About Those Falling Interest Rates and the Fallacy of Monetary Deflation at the Zero Bound

Liquidity Trap, Straight Up, with a Twist

I think we are all familiar with the recently popular viewpoint that as the financial economy crashed, what people called 'money destruction' would follow. Well actually the destruction of credit which some considered the same as money, as money itself. There were many detailed and complex thought experiments to explain why this must happen, involving monetary theories.

This would result in a much stronger dollar, since in fewer dollars would result in an outsized dollar demand, especially to pay off debt, a simple equation resulting from what might best be described as pidgin monetarism, favored heavily by non-economists, using what passes for common sense. Unfortunately these are uncommon times.

In this monetary deflation interest rates would fall, and commodities would be crushed, including gold and silver, falling before the almighty dollar.

The example most often cited was that of post-bubble Japan. America was doomed to decades of a stronger dollar and slack demand.

Well it didn't happen, despite the resurgent hope that the expected deflation will finally occur. There are even fresh definitions of what deflation really is, in Clintonesque manner, to accommodate it to the unexpected outcome we see today.   Unexpected at least by those theorists and their true believers.

When you have no model and are a little right by accident, it is fairly easy to adapt your forecast to what is really happening. But you simply cannot explain it. One might have successful investment results, and my congratulations to such flexibility, but it is the result of momentum following and not from a deep understanding of what is happening.

Let me give you three things to think about.

First, credit is NOT money. Money can be created from a number of sources throughout an economy. The expansion of credit at the business and banking level, often involving savings and fractional reserve leverage, is the major organic source of money, the point of its creation from economic activity or transactions themselves.   It is the most utilitarian form of money, because it is directly tied to what one might ordinarily expect to be productive investment and economic benefits.

Sometimes this mechanism is distorted and abused, in the case of fraud or reckless lending for speculation as an example, and then the money supply begins to decouple from the real economy.  It is the job of the regulators and the Fed to control this.

Like gold or any other asset or liability, credit must be transformed into a utilitarian form of wealth, or money, in order to effect the exchange. You may HAVE a million dollars in credit somewhere, but at some point someone must agree to transform that credit into actual money for you to use it. If an unused million dollar credit line expires, we do not see ourselves as a million dollars poorer.

When organic credit expansion fails to create money, the Fed or the Treasury can step in and create money non-organically, that is, not as the result of economic activity. In the case of an external standard, the Treasury can formally devalue the currency, as the US had done in the first half of the 1930s. Monetary authorities do not like to do this, because it makes their activity more transparent, and therefore more controversial.

By the way, Roosevelt did not have to take the US off the gold standard, or disallow the holding of gold by US citizens, in order to devalue the dollar as he did. This was a more complex arrangement designed to recapitalize the banking system, which I covered in some detail in an earlier blog.

Money is created from the assets on the Fed's balance sheet. These include various forms of credit, forex, and gold. The money as notes and reserves is held on the liability side of the balance sheet, in banking fashion.

The second thing to remember is that the extent of inflation or deflation is a policy decision in an otherwise unconstrained environment.

Greece does not have such a choice, for example, because the ECB controls their currency.  The US probably has the most choice of all, because it not only owns its currency, but the dollar is also still the world's reserve currency. While the audience is not captive, it is at a disadvantage.

The third thing is that the creation of money from the Fed or Treasury may result in more money, but it may not result in a sustainable recovery.    Money created by the Fed is high powered money, created as it were from the will of the monetary authority's policy.

Money creation, or monetary stimulus, works well in situations wherein the economy has fallen into a temporary slump, especially because of some exogenous shock or a slack period that is cyclical in nature, such as seasonal variation.

But in the event of a secular crisis or problem, monetary stimulation is a palliative, but no cure.   The remedy lies generally on the fiscal and political policy actions, with the aim of correcting or repairing whatever had caused the problem in the first place.  

Monetary stimulus alone, without the will to effect political reform for example, results in very uncommon economic conditions, one of which Keynes described as a 'liquidity trap.'

In this case now in the US, we see a lack of political will to reform the outsized and corrupt banking system, and the nation's flows of funds.  The stagnant median wage is a major impediment to sustainable recovery.  Most of the economic benefit for the last twenty years has flowed to the top one percent of the population. 

How that is remedied is another matter, and will be subject to a great deal of political debate as the various interests fight for their portion of the pie as they say.

