30 March 2010

King World Interview with Andrew Maguire 'the Silver Market Whistleblower'


"The Biggest Fraud in the World"

I do not know what to think about this, except to just offer it up to you for your own information.

I am disappointed, however, that only the blogs, and almost no one in the mainstream media, have bothered to cover this story and to speak to the principals, and to either debunk them, support them, or even consider what they have to say.

This really is like the Harry Markopolos story, trying to get a hearing on the Madoff ponzi scheme, and being repeatedly ignored, intimidated, and discouraged in every way possible by the establishment, and even fearing for his life.

Even if this is a mistake, a hoax, some conspiracy, it deserves a proper hearing and an airing in the public. Ignoring it raises even more questions, and serious concerns about the integrity of the US markets. If instead of a proper airing there are only the smears, and disinformation, and the usual sly ad hominem attacks, or even worse, I will begin to believe that it is true.

King World News Interview with Andrew Maguire and Adrian Douglas

I cannot believe that testimony is being completely ignored. I do not understand why this is a 'national security' issue. It seems just too bizarre to me.

Do people inside the trade know something that we don't know? Are these fellows frauds or just mistaken? Is this a hoax? Part of some conspiracy?

Or is this something coming right at us, that will end up hurting the public once again, as the rampant fraud in the financial markets has done so thoroughly.

Is there is something going on then it is time to bring it out into the open. If it is national security concern, or more properly the national interest, because it involves the US banking industry, how long do they think they can keep this sort of thing quiet?

If this is something else, why is it not aired, investigated, and nipped in the bud?

I am trying to keep an open mind on this, but it is not being made any easier by what looks like a curtain of silence while the stories and counter-moves are prepared.

I was disappointed that in the interview they never seemed to discuss the hit and run car incident.

I don't want to speculate or get paranoid on this but its not easy. We deserve to know the truth.

Note at night: I have now listened to this tape five times, carefully. It is a bombshell. This has to be dealt with, one way or the other. Bring it out into the light of day, and let the facts be known. This is either the equivalent of the fictionalized testimony on the order of the Salem Witch trials, or one of the most damning accusations of malfeasance in office against quasi-governmental agencies, and probably US officials, since Teapot Dome.

Giving the mainstream media the benefit of the doubt, they are afraid to touch it because it is radioactive. They will wait on the sidelines until something happens. And the strategy seems to be to stonewall, and hope it goes away. The American public is nortoriously fickle and if not reminded of it will move on to the next shiny thing, the next controversy of any type.

But the coverup is always the first mistake of a government in approaching a breaking scandal. But they never seem to learn. You deal with it up front and early. It was not the actual burglary at the Watergate that brought down the government, and took American into its 'long national agony.' It was, and always is, the coverup.


"How to Corner the Gold Market" By Janet Tavakoli


Janet Tavakoli wrote an interesting essay that was just posted over at the Huffington Post called "How to Corner the Gold Market" which can be read in its entirety from her website here. I started to comment at the HuffPost, but the system there limits comments to 250 characters, so I left a brief comment which is probably still being moderated (note: and still is five hours later - J) and will post my entire comment here while it is fresh in my mind.

First I wanted to thank Janet for dropping me a note about this piece. She knows I have an abiding interest on this topic of market imbalances and regulation in general. I find the US markets fascinating these days, in particular where they involve leverage and derivatives. And Janet is one of the most 'on the ball' and smartest people that I know who are looking at this, and making the good calls well in advance of the situation.

What struck me as odd is that I just wrote a blog piece along similar lines on the same topic today, raising many of the same issues, but that is from the opposite perspective. You can read The Case for Position Limits: What is the Spot Price and How Is It Set? here.

I think Janet and I come to the same conclusions but from a very different perspective, the other side of the table in fact, I wanted to reflect at length on her essay because I think it is important, and in some ways a good formula for manipulating a market from either the short of the long side. In the metals markets today, most of the 'gorillas' are the TBTF crowd, and they seem to be on the short side. That does not mean that they are not being sized up for a market showdown that could be destructive if there is a mispricing of risk and market imbalance.

