Greenspan: Role Of Central Bankers Is to Try to Replicate the Stability of the Gold Standard

Greenspan said on any number of occasions that his model was that a 'fiat currency' works when it emulates the rigor of the gold standard.

I am using this post as a placemarker to gather a few citations along these lines. Sometimes people doubt these things, and it is not always easy to go back and find the actual idea in print.

I will place other example here as I find them but it is not a high priority because Alan Greenspan has never deviated from this point of view. One of the most poignant examples I have was when Ron Paul asked him if he still believed in what he wrote in his famous essay on Gold and Economic Freedom.

And Greenspan answered that he would not change a word.

I think the squaring up of what Greenspan believed, and what he did as Fed Chairman, is one of the more interesting conundrums that I hope that time will explicate. 

The other of course is why the flaming liberal and 'socialist' Obama is really closer to Richard Nixon in his performance and outlook than most would care to admit, on either the right or the left. 

This is from a 2007 Interview by National Public Radio with Alan Greenspan on Turbulence and Exuberance

Greenspan: Well actually, we were not fundamentally regulators [at the Fed]. The vast portion of our efforts were not involved in bank regulation.

NPR: No, but you were regulating interest rates, which have a profound effect on world economies.

Greenspan: You're raising really a very interesting question. I have always argued that the gold standard of the 19th century was a very effective stabilizer. It kept inflation essentially at zero, and I felt it was critical for the tremendous growth that occurred for the American economy in the latter part of the 19th century. When we went off the gold standard essentially in 1933, we then had to have what we call "fiat money" which is essentially money that is - it's printed paper money. Which unless we restrict the volume of, can be highly inflationary.

The type of interest rate regulation that I and indeed most central banks in the last 20 years have been involved in...has been to try to replicate the laws and rules that were governing the gold standard.

And so it is an odd situation where all the central bankers -- while none of them are advocating a return to the gold standard -- nonetheless try to replicate the various types of interest rate policies that the gold standard would have created. And it is an interesting question whether you call that regulation, or basically functioning of a central bank in stabilizing the economy."

I remember all such statements of Greenspan's vividly because they were one of the few times in which I felt that he was telling the truth, at least as he sees it.

I think that a fiat currency can 'work' if it emulates the rigor of an external standard. And exceptions that can be made to this rigor during times of exogenous shocks could be a quite useful tool for monetary policy.

The problem is that it NEVER seems to work out that way in the real world. It does not take long for financiers and politicians to discover the heady power and easy money to be had in manipulating the markets and the fiat currencies to their own advantage, the public and the real economy be damned. And then a pigfest ensues, and a nation's savings and civic virtue are consumed.

"And, indeed, since the late '70s, central bankers generally have behaved as though we were on the gold standard. And, indeed, the extent of liquidity contraction that has occurred as a consequence of the various different efforts on the part of monetary authorities is a clear indication that we recognize that excessive creation of liquidity creates inflation, which, in turn, undermines economic growth.

So that the question is: Would there be any advantage, at this particular stage, in going back to the gold standard? And the answer is: I don't think so, because we're acting as though we were there. So I think central banking, I believe, has learned the dangers of fiat money, and I think, as a consequence of that, we've behaved as though there are, indeed, real reserves underneath the system."

Greenspan, A., Hearing on Monetary Policy Report, US House Committee on Financial Services, 20 July 2005, Washington D.C.

From: Jude Wanniski < jwanniski@polyconomics.com
To: Ben.S.Bernanke@ * * * * *.GOV
Subject: Fwd: Re: Savings glut
5:44 pm, 7/21/2005

I thought you should see this. Greenspan was plain awful in his testimony this week. But members of Congress don't know any better, so they slobber all over him. He again said we don't need a gold standard, because he has demonstrated since he came to the Fed in 1987 that the central bank could "replicate" the gold standard.

Take a look at the dollar/gold price from 1987 until today and you will see how terrific he has been in replicating the gold standard. I can't wait for him to leave, Ben, because he now has so much invested in his Fed legacy as a Maestro that he could never admit he screwed up almost all along the way.

Famous 2005 Exchange Between Ron Paul and Alan Greenspan about the Gold Standard


Related: Why There Is Fear and Resentment of Gold's Ability to Reveal the True Value of Financial Assets

Is the Fed Setting Up the Mother of All Shorts?

