02 July 2012

John C. Williams: The Federal Reserve's Brand of Modern Monetary Theory



I will comment more on this later but I thought it was interesting and probably quite important for future reference.

One point of contention for me has been this whole issue of the Fed paying interest on excess reserves, essentially incenting banks, if the rate is high enough, to cause banks to hoard reserves at the Fed rather than lend the money out to the real economy.

This point was argued quite vociferously some years ago during the first quantitative easing.  We were told by the New York Fed, as I recall, that this was not the case, and that the payment of interest on excess reserves was only a means for the Fed to manage rates at the zero bound, and did not affect the levels of reserves which are only an accounting identity, after all.

Williams seems to contradict this now.  But I have to give it an extra careful reading in this case.

However, some might look at his data and his reasoning and conclude that while the Fed's policies have been doing quite a bit to provide solvency to the banking system, it has not done well by the real economy.  The GDP and employment numbers seem to bear this out.

One might conclude that reducing the interest paid on reserves would cause the banks to make more loans to the real economy.  And yet not so long ago the NY Fed and several of their economists also argued against what seems like common sense that this was not the case, not at all.

So it might be important to pin the Fed down a bit on this now.  Their thinking could be evolving, or it might just be dissembling to suit the changing situation.   One might gather from what Mr. Williams is saying about rewriting established theory that they don't quite know what it is that they are doing, but instead are feeling their way along in uncharted waters.

This of course widens the risk of a policy error enormously.  Greenspan's Fed was replete with policy errors, but of course he was the gure, the infallible one.  And we should trust these same economists who lionized him now for what reason?

From my own perspective the Fed has spun what they are doing in so many different ways at different times that it is difficult to take what they are saying here at face value.

And that is another feature of the credibility trap.

I believe this speech by John C. Williams is significant, in the manner of Bernanke's famous printing press speech.  Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn't Happen Here. 

Let's give it a careful read and see if it provides any additional clues to what they are thinking, and what they might do next.

San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank
Monetary Policy, Money, and Inflation
John C. Williams, President and CEO
2 July 2012

Good morning. I’m very pleased to be in such eminent company, especially that of my former advisor at Stanford, John Taylor. And I’ll begin my presentation with a reference to another pathbreaking monetary theorist. Milton Friedman famously said, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.” 1
We are currently engaged in a test of this proposition. Over the past four years, the Federal Reserve has more than tripled the monetary base, a key determinant of money supply.   Some commentators have sounded an alarm that this massive expansion of the monetary base will inexorably lead to high inflation, à la Friedman.

Despite these dire predictions, inflation in the United States has been the dog that didn’t bark. As Figure 1 shows, it has averaged less than 2 percent over the past four years. (Past performance is not an indicator of future success - Jesse)  What’s more, as the figure also shows, surveys of inflation expectations indicate that low inflation is anticipated for at least the next ten years.  (Did they anticipate the financial collapse? - Jesse)

In my remarks today, I will try to reconcile monetary theory with the recent performance of inflation. In my view, recent developments make a compelling case that traditional textbook views of the connections between monetary policy, money, and inflation are outdated and need to be revised. As always, my remarks represent my own views and not necessarily those of others in the Federal Reserve System.

I’ll start with two definitions. The monetary base is the sum of U.S. currency in circulation and bank reserves held at the Federal Reserve. Figure 2 shows the key components of the monetary base since 2007. Up until late 2008, it consisted mostly of currency, with a small amount of bank reserves held mostly to meet regulatory requirements. Since then, the monetary base has risen dramatically, primarily because of a $1.5 trillion increase in bank reserves. The money stock is a related concept. It is the total quantity of account balances at banks and other financial institutions that can easily be accessed to make payments. A standard measure of the money stock is M2, which includes currency, and certain deposit and money market accounts.

Here I should make an important point about something that often confuses the public. The worry is not that the Fed is literally printing too much currency. 2 The quantity of currency in circulation is entirely determined by demand from people and businesses. It’s not an independent decision of monetary policy and, on its own, it has no implications for inflation. (It is the money stock that concerns people, not the adjusted monetary base per se - Jesse)

The Federal Reserve meets demand for currency elastically. If people want to hold more of it, we freely exchange reserves for currency. If people want less, then we exchange it back. Of course, currency doesn’t pay interest. People hold it as a low-cost medium of exchange and a safe store of value. In fact, over the past four years, U.S. currency holdings have risen about 35 percent. This reflects low interest rates, which reduce the opportunity cost of holding currency. It’s also due to worries about the economy and the health of the banking system, both here and abroad. In fact, nearly two-thirds of U.S. currency is held outside our borders. U.S. currency is widely seen as a safe haven. When a country is going through economic or political turmoil, people tend to convert some of their financial assets to U.S. currency. Such increased demand for U.S. currency is taking place in Europe today.

For monetary policy, the relevant metric is bank reserves. The Federal Reserve controls the quantity of bank reserves as it implements monetary policy. To keep things simple, I’ll start with what happens when the Fed doesn’t pay interest on reserves, which was the case until late 2008. I’ll return to the issue of interest on reserves toward the end of my talk.