First, and its not really a quibble, I think the Hunt Brothers attempt to corner the silver market back in the 1970's was overturned not only by a pre-emptive action by the Fed (and it was not an accident as I recall but a conscious response to inflation speculation) but also actions by the exchanges that broke the corner by altering the rules. I have not read the essay she references but I recall the situation first hand since my stock broker at Bache, Halsey Stuart was keeping close track of it, and liked to discuss it with me. Since I was not trading that market at such a tender age, it was a interesting voyeuristic experience, being in the stands watching the men in the arena. When I saw a spec silver trader in their office breaking out in hives during the trading day, being crushed and ruined lock limit down, I resolved to stay away from that sort of action.

This is important because today, having apparently learned their lesson, the exchanges are generally willing to increase the margin requirements when there appears to be undue speculation, especially on the long side of the trade by the speculators not in the in-crowd with the exchange. This is probably more common in the commodity markets, but most commodity traders are well aware these margin changes. They have to be since it requires them to put up more capital, and the specs are often thinly capitalized.

Second, I believe that the commodity exchanges already have the ability to force a cash settlement between counterparties in the event of a market imbalance. I think they even have the option to force a settlement in a commodity ETF, including some which Janet discusses as possibly being the objects of manipulation.

So think in sum that there is little evidence that anyone is willing to take on the exchanges, even the big players, and try and force a corner or even a squeeze against what they perceive as mispricing, such as Soros and so many other big players did with the British Pound , and most recently other big hedge funds did with mispriced products from the latest bubble in the debt markets, and financial stocks. They may be vilified after the fact, but they were right and served a valuable market function. Whether they did anything illegal is another matter.

The piece I wrote today and reference above is about a situation in the precious metals markets which has the potential to become another serious problem for almost the same basic reasons as the debt markets in our most recent financial crisis: excessive leverage concentrated in a few TBTF institutions, lack of transparency, regulatory laxity, and a mispricing of risk.

Janet alludes to the same thing. My prescription is position limits and accountability the collateral and any other deliverables backing the trade. If indeed there are excessively naked shorts, then not squeezing them is of course one resolution, but the other is to rein them in. I should add that the major players claim that they are not naked short, and reference hedges which I believe are undisclosed.

It was kind of odd to hear this story told in a conspiratorial way, referencing the Hunt Brothers. Anyone who would take on the government sponsored banks like JPM and HSBC at this point would have to be rather well-heeled and gutsy indeed. And what is most ironic is that a whistle-blower's testimony appeared at the recent CFTC hearing, and seemed to allege that JPM is manipulating the silver market. It was widely covered in the blogosphere, but very little of it in the mainstream media. I don't think it was covered at all at the Huffington Post, so Janet may not have seen it.

And of course there was the subsequent story about the man and his wife being struck by a hit and run driver the next day in London, and the usual fear of smears and intimidation that must accompany all those who testify against the vested interests. That story remains to unfold. I hope it turns out better than that of Harry Markopolos, who was widely ignored until the worst happened and the Madoff Ponzi scheme collapsed. As I recall he was subject to intimidation and fears for his safety, warranted or otherwise. It must be hard to come forward with this sort of knowledge.

But let's cut through the verbage. Here we are again, with TBTF institutions playing the excessive leverage games and possible naked shorting and mispricing of risk in under-regulated markets, and putting the 'global markets' stability at risk.

If Janet has any specific knowledge about a conspiracy to take advantage of this she should immediately contact the CFTC. I recommend Bart Chilton because I hear he is responsive and interested in this very topic, and just helped to sponsor hearings on this topic as I understand it. If I knew anything at all like this I would as well. So far all I see is a market relatively dominated by the usual TBTF suspects. If some longs are sizing them up there is certainly nothing wrong with that, and if they are vulnerable to a default, then we can either ban short selling (or I guess in this case it would be buying what they are short) or we can try and tighten up the market and correct any obvious imbalances that might exist now in an orderly manner.