The timing may be tricky, but such severe distortions in valuation as shown in the chart below can often set up special opportunities for investment profits when the eventual reversion to the mean, or norm, occurs.

I think it may be more difficult to trade on these sorts of sweeping macro changes now because of the pervasive corruption and insider operations in the markets which prey on the mispricing of risk and the calculated asymmetry of information.  I am comparing this to my own investment decisions on behalf of my family in the early 1980s, that pre-HFT period when the customers' man still thanked you for your order, when it became obvious to most informed observers that Volcker's interest rate policy had peaked at twenty percent, and the long decline in rates had begun. I remember a colleague coming in to my laboratory and writing the date and rate on my chalkboard, and he was right. For the astute longer term investor, those were the days of zero coupons, high grade and high paying annuities, longer term Treasuries, and high quality dividend DRIPs.

Look at the difficulty one has had investing in the precious metals markets from 2000 until now. I have viewed it as a similar broad macro trend, and consequent bull market, that is so apparent that it has bordered on an IQ test rather than an investment decision.  It does however cross the path of the central banks and their policy enhancement apparatus, so it is not quite so benignly tolerated as dealing in fraudulent paper, the times being what they are. The Fed did not say so much back then, but they did not prevaricate and intervene so broadly and frequently either. If the Fed ultimately does cease to be as an institution, its decline and failure will be marked by the Chairmanship of Alan Greenspan.

But for long term investors I think riding this macro trend will still be possible when the tide turns and change comes. And I think I will wait for it, because to be early is to be wrong. And these days trading early is measured in microseconds. And so it is best to wait for positions to be right, and then sit tight.

Chart courtesy of Ralph Dillon at Global Financial Data. The views expressed above about it are my own.

A Thought on Recovery, Reform, and Events of the Day

"It is not those who advocate, but those who prevent, stabilizing transfers of purchasing power, who are the true Marxists. These self-styled capitalists do not espouse Marx’s theories, but they do something much worse: They perform them. They behave in precisely the way that Marx expected capitalists to behave. They cripple the American system’s greatest strength — its ingenuity, flexibility, adaptability. They prevent the sort of collective action through which earlier generations proved that capitalism could made be consonant with decent, stable, and broadly prosperous societies. In doing so, they risk proving Marx right."

Steve Randy Waldman said this here and I think he is brilliantly right. This is becoming less a struggle to recovery as it is an obsession with personal greed and the will to power gone horribly wrong, corrosive to social structure through corruption, and veering towards the dangerously self-destructive.

Are fellows like Governor Walker of Wisconsin and his backers the Koch brothers 'performing Marxists?' lol I have often wondered if Greenspan was a Randian fifth columnist leading fiat money to its ideological conclusion, but certainly not a Marxian.

Or could it just be that current events and crises bring out and show us who we really are, and hopefully, offer to change us? Those who hold other people in contempt are ever more contemptible, the would be masters ever more deceitful, and obsessive greed leads the few into rough hands and dark cellars. How much wealth did Mubarak and Gaddafi really need after all? Is there not some pathology clearly in evidence with these man-gods, and even in the minor deities on Wall Street? Sad little boys and broken men become dark spirits, seeking to fill the hole in their beings with things, people, all possessions without savour, a wreckage of devices. And even more sad the husks and shadows of people, never at peace, who follow after in their wake, like swirling leaves pulled fitfully along with the wind.

Hell is truly the inability to feel love, empathy, and compassion, knowing the price of everything, but the value of nothing.

Strange days, I am sad to say. Change is in the wind, and is starting to blow like a hurricane, as cycles come round again.

"Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity...
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?"

W. B. Yeats

Both austerity and stimulus will falter in the mire of imbalanced, broken systems and corruption. The Banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, with balance restored to the economy, before there can be any sustained recovery.

From Japan: An Interesting Comment On US Economic Planning, the Dollar, and Peak Cheap Oil

I shared a copy of this video with a friend in Japan earlier today.

Prof. Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University on the Obama Budget

I received his reply, and it was much more interesting and insightful than I had hoped it would be.  Certainly a perspective that I have heard in none of the US based commentary today, a much longer term and more strategic view. 

