NAVs of Certain Precious Metal ETFs and Funds

SP Futures Hourly Chart Updated at 3 PM

See why we put *IF* the neckline is broken on that potential H&S top?

Goldman, Wall Street and their friends in government and the media came out swinging this morning. The SP futures took off from the neckline on some fairly thin rationales, but good enough for an end of month paint job.

This is starting to feel like a real top being formed, with the Wall Street crowd and their demimonde out with the pom poms trying to cheer the institutions and smaller investors with end of month 401k money into the market to buy them out of this anemic rally near a high note.

If you are long or hedged as we are in a paired trade then you are doing all right for a choppy market, and if you are short your timing is probably a little ahead of the market at least, and you are feeding the machine. If you are long and strong, well then, good luck to you.

Be careful. For the longer term this rally appears to be just business as usual into the end of the month with insiders selling vigorously and with a few of the Wall Street crowd front running it with positional and inside information on every turn.

As a reminder watch the VIX and the NDX futures, and perhaps a broader index or two, as well as the SP 500 since those futures are the paintbrush most highly favored by the tape painters.

GDP tomorrow. Who can tell how it will turn out, except to say it will likely be revised. We'll ignore the headline and look more deeply into the numbers.

SP Futures Hourly Chart at 2:30 PM EDT

A potential Head and Shoulders top has formed. It will be a valid formation but the objective will not be activated until and unless the neckline is broken.

Volumes remain light, with lots of technical gamesmanship that contributes to quite a bit of volatility in the short term, aka a 'daytrader's market.'

There is quite a bit of 'tension' in the market ahead of the GDP report tomorrow. The consensus is for growth of 1.5%. We are still a couple of weeks short of the timeframe we have projected for a top and the beginning of a leg down in markets, but some data or exogenous surprise could accelerate this.

There is a de facto partnership between the government and the banks with regard to the financial system and the economy which is spilling over to the equity markets. This is a similar arrangement that brought us the housing bubble and the credit crisis after the tech bubble and crash of 2001, which itself was a reaction to the Asian and Russian currency crisis of the late 1990's.

The financial engineers will likely not abandon their efforts until they either succeed, or finally shake the real economy apart and destroy the US financial system and currency. How they define 'success' is likely to be stability at the price of freedom, a classic oligarchy with 'enlightened despots.' Their financial engineering will require ever greater control over policy and priorities to maintain its artificial equilibrium.

The banks must be restrained, the financial system reformed, and the economy brought back into balance before there can be a sustained recovery.

Janet Yellen Channels Ronald Reagan: "Deficit's Don't Matter"

"You know, Paul, Reagan proved deficits don't matter."Dick Cheney to Paul O'Neill

The mainstream media is reporting that Fed governor Janet Yellen, a noted dove on inflation as Fed governors go, just told a gathering of bankers in Idaho that "deficits do not cause inflation" and summarily dismissed any concerns in that regard.

So, consulting the source material which is included just below, I am struggling to understand what she is saying, and to believe that she said it with a straight face, and was not just jawboning.

What Janet Yellen seems to be saying is:

First, that deficits do not matter unless they are 'structural' and not temporary. It does not matter how much, for example, we give to the banks. When the crisis is over, the deficits will remain, but will not grow larger, and will be offset by higher taxes, that will come from the improved economy.

Secondly, that developing countries have independent central banks that know how to and are willing to fight inflation, as opposed to the central banks of undeveloped countries where the government impedes their ability to fight inflation and to monetize the debt.

Thirdly, monetary inflation only occurs where excess demand for goods and services is generated. Until that point, unless there is this demand, increased money supply does not generate inflation. We might call this the reverse Laffer, in that it is a Demand side view of inflation that tends to discount the supply side completely.

One would not think that the US had recently seen the collapse of an enormous housing bubble, following the collapse of a large but less enormous stock bubble. Janet brushes this off faster than a stock strategist on CNBC.

Although she received her Ph.D. from Yale in 1971, she surely must have subsequently studied the stagflation of the 1970's in the US, where demand remained relatively stable but a supply shock on the oil side, together with the egregious monetary policy of a pliable Fed that had been accommodating Richard Nixon, finally triggered a rather nasty stagflation that the hairy-knuckled resolve of tall Paul Volcker was finally able to overcome.

