US Dollar: Long Term Trend and Triffin's Dilemma

AEIR
Triffin’s Dilemma, Reserve Currencies, and Gold
By Walker Todd

Nearly 50 years ago, Yale University economist Robert Triffin identified the inevitable future deterioration of the dollar in his book, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (1960). Essentially, Triffin argued, under the Bretton Woods system in which the U.S. dollar was the world’s principal reserve currency (instead of gold, for example), the United States had to incur large trade deficits in order to provide the rest of the world with the liquidity required for functioning of the global trading system.

Unfortunately, Triffin wrote, U.S. trade deficits eventually would undermine the foreign exchange value of the dollar because foreign accounts would hold an increasing quantity of dollars. Restating Triffin's argument in contemporary terms, as the proportion of dollar claims held abroad versus U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increases, the foreign exchange value of the dollar must decline if dollar interest rates do not increase at about the same rate as the foreign dollar claims.

Issuing the reserve currency gives domestic policy makers an advantage by making it easier to finance either domestic budget deficits or foreign trade deficits because there always is a ready bidders' market for any financing instruments from that issuer. Issuing the reserve currency enables the domestic population to consume more goods and services from whatever source than otherwise would be feasible. And issuing the reserve currency gives foreign policy officials of that nation the upper hand in determining multilateral approaches to either diplomacy or military action.

This last reason probably is why U.S. policy makers clung to the original Bretton Woods format for about 10 years beyond the point at which it still was viable, with the whole apparatus finally collapsing in August 1971.

Let us reconsider the effect of reserve currency issuance on domestic and foreign trade for a moment. Unless the issuing authorities can discover a way to allow their currency to depreciate more or less in proportion to the growing foreign trade deficits—by reducing interest rates or otherwise stimulating domestic inflation, for example—then a sustainable equilibrium becomes impossible.

Either the currency remains overvalued (good for the reserve currency status) and the trade deficits continue to increase, or the currency maintains fair external value (implicitly, a proportional devaluation, which is bad for the reserve currency status) and the trade deficits either stabilize or shrink. This latter proposition is what Professor Triffin was writing about in 1960, and it has been called Triffin's dilemma ever since.

Lewis Lehrman and John Mueller revived the discussion of Triffin's dilemma, without calling it that, in an article that appeared on December 15, 2008, in National Review Online. They suggested that the proper international reserve currency should be gold. I agree and wrote as much in a commentary, in the Christian Science Monitor, November 17, 2008.

Lehrman and Mueller argue correctly that no country willingly should volunteer for the reserve currency role. Such an endeavor necessarily leads to the same pattern of persistent overvaluation and trade deficits that plagued the United States since European currencies became generally convertible in 1959. Our abandonment of the international gold exchange standard in August 1971 accelerated and intensified our external deficits and the volatility of exchange rates.

Among advanced economies that were key members of the old Bretton Woods system, tolerating large amounts of external claims in their currencies always was a sore point because they wanted to avoid de facto reserve currency status and the curse (Triffin's dilemma) that accompanies it.

In the last two decades, roughly since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, European countries have adopted the euro and allowed large external claims in euros to arise. The Japanese bubble of the 1980s finally burst and relieved the reserve currency pressure of large external claims there until the last couple of years. Recently prosperous nations like China, India, and Brazil linked their currencies to the dollar and managed exchange rates so as to avoid the accumulation of large external claims. Thus, none of the most likely candidates is volunteering for reserve currency status...

SP 500 and NDX December Futures Daily Charts

Wall Street is now starting to rally higher on bad economic news, pricing in a new round of monetary stimulus from the Fed. Unfortunately this is being done on thin volumes by cynical speculators, setting up possibly hazardous market conditions.

Gold Daily and Silver Weekly Projected Charts

The correction was brief and correlated to equities.

Tavakoli: Biggest Fraud in the History of the Capital Markets

Washington Post
'This is the biggest fraud in the history of the capital markets'
By Ezra Klein
10/8/2010

Janet Tavakoli is the founder and president of Tavakoli Structured Finance Inc. She sounded some of the earliest warnings on the structured finance market, leading the University of Chicago to profile her as a "Structured Success," and Business Week to call her "The Cassandra of Credit Derivatives." We spoke this afternoon about the turmoil in the housing market, and an edited transcript of our conversation follows.

Ezra Klein: What’s happening here? Why are we suddenly faced with a crisis that wasn’t apparent two weeks ago?

Janet Tavakoli: This is the biggest fraud in the history of the capital markets. And it’s not something that happened last week. It happened when these loans were originated, in some cases years ago. Loans have representations and warranties that have to be met. In the past, you had a certain period of time, 60 to 90 days, where you sort through these loans and, if they’re bad, you kick them back. If the documentation wasn’t correct, you’d kick it back. If you found the incomes of the buyers had been overstated, or the houses had been appraised at twice their worth, you’d kick it back. But that didn’t happen here. And it turned out there were loan files that were missing required documentation. Part of putting the deal together is that the securitization professional, and in this case that’s banks like Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan, has to watch for this stuff. It’s called perfecting the security interest, and it’s not optional.

EK: And how much danger are the banks themselves in?

JT: When we had the financial crisis, the first thing the banks did was run to Congress and ask for accounting relief. They asked to be able to avoid pricing this stuff at the price where people would buy them. So no one can tell you the size of the hole in these balance sheets. We’ve thrown a lot of money at it. TARP was just the tip of the iceberg. We’ve given them guarantees on debts, low-cost funding from the Fed. But a lot of these mortgages just cannot be saved. Had we acknowledged this problem in 2005, we could’ve cleaned it up for a few hundred billion dollars. But we didn’t. Banks were lying and committing fraud, and our regulators were covering them and so a bad problem has become a hellacious one.

EK: My understanding is that this now pits the banks against the investors they sold these products too. The investors are going to court to argue that the products were flawed and the banks need to take them back.

JT: Many investors now are waking up to the fact that they were defrauded. Even sophisticated investors. If you did your due diligence but material information was withheld, you can recover. It’ll be a case-by-by-case basis.

EK: Given that our financial system is still fragile, isn’t that a disaster for the economy? Will credit freeze again?

JT: I disagree. In order to make the financial system healthy, we need to recognize the extent of our losses and begin facing the fraud. Then the market will be trustworthy again and people will start to participate.

EK: It sounds almost like you’re saying we still need to go through the end of our financial crisis.

JT: Yes, but I wouldn’t say crisis. This can be done with a resolution trust corporation, the way we cleaned up the S&Ls. The system got back on its feet faster because we grappled with the problems. The shareholders would be wiped out and the debt holders would have to take a discount on their debt and they’d get a debt-for-equity swap. Instead we poured TARP money into a pit and meanwhile the banks are paying huge bonuses to some people who should be made accountable for fraud. The financial crisis was a product of our irrational reaction, which protected crony capitalism rather than capitalism. In capitalism, the shareholders who took the risk would be wiped out and the debt holders would take a discount but banking would go on.