I am sure there are plenty of problems which Japan faces that we could discuss.  It has an aging population, very low birth rates, heavy dependence on imports, and a weak military capability.  Its ability to attract and successfully assimilate immigrants is a challenge.  Every country has problems.

I am not quite sure I know the answers about peak cheap oil. But what I think I know is that the challenge to the US is an inability or an unwillingness to think and execute strategically, ie. long term, in non-military matters.  I believe this is a result of its system which is heavily oriented towards short term economic incentives, regional military conflicts, and financial speculation. 

The idea that you would allow what are essentially short term financial speculators to make important public policy decisions with far-reaching, long term consequences seems unusual or even lunatic in most parts of the world, and is certainly not a trend in historically successful organizations.

Within the metrics of energy and infrastructure, the US government is playing checkers in a game of Go.   Its greatest leverage now appears to be an ability to kick over the global economic playing table in an act of self-destruction.  And that threat is wearing thin.


A Japanese perspective on the US budget:

"Unfortunately, the risk of the whole ponzi scheme crashing sooner rather than later is going way up, rapidly.

They want the dollar to go down by 40%, but I think they are going to lose control, and they might wind up with a 90% panic drop in a few months.

As I said, Japan, around 1995, went into a full peak cheap oil panic. A lot of the government borrowing went to what is characterized as "building bridges to nowhere", but I would characterize it as building some bridges to nowhere, building some airports in nowhere, and fixing the entire rail and road infrastructure of the country.

All the bridges and tunnels have been steel plated reinforced, all the bridges are in perfect repair, and the Shinkansen system will next month be extended all the way from Aomori to Kagoshima.

In other words, I think they knew this 15 years ago and did everything that requires a lot of energy, such as steel, asphalt, cement, and completely the public transit infrastructure. The per capital floor space in Tokyo was doubled.

So, if we really do have a decade of serious energy problems coming, Japan has become about as energy efficient as it can be, with further improvements coming as appliances are replaced, etc.

The US has done nearly nothing, although I did note that the gasoline use declined by 7% in one year. There really is a lot of squandering going on. Now, however, the US needs to completely reconstruct its infrastructure, and it doesn't have the money or energy to do it.

This is why I have thought for more than a decade that the trigger for a really nasty collapse of the dollar would be peak cheap oil.

Do they realize that if the dollar drops by half that oil becomes $200 a barrel? Gasoline would be over $5, and the country would be paralyzed. If the dollar drops more than that, the existing infrastructure would become nearly useless and worthless.

I am afraid that the US has already passed the point of no return.  Had the cheap oil continued, the ponzi could have continued for a good while longer.

I think the realization that the cheap oil is gone is the primary motivation for the smash-and-grab behavior we are seeing in the US."

Perhaps, and it might also be the rationale for the increased military presence surrounding the largest known cheap oil reserves in the world.

Why There is Fear and Resentment of Gold's Ability to Reveal the True Value of Financial Assets

There were a few questions raised about the note on the long term chart of the SP 500 deflated by gold which was posted last night, and which is reproduced here on the right, which read "This is why the financial engineers like Bernanke hate and fear gold; it defies their plans and powers."

The chart shows something that most investors have suspected. There has been no genuine recovery in the price of stocks since the decline that cannot be fully explained by the monetary inflation of the dollar, as can be discovered by the ultimate store of value, which is gold.

I thought that this was a fairly straightforward observation, but it apparently jarred a few people and their thinking. So perhaps we have some new readers who are not familiar with the long standing animosity towards gold that is uniformly expressed by all those who promote centralized command and control economies, from both the left and the right.

Can any astute observer doubt the Fed's desire to act in secret and privacy? Their obsession with this is almost unbelievable and beyond comprehension, unless one understands that they are in a 'confidence game,' and use persuasion and even illusion to shape perceptions, especially at the extremes of their financial and monetary engineering of the real economy.

This animosity and desire for secrecy was described by Alan Greenspan in his famous essay, Gold and Economic Freedom, first published in 1966. In a fairly amusing exchange between Congressman Ron Paul and the former Chairman a couple of years ago, Mr. Paul asked Sir Alan about this essay, and if he had any corrections or misgivings about it after so many years. Would he change anything?