But based on the last three years experience of financial misdeed exposed, I would hesitate to account for something by a criminal or even conspiratorial intent what can be attributed to short term greed and sheer reckless stupidity, crony capitalism and regulatory capture, and some intelligent market players seeing this and using legitimate means to confront it, and give it the market players a thrashing they may deserve. But there could be things happening well behind the scenes that I, a reasonably intelligent and trying-to-be-informed market participant cannot see. Is the squid on the hunt again? It is hard to imagine anyone big enough to take on the jokers that seem to be batting the US markets around at will these days. But therein lies the problem to my way of thinking - opaque and excessively leveraged markets that favor the big predatory trading desks.

As anyone who reads my blog knows, I do not think the contrarians are at the heart of our issues here, those who were shorting the mortgage bubble and the derivatives associated with them, although there is always that possibility. I am much more concerned about the establishment, those who are pulling the strings of power, and influencing the regulators, and I found a resonant chord in Janet's essay about this.

The markets are in need of reform. And as concerned as I was before, as shown by the blog which wrote earlier today, I am even more concerned now because Janet seems concerned, and we are coming at this from two very different perspectives: her from the possibility of an engineered short squeeze, and I from the dangerous condition I think I see in the market structure as it is today, with many of the same large institutions at the epicenter of the most recent crisis doing the same thing all over again, different day, different market. same players and modus operandi.

If there are elements trying to manipulate the markets from either side of the trade, then I agree with Janet, that I wish nothing to do with them, and want to see them exposed and prosecuted. But so far that does not seem to be happening very much, anywhere in the system except for some relative 'small fry.'

It feels like groundhog day.

Jesse

What is the 'Spot Price' of Gold and Silver And How Is It Set?


When you ask even a relatively experienced and sophisticated precious metals trader "what is the spot price of gold or silver?' you will generally hear a pause, and then they will come back with a price after checking their computer screen for the latest spot price from some ubiquitous and reliable provider of such quotes, or one of the lesser known, diverse providers of this information.

But when you say, "No what I was asking is 'what is the spot price, where does it come from, who sets it?'" you will most often hear that this is the last physical trade, or the current market price of physical bullion.

Well, is it?

Actually despite what you might think or what you might have heard, it is not.

The reason for this is that there is no centralized and efficient market for the sale of physical bullion in the US at anything resembling a 'spot price.' What is their number, where are their prices and trades posted? Who is buying and selling what, TODAY, with the real delivery of bullion as the primary objective?

There are several large markets for physical bullion in the world, where real buying and selling occurs, with delivery given and taken. The most famous is the London Bullion Market Association, which is an dealer association, over the counter market where the price is set twice a day as the 'London fix' but each counterparty stands on their own with no central clearing authority. From the perspective of bullion the LBMA is 'where the action is' and the Comex is a sideshow. Although there are recent revelations and suggestions that the LBMA is also slipping into a paper market with multiple claims on the same unallocated bullion, fractional reserve bullion banking as it were. Nothing new. It just gets more out of hand at certain times in history.

The reason that physical trading in bullion became so highly concentrated in London was best explained to me by one large bullion dealer. "This situation exists because of the gold confiscation in the US in 1933. When that happened, physical metal trading in the US came to a complete stop. When gold ownership was again made legal on December 31, 1974, the physical metal trading had become so developed outside of the US that it stayed there and never really returned."

But once the London Fix is over, and the day moves around the world, the New York markets open and become more dominant. Where and how is that price obtained? Where is the price discovery.

The fact of the matter is that the bullion market in the US is highly fragmented among many, many dealers in bullion. Yes they have their 'wholesale' sources, but even those sources are more fragmented than I would have imagined.

There seems to be no central market for physical gold and silver in the US, except for the largely paper futures markets. Because the fact of the matter is that the spot price of gold and silver are a type of Net Present Value (NPV) calculation based on the futures price in the nearest month, or the front month.

I had not been able to obtain the actual calculation used by any of the principle quote providers. And I am not saying that they are doing anything wrong at all. Or right for that matter, since I do not audit them or look over their shoulder. I do not know how accurate anyone's reportage might be, or how to explain the discrepancies between the futures prices and the spot prices that occur all too frequently these days. How can one without more transparent knowledge?

