FOMC: Sound the Bell. School's In, Suckas

I do not expect this to change anyone's mind who has sworn themselves to a belief in a stronger dollar through debt deflation and credit contraction, with riches obtained by buying and holding Uncle Sam's proliferating promissory notes. Or those who believe in the instantaneous appearance of hyperflation for no discernible or inexplicable reasons for that matter.

Those who disagree with events as they are unfolding like to dismiss just about anyone who disagrees with them as naive and ignorant, and the Federal Reserve specifically as clueless and incompetent in their ability to generate monetary inflation and expand their balance sheet by buying existing debt of whatever type and flavor.

This is not giving the devil his due. That is the one thing that the Fed knows how to do and quite well: destroy the purchasing power of the dollar in the course of their financial engineering. They obviously have the tools as they have explained in detail, and from this statement and their recent actions it is clear that they stand willing and ready to use those tools again. You cannot say that Benny P to the M has failed to warn you.

What the Fed cannot do is breathe vitality into a zombie economy, and provoke a sustained recovery not tied to some sort of credit bubble. That is why stagflation remains the most likely outcome until the nation obtains the will and the determination to reform the financial system and restore a balance to trade and the real economy through a commitment to sound and practical public policy not driven by self-serving economic quackery. The dollar and bonds are made stronger through a vibrant underlying economy with the ability to generate taxable income and real returns to their holders.

But in the meanwhile the special interests will be served. A profound deflation and hyperinflation remain as possibilities for the future, but they will most likely be seen on the horizon in advance of their arrival as the result of some exogenous event or catastrophic failure. So far, not a glimpse.

Federal Reserve
Release Date: September 21, 2010
For immediate release

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that the pace of recovery in output and employment has slowed in recent months. Household spending is increasing gradually, but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Business spending on equipment and software is rising, though less rapidly than earlier in the year, while investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak. Employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. Housing starts are at a depressed level. Bank lending has continued to contract, but at a reduced rate in recent months. The Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability, although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be modest in the near term.

Measures of underlying inflation are currently at levels somewhat below those the Committee judges most consistent, over the longer run, with its mandate to promote maximum employment and price stability. With substantial resource slack continuing to restrain cost pressures and longer-term inflation expectations stable, inflation is likely to remain subdued for some time before rising to levels the Committee considers consistent with its mandate.

The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period. The Committee also will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings.

The Committee will continue to monitor the economic outlook and financial developments and is prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the economic recovery and to return inflation, over time, to levels consistent with its mandate.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; James Bullard; Elizabeth A. Duke; Sandra Pianalto; Eric S. Rosengren; Daniel K. Tarullo; and Kevin M. Warsh.

Voting against the policy was Thomas M. Hoenig, who judged that the economy continues to recover at a moderate pace. Accordingly, he believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted and will lead to future imbalances that undermine stable long-run growth. In addition, given economic and financial conditions, Mr. Hoenig did not believe that continuing to reinvest principal payments from its securities holdings was required to support the Committee’s policy objectives. (Mr. Hoenig was NOT heard to say, "Suck it up, bitchez." That was the other fellow afflicted with dementia. - Jesse.)

Sound the bell. School's in, suckas. And Ben and the Banks have the hall passes, the keys to the restrooms, and chalk.

The Inflation and Deflation Debate Deconstructed

'What most people call reason is really rationalization. Given a new set of data, most people will search through it only for those examples that support their existing beliefs. Their beliefs are really opinions, a tenuous collection of myths, anecdotes, slogans, and prejudices based largely on justifying personal fear and greed. This is what makes modern propaganda so powerful; people do not bother to think critically and objectively and act for the greatest good. And in their ignorance they can find the will to do increasingly monstrous things, and rationalize them.' Jesse

In a purely fiat regime, the question of a general (monetary) deflation and inflation is a policy decision. Anyone who does not understand this does not understand the modern mechanism of money creation. As the pundit said, "The mind rebels..."

But rather than engage in the usual facile intramurals about the topic, let's consider something more important. How does one 'play this' which is really what all these discussions are about: self interest.

The champion of deflation is the Treasury Bond (and the Dollar), and of the inflationists, Gold.

There are extremes on both sides, and probably more sense in the middle, since life rarely sustains the extreme unless there are people messing about with it. The only naturally efficient markets are in ... nature, and that only as measured over the long term.

Anyone who doesn't think Treasuries have been in a long bull market are blind fools.

But the same is true of gold.