"Not one word." replied Greenspan, in one of his few candidly honest and straightforward statements.

It helps to understand the dynamics of the money world, which appear so mysterious to those who do not specialize in it, even economists, although some may feign ignorance to promote their cause or avoid unpleasant disclosures.

Money is power. Ownership of the means of production may provide for the control of groups of disorganized labor.  But the power of the issuance of money allows for the control of whole peoples and governments, through the distribution and transference of wealth, by the most subtle of means. And this is why the US Constitution relegated this power to the Congress and by their explicit appropriation, and denied it to the States and private parties except in the form of specie, that is, gold and silver which have intrinsic value.

It might be useful to review a prior post in reaction to the self-named maverick economist Willem Buiter, who wrote a few attacks on gold, prior to his leaving academia and the Financial Times to take a senior position with Citibank. Willem Buiter Apparently Does Not Like Gold

It may seem a bit perverse, but I do not favor a return to a gold, or a bi-metallic gold and silver standard at this time.   Each nation can be free to devalue or deflate their own money supply as their needs require, with the consent and knowledge of the people and their representatives.

What I do promote is for gold and silver to trade freely without restraint or manipulation as a refuge from monetary manipulation, and a secure store of value for private wealth. When nations adopt the gold standard, they invariably seek to 'fix' and manipulate its price, and reserve the ownership to themselves, with the tendency to seize the wealth of their citizen under the rationale of such an ownership, or dominant privilege.

Let those who have a mind to it have the means of securing their labor and efforts, and let the state do as it will, with the open knowledge and consent of the world.

"Gold is not necessary. I have no interest in gold. We will build a solid state, without an ounce of gold behind it. Anyone who sells above the set prices, let him be marched off to a concentration camp. That's the bastion of money."

Adolf Hitler

A draconian approach no doubt. It is much more common for the ruling parties to debase the coinage secretively while advantaging their friends and supporters, thereby manipulating the value of gold and silver covertly.

 In modern times of non-specie currency one might choose to select a few cooperative banks and the central money authority to manipulate the price using paper and markets, and hope that this scheme will remain undiscovered. But it always comes out, the truth is always known in the end.

"With the exception only of the period of the gold standard, practically all governments of history have used their exclusive power to issue money to defraud and plunder the people."

F. A. Von Hayek

There are any number of amateur economists and investing pundits around these days who betray an almost irrational opposition to gold, becoming jubilant in every decline, and despondent at every rally. And some of them even take the label of 'Austrianism' in their thoughts which is quite odd given that it is one of their schools strongest bulwarks.

Most often this can simply explained as the envy of those who have not prepared for a crisis, and wish ill upon those who have, regretting and hoping for another chance to provide for their own security. And yet they will fail to take advantage of every opportunity to do so, as they are creatures betrayed alternatively by their own fear and greed.

One of the best indications of quack advice on the question of investing in precious metals is when one of the reasons against it includes the scurrilous non sequitur, 'You can't eat it,' as if nutritional content is a valid measure of the durability of wealth. It betrays a lowness of argument and intellectual integrity that should promptly urge one to run in the other direction.

And regrettably, there are always those who will say almost anything for money, and the profession of economist seems to be particularly infested with that sort, given the stochastic nature of the discipline, and its lack of scientific rigor, being based on principles which do not easily lend themselves to objectification with serious damage to the data being made by the assumptions in their equations and proofs.

But most of all, the financial engineers, politicians, and Wall Street Banks fear gold because it is the antidote to their frauds, and the informant to their confiscation of wealth.

Do not expect them to capitulate once and for all, but only slowly and grudgingly as it becomes more difficult for them to sustain their illusions and persuasion. Protecting wealth against official adventurism is never easy.

Here is Alan Greenspan's famous essay on Gold and Economic Freedom. I suggest your read it, because it will help you to understand much of what is said and done as the global reserve currency system changes and evolves.

Gold and Economic Freedom
by Alan Greenspan

Published in Ayn Rand's "Objectivist" newsletter in 1966, and reprinted in her book, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, in 1967.

An almost hysterical antagonism toward the gold standard is one issue which unites statists of all persuasions. They seem to sense - perhaps more clearly and subtly than many consistent defenders of laissez-faire - that gold and economic freedom are inseparable, that the gold standard is an instrument of laissez-faire and that each implies and requires the other.

