Bernanke's Gamble on the Dollar

There are several things of interest this week. The first and foremost is the Fed's FOMC two day meeting with their announcement on Wednesday at 2:15.

It is important despite the fact that rates are effectively at zero, and the Fed has declared for 'quantitative easing.'

How does the Fed intend to implement this quantitative easing? Another way to ask this is to say, "What is the next bubble?"

Quantitative easing implies market distortion, and traders will be keen to understand where and how that distortion will play, because they are still geared for supercharged returns in an environment where fewer and fewer opportunities exist.

The Treasuries seem like a safer place, because lower interest rates are to the economy's benefit. Foreign entities may not like the monetization aspect, but we wonder how many real 'investors' are left in the bonds? Most in there are domestic parties seeking safe havens with any sort of return, and foreign central banks supporting political and industrial agendas.

So the focus will be on the wording of the Fed's statement once again, looking for clues with regard to the Fed's easing implementation and potential distortions that provide market inefficiencies.


Bloomberg
Bernanke Risks "Very Unstable" Markets as He Weighs Buying Bonds
By Rich Miller
January 25, 2009 19:01 EST

Jan. 26 (Bloomberg) -- Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and his colleagues may try once again to cure the aftermath of a bubble in one kind of asset by overheating the market for another.

Fed policy makers meeting tomorrow and the day after are exploring the purchase of longer-dated Treasury securities in an effort to push up their price and bring down their yield. Behind the potential move: a desire to reduce long-term borrowing costs at a time when the Fed can’t lower short-term interest rates any further because they are effectively at zero.

The risk is that central bankers will end up distorting the Treasury market, triggering wild swings in prices -- and long-term interest rates -- as investors react to what they say and do. “It sets forth a speculative dynamic that is very unstable,” says William Poole, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and now a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington....

Inflated Prices

Recent history shows the economic danger of inflating asset prices. After a stock-market bubble burst in 2000, the Fed slashed interest rates to as low as 1 percent and in the process helped inflate the housing market. The collapse of that bubble is what eventually helped drive the U.S. into the current recession, the worst in a generation.

Faced with the danger of a deflationary decline in output, prices and wages, the Fed is considering steps to revive the moribund economy. On the table besides bond purchases: firming up a pledge to keep short-term interest rates low for an extended period and adopting some type of inflation target to underscore the Fed’s determination to avoid deflation.

The central bank has been buying long-term Treasury debt off and on for years as part of its day-to-day management of reserves in the banking system. Yet it has always gone out of its way to avoid influencing prices. What it’s discussing now, says former Fed Governor Laurence Meyer, is deliberately trying to push long rates below where they otherwise might be.

Fed Purchases

Bernanke raised this possibility in a speech on Dec. 1. While he didn’t specify what maturities the Fed might buy, in the past he has suggested that purchases might include securities with three- to six-year terms. (This is around the sweet spot for foreign Central Banks - Jesse)

Investors immediately took notice, with the yield on the 10-year note falling to 2.73 percent from 2.92 percent the day before. Yields fell further on Dec. 16, dropping to 2.26 percent from 2.51 percent the previous day, after the central bank’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee said it was studying the issue....

Yields have since risen, with the 10-year note ending last week at 2.62 percent. Behind the reversal: expectations of massive fresh supplies of Treasuries as the government is forced to finance an $825 billion economic-stimulus package and a possible new bank-bailout plan. This week alone, the Treasury is scheduled to auction $135 billion worth of securities.

Jump in Yields

David Rosenberg, chief North American economist for Merrill Lynch in New York, says the jump in yields may prompt the Fed to go ahead with Treasury purchases.

This isn’t the first time Bernanke and the Fed have discussed buying longer-dated securities and ended up roiling the market. Bernanke touted the idea as a tool to fight deflation in speeches in November 2002 and May 2003.

Egged on by his comments -- and later remarks by then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan that the central bank needed to build a “firewall” against deflation -- many investors became convinced the central bank was poised to buy bonds. The yield on the 10-year Treasury note fell to 3.11 percent in June 2003 from 3.81 percent at the start of the year.

Traders quickly reversed course as it became clear the Fed had no such intentions, sending the 10-year Treasury yield soaring to 4.6 percent just three months later, on Sept. 2.