For those of you that are familiar with it, the spot price would be calculated from the futures in much the same way that the 'Fair Value' price is obtained for a stock index like the SP from the futures trade, essentially an NPV calculation.

FORMULA FOR DETERMINING FAIR VALUE

F = S [1+(i-d)t/360]

Where F = Fair Value futures price

S = spot index price

i = interest rate (expressed as a money market yield)

d = dividend rate (expressed as a money market yield)

t = number of days from the current spot value date to the value date of the futures contract.


So like most net present value calculations we would have some 'cost of money' figure used to discount the time decay from the strike time of the contract to the present. There is no dividend with gold for example, but there is a lease rate, and a proper calculation should include some allowance for this.

The details are not so important, again as I say, unless you wish to start up your own quotations service, or do your own pricing as a large dealer to make sure you know what a fair price might be.

What is important is that almost all retail transactions for physical bullion in the US key off a 'spot price' that is derived from a paper market which is not based in the reality of physical supply, since the futures exchanges explicitly allow for the settlement in cash if physical bullion is not available. In fact, the vast majority of transactions are settled in cash, and are little more than derivatives bets it seems, and often hedges related to other things like another commodity or interest rates.

So that is the truth of the spot price of gold and silver in the US as best as I can determine it. I am not saying that anyone is doing anything wrong or illegal. I am saying the system is inefficient in that it suffers from the lack of a robust physical market to 'keep it honest.'

Also, almost every trader I speak with does not really understand what the spot price really is, or the implications of what price discovery looks like in a fragmented market where the pricing is set by a group of speculators that rarely deal in the actual commodity itself.

I am surprised that indeed some smart entrepreneur has not consolidated the buying and selling of physical bullion on demand into a highly transparent and efficient market which is the real price setter, rather than the commodities exchanges in which arbitrage can be easily crushed by the very rules of the exchange that allow for unlimited position size, extreme leverage, cash settlement as an easy alternative to shortage, unaudited and unallocated stores of supply, and secrecy. We even recently saw the scandal where a large Wall Street broker was selling bullion and even charging the customer annual storage fees without ever having purchased the bullion for them in the first place!

The actual prices for stocks are published on a price by transaction basis on public exchanges whereas gold and silver have no such facility. That is a key difference, and why the futures market has a significant need for tighter reins on speculation including position limits, accountability for deliverables, and limits on leverage and speculation, more so than any other market. The metals markets are thin and small compared to the forex and financial asset markets, and therefore the most vulnerable when they intermix.

The futures market will be efficient and honest the more it takes on itself the rigors of a physical market. Even Alan Greenspan alluded to this, that the dollar reserve currency standard 'would work' as long as the Fed had the discipline to manage it as if it had the rigor of an external standard like gold. Well, you can toss that vain assumption about the self restraints of human nature out the window. Do you really think that bonus hungry traders are more virtuous and selflessly devoted to the public good than the economists at the Fed? Please.

And I have not spent any time discussing it, but when one has a price that is derived from even a publicly available albeit flawed price like the front month futures, without transparency in the derivation and updating the opportunity to skin pennies all day long is there as a temptation, since there is no official or easily calculable method to check its accuracy.

I contacted a few big dealers hoping to get intimations that there was some sort of a private wholesaler network, in which two or three regional distributors set prices based on available supply. There is a 'dealer market' in which prices in lots of twenty five bars of London ready gold is quoted, but that seems to be part of the parallel market in physical bullion centered around the LBMA that is divergent from the continuous paper price and the 'spot price.'

There is always a wholesale cost and a retail price with a markup. That is not an issue. What seems to be the problem is that when a few players can crush price with paper positions, this tends to remove the discpline of arbitrage of market mispricing from the picture. This is the only part of the efficient markets hypothesis that ever made any sense. If there is a price discrepancy, market players will move in to fill it. This is the case against manipulation.