In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is necessary first to understand the specific role of gold in a free society.

Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It is that commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is universally acceptable to all participants in an exchange economy as payment for their goods or services, and can, therefore, be used as a standard of market value and as a store of value, i.e., as a means of saving.

The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division of labor economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective value which was generally acceptable as money, they would have to resort to primitive barter or be forced to live on self-sufficient farms and forgo the inestimable advantages of specialization. If men had no means to store value, i.e., to save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be possible.

What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in an economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of exchange should be durable. In a primitive society of meager wealth, wheat might be sufficiently durable to serve as a medium, since all exchanges would occur only during and immediately after the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to store. But where store-of-value considerations are important, as they are in richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be a durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen because it is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same as every other and it can be blended or formed in any quantity. Precious jewels, for example, are neither homogeneous nor divisible. More important, the commodity chosen as a medium must be a luxury. Human desires for luxuries are unlimited and, therefore, luxury goods are always in demand and will always be acceptable. Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not in a prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as money, but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were considered a luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and high unit value. Having a high unit value, such a good is easily portable; for instance, an ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of pig iron.

In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media of exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities would fulfill the foregoing conditions. However, one of the commodities will gradually displace all others, by being more widely acceptable. Preferences on what to hold as a store of value will shift to the most widely acceptable commodity, which, in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift is progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of exchange. The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for the same reasons that a money economy is superior to a barter economy: it makes exchanges possible on an incalculably wider scale.

Whether the single medium is gold, silver, seashells, cattle, or tobacco is optional, depending on the context and development of a given economy. In fact, all have been employed, at various times, as media of exchange. Even in the present century, two major commodities, gold and silver, have been used as international media of exchange, with gold becoming the predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses and being relatively scarce, has significant advantages over all other media of exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been virtually the sole international standard of exchange. If all goods and services were to be paid for in gold, large payments would be difficult to execute and this would tend to limit the extent of a society's divisions of labor and specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a medium of exchange is the development of a banking system and credit instruments (bank notes and deposits) which act as a substitute for, but are convertible into, gold.

A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and thus to create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to the production requirements of the economy. Individual owners of gold are induced, by payments of interest, to deposit their gold in a bank (against which they can draw checks). But since it is rarely the case that all depositors want to withdraw all their gold at the same time, the banker need keep only a fraction of his total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the banker to loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security of his deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is not arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and to the status of his investments.

When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally available. But when the business ventures financed by bank credit are less profitable and slow to pay off, bankers soon find that their loans outstanding are excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin to curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates. This tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires the existing borrowers to improve their profitability before they can obtain credit for further expansion. Thus, under the gold standard, a free banking system stands as the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth. When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all nations, an unhampered free international gold standard serves to foster a world-wide division of labor and the broadest international trade. Even though the units of exchange (the dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from country to country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of the different countries act as one — so long as there are no restraints on trade or on the movement of capital. Credit, interest rates, and prices tend to follow similar patterns in all countries. For example, if banks in one country extend credit too liberally, interest rates in that country will tend to fall, inducing depositors to shift their gold to higher-interest paying banks in other countries. This will immediately cause a shortage of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing tighter credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest rates again.

A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard have not as yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the banking system in the United States (and in most of the world) was based on gold and even though governments intervened occasionally, banking was more free than controlled. Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion, banks became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest rates rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went into a sharp, but short-lived recession. (Compared with the depressions of 1920 and 1932, the pre-World War I business declines were mild indeed.) It was limited gold reserves that stopped the unbalanced expansions of business activity, before they could develop into the post-World War I type of disaster. The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.

But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if shortage of bank reserves was causing a business decline — argued economic interventionists — why not find a way of supplying increased reserves to the banks so they never need be short! If banks can continue to loan money indefinitely — it was claimed — there need never be any slumps in business. And so the Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private bankers, but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and supported. Credit extended by these banks is in practice (though not legally) backed by the taxing power of the federal government. Technically, we remained on the gold standard; individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued to be used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit extended by the Federal Reserve banks ("paper reserves") could serve as legal tender to pay depositors.