‘Miscommunication’

Poole, who was then at the St. Louis Fed, was critical at the time of what he called the central bank’s “miscommunication.” He now sees the Fed making the same mistake with its latest suggestions that it might buy longer- dated securities.

“If they do it, it’s going to be disruptive to the market,” says Poole, who is a contributor to Bloomberg News. “If they don’t do it, it will impair the Fed’s credibility and erode the confidence the market has in the statements that the Fed makes.”

Meyer, now vice chairman of St. Louis-based Macroeconomic Advisers, says the Fed should, and probably will, go ahead with purchases as a way to lower borrowing costs. “The story is stop talking and start buying,” he says.

Still, he notes that not everyone at the Fed is enthusiastic about the idea. One concern: Foreign central banks and sovereign-wealth funds, which are big holders of Treasuries, might cool to buying many more if they believe prices are artificially high. (The buyers of our debt now are supporting their own industrial policy we would hope. Any other reason borders on mismanagement of funds while anyone in their country is hungry or unemployed - Jesse)

Undermine the Dollar

That may undermine the dollar. “There’s no guarantee that international investors would switch to other dollar- denominated debt if flushed from the Treasury market,” says Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP LLC in Jersey City, New Jersey.

Tony Crescenzi, chief bond-market strategist at Miller Tabak & Co. in New York, says foreign investors might also get spooked if they conclude that the Fed is monetizing the government’s debt -- in effect, printing money -- by buying Treasuries. (They already are, and they already are - Jesse)

Bernanke himself, in his 2003 speech, said monetization of the debt risked faster inflation -- something bond investors, foreign or domestic, wouldn’t like.

Some economists argue the Fed would help the economy more if it bought other types of debt. (Such as corporate bond - Jesse) Even after their recent rise, 10-year Treasury yields are still well below the 4.02 percent level at the start of last year....

Hawks at the Fed wouldn’t welcome such purchases. They are already uneasy that some of the central bank’s programs are effectively allocating credit to one part of the economy rather than others. Case in point: the Fed’s ongoing program to buy $500 billion of mortgage-backed securities, which Jeffrey Lacker, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, has called “credit policy” rather than monetary policy. (Its nice to see that someone else is noticing that the Fed has crossed the Rubicon from central bank to central economic planner in the worst sense of the description - Jesse)

Some Thoughts on the Debt Disaster in the US and UK and Possible Alternatives

This is a rather important essay in that it nicely frames up the problem that we face, and the constraints on the remedies at our disposal.

We will be speaking more about that in the near term, but for now here is a framework by which to understand the boundaries, the 'lay of the land.'

The key point is that the debt to GDP ratio has become unsustainable. The way to correct this is to lower it to a level that is manageable and to work it down.

It will likely require a combination of inflation and debt reduction by bankruptcies and writedowns in order to restore the economy to something which can be used to achieve a balance.

Liquidationism is a trap because it reduces GDP and cripples the productive economy as it reduces debt. It is similar to poisoning a patient to treat an infection. It is favored only by those who believe that they can insulate themselves and profit by it.

Without serious systemic reforms, any remedies will not obtain traction, merely provide a new step function for a repetition of the cycle of debt expansion, as was done in the series of credit bubbles under Alan Greenspan and Bush-Clinton.

The impact will be felt around the globe because of the interconnectedness of the world economy and finance, but the heart of the problem is in the US and the UK.


Economic Times
US and UK on brink of debt disaster
20 Jan, 2009, 0419 hrs IST

LONDON: The United States and the United Kingdom stand on the brink of the largest debt crisis in history.

While both governments experiment with quantitative easing, bad banks to absorb non-performing loans, and state guarantees to restart bank lending, the only real way out is some combination of widespread corporate default, debt write-downs and inflation to reduce the burden of debt to more manageable levels. Everything else is window-dressing. (Quantitative easing, bad banks, and state guarantees are the instruments of inflation. The amount of inflation that the West can manage will greatly affect the amount of these more draconian measures - Jesse)

To understand the scale of the problem, and why it leaves so few options for policymakers, which shows the growth in the real economy (measured by nominal GDP) and the financial sector (measured by total credit market instruments outstanding) since 1952.

In 1952, the United States was emerging from the Second World War and the conflict in Korea with a strong economy, and fairly low debt, split between a relatively large government debt (amounting to 68 percent of GDP) and a relatively small private sector one (just 60 percent of GDP).

