects rippled through the rest of the economy. Most of the economic models have that structure and international isolation embedded within them. Yet this is not the world that policy makers are now dealing with, as the above descriptions of the causes of the current inflation aptly illustrate.

If the major causes of inflation are external to an economy, and policy makers have domestic tools and targets for inflation and local employment, either explicitly or implicitly, then how should they respond to externally generated causes of inflation? What is the link between the central bank's domestic policy interest rate tool and the external causes of price increases? These key questions are not currently addressed within contemporary policy frameworks employed by the FOMC, the ECB, or the Bank of England, as best one can determine.

In the current inflation environment, one can justify any one of three alternatives, and some of these are clearly being adopted. Furthermore, all can be mostly right or mostly wrong.

First, a policy maker could attempt, as the US did during the 1970s oil crisis, to insulate the real domestic economy from the contraction supply shock by keeping rates low. This policy seemed appropriate and was politically acceptable, especially since the price increases were viewed as temporary. But it clearly failed, and we paid the cost with higher inflation.

Second, if one believes that the energy, food and commodities price increases are transitory, then no response is called for; and this can justify focusing on domestic employment, as is currently being done in both the US and UK. Even if the increases are permanent, doing nothing may be the appropriate policy. Permanent increases in energy, commodity, and food prices will shift these prices relative to other goods and services and generate substitution and accommodative responses by business and consumers. We may, for example, drive less and adopt more hybrid transportation alternatives -- moves that are already beginning to take place -- than we would if the energy price increases were viewed as being temporary.

But doing nothing also has its own risks. Maintaining an accommodative policy too long risk overheating an economy and fueling both an increase in domestically-produced goods and services prices and passing along the increased prices of external goods and energy prices as second round effects. As always, timing is everything when it comes to exiting from an accommodative policy.

Third, a central bank can move to increase its policy rate to choke off inflation, as the ECB has begun to do. But this policy has certain risks associated with it. If the causes of the inflation are external to the economy, then one would not expect those prices to be responsive to a policy move by a domestic central bank. But the increase in rates will clearly impact those domestic and non-international activities that are affected by rising interest rates. Economic activity in those areas will contract, including production, employment, and prices. So the impact of responding to an external inflation source is to force a decline in an aggregate price index by contracting domestic economic activity. This seems a risky path indeed. Right now it may appear less so because policy, as ECB President Trichet stated, is still viewed as being extremely accommodative.

So what is a central bank to do, especially when policy is overly accommodative? While Vice-Chair Yellen may argue that the increase in world prices is not our fault, it is undeniable that the world's central banks collectively have flooded world financial markets with liquidity by printing money.

This situation is likely to become even worse in the near term if Japan resorts to inflation as a means to finance the cleanup and rebuilding necessitated by the recent earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disasters. When domestic economies are no longer insulated from international markets and forces, individual central banks can no longer go-it-alone with their policy decisions. In such a world, perhaps the best policy is to remove the distortions cause by current policies, and then attempt to avoid extremes. Unfortunately, how to get from here to there in a non-disruptive way is not at all obvious, as the ECB may soon find out..

What this means for investors is that market uncertainty is likely to remain high for some time to come, and attempting to play in international markets carries with it huge foreign-exchange and real risks that need to be hedged.

Although I may say uncomplimentary things occasionally about Messrs. Bernanke and Greenspan and their colleagues on Wall Street and in government, I most definitely do not think they are fools, or naive, or uncomprehending of what they are doing. Therefore I find their actions difficult to square with a sincere fulfillment of their stated objectives, and the oaths of their offices, unless there is another dimension to their plans which has not been disclosed, and which I do not yet understand.

"And some of us who have already begun to break the silence of the night have found that the calling to speak is often a vocation of agony, but we must speak. We must speak with all the humility that is appropriate to our limited vision, but we must speak...Perhaps a new spirit is rising among us. If it is, let us trace its movements and pray that our own inner being may be sensitive to its guidance, for we are deeply in need of a new way beyond the darkness that seems so close around us."

Martin Luther King

US Dollar: Long Term Trend and Triffin's Dilemma

AEIR
Triffin’s Dilemma, Reserve Currencies, and Gold
By Walker Todd

Nearly 50 years ago, Yale University economist Robert Triffin identified the inevitable future deterioration of the dollar in his book, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (1960). Essentially, Triffin argued, under the Bretton Woods system in which the U.S. dollar was the world’s principal reserve currency (instead of gold, for example), the United States had to incur large trade deficits in order to provide the rest of the world with the liquidity required for functioning of the global trading system.

Unfortunately, Triffin wrote, U.S. trade deficits eventually would undermine the foreign exchange value of the dollar because foreign accounts would hold an increasing quantity of dollars. Restating Triffin's argument in contemporary terms, as the proportion of dollar claims held abroad versus U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increases, the foreign exchange value of the dollar must decline if dollar interest rates do not increase at about the same rate as the foreign dollar claims.

Issuing the reserve currency gives domestic policy makers an advantage by making it easier to finance either domestic budget deficits or foreign trade deficits because there always is a ready bidders' market for any financing instruments from that issuer. Issuing the reserve currency enables the domestic population to consume more goods and services from whatever source than otherwise would be feasible. And issuing the reserve currency gives foreign policy officials of that nation the upper hand in determining multilateral approaches to either diplomacy or military action.

This last reason probably is why U.S. policy makers clung to the original Bretton Woods format for about 10 years beyond the point at which it still was viable, with the whole apparatus finally collapsing in August 1971.