Except they cannot really address any serious market mispricing because the price is set in the paper markets which are not amenable to efficient arbitrage. Unlimited leverage through derivatives, and the willingness of central banks to sell into the gold market to manage price spikes, again as Chairman Greenspan admitted, takes care of that. Not even a motivated buyer with deep enough pockets like China would take on this market openly because all they would do is buy against themselves, and drive a default which would be cash settled by force.

You might ask at this point, why would anyone ever wish to engage themselves in this market, besides those who must obtain supply for industrial or cosmetic uses? Few do actually, except to buy physical bullion at the retail level, and hold it as protection against the devaluation of currency and the monetization of the debt.

There are always professional speculators, but they tend to go with the momentum for the reasons outlined above. Its an easy trade. I sometimes play the arb myself, or at least maintain an awareness of it. You can't fight the Fed in the short term, and the financial engineers and statists hate anything that threatens to rival or even limit their power. But that does not mean that one might not insure themselves against the eventual failure of the new masters of the universe to control the large forces and unintended consequences of world markets. What I find so disappointing is that Greenspan knew all this. and wrote eloquently about it, before he sold himself to those who he had spent the bloom of his intellect opposing. I was never interested in this subject until I started reading his various biographies to understand his thinking better in the late 1990's, and then went on to read his early works on the state and freedom. If he had been a more noble figure his fall might have been a tragedy. As it is, it just seems to be another dishonorable failure of stewardship and conscience.

This is what you have. Whether it works well or not is another matter and it seems a personal opinion heavily biased on where you sit at the playing table. But from a purely economic perspective if I were going to set up a mechanism to allow price fixing and fraud to occur, I could do little better, except perhaps to set up something more like an opaque monopoly such as the Federal Reserve with the ability to create supply out of nothing. The investors and producers are largely at the mercy of those who control the paper markets And this says nothing about the involvement of the central banks in influencing the price, which they admit that they do, if only obliquely.

Sure one can say. If you don't like the price you can keep taking delivery, except that you can't. The price is set on the Comex, which delivers paper dollars at will, and has a history of changing its rules at the drop of a hat to rescue trapped suppliers and speculative shorts. This is the sort of odd market that resolves itself in executive actions precipitated by breakdowns and default.

There is nothing here that could not be greatly improved by position limits and much greater transparency and accountability for counterparty risk. CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton has shown himself to be remarkably insightful and courageous in promoted these changes to the US futures markets in the metals. Far from an efficient and vigorous market, as Adrian Douglas said at the CFTC hearing the US is merely a "sidehow" to the London market when it is open for trading at least with respect to actual product. But as amenable as this paper based market is to the 'easy skim' one might imagine there is a status quo that would fight any reform vociferously.

To use a poker analogy, I don't mind a 'no limits' game as long as it is table stakes where you put your 'stash' on the table for all to see, which again this is not, and the pot is split if you are raised beyond your bankroll, which this is also not. I would not imagine that a no limits game in which the big players are also often the dealers, and can see the cards that other cannot because of their seating, is the best sort of a mechanism with which to conduct price discovery for the average person in the market, who only wishes to play a few hands on a limited budget, or a small producer who wishes to bring their product to market.

As someone who approaches it as an amateur economist, and has been looking at its dynamics for the past few years, I may be missing something, but this seems less like an efficient market mechanism for price discovery and capital allocation, and more like a carney game.

Banks Come Back For Another Bailout in Ireland While the US 'Manages Perceptions'


The whole notion of bank bailouts is a tremendous injustice when not accompanied by personal bankruptcy and civil and criminal prosecution for those banks managers who created them and are found guilty of fraud.

In addition, the owners of the banks, whether through debt or shares, should be wiped out and the bank placed in a proper receivership while its books are sorted out.

The US is an accounting mirage. The notion that it will make money from its stake in Citi is a sleight of hand. The enormous subsidies to the banks both in terms of direct payments, indirect payments through entities like AIG, and subsidies such as the erosion of the currency and the deterioration of the real economy, will never be repaid.

The real model of how to handle a banking crisis is in the Scandinavian nationalization of the banks, or even better, the disposition of the Savings and Loans in the US. during that crisis.