But in the case of monetary stimulus coupled with a lack of organic recovery, and the sort of slack aggregate demand that comes from economic imbalances, too much money in too few hands, what we will see is money being hoarded in safe havens of wealth, especially short term Treasuries, gold and silver, and bank reserves.   It really makes perfect sense.

Can this go on indefinitely?  No way.  Unless the system is reformed, it will resolve in one of three ways, or a combination of them: a hyperinflation, an authoritarian oligarchy with grinding stagflation, or a civil insurrection with a fascist response. 

I don't think a true deflation is in the cards unless the US becomes isolationist, or mercantilist, and it is forced upon the  population through a policy of austerity.   Then we might see that authoritarian oligarchy with a grinding deflation instead of stagflation.

It should be noted that all three are variations on a theme of the breakdown of the market system and individual economic liberty.

Finally, and this is directed primarily at the Modern Monetary Theorists, while one can create money without using a debt based system, the money creation must act as though it is governed by some restraint.  Traditionally this had been gold and silver, and in the case of a national bank, the debt markets.  Government may indeed print on their own volition, in those areas wherein they lack legal tender controls, most notably international trade, they are beholden to those parties in the manner of debtors to creditors, since the dollars are really promissory notes based on the full faith and credit of the government.

Hyperinflation is no certain outcome by any means at all.  Furthermore, it is not even likely yet except for a further string of remarkable policy errors.  It is therefore somewhat of a policy decision of incompetence.  But as things progress, the latitude of the policy makers becomes increasingly constrained by the sustainability of the real economy in particular and the social fabric as a whole. 

It should also be noted that there is a growing and largely unreported overhang of eurodollars around the world.  If at some time the world begins to repudiate US dollars and debt in a de facto devaluation, the resolution may not be in the hands of policy makers, and the progress of change could accelerate, dramatically.

Endnote:  People like to send me things that are basically chicken and egg examples with regard to money creation, wrapped in lots of accounting language.

These so called proofs are largely word plays, and mostly misunderstandings of the system because of lag times and complex relationships crushed into meaningless by overly simplistic models.

So, in other words, I have looked at most of them, and please don't bother. They are just rationalizations for reasons why certain things that have happened could not happen, and are thus a bit outdated.

I am not interested in resurveying the same real estate that I have already been over many times since 1996, when this current cycle of economic history began in earnest. Some of those dead horse theories have already been beaten thoroughly into glue, so it is time to move on.

And I am becoming somewhat indifferent to those who will not, since they obviously wish to live the destructive experience to the fullest. It must be some perversity in human nature, or the will of God, or some combination thereof that is beyond my power to affect or obtain value from any more.

But it is necessary to understand how things work, and what went wrong, to reform and recover from a crisis such as the Western world is undergoing, and so I leave you with this summary of where I am to date.

The economy will not enjoy a sustainable recovery without a significant improvement in the media wage, if you wish to look at some simplistic indicator. Those reforms that people propose, if any, since continuing to steal from the weak seems to be in vogue in some vocal circles, will be effective to the extent that they increase it.

Of the outcomes outlined above, America seems to be flirting with the path of an authoritarian oligarchy with a grinding stagflation, which has also been called financial repression in other quarters.  It is a monetary inflation in the face of slack aggregate demand, with an unreformed financial and political sector.

 This could look a bit like the mercantilist command economy of Japan, dominated as it is by a deeply entrenched oligarchy that honors its social contract with the mass of its people however.  I expect China to go down this route when their time comes.  I am not suggesting outright fascism except as a response to civil insurrection.

But in the case of the much larger and more open US economy, that is going to produce some interesting anomalies, and a mix of disinflation and soaring price inflation. I am not sure how long the aggregate demand slump will be able to hold its ground against the tide of paper.

And quite a few people seem to favor that, if they think it benefits them. So the things we see happen might well perk along as they are, at least for the time being, until the anger of the broader public reaches critical mass, and action with reaction intensifies.

Time For a Review: Economic Power, Authoritarian Capitalism, and the Failure of Governance

There are quite a few theories and a deepening economic debate swirling around. Even Marx is being selectively resurrected to help explain what is going on. Everything can contribute something, but the less useful parts merely add to the noise and confusion.

I think the situation is a little more simple than many portray, but it is ironically elusive to most people's minds as they distort their models to accommodate the new realities, which are little different from the old realities, at least in the historical context. Reform is a slow horse to leave the gate when the games are still fixed.