I will leave the dollar aside for now to simplify the discussion, but it hardly lends itself to the deflationary theory.

People who have taken positions and held them in both Treasuries and Gold over the past ten years have made money, a very nice return. When one has a theory that consistently and reasonably encompasses that, you might have something worthwhile.

The deflationists will say that gold is a bubble fueled by mistaken speculators, and the inflationists will say that the Treasuries are being supported and manipulated by the Fed. Neither is able to look out from their deep wells of subjectivity.

You may wish to consider that the great part of this discussion, inflation versus deflation, is a diversion. But that is a discussion for another time.

The question for all failing theories is, as always, what next. What is the alternate count.

Oh boy oh boy, [our desired outcome] is finally coming and when it gets here its going to be good. We are finally turning [Japanese / Weimar].

Things are in bull markets, or bear markets, until they are not. The undeniable trend break is the best indication of change in momentum.

But things in the world of complexity are rarely as simple or straightforward as the average mind will allow, or can accept.

Anyone who thinks the Fed is impotent has not been paying attention to the last one hundred years. The Fed is not impotent, merely constrained. Their constraint is the policy arm of the government, the dollar, and the bond, in the absence of some external standards including external force.

Until one understands that, nothing can or will make sense. That is why the current discussion is so nasty and propaganda-like. It is not about what will happen, but rather about a public policy decision, about what people want to happen.

Consider that these debates are merely diversions, to distract people away from the most significant factors in their troubles, which are exploitation and fraud, and a military-industrial complex that is largely unproductive in terms of organic growth, and is quite simply no longer sustainable.

Paid professionals who were arguing the virtue of credit expansion as the bubbles blossomed are now arguing just as strenuously for austerity now that the bubbles are collapsing, their masters having taken their spoils. They will say for pay, without regard for the solutions that are in the best interest of the country. Few are thinking of their country anymore, as the individual is conditioned to think of themselves as globalized abstractions.

As always, be careful what you wish for, because you may get it. In this current climate, this class warfare, the American nation is a house divided. And you know what happens to those.

And the winners may inherit the wreckage, a pyrrhic victory indeed, but they can console themselves with the satisfaction that they have won the irrelevant debate.

China and the Goldfinger Syndrome

I have had some interesting discussions recently with correspondents about the problem which China has with its very large US dollar reserves.

To summarize what I think, China is attempting to diversify their portfolio of US Treasury dollar holdings. They are obviously accumulating 'real goods' including stockpiles of basic materials, gold, silver, oil and investments in the means of production in their own region and in key regions around the world.

This is more difficult than it might appear on the surface. Real goods are often strategic, and governments are sometimes reluctant to allow them to be acquired by a government considered a potential threat. The first difficulty is the strategic importance of some assets, such as the China's offer for the purchase of Unocal.

But there is also a need for confidentiality, stealthiness if you will. If word were to leak out that 'China is dumping its Treasuries' there would be a run on the market and the Chinese could lose a portion of their reserve wealth rather quickly.

Now, would it matter. Well, yes. It would matter because US dollars are still the currency of choice for most international trade including the all important international commodity, oil. If you think that philosophically dollars have no value because they are just paper, I would be more than happy to dispose of them for you. Limited time offer, of course.

I also posited that China, while accumulating its real goods quietly against the constraint of perturbing the markets, could do short term hedges against the less catastrophic scenario of further dollar devaluation by going into the very deep and liquid financial assets markets, and hedging risk with CDS and other obvious investments including shorts of various types.

As anyone who has attempted to acquire a company or take a substantial position in or out of an asset or company, at some point you can affect the price, making other participants aware that the asset is in play, and end up selling or buying against yourself. In the case of China it could also trigger a run on the bank of the US, which is an immediate endgame.

With regard to the use of financial instruments, someone raised the obvious issue of counter party risk. Well, of course it is an issue. But less so if you are merely hedging a portion of the portfolio for the devaluation scenario, and not a catastrophic default. And the choice of counter parties can be managed to some degree. It is a big world out there and the Swiss are always open for a bet.

But correctly, if there is a catastrophic failure of the dollar, they will be carrying banks and brokers around the world out on stretchers and almost all financial assets, or bets, will be in default. Those who are holding leap puts as insurance against a collapse may as well be holding food vouchers for a restaurant in Brigadoon.

China would most likely not lose the value of its reserves in the extreme case of a US default, even if every one of their remaining Treasuries and the financial hedges on those Treasuries became worthless. Why?