When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous, however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain who had been losing gold to us because the Bank of England refused to allow interest rates to rise when market forces dictated (it was politically unpalatable). The reasoning of the authorities involved was as follows: if the Federal Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks, interest rates in the United States would fall to a level comparable with those in Great Britain; this would act to stop Britain's gold loss and avoid the political embarrassment of having to raise interest rates. The "Fed" succeeded; it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world, in the process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock market, triggering a fantastic speculative boom. Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted to sop up the excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom. But it was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching and a consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a result, the American economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than absorb the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in 1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.

With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued, Britain's abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the gold standard in any form — from a growing number of welfare-state advocates — was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare expenditures on a large scale.

Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can support is determined by the economy's tangible assets, since every credit instrument is ultimately a claim on some tangible asset. But government bonds are not backed by tangible wealth, only by the government's promise to pay out of future tax revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial markets. A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government deficit spending under a gold standard is severely limited. The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. They have created paper reserves in the form of government bonds which — through a complex series of steps — the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what was formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond or of a bank deposit created by paper reserves believes that he has a valid claim on a real asset. But the fact is that there are now more claims outstanding than real assets. The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods. When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for welfare or other purposes with the money proceeds of the government bonds financed by bank credit expansion.

In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.

This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.

Given his Randian audience and the mood at the time, it is interesting that Greenspan defines the culprits in the scheme of fiat monetization as 'welfare statists.' How ironic, that over a period of time there is indeed a group of welfare statists behind the latest debasement of the currency, the US dollar, but the recipients of this welfare are the Banks and the financial elite, who through transfer payments, financial fraud, and federally sanctioned subsidies are systematically stripping the middle class of their wealth. Perhaps they decided that if you cannot beat them, beat them to the trough and take the best for themselves until the system collapses through their abuse.

A Tale of Two Economies and The Myth of Recovery: Thoughts Before the State of the Union Address

Economist Michel Hudson frames the current situation with the US national economy in his most recent essay, The Myth of Recovery, in a way that is strikingly different from the conventional view.

Sometimes we become locked into a model of thinking that leads us to engage in repeated errors, because of a flaw in the model, and not in the actual detailed decisions that lead us to those errors.

I think it is worth reading, and herein is a protracted excerpt from it. It cuts to the heart of what we have said, that there will be no sustained recovery until the real wage increases. The outsized financial sector is strangling the real recovery by diverting resources to itself, and taxing whatever is provided to the real economy.

Mike Hudson takes a more Keynesian approach than I would because of his background and training. That is a legitimate difference. My personal approach would begin with a reform and reshaping of the financial system first and foremost, and a recognition that the current structure of global trade is a game that is rigged against the American working class.


There are two economies – and the extractive FIRE sector dominates the “real” economy

When listening to the State of the Union speech, one should ask just which economy Obama means when he talks about recovery. Most wage earners and taxpayers will think of the “real” economy of production and consumption. But Obama believes that this “Economy #1” is dependent on that of Wall Street. His major campaign contributors and “wealth creators” in the FIRE sector – Economy #2, wrapped around the “real” Economy #1.

Economy #2 is the “balance sheet” economy of property and debt. The wealthiest 10 per cent lend out their savings to become debts owed by the bottom 90 per cent. A rising share of gains are made in extractive ways, by charging rent and interest, by financial speculation (“capital gains”), and by shifting taxes off itself onto the “real” Economy #1.

John Edwards talked about “the two economies,” but never explained what he meant operationally. Back in the 1960s when Michael Harrington wrote The Other America, the term meant affluent vs. poor America. For 19th-century novelists such as Charles Dickens and Benjamin Disraeli, it referred to property owners vs. renters. Today, it is finance vs. debtors. Any discussion of economic polarization between rich and poor must focus on the deepening indebtedness of most families, companies, real estate, cities and states to an emerging financial oligarchy.

Financial oligarchy is antithetical to democracy. That is what the political fight in Washington is all about today. The Corporate Democrats are trying to get democratically elected to bring about oligarchy. I hope that this is a political oxymoron, but I worry about how many people buy into the idea that “wealth creation” requires debt creation. While wealth gushes upward through the Wall Street financial siphon, trickle-down economic ideology fuels a Bubble Economy via debt-leveraged asset-price inflation.