Fraud is, after all, a confidence game. But when confidence fails, all the con men have left is fear and greed, and the darker emotions that come with them. So let's talk about anything and everything except what really happened, and make that discussion as complex as possible. Let's not fix what is broken, in small manageable bites. Let's attempt to reinvent and reorganize the entire system. As in corporations, when management fails, time to reorganize and redivide the power amongst the power brokers, rather than actually fix anything.

The sad truth is that most economic models are artificial constructs that crush the life out of reality according to the bias of their authors, and are used to justify behaviours that are in the self-interest in whatever group that promotes them. This is because except for some very basic ideas, macro-economics is not a science, but much more significantly a public policy discussion with some mathematical relationships added, and those largely of a statistical estimation.

This is a long discussion and it is a bit dated. But it is useful to remember where we are on this turn of the circle, and how we got here.

We are in the hysteria period of the financial crisis, an uneasy calm wherein the facade of the system is restored, more or less, and people are attempting to ignore the wreckage and the victims. The winners are standing on their piles of loot, unwilling to give anything up.

But they are not at peace, because they do not or can not talk about how and why this crisis happened, and so cannot be sure that it will not happen again.  And they know that a society that is not willing to help the weak will not be able to protect the wealthy.

The economic system was beginning to totter in the 1980's,  but it started to slip off the rails in the late 1990's with the final pushes of free market fundamentalism with the unleashing of the derivatives market, and the repeal of Glass-Steagall. The derivatives market is a monster that still remains untamed.

One cannot have a sustainable economy where the Financial Services sector continues to take an inordinate share of national income and corporate profits, which some estimate to be as high as 40 percent. And that largesse is used to virtually control the very system that is set up to regulate and control it.

For those who simply must have an easy answer, here it is:

The Banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, with balance restored to the economy, before there can be any sustained recovery.

The descent to hell is easy, but to return to the upper air is always the real task, the labor, especially when your hellion guides continue to herd you about using greed and fear alternatively. How can one attempt to recover, when they do not even know where they are, and do not remember how they got there?

So, here is some food for thought, and what I hope might be an interesting conversation amongst some bright people who don't always agree with each other. But each makes sense in their own way, and contributes to what seems to be an honest discussion, which is a scarce commodity in these times of universal deceit.

Shock B: I'll Bust a Cap in Your Curve, And Then Some...

Ben Bernanke and his gangsta bankas have been following the approach outlined in this paper from 2004, Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, which is excerpted below, and also in his famous 'printing press' speech on avoiding deflation from 2002.

I have written about this before several times over the years, but perhaps it is a good time to review the Fed's game plan.

The first item, communications to model and influence the perception of the markets, is obvious. Jawboning is a major element of any financial intervention. Acknowledging or denying the intervention is all about the message as well.

The most recent statement from the Fed, for example, about keeping rates at the zero bound for the next two years, depending on how the economy fares, is a good example of this. Other actions they may take through their own speeches, and the statements of informal intermediaries in the industry and the press, are good examples as well.

The expansion of the Fed's Balance Sheet is also known as quantitative easing, and that has been done at least twice now, and in epic proportions.

The third option, the targeted purchasing of certain assets, has been done to a large extent to support the banking and mortgage system, but not necessarily the real economy.  This is the program by which the Fed has been taking non-traditional assets into its portfolio in the various vehicles it has constructed in order to shore up the shaky creditworthiness of the TBTF asset profiles.

What the Fed is not doing in a major program yet, although it certainly has done it in the past, is to conspiculously shift the duration of its Treasury bonds portfolio in order to achieve certain interest rate objectives, effectively setting caps on target rates up the curve.

In 1961 in a program called Operation Twist, the Fed moved the duration of its portfolio to help lower longer term rates.  It should be noted that OT1, if you will,  was conducted during the fixed exchange rate period known as Bretton Woods I, which included the redeemability of dollars for gold.  Also, although the short end of the Treasury curve was not at the zero bound,  it was not viewed as adjustable for policy constraints than the zero bound.

So there are some subtle differences perhaps in any OT2 which the Fed might announce this week, or soon thereafter.

John F. Kennedy was elected president in November 1960 and inaugurated on January 20, 1961. The U.S. economy had been in recession for several months, so the incoming Administration and the Federal Reserve wanted to lower interest rates to stimulate the weak economy. Under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system then in effect, this interest rate differential led cross-currency arbitrageurs to convert U.S. dollars to gold and invest the proceeds in higher-yielding European assets. The result was an outflow of gold from the United States to Europe amounting to several billion dollars per year, a very large quantity that was a source of extreme concern to the Administration and the Federal Reserve.