It's the Goldfinger Syndrome. As you may recall, Auric Goldfinger did not wish to steal the US gold supply, at that time the currency of the nation, from Fort Knox. He merely wished to eliminate it, making his own substantial gold holdings significantly more valuable. It is a form of increasing value through deflation, a concept that is much more familiar these days thanks to quite a few amateur economists patiently waiting for the US dollar to gain in value because of it.

If the US were to actually default, the value of real goods, from basic materials to gold and silver and oil, would absolutely soar in terms of dollars of course, but in most other fiat currencies of the developed world as well. The perception of the risk of a fiat currency would border on hysteria.

Returning to the deflation meme, the elimination of US financial assets from the 'world currency base' would make all the other currencies extremely valuable, and China would be flush with them. For real goods are a form of currency suitable for the exchange of wealth. They are merely less liquid, and not often used as the unit of value anymore. But real goods are a form of currency. They just cannot be printed, except perhaps on the Comex and at the LBMA it appears, and they would be absolutely discredited and out of business.

So, that is something to think about. China need do nothing but slowly and stealthily acquire real goods, and hedging their positions along with way with financial instruments, waiting for the US to play itself into some beneficial outcome for them. I think the financial hedging is important because of the relative illiquidity of some of the real goods, and the difficultly of acquiring them in sufficient supply without triggering a 'run on the dollar.' The financial markets are deeper and more discreet than the markets for real goods.

The problem facing the holders of dollars is not inflation or deflation, per se. They are merely particular manifestations of currency risk, and the uncertainty of holding substantial assets denominated in a fiat currency that is risky, meaning something abnormal or unstable in the classic sense of the term. A serious deflation or inflation are both unusual and risky.

This is not hair-splitting. Rather it is essential to understanding why gold can increase in value during periods of both a significant deflation and inflation, which on the surface seem like opposites. In fact they are similar if view in the terms of probability. They are both the opposite of currency stability, what I call currency risk. The further one gets out on the probability curve with a currency, the better gold looks in relation to it. Gold is the ultimate in stability, almost inert, and highly resistant to corrosion and decay, bordering on the timeless, comparatively uniform in its supply.

There are those who say that when the time comes, and what is happening becomes apparent, they will buy some real goods, foodstuffs, land, gold and silver. I can assure you that when that time comes, there will be little or none available at almost any price. One has to have lived through a currency crisis first hand to understand the phenomenon.

You are holding a currency in decline and there is little or no place to spend it except as a throwaway, because no one wants it anymore. Barter becomes predominant, and any hard currency is king. This is how it was in Russia in the 1990's with the old rouble before it finally imploded, at which time I was thankfully out of country. It was quieter than you might imagine, despite the headline antics of their mafia, and a sense of quiet desperation as people watched their life savings simply evaporate.

There is almost no doubt in my mind that this is how the Chinese are playing this, and certainly Russia and a few others as well, who are playing the long game. It explains some of the recent moves in price of certain forward looking assets, a phenomenon so little understood by the many, even now.

I still see the greater probability for the US as a devaluation and a stubborn stagflation for quite a few years. But the policy errors being committed by Bernanke and the Obama Administration are making the possibility of an actual collapse more likely than I would have thought even six months ago. I suppose it is never well to underestimate the self-destructive tendencies of obsessive greed.

See also The Last Bubble: The Problem of Unresolved Debt in the US Financial System and Currency Wars: Selling the Rope

Not So Much Deflation as the Decay of Value: SP 500 Futures and Gold Daily Charts Updated at Market Close

Wash and rinse. Best way to get that stubborn money out of the public through fees, commissions, and of course front running for those perfect trading profits at the faux banks.


Chart Updated at Market Close

Now that option expiration is over gold is back to where it was a week ago, trying to break out of its large cup and handle formation. Silver is on the cusp of activating a massive and bullish multi-year chart formation of its own. It is an open question whether gold or silver will lead the way.

But I have to say that the CFTC is a disgrace. Eventually they will clean up their markets, but the foot dragging and dissembling is a mark against them. Chairman Gary Gensler knows better, but he is a Goldman alumnus, so what else would we expect? There are always many frustrated people in every organization trying to do a good job, so we should not paint them all with the same brush. The boss sets the tone, and Gensler's tone seems to be the status quo and crony capitalism. But that is the overall flavor of the Obama economic team.


Chart Updated at Market Close

Most people have a profound misunderstanding about the function that gold, and to a somewhat lesser extent silver, perform in the currency markets and wealth preservation trade.