Janet Yellen is greatly mistaken, but almost emblematic of the thinking in some circles that can see only the demand side of the equation, which is most common in a layperson relating to their common domestic experience. What is frightening in a way is that she is not some blogger out on the net, or a talking head for the extended infomercial that is financial reporting in the US, but is a Fed governor.

And she is no outlier. Her thinking underpins the basis for Bernanke's strategy of packing the banks with liquidity, monetizing their assets, but maintaining control of that added liquidity by having the ability to attract bank reserves into the Fed where they can be managed through the ability to pay interest on those reserves.

Can the Sorcerer's apprentices keep a steady hand on this latest monster from their laboratory? Every time they try this, something unexpected happen, and we go to the brink, to be rescued by another patch, another new experiment, designed to save us from the last one gone wrong.

Her arrogance toward 'developing countries' is absolutely appalling, and sure to come back to haunt her at some later date. If one looks at the performance of the dollar and its long term purchasing power under the Fed, it appears that Janet is a proud member of the subjective idealist school of behavioural economics. What we do not admit to be real cannot exist, and will not hurt us.

So, we can inflate our way to prosperity, provided that we control the perception of the results of our actions. Jigger the CPI so its no longer valid, suppress long term interest rates by buying the curve selectively and suppressing gold (See Gibson's Paradox by Larry Summers), and coerce the world's central banks through various means to support our monetary inflation step for step. After all, everything is relative. Until it is not.

OMG. Our entire financial system is based on the sufferance and good will of potential adversaries to do what is in our best interests because the fragility of our currency frightens them. And well they might be fearful, when they read this from Ms. Yellen, and see how many true believers in the omnipotence of the Fed take it seriously.


Large deficits don't cause inflation: Fed's Yellen
By Greg Robb
Jul 28, 2009, 1:06 p.m. EST

(MarketWatch - Washington) -- Concern that the massive federal budget deficit will cause inflation is misplaced, said Janet Yellen, the president of the San Francisco Federal Reserve on Tuesday. Deficits don't cause inflation, she said. Instead, the worry is that they might cause interest rates to rise. "Right now, private investment spending is extremely weak, so financing for the large federal deficits is readily available. But once private spending recovers, the competition for funds between the government and private sectors could drive interest rates up," Yellen said in a speech to bankers in Idaho.

Jesse here. The relevant quote from Janet Yellen's speech to the bankers in Idaho is excerpted below from the San Francisco Fed's website.

Let me now address another issue that is garnering attention—inflation. This is a subject rife with contradiction. Almost without exception, my business contacts report downward pressure on wages and prices. At the same time, they tell me they worry that the United States is on the threshold of serious inflation. They see large federal budget deficits today and more looming on the horizon. They also note that the Fed has pumped up bank reserves and expanded its balance sheet to fund its financial support programs. They worry that this may amount to financing deficits with money creation. Surely, they say, these things will eventually have to lead to higher inflation.

I’ll begin with budget deficits. The gap in the federal budget for the current and the next fiscal years are projected to exceed $1 trillion, far larger than anything we’ve ever seen before. But a large part of these current deficits are temporary. A portion stems from the impact of the weak economy on the budget. In a recession, tax collections fall and spending on programs such as unemployment insurance rise automatically. A significant portion is due to the fiscal stimulus that has been put in place over the next few years to address the recession. Antirecessionary fiscal policy, in my view, is entirely appropriate. Since that stimulus is temporary by design, the resulting deficits will shrink as the stimulus phases out. But federal deficits will not disappear completely even when the economy has recovered and the stimulus program has phased out. On the contrary, these ongoing or “structural” deficits are anticipated to stretch indefinitely into the future and to escalate over time in a manner that ultimately is not sustainable. The long-term projected structural budget deficit mainly reflects the impact of an aging population and rapidly rising health-care costs on spending for federal entitlement programs, particularly Medicare and Medicaid.

Economists have known, worried, and warned the public about the damaging consequences of escalating long-term budget deficits in the United States for decades. It’s high time for our country to tackle the problem head-on. But the main concern with these deficits relates to productivity and living standards, and not high inflation. Large budget deficits do not cause high inflation automatically. In fact, since World War II, large deficits have been associated with high inflation only in developing countries. That’s because developing countries often have central banks that are under the sway of the government, which sometimes induces them to print money to finance government spending. The connection isn’t found in countries such as ours with advanced financial systems and independent central banks. Remember that, in the 1980s, the United States ran large deficits just as inflation was coming down. And Japan has had huge deficits through much of the past two decades, yet its problem is persistent deflation—precisely the opposite of inflation. The United States and most other industrialized countries have central banks with long traditions of independence and deep-seated support for keeping politics out of monetary policy. In those countries, the monetary authorities generally have stuck to their inflation objectives, even when governments ran large budget deficits.