The role of public spending – and hence budget deficits – no longer means taxing citizens to spend on improving their well-being within Economy #1. Since the 2008 financial meltdown the enormous rise in national debt has resulted from the reimbursing of Wall Street for its bad gambles on derivatives, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps that had little to do with the “real” economy. They could have been wiped out without bringing down the economy. That was an idle threat. A.I.G.’s swap insurance department could have collapsed (it was largely in London anyway) while keeping its normal insurance activities unscathed. But the government paid off the financial sector’s bad speculative debts by taking them onto the public balance sheet.

The economy is best viewed as the FIRE sector wrapped around the production and consumption core, extracting financial and rent charges that are not technologically or economically necessary costs.

Say’s Law of markets, taught to every economics student, states that workers and their employers use their wages and profits to buy what they produce (consumer goods and capital goods). Profits are earned by employing labor to produce goods and services to sell at a markup. (M – C – M’ to the initiated.)

The financial and property sector is wrapped around this core, siphoning off revenue from this circular flow. This FIRE sector is extractive. Its revenue takes the form of what classical economists called “economic rent,” a broad category that includes interest, monopoly super-profits (price gouging) and land rent, as well as “capital” gains. (These are mainly land-price gains and stock-market gains, not gains from industrial capital as such.) Economic rent and capital gains are income without a corresponding necessary cost of production (M – M’ to the initiated).

Banks have lent increasingly to buy up these rentier rights to extract interest, and less and less to promote industrial capital formation. Wealth creation” FIRE-style consists most easily of privatizing the public domain and erecting tollbooths to charge access fees for basic necessities such as health insurance, land sites, home ownership, the communication spectrum (cable and phone rights), patent medicine, water and electricity, and other public utilities, including the use of convenient money (credit cards), or the credit needed to get by. This kind of wealth is not what Adam Smith described in The Wealth of Nations. It is a form of overhead, not a means of production. The revenue it extracts is a zero-sum economic activity, meaning that one party’s gain (that of Wall Street usually) is another’s loss.

Debt deflation resulting from a distorted “financialized” economy

The problem that Obama faces is one that he cannot voice politically without offending his political constituency. The Bubble Economy has left families, companies, real estate and government so heavily indebted that they must use current income to pay banks and bondholders. The U.S. economy is in a debt deflation. The debt service they pay is not available for spending on goods and services. This is why sales are falling, shops are closing down and employment continues to be cut back.

Banks evidently do not believe that the debt problem can be solved. That is why they have taken the $13 trillion in bailout money and run – paying it out in bonuses, or buying other banks and foreign affiliates. They see the domestic economy as being all loaned up. The game is over. Why would they make yet more loans against real estate already in negative equity, with mortgage debt in excess of the market price that can be recovered? Banks are not writing more “equity lines of credit” against homes or making second mortgages in today’s market, so consumers cannot use rising mortgage debt to fuel their spending.

Banks also are cutting back their credit card limits. They are “earning their way out of debt,” making up for the bad gambles they have taken with depositor funds, by raising interest rates, penalties and fees, by borrowing low-interest credit from the Federal Reserve and investing it abroad – preferably in currencies rising against the dollar. This is what Japan did in the “carry trade.” It kept the yen’s exchange rate down, and it is lowering the dollar’s exchange rate today. This threatens to raise prices for imports, on which domestic consumer prices are based. So easy credit for Wall Street means a cost squeeze for consumers.

The President needs a better set of advisors. But Wall Street has obtained veto power over just who they should be. Control over the President’s ear time has been part of the financial sector’s takeover of government. Wall Street has threatened that the stock market will plunge if oligarch-friendly Fed Chairman Bernanke is not reappointed. Obama insists on keeping him on board, in the belief that what’s good for Wall Street is good for the economy at large.

But what’s good for the banks is a larger market for their credit – more debt for the families and companies that are their customers, higher fees and penalties, no truth-in-lending laws, harsher bankruptcy terms, and further deregulation and bailouts.

This is the program that Bernanke has advised Washington to follow. Wall Street hopes that he will be kept on board. Bernanke’s advice has helped bolster that of Tim Geithner at Treasury and Larry Summers as chief advisor to convince Pres. Obama that “recovery” requires more credit.

