06 November 2008

Credit Card Bond Sales Zero As the Credit Markets and Consumption Engines Stalls


Approaching our economic problems through crony capitalist bailouts of a few large banks (speculative investment banks by any other name) without reform is a policy error of the first order. Attempting to maintain the same unworkable status quo while doing nothing for the wage earners and the bulk of consumers is the curse of ideology and a financial sickness unto death.


Bloomberg
Credit Card Bond Sales at Zero, First Time Since 1993
By Sarah Mulholland

Nov. 5 -- Credit card companies were shut out of the market for bonds backed by customer payments in October for the first time in more than 15 years, as investors shunned the debt amid the global credit freeze.

A weakening job market and a looming recession are making it harder for consumers to make monthly payments, eroding confidence among investors about the safety of credit-card-backed bonds. It's the first month since April 1993 that there have been no sales, according to Wachovia Corp. data. Issuers sold $17.1 billion of the debt in October 2007, the data show.

``Nobody is eager to put money to work given the uncertainty in the market,'' said James Grady, a managing director at Deutsche Bank AG's asset management unit. ``When you think it can't get worse, it continues to get worse. There is not a demand'' for these bonds.

Top-rated credit card-backed securities maturing in three years traded at a gap, or spread, of 475 basis points over the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, during the week ended Oct. 30, JPMorgan Chase & Co. data show, 25 basis points higher than the previous week. The debt was trading at 50 basis points more than Libor in January.

The higher cost to sell the bonds makes it more expensive for banks and credit card companies to fund loans to customers. New York-based American Express Co. paid 160 basis points more than Libor at a Sept. 11 sale of the securities compared with 30 basis points over the benchmark at a similar sale in October 2007, Bloomberg data show.

Non-Farm Payrolls Report Tomorrow Could Move the Markets


We were starting to turn the crank on our projections for tomorrow's Non-Farm Payrolls report when we spotted this update.

The 'imaginary jobs' component will be in play, but in particular it is the 'seasonal adjustment' factor that gives the bureaucrats at the BLS an enormous ability to massage the headline numbers from the actuals.

We suspect the market will strike a level today and then gyrate around it to burn out the daytraders while the pros wait to see how the Jobs number gets spun tomorrow.

We see 926 as support on the SP futures with 918 below that. It would be a breakdown below 910 that would cause us to change our current hedged positions weighting. On the upside there is strong resistance at 954 and 978 with a few stumbling blocks around 960-968.

This is a thin market with a predilection to being pushed around by the Wall Street wiseguys. To use a 'poker analogy' they like to see the funds and specs take positional wagers with leverage, and then use their superior bankrolls and advantaged table insight to 'raise them' out of their bets and pocket the difference. This is one of the issues that must be addressed if the house banks are going to be sitting with the other players at the table, with the backing of the Treasury and slack regulation.


JOHN WILLIAMS’ SHADOW GOVERNMENT STATISTICS
FLASH UPDATE
November 6, 2008

October Employment Conditions Should Show Marked Deterioration

Jobs and Unemployment Due for Big Hits. With both the October manufacturing and nonmanufacturing purchasing managers surveys showing their employment measures falling deep into recession territory, with September help-wanted advertising holding at its historic low and online advertising still tumbling year-to-year, and with a new claims for unemployment insurance continuing to rise sharply year-to-year, October payrolls should have dropped by over 200,000, along with a continued sharp rise in the unemployment rate.

The October report is due for release tomorrow morning (November 7th). Consensus expectations are running at roughly a 200,000 payroll loss and a 0.2% increase in the unemployment rate to 6.3%, per briefing.com. They are not unreasonable, but still appear to be somewhat shy of reality. Election pressures are gone, but financial market pressures for rigged data remain. With the markets still far from stable conditions, a slightly better than expected payroll number might be a fair bet.


Marc Faber Sees Bankruptcy for the US


MINA
Swiss Finance Guru sees bankruptcy for the U.S
Thursday, 06 November 2008


Swiss financial guru Marc Faber tells swissinfo he sees hard times ahead for the world's stock exchanges and even state bankruptcy for the United States.