In advanced countries, the problem isn’t that large deficits cause inflation. Rather it’s that they raise long-term interest rates, thereby crowding out private investment, which holds back advances in productivity and living standards. Right now, private investment spending is extremely weak, so financing for the large federal deficits is readily available. But once private spending recovers, the competition for funds between the government and private sectors could drive interest rates up. A decline in productivity growth is a serious problem—one we should strive to avoid—but it is not the same as inflation.

So what about the Fed’s unprecedented balance sheet expansion? Our strong steps to avert financial and economic meltdown have caused our assets to more than double, from under $900 billion at the start of the recession to over $2 trillion now. This expansion is largely financed by increases in excess reserves that banks deposit with us.

Now we come to the crux of the issue: Will this expansion of credit and bank reserves create high inflation? My answer is no. And the reason again is because of current economic conditions. Monetary policy fosters inflation when it loosens the stance of policy enough to create excess demand for goods and services. Right now, we have exactly the opposite—an excess supply of goods and services. We need more demand—not less—to offset slack in labor and product markets. We have seen a noticeable slowdown in wage growth and reports of wage cuts have become increasingly prevalent. Businesses are cutting prices to boost sales. As a result, core inflation—a measure that excludes volatile food and energy prices—has drifted below 2 percent, a level that I and most of my colleagues consider consistent with price stability. With unemployment already substantial and likely to rise further, and industrial capacity utilization at record low levels, downward pressure on wages and prices isn’t likely to go away soon. I expect core inflation to remain below 2 percent for several more years.

Of course, the economy will eventually recover and we will need to withdraw monetary accommodation. If we were to fail to do so, we would indeed have higher inflation. The Fed is keenly aware of this. We have the tools to tighten policy when the time is right and we have the will to use them. First, many of our emergency programs are already tapering off as market conditions improve. Second, many of the assets that we have accumulated during the crisis—such as Treasury and mortgage-backed agency securities—have ready markets and can be easily sold. Finally, the Fed can push up the federal funds rate and tighten policy by raising the rate of interest paid to banks on the reserves they deposit with us—authority granted by Congress last year. An increase in the interest rate on reserves will induce banks to lend money to us rather than to other banks, thereby pushing up rates in the interbank market and, by extension, other interest rates throughout the economy. This is an important tool because, even if the economy rebounds nicely, the credit crunch might not be fully behind us and some financial markets might still need Fed support. This tool will enable us to tighten credit conditions even if we maintain a large balance sheet for a time. The experience of central banks in Europe, Japan, and Canada suggests that this approach can be effective.

Full Text of Janet Yellen's Speech to the Idaho Bankers here.

Martin Meyer on Credit Default Swaps

The current state of the Credit Default Swaps market represents a risk similar in quality to that of portfolio insurance just prior to the market crash of 1987.

What is alarming that in terms of quantity there is no comparison, as the risks now are probably an order of magnitude greater in that the risk in concentrated at the heart of the US banking system. In 1987 the US was still at least partially protected by Glass-Steagall.


On Credit Default Swaps: Comments at AIER
By Martin Mayer
June 25, 2009

Let me open with a large thought you can carry with you when you leave. Note how we are no longer being told that the chairman of the Federal Reserve is the second most powerful man in America. Why do you think that is true?

One of the truly awful moments of my time in this business was the early evening of December 9, 1982, an incident not in any of the histories but highly revelatory. What happened that evening was that Banco do Brasil failed at CHIPS (the Clearing House Interbank Payments System). Neither National City Bank nor Chemical, which represented Banco d Brasil in New York, was willing to pony up the $300-plus million the Brazilians couldn't find. So they kept the window open until midnight, while the Fed worked its necromancy on its member banks and the money was found.

Subsequent examination revealed that after the Mexican collapse the previous summer, Banco do Brasil had found it increasingly difficult to roll over its loans, and had steadily switched a higher and higher share of its borrowings out of the conventional lending and borrowing market and into the overnight infrastructure market. For more than six months, the Brazilians had increased the size of its overnight position, until somebody at National City noticed and said, No more.