The buying of the longer end of the curve, moving out from the bills to the shorter notes, has been telegraphed repeatedly to the markets this year. So it does appear likely.

The effects would be to lower real rates more broadly across the curve, perhaps taking them all negative, or at least closer to zero on the longer end depending on how one wishes to calculate inflation. I think the Fed uses their chain deflator.  I doubt its accuracy for practical purposes, but let's not quibble.

This is 'bad' for the dollar and good for gold and longer dated Treasuries which will enjoy a brief rally. However it will drive yield hungry investors to seek other alternatives, perhaps in the stock market and overseas.   It may shake up the Treasury markets on the longer end moreso than we might expect if there is an erosion in confidence in the US' ability to put its house in order without devaluation of the dollar debt.  That erosion may be well-founded.

Such a policy move is intended to stimulate consumption and investment in situations where the middle of the curve and out is used as a benchmark for setting non-governmental interest rates.  There is thinking that by moving out from the short maturies, the pull lower on the even longer rates will be more pronounced.

I do not think this alone will work. Banks are reluctant to lend at any price, and lowering the rates would not improve the credit risk profile of potential borrowers.

The Fed could also reduce the interest it pays on reserves to zero, or even place a negative rate on it. This would stimulate banks to put the money to work in the markets for projects with positive yields. This is not so different from the Fed's actions in driving consumers out of short term bonds and zero interest savings accounts, which they have done from time to time.

There is some further indications that the Fed will be using a reverse repo mechanism in order to grow bank credit in a more targeted fashion.  I will not get into that further here, because if it does develop I am sure there will be much more lucid explanations given in some detail based on Fed announcements.

But it does follow the theme of actively stimulating lending in ways other than lowering rates, even on the longer ends of the curve.

The Fed might couple this with government guarantees on loans for example, for certain situations where the government wishes to stimulate activity, such as housing for example. It is hard to imagine anything like this passes through the dysfunctional Congress.

There is another option that the Fed has, which is not cited in the summary of this paper shown below.

For this we have to turn to Chairman Bernanke's famous speech on Deflation in 2002 in which he stated that 'the Fed's owns a printing press' and highlighted various steps which they might take to insure that deflation does not happen in the US, the ability and the resolve of the Fed to prevent it, and some of the options the Fed might have if they reach the infamous zero bound:

However, a principal message of my talk today is that a central bank whose accustomed policy rate has been forced down to zero has most definitely not run out of ammunition. As I will discuss, a central bank, either alone or in cooperation with other parts of the government, retains considerable power to expand aggregate demand and economic activity even when its accustomed policy rate is at zero. In the remainder of my talk, I will first discuss measures for preventing deflation--the preferable option if feasible. I will then turn to policy measures that the Fed and other government authorities can take if prevention efforts fail and deflation appears to be gaining a foothold in the economy...

What has this got to do with monetary policy? Like gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the extent that they are strictly limited in supply. But the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services. We conclude that, under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation.

So what then might the Fed do if its target interest rate, the overnight federal funds rate, fell to zero? One relatively straightforward extension of current procedures would be to try to stimulate spending by lowering rates further out along the Treasury term structure--that is, rates on government bonds of longer maturities.

There are at least two ways of bringing down longer-term rates, which are complementary and could be employed separately or in combination. One approach, similar to an action taken in the past couple of years by the Bank of Japan, would be for the Fed to commit to holding the overnight rate at zero for some specified period. Because long-term interest rates represent averages of current and expected future short-term rates, plus a term premium, a commitment to keep short-term rates at zero for some time--if it were credible--would induce a decline in longer-term rates.

A more direct method, which I personally prefer, would be for the Fed to begin announcing explicit ceilings for yields on longer-maturity Treasury debt (say, bonds maturing within the next two years). The Fed could enforce these interest-rate ceilings by committing to make unlimited purchases of securities up to two years from maturity at prices consistent with the targeted yields. If this program were successful, not only would yields on medium-term Treasury securities fall, but (because of links operating through expectations of future interest rates) yields on longer-term public and private debt (such as mortgages) would likely fall as well.

Lower rates over the maturity spectrum of public and private securities should strengthen aggregate demand in the usual ways and thus help to end deflation. Of course, if operating in relatively short-dated Treasury debt proved insufficient, the Fed could also attempt to cap yields of Treasury securities at still longer maturities, say three to six years. Yet another option would be for the Fed to use its existing authority to operate in the markets for agency debt (for example, mortgage-backed securities issued by Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association). Historical experience tends to support the proposition that a sufficiently determined Fed can peg or cap Treasury bond prices and yields at other than the shortest maturities...