Over the next 23 years, the volume of debt increased, but the rise was broadly in line with growth in the rest of the economy, so the overall ratio of total debts to GDP changed little, from 128 percent in 1952 to 155 percent in 1975.

The only real change was in the composition. Private debts increased (7.8 times) more rapidly than public ones (1.5 times). As a result, there was a marked shift in the debt stock from public debt (just 37 percent of GDP in 1975) toward private sector obligations (117 percent). But this was not unusual. It should be seen as a return to more normal patterns of debt issuance after the wartime period in which the government commandeered resources for the war effort and rationed borrowing by the private sector.

From the 1970s onward, however, the economy has undergone two profound structural shifts. First, the economy as a whole has become much more indebted. Output rose eight times between 1975 and 2007. But the total volume of debt rose a staggering 20 times, more than twice as fast. The total debt-to-GDP ratio surged from 155 percent to 355 percent.

Second, almost all this extra debt has come from the private sector. Despite acres of newsprint devoted to the federal budget deficit over the last thirty years, public debt at all levels has risen only 11.5 times since 1975. This is slightly faster than the eight-fold increase in nominal GDP over the same period, but government debt has still only risen from 37 percent of GDP to 52 percent.

Instead, the real debt explosion has come from the private sector. Private debt outstanding has risen an enormous 22 times, three times faster than the economy as a whole, and fast enough to take the ratio of private debt to GDP from 117 percent to 303 percent in a little over thirty years.

For the most part, policymakers have been comfortable with rising private debt levels. Officials have cited a wide range of reasons why the economy can safely operate with much higher levels of debt than before, including improvements in macroeconomic management that have muted the business cycle and led to lower inflation and interest rates. But there is a suspicion that tolerance for private rather than public sector debt simply reflected an ideological preference.

THE DEBT MOUNTAIN

The data makes clear the rise in private sector debt had become unsustainable. In the 1960s and 1970s, total debt was rising at roughly the same rate as nominal GDP. By 2000-2007, total debt was rising almost twice as fast as output, with the rapid issuance all coming from the private sector, as well as state and local governments.

This created a dangerous interdependence between GDP growth (which could only be sustained by massive borrowing and rapid increases in the volume of debt) and the debt stock (which could only be serviced if the economy continued its swift and uninterrupted expansion).

The resulting debt was only sustainable so long as economic conditions remained extremely favorable. The sheer volume of private-sector obligations the economy was carrying implied an increasing vulnerability to any shock that changed the terms on which financing was available, or altered the underlying GDP cash flows.

The proximate trigger of the debt crisis was the deterioration in lending standards and rise in default rates on subprime mortgage loans. But the widening divergence revealed in the charts suggests a crisis had become inevitable sooner or later. If not subprime lending, there would have been some other trigger.

WRONGHEADED POLICIES

The charts strongly suggest the necessary condition for resolving the debt crisis is a reduction in the outstanding volume of debt, an increase in nominal GDP, or some combination of the two, to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio to a more sustainable level.

From this perspective, it is clear many of the existing policies being pursued in the United States and the United Kingdom will not resolve the crisis because they do not lower the debt ratio.

In particular, having governments buy distressed assets from the banks, or provide loan guarantees, is not an effective solution. It does not reduce the volume of debt, or force recognition of losses. It merely re-denominates private sector obligations to be met by households and firms as public ones to be met by the taxpayer.

This type of debt swap would make sense if the problem was liquidity rather than solvency. But in current circumstances, taxpayers are being asked to shoulder some or all of the cost of defaults, rather than provide a temporarily liquidity bridge.

In some ways, government is better placed to absorb losses than individual banks and investors, because it can spread them across a larger base of taxpayers. But in the current crisis, the volume of debts that potentially need to be refinanced is so large it will stretch even the tax and debt-raising resources of the state, and risks crowding out other spending.

Trying to cut debt by reducing consumption and investment, lowering wages, boosting saving and paying down debt out of current income is unlikely to be effective either. The resulting retrenchment would lead to sharp falls in both real output and the price level, depressing nominal GDP. Government retrenchment simply intensified the depression during the early 1930s. Private sector retrenchment and wage cuts will do the same in the 2000s.

BANKRUPTCY OR INFLATION

The solution must be some combination of policies to reduce the level of debt or raise nominal GDP. The simplest way to reduce debt is through bankruptcy, in which some or all of debts are deemed unrecoverable and are simply extinguished, ceasing to exist.