The Treasurer of Chemical was an exceedingly able young man who went on to a great career at AIG, oddly enough. I went to see him to help my understanding of what had happened. Finally, he said, "You have to understand. They were paying an extra eighth." A banker will turn himself absolutely inside out for what looks like a safe extra eighth of a point. The change over the quarter century is that now he will probably do it for five basis points. (And this is why banks must be regulated and their speculation firewalled from the public funds. Why? Because they are human. - Jesse)

Meanwhile, on a less cosmic scale, let us start with the thought that Wall Street gets in its worst trouble not by taking risks but by following false prophets who promise to make finance risk-free. The nomenclature and some of the equations change, but the truth is that there are only six scams, and each of these financial panics is rooted where the others were. (In defense of false prophets, Wall Street and others too often use them as a convenient excuse to do what they are already inclined to do in the first place. - Jesse)

What made the market break of 1987 so sharp and so deep was the widespread adoption of dynamic hedging, a mathematically proven plan to provide portfolio insurance by selling futures contracts on stock indexes if the stocks themselves fell hard. Dumbest idea ever accepted by any substantial part of mankind, said Howard Stein, who then ran the Dreyfus fund. How could anybody believe that everybody could sell at the same time?

It then took twenty years for the magnificently rewarded innovators of the new paradigm in banking to find an even dumber idea that everybody could safely and profitably hedge everybody else's risks through credit default swaps. (Quite so. The resemblance between portfolio insurance and the current state of Credit Default Swaps is apparent, but even worse, because they are so heavily written and held by the major money center banks, with their risk spread to the public compliments in part to Alan Greenspan and Phil Gramm - Jesse)

We make bad policy in this country because we do not inquire about how we got to where we are. There are every few second acts in American finance. Not one in a thousand of the people now commenting on the future or regulation of the CDS knows where the instrument comes from. The truth is that the CDS is one of many of what I shall call GSIs - "Government Supported Instruments" -- that would never have come into existence without dumb ideas from on high.

The Collateralized Debt Obligation or CDO, which came into existence in the late 1980s, is a single instrument expressing a garbage pail of loans and notes and bonds. It is all but impossible to value because it mixes together many disparate risks. Most people who think about it at all come to the conclusion that its not very useful for trading or for investing. In short, it is an excrescence that ought not to exist.

The CDO came about because Bill Seidman, when he was given control of the S&L workout in the late 1980s, wanted to sell whole banks rather than gather the tainted assets in FDIC control and auction them off in the usual FDIC procedure. Instead of taking, say, the real estate loans of six failed S&Ls and lumping them together as an offering on which real estate experts could paste a price, he wanted to take the entire portfolio of one or more failed thrifts and sell it off for what it would bring. (Marty is being a bit hard on Bill Seidman. There was nothing inherently fraudulent in the manner in which they packaged the sales related to the S&L crisis. It took Wall Street and the Rating Agencies to provide the real dose of fraud and larceny in the misrating and intentional mispricing of risk. - Jesse RIP Bill Seidman)

Note that this multiplied the amount of business Wall Street would get from the workout. The way you got people to bid on this sort of package was to give them the right to substitute other assets for assets in the package, or to guarantee the cash flow from the package.

The idea that a bank could be rid of its bad stuff through the device of a bad bank was then picked up by Mike Milken, and carried through with Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, where the operation was funded through junk bonds. I wrote a piece for Barrons about how intelligent all this was. I spoke with some of the brilliant kids Milken assigned to this project.

The damage these CDS instruments do has not yet been exhausted. The publicized stress tests to which the federal bank examiners recently subjected the 19 largest banks was not really a serious enterprise, because all these banks rely on swaps to protect them against their losses on the toxic legacies they accumulated under the gaze of these same examiners -- and nobody knows whether or not these hedges will pay out if they are needed. (They will only pay out in full with government monies, which is the dirty little secret that the Treasury and Fed are desperate to hide from the public. And when they fail, they will bring down the top four or five banks in the United States. - Jesse)

Swaps, after all, are bilateral contracts, and if the loser under the contract can't pay, the fact that he has theoretically hedged his risk in a separate contract with a third party does not necessarily mean that the winner can collect. Hence the "systemic risk" when AIG or Lehman, signatories to tens of thousands of these contracts, blows up, leaving a paper litter of unimaginable dimensions.