If lowering yields on longer-dated Treasury securities proved insufficient to restart spending, however, the Fed might next consider attempting to influence directly the yields on privately issued securities. Unlike some central banks, and barring changes to current law, the Fed is relatively restricted in its ability to buy private securities directly. However, the Fed does have broad powers to lend to the private sector indirectly via banks, through the discount window. Therefore a second policy option, complementary to operating in the markets for Treasury and agency debt, would be for the Fed to offer fixed-term loans to banks at low or zero interest, with a wide range of private assets (including, among others, corporate bonds, commercial paper, bank loans, and mortgages) deemed eligible as collateral. (Obviously the Fed has already been doing this as well).

Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.17 The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.

Each of the policy options I have discussed so far involves the Fed's acting on its own. In practice, the effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. A broad-based tax cut, for example, accommodated by a program of open-market purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices. Even if households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" of money. (I think the Obama Administration used this as the rationale for extending the Bush tax cuts).

Of course, in lieu of tax cuts or increases in transfers the government could increase spending on current goods and services or even acquire existing real or financial assets. If the Treasury issued debt to purchase private assets and the Fed then purchased an equal amount of Treasury debt with newly created money, the whole operation would be the economic equivalent of direct open-market operations in private assets. (I believe the Fed has already been doing this with the help of a few Primary Dealers.)

In summation, I think Bernanke's next move will be to start capping the two and three year rates, with the five year to follow. The purpose will be to keep rates low for the purpose of enabling spending and devaluing the dollar. I do not think he will have to expand the Fed's Balance Sheet to accomplish this.

But it is important to note that while the Congress can enforce a debt ceiling on the US Treasury, there is no such hard ceiling on the Fed's Balance Sheet. And this is probably the genesis of Presidential candidate Perry's scarcely veiled threat to Mr. Bernanke and the use of the word 'treason.'

I am not saying that the Fed is right in what they are doing. I am using Bernanke's thinking, and his own words, to determine what the Fed is likely to do next. I have been using this model for the past five years, and it has served me well. 

I have some sympathy for Bernanke, because he has few allies, especially among the libertine left and the luddites of the right, and the serpentine Obama.  The major obstacle to the US recovery is a failure in governance.

I have very little sympathy for the manipulation of certain markets traditionally viewed as safe havens, based on the rationale outlined in Larry Summer's paper about Gibson's Paradox, and the linkage between interest rates and gold.  That appears to be roughly analagous to machine-gunning the lifeboats.
Deflation or inflation are truly policy decisions in an unconstrained fiat currency regime such as that enjoyed by the US. On this Mr. Bernanke is correct, and anyone who thinks otherwise does not understand a fiat money system.  It really is that simple.  To their credit, the Modern Monetary Theorists understand it very well, except for the downside of excessive money creation in a co-dependent world, even if one does enjoy the exorbitant privilege of the world's reserve currency.

Various interests have been seeking to restrain the Fed, ranging from large creditors such as China, and the domestic monied interests who have already received their bonuses and bailouts, and who do not wish to see their dollar wealth erode. One is richer if all around them are made relatively poorer, or so some lines of thinking go.  And of course there are the prudent savers, who have been fleeing the dollar to the relative safety of some foreign currencies and hard assets like gold and silver.

I would hope that by now that any reader here would know that, at least in my judgement, deflation through hard money and austerity, or inflation through stimulus and money printing, are both unable to achieve a sustainable economic recovery because the system is caught in a credibility trap in which the governance of the country is unable to act justly and reform the system without implicating themselves in the compliant corruption that caused the unbridled credit expansion, massive frauds, and financial collapse in the first place. 

This was a major contributor to Japan's lost years.  The lack of will was in the failure of their largely single party system to correct the inefficiencies and crony capitalism of the banks and their keiretsus that provided a drag on all stimulus and the real economy, siphoning off the additional money into unproductive projects and support for zombie corporations.

The Banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, with balance restored to the economy, before there can be any sustained recovery.

Federal Reserve
Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment

Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, Brian P. Sack

8 April 2004


Abstract

 The success over the years in reducing inflation and, consequently, the average level of nominal interest rates has increased the likelihood that the nominal policy interest rate may become constrained by the zero lower bound.