Going down this road will make the debt overhead heavier, raising the cost of living and doing business. So we must beware of the President using the term “recovery” in his State of the Union speech to mean a recovery of debt and giving more money to Wall Street Jobs cannot revive without consumers having more to spend. And consumer demand (a hateful, jargon word, because only Wall Street and the Pentagon’s military-industrial complex really make demands) cannot be revived without reducing the debt burden. Bankers are refusing to write down mortgages and other debts to reflect the ability to pay. That act of economic realism would mean taking a loss on their bad debts. So they have asked the government to lend new buyers enough credit to re-inflate housing prices. This is the aim of the housing subsidy to new homebuyers. It leaves more revenue to be capitalized into higher mortgage loans to support prices for real estate fallen into negative equity.

The pretense is that this is subsidizing the middle class, but homebuyers are only the intermediaries for government credit (debt to be paid off by taxpayers) to mortgage bankers. Nearly 90 per cent of new home mortgages are being funded or guaranteed by the FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – all providing a concealed subsidy to Wall Street.

Obama’s most dangerous belief is in the myth that the economy needs the financial sector to lead its recovery by providing credit. Every economy needs a means of payment, which is why Wall Street has been able to threaten to wreck the economy if the government does not give in to its demands. But the monetary function should not be confused with predatory lending and casino gambling, not to mention Wall Street’s use of bailout funds on lobbying efforts to spread its gospel.

Deficit reduction

It seems absurd for politicians to worry that running a deficit from health care or Social Security can cause serious economic problems, after having given away $13 trillion to Wall Street and a blank check to the Pentagon. The “stimulus package” was only about 5 per cent of this amount. But Obama has announced that he intends on Tuesday to close the barn door by proposing a bipartisan Senate Budget Commission to recommend how to limit future deficits – now that Congress is unwilling to give away any more money to Wall Street.

Republican approval would set the stage for Wednesday’s State of the Union message promising to press for “fiscal responsibility,” as if a lower deficit will help recovery. I suspect that Republicans will have little interest in joining. They see the aim as being to co-opt their criticism of Democratic spending plans. But in view of the rising and well-subsidized efforts of Harold Ford and his fellow Corporate Democrats, the actual “bipartisan” aim seems to be to provide political cover for cutting spending on labor and on social services. Obama already has sent up trial balloons about needing to address the Social Security and Medicare deficits, as if they should not be financed out of the general budget by taxpayers including the higher brackets (presently exempted from FICA paycheck withholding).

Traditionally, running deficits is supposed to help pull economies out of recession. But today, spending money on public services is deemed “bad,” because it may be “inflationary” – that is, threatening to raise wages. Talk of cutting deficits thus is class-war talk – on behalf of the FIRE sector.

The economy needs deficit spending to avoid unemployment and poverty, to increase social spending to deal with the present economic shrinkage, and to maintain their capital infrastructure. The federal government also needs to increase revenue sharing with states forced to slash their budgets in response to falling tax revenue and rising unemployment insurance.

But the deficits that the Bush-Obama administration have run are nothing like the familiar old Keynesian-style deficits to help the economy recover. Running up public debt to pay Wall Street in the hope that much of this credit will be lent out to inflate asset prices is deemed good. This belief will form the context for Wednesday’s State of the Union speech. So we are brought back to the idea of economic recovery and just what is to be recovered.

Financial lobbyists are hoping to get the government to fill the gap in domestic demand below full-employment levels by providing bank credit. When governments spend money to help increase economic activity, this does not help the banks sell more interest bearing debt. Wall Street’s golden age occurred under Bill Clinton, whose budget surplus was more than offset by an explosion of commercial bank lending.

The pro-financial mass media reiterate that deficits are inflationary and bankrupt economies. The reality is that Keynesian-style deficits raise wage levels relative to the price of property (the cost of obtaining housing, and of buying stocks and bonds to yield a retirement income). The aim of running a “Wall Street deficit” is just the reverse: It is to re-inflate property prices relative to wages.

A generation of financial “ideological engineering” has told people to welcome asset-price inflation (the Bubble Economy). People became accustomed to imagine that they were getting richer when the price of their homes rose. The problem is that real estate is worth what banks will lend – and mortgage loans are a form of debt, which needs to be repaid.