This pragamatic approach, its cheaper just to pay them all off than to sort them out, is a child of the Rubinomics of mid 1990's in the States, in which it was determined to be better to prop up the stock markets, often by buying the SP futures, than it was to allow the market to reach its level, and then deal with the financial carnage of a market crash. Here is a review of a paper by Rubin's protege, and some might say the government's Thomas Cromwell, Larry Summers.

From the Horse's Mouth: Lawrence Summers On Market Manipulation In Times of Crisis

The fourth position, which Summers calls pragmatic, in his own words, “is the one embraced implicitly, if not explicitly by policymakers in most major economies. It holds that central banks must always do whatever is necessary to preserve the integrity of the financial system regardless of whether those who receive support are solvent or can safely pay a penalty rate. This position concedes that some institutions may become too large to fail. While lender-of-last-resort insurance, like any other type of insurance, will have moral hazard effects, I argue that these may be small when contrasted with the benefits of protecting the real economy from financial disturbances”
This is the very essence of the Rubin doctrine. Pragmatic circumvention of the Constitution and the laws of the land by means of market manipulation and government subsidies cloaked in secrecy, misrepresentation, and a public relations campaign.

In addition to this paper, Mr. Summers is also the author of a paper Gibson's Paradox which seems to prescribe the manipulation the price of key commodities including gold in order to influence longer term interest rates. Indeed, we hear that in some recent FOIA act returns there were refusals to disclose papers from the Fed purporting to set out the 'new gold policy of the US' with many charts and pages of text. Indeed, what is the real policy of the US? I thought it was to allow it to sit, unaudited, in Fort Knox and the various Reserve Banks, while leasing it out to some extent.

And while as Obama's current Economic Advisor is talking a good game, the facts seem to indicate that the US is still pursuing a policy of managed perceptions, accounting deceptions, and old fashioned insider dealing and other forms of corruption that always accompany government, but reach a feverish pitch in times of crisis. It is the establishment's form of looting.

As we can easily see, this policy has spawned a series of tremendous financial bubbles in tech, and housing, and now credit, and corporate debt, and the dollar itself, which will eventually veer completely out of control into the improbability of hyperinflation. Inflicting pain on the common taxpayers for the transfressions of the financiers is beyond moral hazard.

The Banks must be restrained, the financial system reformed, and the economy brought back into balance, before there can be any sustained recovery.

Guardian UK
Ireland Poised for New Bank Bailout

By Jill Treanor
29 March 2010 18.58 BST

Irish taxpayers face pouring billions more euros into their troubled banking sector on what is being dubbed "bailout Tuesday".

The government is expected to take bigger stakes in Allied Irish Banks and Bank of Ireland as the property lending spree that took place before the 2007 credit crunch continues to knock holes in their battered balance sheets.

But while the Irish taxpayer faces taking on a greater burden from the banking sector – perhaps as much as €16bn (£14bn) – the US began to prepare to sell off its 7.7bn shares in Citigroup, into which the authorities pumped $24bn of cash during the 2008 banking crisis. Those 7.7bn shares were worth $32bn last night - implying a profit for the US treasury if the share price can withstand the sale of such a huge amount of shares.

In Ireland, though, the crisis is yet to abate as the economy weakens and the government follows through on an austerity budget that has imposed cuts in public sector pay after €11bn was injected into the banks.

Shares in Allied Irish Banks closed down 19% in Dublin at €1.37, ahead of announcements when the National Asset Management Agency, a toxic loan body, is due to provide details on the price for taking on the bad loans. Financial regulators will also set out the size of the capital cushions the banks will have to hold in preparation for future losses.

The Irish government took control of Anglo Irish Bank last year and holds stakes of 16% in Bank of Ireland, which runs the Post Office bank in the UK, and 25% of Allied Irish.

Local speculation is focused on the government stake rising to more than 70% in Allied Irish and more than 40% in Bank of Ireland while building societies EBS and Irish Nationwide may also need taxpayer involvement as the authorities continue to tackle the losses caused by bad lending.