Bankruptcy would ensure the cost of resolving the debt crisis falls where it belongs. Investor portfolios and pension funds would take a severe but one-time hit. Healthy businesses would survive, minus the encumbrance of debt.

But widespread bankruptcies are probably socially and politically unacceptable. The alternative is some mechanism for refinancing debt on terms which are more favorable to borrowers (replacing short term debt at higher rates with longer-dated paper at lower ones).

The final option is to raise nominal GDP so it becomes easier to finance debt payments from augmented cashflow. But counter-cyclical policies to sustain GDP will not be enough. Governments in both the United States and the United Kingdom need to raise nominal GDP and debt-service capacity, not simply sustain it.

There is not much government can do to accelerate the real rate of growth. The remaining option is to tolerate, even encourage, a faster rate of inflation to improve debt-service capacity. Even more than debt nationalization, inflation is the ultimate way to spread the costs of debt workout across the widest possible section of the population.

The need to work down real debt and boost cash flow provides the motive, while the massive liquidity injections into the financial system provide the means. The stage is set for a long period of slow growth as debts are worked down and a rise in inflation in the medium term.

The Fed is Monetizing Debt and Inflating the Money Supply

Here are the latest figures on the growth of the various money supply measures.

See Money Supply: A Primer for a review of measures and their differences.

The charts indicate that the growth in the money supply is due to a significant monetization of debt by the Fed in expanding its balance sheet and deficit spending by the Treasury, rather than organic growth from credit expansion from commercial sources and economic activity. The negative GDP figures confirm this.

You could imagine this as a tug of war if you wish. On one side is the deflationary force of bad debt and falling aggregate demand. On the other is the Treasury, the Fed, and the Congress, using the triple threat of deficit spending, monetization of debt, and stimulus programs. The limits of the power of the Feds are the value of the dollar and the acceptability of Treasury debt.

There is no lack of debt that can be monetized. To think otherwise is fantasy. But there are limitations about how much the dollar can bear, which is why the banks and moneyed interests have shoved their way to the front of the line, and are gorging themselves now with a little help from their friends in the Treasury and the Fed. When the time comes they intend to throw the public agenda under the bus. Its an old script, many times performed with minor enhancements.

If the current trend continues, it will have an inflationary effect on certain financial assets and commodities, and a negative impact on the dollar. There are lags in the appearance of this, but it will come.

Because the Dollar Index (DX) is an outmoded and artificial measure of dollar strength, containing nothing to account for the Chinese renminbi for example, it may not be a true reflection of the progress of this inflation. Time will tell.

A similar case might be made for certain strategic commodities, gold and oil, which are the instrument of government policy. Although it is much less important, silver may be one of the first commodities to break out because the government maintains no significant physical inventory of it as it does for gold and oil.

The huge short interest in silver may be an ignored scandal on the order of the Madoff Ponzi fund, not in dollar magnitude, but likely in terms of regulatory lapse and deep capture.



M1 has become a much less useful measure of the money supply these days because of changes in banking rules and technology. However, M1 is a good intermediate measure of the impact of the growth in the Fed's balance sheet as it feeds through the system.





Growth in MZM frequently results in financial asset expansion once it gains traction.



The US Dollar does not generally react well to aggressive growth in MZM.



The growth of credit, organic growth from economic activity, is sluggish.



The growth in the Monetary Base due to Fed inflationary activity has been nothing short of spectacular, without equal in US monetary history. This makes all Money Multiplier measures that use the AMB in the denominator meaningless for now.



The spike in Treasury settlement failures is one measure of the stress in the financial system. It seems to be quieter now, after spiking in response to seizures in the bonds trading. We will maintain a watch on this.

Chicago Fed Says Take Interest Rates "Below Zero" and Monetize Debt (to Devalue Dollar)

Quantitative easing to mimic interest rates 'below zero' effectively penalizes the buyers of US bonds and dollar savings by providing a negative rate of return after inflation.

Inflation is desirable if you are a net debtor and you control the value of the method of your payment, ie. cheaper dollars to pay off service your debt.

We have to wonder how well negative real interest rates will support the enormous increase in the supply of Treasury debt that is coming to market this year because of a soaring national debt of about two trillion dollars.

The obvious target buyers are the exporting countries such as OPEC, Japan and China. We also suspect the Fed will start buying the yield curve, quietly and indirectly if not transparently.