When that happens, a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions and must rely on “non-standard” policy alternatives. To assess the potential effectiveness of such policies, we analyze the behavior of selected asset prices over short periods surrounding central bank statements or other types of financial or economic news and estimate “no-arbitrage” models of the term structure for the United States and Japan.

There is some evidence that central bank communications can help to shape public expectations of future policy actions and that asset purchases in large volume by a central bank would be able to affect the price or yield of the targeted asset.


Non-Technical Summary

 Central banks usually implement monetary policy by setting the short-term nominal interest rate, such as the federal funds rate in the United States. However, the success over the years in reducing inflation and, consequently, the average level of nominal interest rates has increased the likelihood that the nominal policy interest rate may become constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates. When that happens, a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions and must rely instead on “non-standard” policy alternatives.

An extensive literature has discussed monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound, but for the most part from a theoretical or historical perspective. Few studies have presented empirical evidence on the potential effectiveness of non-standard monetary policies in modern economies. Such evidence obviously would help central banks plan for the contingency of the policy rate at zero and also bear directly on the choice of the appropriate inflation objective in normal times: The greater the confidence of central bankers that tools exist to help the economy escape the zero bound, the less need there is to maintain an inflation “buffer,” bolstering the argument for a lower inflation objective.

In this paper, we apply the tools of modern empirical finance to the recent experiences of the United States and Japan to provide evidence on the potential effectiveness of various nonstandard policies. Following Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), we group these policy alternatives into three classes:

1. using communications policies to shape public expectations about the future course of interest rates;
2. increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, or “quantitative easing”; and
3. changing the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet through, for example, the targeted purchases of long-term bonds as a means of reducing the long-term interest rate.

We describe how these policies might work and discuss relevant existing evidence...

Additional Reading:
The Upcoming Expansion of US Bank Credit - Alasdair MacLeod

Gold and Interest Rates: More than Joined at the Hip - Rob Kirby

“The study of money, above all other fields in economics, is one in which complexity is used to disguise truth or to evade truth, not to reveal it.”

John Kenneth Galbraith

Jim Grant Discussion with James Turk on Money, Bonds, the Fed, International Trade, and Gold

"...I have a dreadful confidence that existing [monetary] arrangements will not last."

James Grant

This is an excellent discussion of some of the key topics affecting global currency and the roots of the financial crisis.

It provides some background for the unfolding currency war and the evolution of the global reserve currency which is in progress today.

I think it is fair to say that very few people understand this, and yet it is having a tremendous impact on their lives, and that effect will be increasing, perhaps exponentially, over the next few years.

It is said that a shark must keep growing and moving to remain alive, and can never be at rest. It must continually devour all that it can to survive.

This is the nature of a Ponzi scheme as well, since it is founded on nothing more than a growing believe, and misplaced trust. It can ultimately tolerate no dissent, and needs continue to add converts to it, whether it be by persuasion or force.

And therefore we have the not incidental connection between a global fiat currency such as the American Dollar or the British Pound and a far reaching military-political empire. When the empire stops expanding, the currency begins its slow but inexorable decline.

This discussion is presented as a contrast to Modern Monetary Theory.

Propaganda, Western Style: Moscow Memories II

As regular readers know, Le Proprietaire was doing business in Russia, mostly in Moscow and St. Pete, in the 1990's as part of the overall international business portfolio during his past corporate life.

It was an exciting and somewhat nerve-wracking experience, but one that vividly drove home certain lessons about government, currency, and the resilience of the human spirit that have served well in the following decade. Moscow Memories of 1997

I have to admit I was not aware of this series about Russia by the Wall Street Journal, given a long term preference for The Economist and The Financial Times. Thanks to Zero Hedge for bringing this story about it from The Nation (which I would have never read, being a long time conservative) about the Journal and Steve Liesman to light.

As someone involved there I can say that anyone who did not perceive the growing crisis was living in a bubble, or carrying some particularly optimistic slant in their outlook.

The decline of the Russian economy was oppressive, palpable, almost on everyone's mind. Hard to miss, even at the occasional showy party in English thrown by western corporations for an audience largely made up of ex-pats. The move out of the rouble into just about anything else with substance was becomng a groundswell, later to become unstoppable default. Any presentation about a Russian venture in the 1990's had better contain some plans regarding currency risk.

But why bring this up now? Le Cafe has no particular squabble with the Liesman, and since we do not watch CNBC anymore, are largely immune to whatever it is he says that does not appear in a youtube excerpt, generally involving his getting owned by Rick Santelli.