He also believes that stock exchanges will stay at low levels for a long time.


Faber, otherwise known as Dr Doom for his contrarian views on the economy, has lived in Asia for the past 35 years.

He is a jack-of-all-trades: investment adviser, financier, best-selling author and the compiler of a monthly economic publication called The Gloom Boom and Doom Report.

Faber sits on various boards of directors and investment committees.

swissinfo: You prophesied the stock market crash of 1987 and the Asia crisis and became a celebrity as a result. Did you see this crisis coming too?

Marc Faber: It was quite clear we had a credit bubble. I had been warning about that for years and not only in the mortgage sector. But what surprised even me was that [US insurer] AIG would almost disappear and that UBS shares would fall under $17.20.

swissinfo: How did it come to such a situation?

M.F.: A credit bubble has been growing for 25 years. We've seen, in particular over the past seven years, an unbelievable credit growth, which fuelled economic development. Then there were structural changes in the economy, for example the sinking saving ratios that have had an effect on consumption and growth rates.

The situation worsened in 2001 in the United States when the central bank lowered the interest rate from 6.5 per cent to an unheard of one per cent in 2003. This ultra-expansive monetary policy led to a credit growth that was five times higher than growth of the economy. A bubble growth and later the crash were the logical consequences.


swissinfo: Have we reached rock bottom?

M.F.: I think we're near it. But I also think we'll stick at this low point for a long time. Anyone who thinks that everything will soon be rosy again is naive. It's quite possible that worldwide stock exchanges will experience a similar development to that witnessed in Japan over the past two decades [the Nikkei index has fallen from 39,000 points to under 8,000].

Japan also shows that the large amount of money injected to stimulate the markets didn't have the desired effect – but it did produce huge holes in the state coffers.

swissinfo: You are known for swimming against the tide of conventional wisdom. But you are right in line with the prevailing pessimism.

M.F.: Not quite. I'm even more pessimistic than most (laughs). Look at it like this, between 1980 and 2007 people saved from their capital gains and not their income, as their income was spent. That was fine while property and shares increased in value every year. Today these people are highly indebted and are only beginning to save more by putting the brake on their consumption.

That's how every economy goes to the dogs – with or without injection of capital by governments. With the best of wills, I do not see a single catalyst that could lead to a new bull market in the world. At the moment, everything has gone down the drain.

swissinfo: How does the present crisis differ from previous ones?

M.F.: In the past few years everything went up – shares, commodities, consumer goods, real estate values, art and even bonds. Such a combination is extremely unusual. We saw the biggest investment bubble in the history of humanity. The current situation is possibly worse than the global economic crisis of 1929. And that is thanks to Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke [the former and current US Federal Reserve Board chairmen]. These two gentlemen must account for massive errors.

swissinfo: Governments are offering guarantees and are pumping thousands of billions into the markets. Is that a mistake?

M.F.: Yes. The losses are there and someone has to bear them. There are two possibilities. Banks go under and the stakeholders are left with nothing, as is the case with Lehman Brothers, or governments pump money into the financial system so that the incompetent financial clowns in Bahnhofstrasse [Zurich's financial centre] and Wall Street can continue to eat in fancy restaurants.

I am clearly in favour of the first because the consequences of these state interventions are massive budget deficits. To finance these, governments have to acquire money. For that they have to borrow money, which makes state debt and interest payments soar. US economists have come to the conclusion from the trends that there will be a US state bankruptcy. (That's not a very widely held view Herr Faber, and we're feeling a little isolated in that view - for now - Jesse)

swissinfo: Do you share that view?

M.F.: One hundred per cent. The US government will in future have new debts of at least $1,000 billion (SFr1,165 billion). That's on top of the current state debt of $10,000 billion. And that doesn't take into account state programmes to stimulate the economy. The government will have no other choice than to print money, which in the long term will lead to inflation.

swissinfo: How do you see the near future?