Other central banks, such as Europe, will be expected to follow suit and devalue their own currencies through lower rates, to decrease the perceived impact of a dollar devaluation, in a group 'ratcheting down' of the developed nations' currencies.

This will require 'management' of the price of real things like commodities. Fortunately the price for most of them is set in London and New York. Life is tough for an exporting nation when you are riding the dollar reserve currency regime and an industrial policy of 'beggar your people' to support it.

The boundary constraint on the Fed in a purely fiat regime is the value of the US dollar and the Treasury debt. Greenspan's Fed managed to inflate its way out of the tech crash of 2000-2 with bubbles in equities and housing prices, a significant dollar devaluation, but an amazingly resilient bond thanks to official buying by a few foreign central banks.

Alan Greenspan famously stated, in a repudiation of his earlier views while responding to Congressman Ron Paul, that a fiat dollar as the reserve currency is viable because "the Federal Reserve does a good job of essentially mimicking a gold standard and...the Fed does not facilitate government expansion and deficit spending."

We expect to see Bernanke and the Congress test the limits of monetary and Keynesian economic theory again this year, and the acceptance of the US dollar and fiat currencies as a faux gold standard, as being of the utmost integrity and impartiality, immutable and nationless.

We tend to remain skeptical of the outcome however, keeping in mind the words of George Bernard Shaw, "You have a choice between the natural stability of gold and the honesty and intelligence of the members of government. And with all due respect for those gentlemen, I advise you, as long as the capitalist system lasts, vote for gold."

The major challenge for the governments of the world for the remainder of this decade, other than blowing us all to pieces, will be to create a viable alternative to the US dollar as the world's reserve currency and a major vehicle for international trade.

This could be one for the record books.



Reuters
Evans says Fed needs to mimic below-zero rates
By Ros Krasny
Sat Jan 3, 2009 8:18pm EST

SAN FRANCISCO (Reuters) - A grim economic outlook highlights the need for the Federal Reserve to step up quantitative measures to boost growth, with official interest rates already effectively at zero, Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Fed, said on Saturday.

Evans said that based on the outlook for rising unemployment, falling industrial production and a wider output gap, economic models suggest rates should be below zero.

"If it were not constrained by zero, those models would want to push it below zero, but that's not possible," Evans told reporters after a panel at the American Economic Association's meeting in San Francisco.

Quantitative easing, a way to flood the banking system with large amounts of money, "is a way to mimic below-zero rates and provide support to the economy," he said. (They would intend to create a monetary inflation to take the 'real rate' below zero. "Quantitative Easing" is Fedspeak for "printing money." - Jesse)

The process often involves buying up large quantities of assets from banks, such as the Fed's latest programs to buy mortgage-backed securities. (This is known as "monetizing debt." - Jesse)

In December, the Federal Open Market Committee, the Fed's policy-setting body, took the surprising step of lowering the federal funds rate to a range of zero to 0.25 percent. Cash fed funds had been trading below the previous 1 percent target rate for several weeks.

In his remarks, Evans, who is a voting member of the FOMC in 2009, said the Fed's various lending programs should help cushion the impact of the year-old U.S. recession but a large traditional fiscal stimulus plan is also needed, even with the problems it could create over the longer term.

"I believe a big stimulus is appropriate," Evans said. "But it is sobering to be deploying large amounts of taxpayer funds at a time when our fiscal balance sheet is already coming under significant stress."

Without the Fed's programs to help unfreeze credit markets and to-the-bone rate cuts, "the downturn -- and its costs to society -- would be even more severe than what we are currently facing," said Evans.

Since the financial market crisis erupted, the Fed has created several new programs aimed at bypassing the traditional banking system and smashing through the credit-market logjam, including the direct purchase of mortgage-backed securities.

Even so, the U.S. jobless rate appears on pace to exceed 8 percent in 2009, from the most recent reading of 6.7 percent in November, Evans said.

Although the current recession started with the collapse of the U.S. housing market, Evans said many non-financial industries now face the risk of "long-term structural impairment." (It was the Fed's reflationary effort after the Crash of 2000-2 that created the housing bubble. - Jesse)

Evans said fiscal programs to support growth "must be large in order to be effective and to instill badly needed confidence" given the severity of the downturn. (We have an intuition that the Congress will meaningfully explore the concept of 'large' government programs - Jesse)

President-elect Barack Obama has said that signing a major economic stimulus package will be his first priority when he takes office on January 20, with a goal of creating 3 million jobs over two years.