We bring it up because this article below exposes the typical modus operandi of the Western press, now and over the past twenty years. Carry a party line until the situation explodes, cover it up and distract the public with phony debates and verbal circuses, and then back to give breaking coverage of Armageddon, with a twist of shared guilt. No one is to blame.

Can you remember the coverage of the tech bubble of 2000 by the media? Giddy excitement as the numbers climbed higher, with reassurance as they turned down that this was just a temporary setback.

And I will never forget, as the stocks collapsed and people were wiped out, the CNBC regular arrogantly saying "Well, no one FORCED them to buy those stocks."

Keep this in mind, because we are nearing that point again, with the western media reassuring its public that all is well, while the insiders sell, and the grifters and grafters are draining the nation of its wealth, while the propaganda puppets mouth the slogans of the day. And after it blows up, they will shift gears without an afterthought, keeping the public mind moving on, trusting to the collective amnesia of a distracted populace.

As they said on Bloomberg this morning regarding the crisis just passed, 'We are all to blame; the regulators, the government, the rating agencies, the banks, and the public who was apathetic, who failed to act."

And then they moved on to let us know that Ashley Dupre will be providing a weekly advice column in the NY Post. Romance with a financial twist?

The difference here, at least it seems to me, is that the American public is still a believer in what the government says. The Russian people, at least by that time, did not. So perhaps there are a few more good years left.

The Nation
The Journal's Russia Scandal
By Matt Taibbi & Mark Ames
October 4, 1999

Just before Christmas in 1997, as a tumultuous stock-market
crisis ravaged emerging markets in every corner of the globe, readers of the
Wall Street Journal were treated to some good news: Russia was going to emerge
from the mess unscathed. While conceding that "few debt markets outside
Southeast Asia were hit harder by recent financial turmoil than Russia's," the
Journal's Moscow bureau chief, Steve Liesman, added quickly that "many analysts
believe an equally strong rebound may be in the offing." Moreover, Liesman
wrote, investors were rapidly coming to the realization that "Russia's problems
are far different and, for the moment, less dire than those that undermined
Asian economies." The December 16 piece was headlined, "Russian Debt Markets Due
for Rebound."

A few weeks later, Liesman and the Journal used even
stronger language to trumpet Russia's economic merits. They chided investors who
were too busy "fretting over Asia's financial crisis" to notice what they called
"one of the decade's major economic events: the end of Russia's seven-year
recession."

The Journal's prediction was more than a little precipitate.
Instead of getting better, things in Russia got worse. A lot worse. Nine months
after Liesman declared that Russia's debt market was due for a rebound, and just
over seven months after proclaiming the end of the Russian recession, the
Journal--like most US newspapers--found itself having to explain the near-total
collapse of Russia's economy and capital markets...

Read the rest here: The Journal's Russia Scandal - Matt Taibbi, The Nation 1999

The Federal Reserve School of Monetary Witchcraft and Wizardry

Here are some key excerpts from the account by The Institutional Risk Analyst of his trip to "The International Financial Crisis" conference in Chicago. You may read it in its entirety here.

It matches up with our feel from reading on the web, that most economists are going to be painfully slow to change their thinking, particularly in the US, even after this latest financial crisis of historic proportions. It is hard to change when one cannot even admit one's mistakes, and the green shoots of a false Spring bring out new hopes that old ways might still work once again.

The status quo often has a powerful grip on the levers of thought leadership, and a social science like economics is especially vulnerable to peer pigheadedness, even when it is shown to be flat out wrong. The lack of innovation seems even slower now than in the 1970's when the appearance of a virulent stagflation shook up the assumptions of the economic establishment.

One thing which is almost certain is that change will not come from within, but from without. The great opportunity for reform that Obama was presented is passing quickly, probably from the point at which he surrounded himself with highly atrophied economic thinkers, from the atavistic Larry Summers to the clever but highly tailored Ben Bernanke, who is like Alan Greenspan with a real PhD. The Treasury Secretary is not a thinker, but a pair of hands, at best, what T. S. Eliot called 'a willing tool, glad to be of use.'

A new school of economics will rise out of this crisis, and we are more sure now than before that it will not originate in the States, which is seeing an appalling failure in economic thought leadership, in part caused by a dominant Fed, acting in part to stifle innovation as MITI did in Japan.

But the stock market is up, after a brief period of housecleaning last week by the funds and the banks, opening the door to the end of quarter window dressing. So let's ignore our problems once again and keep the printing presses and that wealth transfer mechanism turning. For now.