The meme is that gold is a hedge against inflation. Over the past 100 years or so in particular, the greatest threat to the US dollar, and indeed to most currencies, has been inflation, which is the debasement of the value of a currency through printing or expanding supply faster than real growth in productive economic activity.

But was it really inflation that drove the gold hedge, or something more properly called 'currency risk.' Inflation through expansion of supply is just one facet of currency risk.

The risk today is not a gradual inflation through an overexpansion of the broad money supply, but something insidiously different, not seen since the last Great Depression. It is the risk of the default and devaluation, and the erosion of the assets backing the currency itself, which is not yet showing up in the conventional inflation figures.

What backs the US currency? Often referred to simply as 'the full faith and credit of the government,' it is the ability to collect taxes and service the debt with real returns, and of course and importantly the Fed's and the Treasury's balance sheets. I should have to say no more about this to anyone who has been following recent developments. The erosion of the ability of the government to produce revenue by taxing real income, and the rapidly declining quality of the assets held by the Fed, are obvious. Yes the US dollar may look good when compared some of the other wretched alternatives, but that appearance is like the portrait of Dorian Gray, not capturing the rapid decline in its own worth and well being.

So perhaps this will prove to be some help to those who are expecting debt deterioration and monetary deflation to deliver to them a stronger dollar and stable wealth. They fail to notice that this did NOT happen in the 1930's, and in fact quite the opposite occurred. I am now *hoping* for stagflation as an outcome because it seems better than the alternatives where the US and Europe now appear to be heading.

Yes, it can do so in the short term, particularly if you own the world's reserve currency, and that largely an illusion. But the decay is there for any who care to see it, and the rush to gold by the smarter money is also there to see, for those who will not willfully blind themselves to it.

There is nothing more disheartening than to watch otherwise good people fighting the last war, or perhaps most properly the wrong war, painfully unaware that their tactics and assumptions are misconstrued and self-defeating, and that they are committed to following 'leaders' who are articulate, persuasive, often very loud, and wrong.

Performance of Several Key Currencies Since January 2007

This chart shows the comparative performance of several currencies in their dollar crosses since January 2007, or shortly before the most recent financial crisis took hold. For the US dollar itself we are using the DX index.



Gold did sell off hard in the market plunge in October of 2008 reaching an intraday low of $680, a buying opportunity of the first order. Many who said they were waiting to buy a dip never bought, because like most speculators they keep waiting for 'THE' bottom, and keep lowering their target buy price, and never really take a position. Then watch it run away from them, and wait for a pullback, but again never buy back in. Oh they will point to certain stocks that performed fabulously off the bottom, but they did not buy and hold them either, except in their fantasies and trash talk.

This is a flip side to those bulls who were long the tech bubble, and kept waiting for a higher price to sell their positions, just a few dollars more, and ended up taking a ride on a death spiral.

If you did not buy in then, what makes you think you can muster the conviction to buy on any other dip in a new major selloff? What makes you think the market will give you a second chance?

Gold never broke in the Crash of 1987, and offered quite a safe haven until Greenspan and the central banks started selling into it in 1988 to discourage the competition. Think they can do that again? With what?



And as for the theory about debt destruction making a currency more valuable, it could work, but don't hold your breath for the euro to strengthen as the sovereign debt of the PIGS starts swirling the bowl. And where they go, so will the UK and then the US go as well.

And before you complacently snicker at the problems in the eurozone, keep in mind that as a percent of GDP, the US debt is fast approaching the same level as Portugal, and climbing.

Several ProSharest ETFs Are Going to Have Reverse Splits This Week

The 'deflation trade' has been a tough row to hoe for the past year or so, compliments of the Fed's Balance Sheet.

It has been SO bad, that nine Proshares funds including several of the 'short ETFs' are going to have substantial reverse splits this week.

ProShares announced that it will execute reverse share splits on nine ProShares ETFs.



The splits take effect after the close on April 14. Here's the reason for doing the reverse splits according to ProShares:

For funds with lower nominal prices, bid-ask spreads represent a higher percentage of the transaction price than for higher-priced funds, increasing both costs and volatility — even when the spread is tight.

ProShares believes the reverse splits will adjust the share prices to a more cost-efficient level for the Funds' shareholders and that commissions charged by brokers who assess their clients on a per-share basis may be smaller, as investors will need to buy or sell fewer shares.

Read the rest of this article here.