Evans also said the market crisis that erupted in 2007 showed huge holes in financial regulation.

"Significant weaknesses have been revealed in our system of financial regulation. ... These failures call for a reassessment of the roles of market discipline and our regulatory structures," he said

Bernanke Unleashes the Power of the Monetary Force

The Fed will lead us out of deflation, but how many years will we spend in the wilderness?

Federal Reserve Open Market Committee
Release Date: December 16, 2008
For immediate release

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent. (That's it, we're effectively at ZERO - Jesse)

Since the Committee's last meeting, labor market conditions have deteriorated, and the available data indicate that consumer spending, business investment, and industrial production have declined. Financial markets remain quite strained and credit conditions tight. Overall, the outlook for economic activity has weakened further.

Meanwhile, inflationary pressures have diminished appreciably. In light of the declines in the prices of energy and other commodities and the weaker prospects for economic activity, the Committee expects inflation to moderate further in coming quarters.

The Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote the resumption of sustainable economic growth and to preserve price stability. In particular, the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.

The focus of the Committee's policy going forward will be to support the functioning of financial markets and stimulate the economy through open market operations and other measures that sustain the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet at a high level. As previously announced, over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant. The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities.

Early next year, the Federal Reserve will also implement the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity. (TASLF for homes and businesses. Will that be a two-page form like TARP? Can I fill it out online? - Jesse)

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Christine M. Cumming; Elizabeth A. Duke; Richard W. Fisher; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S. Kroszner; Sandra Pianalto; Charles I. Plosser; Gary H. Stern; and Kevin M. Warsh. (Did Ben threaten them with martial law? Or just scare the hell out of them? - Jesse)

In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 75-basis-point decrease in the discount rate to 1/2 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. The Board also established interest rates on required and excess reserve balances of 1/4 percent.

T-Bills Hit Zero

AP
Point of no return: Interest on T-bills hits zero
By MADLEN READ and MARTIN CRUTSINGER
December 9, 2008

NEW YORK – Investors are so nervous they're willing to accept the same return from government debt that they'd get from burying money in a coffee can — zero.

The Treasury Department said Tuesday it had sold $30 billion in four-week bills at an interest rate of zero percent, the first time that's happened since the government began issuing the notes in 2001.

And when investors traded their T-bills with each other, the yield sometimes went negative. That's how extreme the market anxiety is: Some are willing to give up a little of their money just to park it in a relatively safe place.

"No one wants to run the risk of any accidents," said Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP, a research company that specializes in government finance.

At last week's government auction of the four-week bills, the interest rate was a slightly higher but still paltry 0.04 percent. Three-month T-bills auctioned by the government on Monday paid poorly, too — 0.005 percent.

While everyday people can keep their cash in an interest-earning CD or savings account at the bank, institutional investors with hundreds of millions of dollars on their hands often use government debt as part of their investment strategy.

In the Treasury market, the U.S. government, considered the most creditworthy of borrowers, issues IOUs of varying durations to raise money.

The zero percent interest rate is no reason to panic. As recently as Monday, investors were plowing cash into stocks, and averages like the Dow industrials are off their lows.

And long-term government bonds, while near record lows, are still paying decent money considering the tumultuous climate. The yield on a 30-year bond on Tuesday was a little higher than 3 percent.

There's good news in all this for taxpayers: Low interest rates on government debt mean the United States is financing its $700 billion bailout of the financial system very cheaply. The Treasury has sold mountains of debt to pay for it.

But the trend also underlines stubborn anxiety in the financial market that could keep the economy sluggish for years to come, and it translates into stagnant returns for people who have their money in places like money market funds.

"There's a price for safety," said Peter Crane, president of money market mutual fund information company Crane Data LLC. "Down slightly is the new up."

As the stock market has taken its alarming plunge, people have been moving money from riskier assets to safer ones. According to Crane Data, funds invested purely in Treasurys have surged more than 150 percent over the past year, to $726 billion.

Earning zero percent on an investment for a short while may not seem that dire for the average person. But a zero percent rate has serious consequences for the complex credit markets.

Those markets have been dysfunctional since Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. went bankrupt in September, scaring away investors who normally buy bonds from seemingly creditworthy borrowers. Lending, the lifeblood of the economy, has frozen up.