Sixteen years ago, I testified before the House Banking Committee to urge that it should be public policy to discourage over-the-counter derivatives contracts and encourage the use of exchange-traded instruments instead. To assure that losers pay, exchange-traded contracts impose overnight deposits to meet margin requirements rather than collateral that may show up some day. The Treasury Department, after years of fighting on the other side, has now discovered the virtues of settling derivative contracts through clearing houses.

But what Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has proposed will not do the trick, because it leaves the actual trading of these instruments in the hands of inter-dealer brokers who do not publish the prices at which they arrange the deals (and may not offer the same prices to all bidders). And because it does not show the way to meeting the legitimate needs that spawned this illegitimate market, the Geithner proposals invite evasion of the rules. (Geither's solution was designed in large part by the banks themselves who do not wish the game to end just yet - Jesse)

The legitimate need is for a place where traders can short bonds.

Shares of stock scan be borrowed (fees for such borrowings are an important source of income for brokers) and delivered to buyers who don' know that what they have bought is borrowed stock. Much publicity has been given to traders who abuse these rules, sell what they have not borrowed and then fail to deliver and suffer no significant punishment for their failure. The SEC had been and remains asleep at the switch when it comes to this issue. And even when stock cannot be borrowed, there is an options market offering puts in a trading context where open interest is public knowledge. No such institutions exist in the bond market.

It was the difficulty of shorting bonds that produced the T-bond contract at the Chicago Board of Trade thirty years ago, permitting participants in the fixed-income markets to protect themselves against interest-rate fluctuations. Interest-rate futures are a legitimate instrument because there is a generic interest-rate risk, expressed in the market-determined yield curve.

It is easy to understand that traders once they have hedged interest-rate risks would seek to insure also against credit risks. But there is no such thing as a generic credit risk that can be traded. Like all instruments with a trigger option, they promote the illiquidity that drives markets out of the patterns the white swan people need.

Hat tip to Institutional Risk Analytics for the article

The Bull Market in Financial Fraud in the US

Does it, should it, surprise us that there is a bull market in financial fraud in the United States, to accompany the bubble economy and the deterioration in government and corporate financial statistics and accounting?

A society where the capital allocation in the bond and equity markets have become the domain of organized manipulation, theft, and insider trading? Where the major media is owned by a handful of corporations dedicated to selectively spinning the truth for their own benefit and point of view? A nation whose very money supply has become a thinly disguised Ponzi scheme?

A wise old hand of many years in government of our acquaintance told us once that he did not think there were more people of questionable virtue in the world today. Rather it is the tolerance of bad behaviour from the top down that emboldens those who are so inclined to lie, cheat, and steal in greater numbers than at other times.

All that is required for society to decline is for good people to do nothing. Those who tolerate or ignore such widespread deceit are enablers. The rest of the world must begin to stand up to the American Wall Street crowd, first in their own countries, their regions, and then in all free economies.

The Economist
Fraud reporting
Jul 21st 2009

The rise in financial crime in America

OVER 730,000 counts of suspected financial wrongdoing were recorded in America last year, according to recent data from the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

Institutions such as banks, insurers and casinos are required by law to report suspicious activities to federal authorities under 20 categories. Financial institutions filed nearly 13% more reports of fraud compared with 2007, accounting for almost half of the increase in total filings.

The number of mortgage frauds alone rose by 23% to almost 65,000. But not all categories saw an increase: incidents suspected terrorist financing fell. Just under half of all filings are related to money laundering, a proportion that is little changed in over a decade.

Hat tip to Tim Dossman for the article.

"Build America Bonds" Paying a Shocking Premium to Corporates

The “Build America Bonds” were created by Bill S.238 called "The Build America Bonds Act of 2009 which provides $50 billion of federal taxpayer funds to subsidize state and local government tax free bonds in support of 'shovel ready' infrastructure projects.

The U.S. Government gives the issuing municipality or state a 35% rebate on the interest that the issuer pays to the bond holders. This is a huge benefit for local governments.

We have not yet found out why, but it is apparently giving a big benefit to the buyers of the bonds who are getting an income stream at well below market prices for comparable issues. In some cases the BAB bonds are pricing at 149 basis points over comparably rated corporate bonds.

Where is the inefficiency coming from in this bond offering? Who is taking the differential, the vigorish, being granted to the state and cities? Who are the underwriters and the market makers? Who are the big market makers besides Pimco? What are the fee structures being charged compared to the overall bond market?