The US may indeed suffer a lost decade after all.

Institutional Risk Analytics
The Global Carry Trade and the Crimes of Patriots
September 29, 2009

Our trip to Chicago last week to participate in "The International Financial Crisis" conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the World Bank was instructive in several ways. First and foremost, it confirmed that the US economics profession is still trying to defend the old ways and means in terms of analytical methods for bank safety and soundness.

While there were many calls for "reform" of regulation, we heard nary a suggestion that the mish-mash of quantitative methods that currently comprise the framework for assessing the safety and soundness of banks needs to be set aside and a new approach defined. Indeed, the foreign participants in the two-days of presentations seem to be far more advanced in their thinking about bank safety and soundness than their counterparts from the US.

Andrew Sheng of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, reproached us for thinking that throwing debt at a global problem of insolvency will be successful. We have created the world's largest ever carry trade, Sheng noted, and suggested that the approach of exchanging a bank solvency problem for a sovereign debt problem could effectively replicate the lost decade of Japan on an international scale. He also wondered how any nation will be able to raise interest rates when vast sums of cash (i.e. fiat paper dollars) are ready to immediately pounce on any carry trade opportunities that arise.

Charles Goodhart of the London School of Economics.... reminded the audience that whereas Americans still debate the merits of regulation vs. innovation, in the EU the political class has already decided the robust regulation of banks is a necessary condition for stability. He also dismissed the idea that you can separate the "utility" bank from "the casino," again suggesting that the EU view of regulation of banks is comprehensive and should be emulated by the US....

While the members of our panel suggested various ways to restore balance and even virtue to the regulatory process, we suggested that Washington does not need another oversight agency or more platonic guardians. Rather, we need to address the problem where it truly resides, first with the debt issuance of our profligate government and second with the accommodative monetary policy of our central bank. As one participant noted, there is no longer any distinction between fiscal and monetary policy in the US.

Though there were many insightful and interesting comments made at the two-day conference in the FRB Chicago, the one thing that we heard virtually no one say is that the current financial crisis stems from irresponsible monetary and fiscal policies. Many participants talked about the role of "global capital flows" in fueling the crisis, but none made the basic statement that having printed this money to pay for imports and fund domestic deficit spending, the US was bound to see the dollars eventually come home in the form of a credit bubble.

Since the October 1987 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve System has not denied the Street either liquidity or collateral. The objective goal of policy, it seems, has been to keep the ability of Congress to issue debt intact all the while keeping the casino part of the banking system operating at full steam regardless of the impact on inflation and, more important, investor behavior. Seen in this light, the proliferation of hedge funds and OTC securities is the natural response of investors to inflationary fiscal and monetary policies in Washington, a city where income and the proceeds of borrowing are seen as being equivalent.

Today the amount of debt and fiat money issued by the US government is threatening not only the solvency of private financial institutions and companies, but the stability of the entire global economy. Yet virtually no observers make the connection between the reality of secular inflation in the US and the bad outcomes in the financial markets, and in the global economy, where trade flows continue to shrink. Indeed, if members of Congress ever wanted a reason not to give the Fed more power as a regulator of financial institutions, they should start with an investigation of the Fed's conduct of monetary policy, not bank regulation. Just imagine how the US economy would look several decades from now were the Congress to give the Fed hegemony over bank supervision via the rubric of "systemic risk" even as the central bank continues its reckless policies with respect to monetary policy and its accommodation of US debt issuance.

Systemic risk, it seems, is not the result of bad regulatory policies, but the natural outcome of a system where income from productive economic activities is being increasingly supplemented with debt and inflation. Our political leaders say that such policies are meant to help the American people, but we've heard such empty justifications before. Call the policies of borrow and spend and print the "crimes of patriots," a powerful metaphor used by author Jonathan Kwitny to describe the bad acts of the CIA in the banking world decades ago. Since then, the money game and the role of government in our financial markets has only grown larger.

If the American people want to get the US financial system under control, then the first areas of investigation, we submit, must be fiscal and monetary policies. And if Americans do not soon get control over the habit of borrow and spend practiced by the Congress and facilitated by the Fed, then end result must be a populist backlash against Washington and incumbents in politics and the corporate world. As Congressman Ron Paul (R-TX) writes in his latest book, End the Fed: "Nothing good can come from the Federal Reserve… It's immoral, unconstitutional, impractical, promotes bad economics, and undermines liberty."