One corner of the credit markets is the repurchase markets, known as "repo," where banks and securities firms make and receive short-term loans backed by collateral, usually Treasury bills.

When those T-bills are yielding nothing, there's little incentive to deliver them on time. If the holder loses the interest, it's no big deal.

"This is a particular problem in a time like this, because people are buying Treasury securities for their security, for their safety. It's important that they're delivered," Crandall said. (You can bet the shorts are piling on - Jesse)

And high demand for government debt rather than corporate debt could stifle economic growth.

Corporate bond rates have been surging to record levels compared with Treasurys, which makes it more expensive for companies to raise money. And when companies can't raise money, they often have to cut costs, sometimes through layoffs.

Only a few corporate bond deals have been going through lately, and most have been through the government, which has agreed to guarantee financial institutions' bond sales. American Express Co., for one, said Tuesday it has issued $5.5 billion through the government program.

Many worry that the government will become the most attractive lender and borrower in the market — crowding out others in the private sector....

The New Deal for the Banking System as the Financial Storm Intensifies

"Do you think he is so unskilful in his craft, as to ask you openly and plainly to join him in his warfare against the Truth? No; he offers you bait to tempt you. He promises you civil liberty; he promises you equality; he promises you trade and wealth; he promises you a reduction of taxes; he promises you reform... He prompts you what to say, and then listens to you, and praises you, and encourages you. He bids you mount aloft. He shows you how to become as gods. Then he laughs and jokes with you, and is familiar with you; he takes your hand, and gets his fingers between yours, and grasps them, and then you are his."
J.H. Newman, The Times of AntiChrist, 1889

We are seeing an enormous parody of Roosevelt's New Deal being rolled out in a hurried fashion for the bankers and the wealthy under the cloak of dire necessity prior to the likely change in political Administrations.

If we follow the political pattern of the 1930s, we will see a minority of Republicans and a sympathetic majority at the Supreme Court attempt to maintain the disbursal of liquidity largely to the corporations and banks, and to fight any progressive tax increases and social programs designed to push that liquidity directly to the public without passing through the tollgates of the financial system.

If this happens, we may see a powerful polarization in the country between a minority that will attempt to embrace state control to halt those programs and the encroachment on 'true American principles' and a suffering public, with a middle class pinned between them.

The corporatist appeal will be made to social conservatives, small businessmen, the banks and the corporations that spring up around them, and the lowest elements in the hatreds and prejudices and fears in the public, particularly the older middle class, to retrieve our national honor.

And if against all safeguards and probability this succeeds in gaining power, and burning the Constitution to preserve our freedom becomes a popular slogan, and a slyly articulate but otherwise inexperienced, almost mediocre, leader arises, and the corporate powers support this person in order to achieve their ends, then it will be time to leave, without looking back, before the storm breaks, and madness is unleashed, and a darkness falls over the land.

Bernanke May Seek New Ways to Ease Credit as Fed Rate Nears 1%
By Craig Torres

Oct. 23 (Bloomberg) -- Federal Reserve officials are likely to bring interest rates down so aggressively over the next few months that they will have to search for fresh tactics to continue easing credit.

The Fed's Open Market Committee will probably reduce the benchmark federal funds rate by half a point next week to 1 percent, the lowest since May 2004, according to futures trading. The official rate has never been lower since the Fed made it an explicit target in the late 1980s.

Further cuts below 1 percent could turn Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke's focus away from the main rate and toward more use of alternative tools. Those might include increasing its holdings of mortgage bonds to lower costs for homebuyers and purchasing securities directly from the Treasury in order to pump more cash into the economy, Fed watchers said.

``If there is need for more stimulus, the Fed will buy up government debt to keep borrowing costs low," said Adam Posen, deputy director at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a co-author with Bernanke. That's tantamount to ``turning government debt, as it is issued, into money.'' (That is pure monetization and they can do it if they have the will and the need - Jesse)

Bernanke, 54, has already thrown the central bank's balance sheet into action in unprecedented ways. Working with the New York Fed, the Board of Governors has rolled out 11 new programs aimed at absorbing risk or making dollars available when banks don't want to loan. (A New Deal for the Banking System - Jesse)

Assets Doubled

The result: The central bank's assets, which include a loan to insurer American International Group Inc. and a pool of investments once held by Bear Stearns Cos., more than doubled to $1.772 trillion last week from a year-earlier total of $873 billion that comprised mostly Treasuries. The latest weekly figures are scheduled for release at 4:30 p.m. in Washington.