Let us reconsider the effect of reserve currency issuance on domestic and foreign trade for a moment. Unless the issuing authorities can discover a way to allow their currency to depreciate more or less in proportion to the growing foreign trade deficits—by reducing interest rates or otherwise stimulating domestic inflation, for example—then a sustainable equilibrium becomes impossible.

Either the currency remains overvalued (good for the reserve currency status) and the trade deficits continue to increase, or the currency maintains fair external value (implicitly, a proportional devaluation, which is bad for the reserve currency status) and the trade deficits either stabilize or shrink. This latter proposition is what Professor Triffin was writing about in 1960, and it has been called Triffin's dilemma ever since.

Lewis Lehrman and John Mueller revived the discussion of Triffin's dilemma, without calling it that, in an article that appeared on December 15, 2008, in National Review Online. They suggested that the proper international reserve currency should be gold. I agree and wrote as much in a commentary, in the Christian Science Monitor, November 17, 2008.

Lehrman and Mueller argue correctly that no country willingly should volunteer for the reserve currency role. Such an endeavor necessarily leads to the same pattern of persistent overvaluation and trade deficits that plagued the United States since European currencies became generally convertible in 1959. Our abandonment of the international gold exchange standard in August 1971 accelerated and intensified our external deficits and the volatility of exchange rates.

Among advanced economies that were key members of the old Bretton Woods system, tolerating large amounts of external claims in their currencies always was a sore point because they wanted to avoid de facto reserve currency status and the curse (Triffin's dilemma) that accompanies it.

In the last two decades, roughly since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, European countries have adopted the euro and allowed large external claims in euros to arise. The Japanese bubble of the 1980s finally burst and relieved the reserve currency pressure of large external claims there until the last couple of years. Recently prosperous nations like China, India, and Brazil linked their currencies to the dollar and managed exchange rates so as to avoid the accumulation of large external claims. Thus, none of the most likely candidates is volunteering for reserve currency status...

On the Edge of History: Will Europe Join in Promoting the SDR as the Global Reserve Currency?

There is a tide in the affairs of men.
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures.

Julius Caesar: Act 4, scene 3, 218–224

China and Russia and some of the other developing nations have been proposing a reformulated SDR, with less US dollar content, a broader representation of currencies, and the inclusion of gold and silver, as a suitable replacement for the US dollar as the global reserve currency.

The US and UK are opposing the SDR as replacement to the US dollar as the new global reserve currency. They prefer to delay and postpone the discussions, and to maintain the status quo for as long as is possible to support their primacy in the financial markets. Control of the money supply is a huge hand on the levers of financial and political power.

It will be most interesting to see where the European Union comes out on this issue, especially in light of the recent drubbing that their banks have taken via dodgy dollar assets and a vicious dollar short squeeze, alleviated by a rescue from the Federal Reserve. It could have gone otherwise, and that provides things to think about. No one wishes to be at the mercy of a small group of unelected financial engineers who are closely aligned with an equally small set of Anglo-American banks operating with a somewhat opaque discretion. Or the goodwill of totalitarian governments who are acting aggressively from their own mercantilist self-interest for that matter.

One hears things. A deal being offered to Germany by the financial interests, for example, as a counterbalance to sentiment for greater latitude and independence in the EU. The lines of discussion move, and sometimes blur. Currency wars are the continuation of diplomacy, and possibly a revival of the cold war, by other means, to paraphrase Clausewitz. And a chilling fog is rolling over the landscape. This is what the timeless metal has been telling us, as it sounds an historic warning.

This is just the latest episode in a long unfolding macro change I have been calling Currency Wars after the Chinese best seller authored by Song Hongbing in 2007. I viewed it as the definitive spike in the theory of The End of History by Fukuyama.

It will continue to proceed slowly, at least for now, but such events tend to accelerate and sometimes dramatically as they progress. However the longer term implications for a change to the de facto Bretton Woods arrangement in place since Nixon closed the gold window in 1971, are enormous and yet little remarked yet by conventional economists, who too often prefer to glare at photons, gaping in the light. It has all the hallmarks of a classic conflict yet unfolding.

Rather than standing fast on an unsustainable status quo, as noted in Triffin's Dilemma, that serves the special interests of a wealthy few, the US might be well served to reform its banks, and balance its economy between service and industry, and stand once again for independent freedom and the common good, rather than narrow power and greed of the monied interests, and their willing tools and frivolous assistants. That is to trust in the wisdom and altruism of a people and their leaders who have of late shown a greater propensity to greed, deceit, and self-destruction. And so I say we must be in God's hands, because I recoil from Caesar's deathly grasp.

Some worry about deflation and inflation. Those outcomes are both hedged easily enough. I am more concerned about the next global holocaust of human destruction, and the bonfire of the vanities yet to come. That is history.

Financial Times
Germany asks US to give up its IMF veto
By Alan Beattie in Washington
September 14 2010 22:31

The US should give up its veto over important decisions in the International Monetary Fund in return for Europe accepting a smaller say, Germany has proposed.

The suggestion, which experts say will be strongly opposed by the US, addresses a politically highly symbolic dispute about voting power and seats on the fund’s executive board. Shifting power towards emerging market countries is one of the central elements in the Group of 20 nations’ drive to make the fund and other international institutions more representative...

Read the rest here.

Reuters
Lagarde says French G20 to discuss wider use of SDR
2010-09-01 18:06 (UTC)

JOUY-EN-JOSAS, France, Sept 1 (Reuters) - France will use its presidency of the G20 next year to discuss proposals for the wider use of IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) as a reserve currency as proposed by China, Economy Minister Christine said...

Read the rest here.