Meredith Whitney, star analyst that she is, was the closest with her $4.65 prediction. She thinks the stock has lots of room to run, notes Fortune. Goldman, in her mind, will surf the economic woes now roiling the country. Goldman is a top underwriter of municipal bonds and the No. 1 underwriter of Build America Bonds. "These are a new type of municipal bond, part of the Obama administration's $787 billion stimulus plan. Cities, states, universities and government entities use BABs, as they're known, to finance infrastructure projects. This is a potential $50 billion annual market, Whitney says, and Goldman currently holds a 25 percent share," reports a Fortune article.

Oh now it all makes sense. Droit de Seigneur.

Bloomberg
Taxpayers Inferior to Shareholders With Obama Bonds
By Michael McDonald and Bryan Keogh

July 22 (Bloomberg) -- State and local governments, forced to close budget gaps by firing workers and shutting schools, may pay at least $4.2 billion more in interest than companies with similar credit ratings on Barack Obama’s Build America Bonds.

The $17.4 billion of Build America Bonds sold since April pay an average yield that’s 0.96 percentage point more than corporate securities with the same ratings, according to data compiled by Bloomberg and based on the 25 largest deals.

“Taxpayers are taking it on the chin,” said G. Joseph McLiney, president of Kansas City, Missouri-based McLiney & Co., a firm that specializes in selling municipal bonds that qualify for federal tax credits. “There should be no spread.”

While Build America Bonds opened credit markets to municipalities after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., states and cities are being penalized compared with corporations, which are 90 times more likely to default than local governments, according to Moody’s Investors Service....

‘Disserving Their Constituents’

The difference in borrowing costs shows elected and appointed officials are failing taxpayers, said Stanley Langbein, a banking and tax law professor at the University of Miami and former counsel at the U.S. Treasury in Washington.

Issuers are “supposed to get the best rate available,” Langbein said. “To me they’re disserving their constituents. Their responsibility is to get the lowest rate available, which is the corporate rate.”

Congress included the Build America Bonds program in the $787 billion stimulus President Obama signed into law in February, after sales of fixed-rate municipal bonds fell 17 percent last year to $281.1 billion, according to Bloomberg data. Most of the drop followed Lehman’s bankruptcy in September.

The initiative, which expires at the end of next year, provides a federal subsidy for 35 percent of the interest costs on taxable bonds sold by states, local governments and universities to finance capital projects that create jobs. Borrowers say they save money compared with tax-exempt debt because the interest after the federal payments is lower than tax-exempt benchmarks.

‘Priced it Right’

“We feel like we priced it right,” Jennifer Alvey, Indiana’s public finance director, said of the June bond sale. Indiana is paying a rate of 4.28 percent after the subsidy, lower than on tax-exempt bonds, she said. “That’s the difference I care about.”

Investors demand higher rates from municipal borrowers because Build America Bonds are 91 percent smaller than company offerings on average, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

While California sold $5.23 billion in April, the largest issue so far, Avondale, Arizona, offered $29.8 million on July 6 for sewer and other public improvements. The average par amount for Build America Bonds is $102.5 million, compared with $1.16 billion for the 611 U.S. investment-grade corporate bond offerings this year, according to Bloomberg data.

‘Pricing Power’

Investors also require higher yields because they say the securities may become difficult to trade if the program isn’t extended past 2010, said Natalie Trevithick, a senior vice president at Pacific Investment Management Co. The Newport Beach, California-based firm runs the world’s biggest bond fund, the $161 billion Total Return Fund.

“We do have much more pricing power in these deals,” Trevithick said.

Endowments, foundations and pension funds are overlooking the securities because unlike Pimco, they don’t have expertise to analyze municipalities, said Peter Coffin, president of Boston-based Breckinridge Capital Advisors, which oversees $10 billion in bonds.

“You have a lot of big buyers so there’s less price competitiveness,” said Scott Minerd, the chief investment officer at Santa Monica, California-based Guggenheim Partners, which manages $100 billion.

Alan Krueger, the Treasury’s chief economist in Washington, said Build America Bonds succeeded in reviving the municipal market by lowering debt costs. He said municipal and corporate securities are different, so they are difficult to compare.