There's more to come. The Fed announced this week a backstop for money-market mutual funds to which it will commit another $540 billion. A commercial-paper program approved Oct. 7 could buy up to $1.8 trillion of securities.

``The net effect of these facilities has been a truly staggering pace of growth in the Fed's balance sheet,'' said Jan Hatzius, chief U.S. economist for Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

When the Bank of Japan fought deflation and a banking collapse earlier this decade, its balance sheet ballooned to more than 30 percent of gross domestic product as it pumped money into the economy, Hatzius said. He predicted ``further rapid growth'' in the Fed's, which is now equal to 12 percent of U.S. GDP. (The policy error is that they pumped the money into foolish projects and into an unreformed financial system, hopelessly compromised by the keiretsu corporatism of interlocking insider dealing. One does not start an engine that is broken by pouring more fuel into it. - Jesse)

`Helicopter Ben'

As a Fed governor, Bernanke did research on alternative policy tools between 2002 and 2004, when U.S. central bankers last cut the benchmark rate to 1 percent. Traders nicknamed him ``Helicopter Ben'' after a 2002 speech that referenced Milton Friedman's comments comparing such unorthodox methods to dropping money from a helicopter.

Vincent Reinhart, the Fed's director of monetary affairs at that time, said Bernanke's policy activism, which contrasts with his predecessor Alan Greenspan's almost exclusive use of the federal funds rate, derives from the chairman's research on policy errors in the Great Depression and during Japan's rolling recessions of the 1990s.

``He saw what we viewed as an obvious policy failure and it was in the ability of human reason'' to fix it, said Reinhart, now a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

`Quantitative Easing'

The Bank of Japan, struggling against deflation, slow growth and consumers' reluctance to spend, brought its policy rate close to zero before turning in 2001 to a so-called quantitative easing strategy of increasing money in accounts held for commercial banks. The policy lasted for five years, before the central bank began to draw down reserves and raised its benchmark rate to 0.5 percent, where it has been since February 2007.

The Fed has flooded the economy with so much cash that excess reserve balances at banks, or cash surpluses beyond what banks are required to hold against deposits, soared to $136 billion for the two-week period ending Oct. 8 compared with an average of $1.4 billion in the same month last year. (We showed this in a chart the other day. They are stuffing the banks with liquidity, and the banks are holding the reserves against writedowns and credit risk. At some point this will spill over and perhaps even break out, into what contrivances who knows. We may see a rise of 'superbanks' through acquisition. These will have to be taken apart in the coming years. - Jesse)

``The Federal Reserve has already entered a regime of quantitative easing,'' said Brian Sack, vice president at Macroeconomic Advisers LLC who also worked with Bernanke as an economist in the Monetary Affairs Division.

As their liquidity programs dump excess funds into the banking system, it's become more difficult for the Fed to keep the rate at which banks lend overnight to each other in line with policy makers' 1.5 percent target. (This is an absolutely key point to keep in mind - Jesse)

Below Fed Target

In an effort to put a floor under the overnight rate, the central bank started paying interest on the reserves banks deposit with it. That hasn't stopped the so-called effective federal funds rate from falling below the target every day since officials lowered their benchmark by half a point in an emergency move on Oct. 8.

In the two weeks since then, evidence of a deteriorating economy has mounted and will likely push Fed officials toward a further rate cut when they meet Oct. 28-29, economists said.

Industrial production in the U.S. fell in September by the most in almost 34 years, and retail sales dropped by the most in three years. Inflation pressures are easing as oil prices fall to a 16-month low, and nine months of job losses eliminates any pressure from wage increases.

Whether the target rate ends up below 1 percent depends on how fast consumers and businesses gain more access to low-cost credit. Economists at HSBC Holdings Inc. said the Fed would like to avoid cutting to zero. Still, if the economy doesn't improve, it ``could be at zero'' by the middle of next year, said HSBC economist Ian Morris.

``There is this understanding at the Fed that the worst thing you can do is save your ammunition,'' said Ethan Harris, economist at Barclays Capital Inc. ``You move fast -- that is the whole lesson of past crises in Japan and during the Great Depression.''