M.F.: More positively. The markets are totally undervalued so I reckon on a short-term recovery of easily 20 to 30 per cent. (LOL. Stocks are absolutely not undervalued, but a technical bounce of 20% is very possible. There was a 60% bounce after the Great Crash of 1929, before the markets turned lower again, eventually giving up 89% of their peak values into the market bottom of 1933. Bear markets often get 20-30% short covering rallies before starting a next leg down. This is what makes them so difficult to trade. You cannot hold anything, which is how most investors have been conditioned by the preceding bull market. The use of leverage is deadly for core positions. - Jesse)

swissinfo: When?

M.F.: In the next two to three weeks. (After we make a bottom. Use that rally to discard any remaining dollar financial holdings and get liquid, buy gold and silver. - Jesse)

swissinfo: That's not exactly very much in view of the massive losses.

M.F.: No. If you drop a tennis ball with only a little air in it, it doesn't bounce very high!

swissinfo: Are you calling into question the concept of making money from shares?

M.F.: No. The idea is still valid but you have to be realistic. Adjusted for inflation and with a long-term perspective you could earn on average three per cent with US shares. The long-term promises of eight per cent made by bankers and pseudo investment advisers to lure their customers are absolute rubbish. (Can't fault that logic - Jesse)

swissinfo: It looked for a long time as though Switzerland would get away with just a black eye. What is your view? (What the Swiss government and central bank have done to their economy and finances is a disgrace. We hold no Swiss francs any longer. The Swiss people have been treated badly. - Jesse)

M.F.: The export industry will be extremely hard hit. People in Switzerland will have to accustom themselves to bankruptcies, particularly in the machine industry (They will devalue the franc inevitably. The savings of the people will be destroyed. The Swiss bank has sold off its gold. The large banks are functionally insolvent. Shameful - Jesse)

DTCC Report Omits A Significant Amount of Credit Default Swap Exposure


In a nutshell, the DTCC Report failed to include the Credit Default Swaps that cover the CDO's. This is because the DTCC only captures 'commonly traded contracts and not privately negotiated derivatives such as those on collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

This is a key gap in the report since the market for these customer derivatives is quite large, and it is the failures of the CDOs that are in the process of failing, and bringing down banks and other financial institutions with them.

It is not surprising that the DTCC omits the custom, or privately written, derivatives. Because each one has variations, placing these on an electronic exchange seems a daunting task indeed.

But it represents an important caveat to anyone looking at the DTCC report and then attempting to draw conclusions about the overall swaps market net exposures.

Bloomberg
Credit-Default Swap Disclosure Hides Truth on Risk at Banks
By Shannon D. Harrington and Abigail Moses

Nov. 6 -- The most comprehensive report on unregulated credit-default swaps didn't disclose bets in the section of the more than $47 trillion market that helped destroy American International Group Inc., once the world's biggest insurer.

A study by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. fails to include privately negotiated credit swaps that insurers such as AIG, MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group Inc. sold to guarantee securities known as collateralized debt obligations, according to analysts including Andrea Cicione at BNP Paribas in London.

New York-based DTCC's report, released on its Web site Nov. 4, showed a total $33.6 trillion of transactions on governments, companies and asset-backed securities worldwide, based on gross numbers. While designed to ease concerns about the amount of risk banks and investors amassed on borrowers from companies to homeowners, the study may have missed as much as 40 percent of the trades outstanding in the market, Ciccone said. (Oops, lol - Jesse)

The data are ``likely to underestimate the amount of net CDS exposure,'' he said in an interview.

Trading of credit derivatives soared 100-fold the past decade as banks, hedge funds, insurance companies and other investors used the contracts to protect against losses or speculate on debt they didn't own.

Banks worldwide have taken $693 billion in writedowns and losses on loans, CDOs and other investments since the start of 2007, according to data compiled by Bloomberg...

Commonly Traded Contracts

Because the DTCC registry captures only commonly traded contracts that can be confirmed over electronic systems, not every swap trade is in the company's report, spokeswoman Judy Inosanto said. Among those not included are credit-default swaps on CDOs, she said...