Before interest on reserves, the opportunity cost for holding noninterest-bearing bank reserves was the nominal short-term interest rate, such as the federal funds rate. Demand for reserves is downward sloping. That is, when the federal funds rate is low, the reserves banks want to hold increases. Conventional monetary policy works by adjusting the amount of reserves so that the federal funds rate equals a target level at which supply and demand for reserves are in equilibrium. It is implemented by trading noninterest-bearing reserves for interest-bearing securities, typically short-term Treasury bills.

Normally, banks have a strong incentive to put reserves to work by lending them out. If a bank were suddenly to find itself with a million dollars in excess reserves in its account, it would quickly try to find a creditworthy borrower and earn a return. If the banking system as a whole found itself with excess reserves, then the system would increase the availability of credit in the economy, drive private-sector borrowing rates lower, and spur economic activity. Precisely this reasoning lies behind the classical monetary theories of multiple deposit creation and the money multiplier, which hold that an increase in the monetary base should lead to a proportional rise in the money stock.

Moreover, if the economy were operating at its potential, then if the banking system held excess reserves, too much “money” would chase too few goods, leading to higher inflation. Friedman’s maxim would be confirmed. Here’s the conundrum then: How could the Fed have tripled the monetary base since 2008 without the money stock ballooning, triggering big jumps in spending and inflation? What’s wrong with our tried-and-true theory?

A critical explanation is that banks would rather hold reserves safely at the Fed instead of lending them out in a struggling economy loaded with risk. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is low, while the risks in lending or investing in other assets seem high. Thus, at near-zero rates, demand for reserves can be extremely elastic. The same logic holds for households and businesses. Given the weak economy and heightened uncertainty, they are hoarding cash instead of spending it. In a nutshell, the money multiplier has broken down. 4

The numbers tell the story. Despite a 200 percent increase in the monetary base, measures of the money supply have grown only moderately. For example, M2 has increased only 28 percent over the past four years. 5  Figure 3 shows that the money multiplier—as measured by the ratio of M2 to the monetary base—plummeted in late 2008 and has not recovered since. Nominal spending has been even less responsive, increasing a mere 8 percent over the past four years. As a result, the ratio of nominal gross domestic product, which measures the total amount spent in the economy, to the monetary base fell even more precipitously, as the figure shows. This ratio also has not recovered, illustrating how profoundly the linkage between the monetary base and the economy has broken.

A natural question is, if those reserves aren’t circulating, why did the Fed boost them so dramatically in the first place? The most important reason has been a deliberate move to support financial markets and stimulate the economy.  By mid-December 2008, the Fed had lowered the federal funds rate essentially to zero. Yet the economy was still contracting very rapidly. Standard rules of thumb and a range of model simulations recommended setting the federal funds rate below zero starting in late 2008 or early 2009, something that was impossible to do. 6  
Instead, the Fed provided additional stimulus by purchasing longer-term securities, paid for by creating bank reserves. These purchases increased the demand for longer-term Treasuries and similar securities, which pushed up the prices of these assets, and thereby reduced longer-term interest rates. In turn, lower interest rates have improved financial conditions and helped stimulate real economic activity.

The important point is that the additional stimulus to the economy from our asset purchases is primarily a result of lower interest rates, rather than a textbook process of reserve creation, leading to an increased money supply. It is through its effects on interest rates and other financial conditions that monetary policy affects the economy.

But, once the economy improves sufficiently, won’t banks start lending more actively, causing the historical money multiplier to reassert itself? And can’t the resulting huge increase in the money supply overheat the economy, leading to higher inflation? The answer to these questions is no, and the reason is a profound, but largely unappreciated change in the inner workings of monetary policy. 
The change is that the Fed now pays interest on reserves. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is now the difference between the federal funds rate and the interest rate on reserves. The Fed will likely raise the interest rate on reserves as it raises the target federal funds rate. 8 Therefore, for banks, reserves at the Fed are close substitutes for Treasury bills in terms of return and safety. A Fed exchange of bank reserves that pay interest for a T-bill that carries a very similar interest rate has virtually no effect on the economy. Instead, what matters for the economy is the level of interest rates, which are affected by monetary policy.

This means that the historical relationships between the amount of reserves, the money supply, and the economy are unlikely to hold in the future. If banks are happy to hold excess reserves as an interest-bearing asset, then the marginal money multiplier on those reserves can be close to zero. As a result, in a world where the Fed pays interest on bank reserves, traditional theories that tell of a mechanical link between reserves, money supply, and, ultimately, inflation are no longer valid. In particular, the world changes if the Fed is willing to pay a high enough interest rate on reserves. In that case, the quantity of reserves held by U.S. banks could be extremely large and have only small effects on, say, the money stock, bank lending, or inflation.

As I noted earlier, inflation and inflation expectations have been low for the past four years, despite the huge increase in the monetary base. Of course, if the economy improved markedly, inflationary pressures could build. Under such circumstances, the Federal Reserve would need to remove monetary accommodation to keep the economy from overheating and excessive inflation from emerging. It can do this in two ways: first, by raising the interest rate paid on reserves along with the target federal funds rate; and, second, by reducing its holdings of longer-term securities, which would reverse the effects of the asset purchase programs on interest rates.