‘Good Start’

“Build America Bonds are doing what they were designed to do, which is lower the cost of capital for municipalities and increase access to capital markets,” Krueger said in a July 15 telephone interview. “That’s what Build America Bonds are intended to do, and they’re off to a good start doing that.”

State tax collections fell 11.7 percent to $160 billion in the first quarter compared with the same period in 2008, the largest drop in at least 46 years, the Rockefeller Institute of Government in Albany, said in a July 17 report.

Congress’s Joint Tax Committee estimated in February that the Treasury would spend $9.8 billion through 2019 subsidizing the bonds. Matt Fabian, a managing director at Municipal Market Advisors in Westport, Connecticut, said in a June 22 report that the program’s price tag may reach $27.3 billion by the time all such securities mature in 2044...

The spread is even wider when considering more of the smaller Build America Bond deals, according to Philip Fischer, a strategist in New York at Merrill Lynch & Co., a unit of Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America. He found that on July 15 the average yield on bonds of more than $100 million compared with an index of AA corporate rates was 1.49 percentage point.

“Munis and corporates are apples and oranges in terms of the credit, but does that justify that kind of spread? Not for me,” said Ben Watkins, the director of Florida’s state bond division. Investors in the corporate bond market are “taking advantage of an opportunity.”

SP Futures Hourly Chart at 2:30 EDT

Some short term indicators are flashing that we are nearing at least a short term top. There is also indication of distribution of stock here by insiders to the public, which is also an indication of a possible top. This judgement is based on many charts and indicators not shown here.

Having said that, our discipline will not prompt us to do any seriously non-hedged shorting until the 'trendline' Key Pivot is violated at least on a daily close, and then confirmed by a move lower.

The market is rising on thin volumes, and unless the sellers come back in, it can continue to drift higher on program trading and short squeezes.

We are within two weeks of a potential 'crash window' where a final top will be made, and a selloff with a significant leg lower will be seen into the end of year. The window is a bit wide for now, a six week period starting around August 17th. We will hope to tighten that up by the end of July.

This is only a probability, not a hard forecast. But it has us edgy to be on the long side, even in precious metals miners, without hedging a general market decline. The Cashflow in the market is looking a bit stretched. We may have to wait until later in earnings season for this to shake out.

In sum, the markets seem 'precarious' and unstable to us, but not enough to jump in front of the market to the bear side yet.

As an aside, we are seeing quite an increase in 'screwy fills' on the bid ask level II where fills on the retail side seem to be made 'out of bounds' of the usual bid/ask action.

We do not use market orders normally and would not suggest them here for those that do. The market makers are shaving fills and front running perhaps although that is harder to spot except on the thinly traded stocks where other issues may come into play.

But we are seeing far too many fills BELOW our limit bids on some stocks to believe this market is functioning normally.

The Allure of Outsourcing Financial Regulation

One has to be fascinated with the proposal by the Obama Administration to effectively outsource the regulation of US markets and the protection of consumers to the Federal Reserve, an agency that is owned by the industry which it would be asked to regulate.

It is especially interesting given the recent history of the failure of that organization to do its job properly, failure to engage in open and transparent dialogue about its non-core (non-monetary) operations, and continuing resistance to taking direction from the government in matters related to fiscal and legislative policy that would fall under its regulatory purview while asserting its independence.

Its almost surreal. I cannot believe anyone is taking this proposal seriously.

There are three reasons why the Obama Administration is proposing it and the Congress is giving it serious consideration.

1. The special interests, the banks, who are significant donors to the Democratic and Republican parties would like to have it since they effectively own the Fed, and Wall Street likes no regulation better than self-regulation.

2. Government enjoys outsourcing its responsibilities to outside agencies like the Fed, because when the lapses and failures come, it gives them a great opportunity for finger pointing and hearings to chastise the party that failed, and shift the blame for the responsibility for the failure from themselves to someone outside their organization.

3. Larry Summers wants to be both the chairman of the Federal Reserve and of the SEC and a proposed Financial Consumer Protection Agency to attempt to maximize his ability to manipulate and control the financial system. And Larry does not work for you or your interests.

Would you like to have seen Alan Greenspan as not only the chairman of the Federal Reserve, but also the head of the SEC and the Consumer Protection Agency for financial products?

What is being proposed amounts to a financial Star Chamber. It makes the machinations behind the founding of the Federal Reserve in 1913 look tame by comparison.

Has the US a shred of common sense and regard for democratic principles left?