In thinking of exit strategy, the nature of the monetary policy problem the Fed will face is no different than in past recoveries when the Fed needed to “take away the punch bowl.” Of course, getting the timing just right to engineer a soft landing with low inflation is always difficult. This time, it will be especially challenging, given the extraordinary depth and duration of the recession and recovery. The Federal Reserve is prepared to meet this challenge when that time comes. Thank you.

End Notes
1. Friedman (1970), p. 24.
2. Technically, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing prints paper currency. The Federal Reserve is responsible for processing and distributing currency to the banking system. The Federal Reserve also distributes coins, which are distinct from paper currency, to the banking system, but the amount of coins in circulation is comparatively small.
3. See Goldberg (2010).
4. For a discussion of this, see Williams (2011a).
5. Similarly, an alternative measure of the money stock, MZM, increased 26 percent over the past four years.
6. See Chung et al. (2011) and Rudebusch (2010).
7. See Williams (2011b) for details.
8. For details on the Fed’s planned exit strategy, see the minutes for the June 2011 FOMC meeting (Board of Governors 2011).





SP 500 and NDX Futures Daily Charts


Weaker than expected economic numbers put a damper on the US equity markets, but the usual late day rally brought the numbers back into the green.

There is a national holiday in the States on Wednesday.

There is intraday commentary on the quality of these markets.



 

Why Do Bankers' Seem to be Uniquely Immune to Punishment? - Silver Exchange Holiday



"The global economy has yet to overcome the legacies of the financial crisis to achieve balanced, self-sustaining growth. In different ways, vicious cycles are hindering the transition for both the advanced and emerging market economies...

Markets do not perceive the crisis to be over. Concerns about the banking sector’s vulnerability continue to depress equity valuations and raise spreads in debt markets. Official support has provided only a partial reprieve."

Bank for International Settlements, 82nd Annual Report, 24 June 2012

It is all about the credibility trap. Thank you very much.
A credibilty trap is a situation where the regulatory, political and informational functions of a society have been thoroughly taken in by a corrupting influence and a fraud so that one cannot even begin to discuss the situation honestly without implicating, at least incidentally, a broad swath of the power structure and the status quo who at least tolerated it, if not profited directly from it. Who will reform the reformers?

It is difficult to discuss a particular problem in any sort of specifics without at least reviewing some of the facts and causes in a open manner. But when the problem involves a fraud, that discussion can become rather difficult if those leading the discussion are too close to the situation.

So we have these myths about vaporizing money, and magical thinking about how things just happen without any human intelligence or activity behind them. It just seemed to have happened as a series of unfortunate events. Who could have known?

But on a larger note, we are all to blame aren't we? So let's just move on.

In thinking about this manipulation issue further, and the events of the past few weeks, it would not surprise me overmuch if some day in the not too distant future we wake up to the news that the CFTC, the SEC, the Justice Department, the FSA, and the Banks have agreed to a settlement in some major market, perhaps the metals market, as a result of an official investigation. There will be record fines, and the regulators will claim victory.

The existing contracts for the related asset or assets, on the exchanges and in unallocated and perhaps even 'allocated' accounts, and perhaps even a big ETF, will all be force settled for a pre-determined price in dollars, and that the banks will agree not to manipulate the markets anymore, without admitting any guilt.

And of course after a one or two day holiday, the price of that underlying asset, perhaps bullion, will be revalued significantly higher.  And there will be definite winners and losers because of this forced repricing in resolving this 'problem.'

The assets will not be overtly confiscated, so much as paper claims and storage receipts dismissed, and the system 'reset.' But word may have leaked out, and ownership of assets will have passed to informed hands prior to the event.

No, that could not happen, right? Well, it is pretty much what happened in the case of MF Global, except this would be on a larger scale.

Salon
Bankers constantly lying, defrauding; most still not in jail
By Alex Pareene
2 July 2012

Barclays, JPMorgan and the rest of the megabanks reach new heights in malfeasance, suffer few consequences

Has there ever been a better time to be a disastrously inept banker? Well, probably — over the course of human civilization it’s almost always been a pretty good time to be a banker — but today’s finance titans seem uniquely immune to punishment of any sort.

Remember how JPMorgan Chase accidentally lost $2 billion in a “hedge”-slash-huge stupid bet placed by a guy in the Chief Investment Office? Funny story, it will actually end up being closer to $6 billion, or maybe like $9 billion — who can be sure, math is pretty complicated, it’s all imaginary money anyway — as the bank attempts to extricate itself from the insanely complex losing trade made by the office that is supposed to manage the bank’s risk.

Funnier story: Remember when Mr. Jamie Dimon, the head of JPMorgan Chase and the World’s Sagest Banker, was asked to sit before the Senate Banking Committee and be repeatedly complimented and praised? And remember how he kept mentioning “claw-backs,” the weird bank term for taking bonuses away from people who screw up? Turns out Ina Drew, the former head of the Chief Investment Office — the one who lost somewhere between more money than you’ll ever see in your entire life and more money than God has ever seen in His entire life — will not have any of her money clawed back...

Read the rest here.