Deflation, Hyperinflation, Stagflation, and Where We Are Going

 

This is a repost of a column from four years ago almost to the day.

This is where I make the case most explicitly for the stagflation forecast I made in 2005.

Although I add one parenthetical note and some underlining for emphasis, otherwise I did not have to change a word.  I could have rewritten a few things a little more smoothly but at this point why bother.

I believe that things are playing out pretty much as I had thought with a few notable exceptions on the particulars.    The 'top down' approach to monetary stimulus favored by the Fed and their Banks and their politicians is fostering more inequality and slack aggregate demand while inflating select asset prices, a type of stagflation.  The 'inflation' component of that has not yet set in yet generally, but is certainly visible to anyone who uses incidental things like healthcare, higher education, and food. 

I think that the same dynamic is playing out in Europe and the UK.

It will end involuntarily in a social dislocation, or by a voluntary reform.  Since the oligarchs have apparently not yet been satisfied in their acquisition and looting, they believe that they can keep pushing the envelope for now.

One new area of thought for me now is how China and Russia and a few of their friends will attempt to implement a new regional currency and a global reserve currency with some inclusion or reference to gold, and perhaps silver.  That they are leaning into this area is to be found in their own words and actions.  

What I am struggling with is how they might do this without exposing themselves to currency manipulation and rigging, which is probably a lot easier to accept as a given now than it was in 2011, although it was certainly occurring before all these market rigging scandals broke.   I don't think a market was left untouched.

I suspect it will center around the terms for the exchange and the valuation or peg.  A misstep will open them to the predations of the global hedge funds and the Banks, and the status quo centered on the Dollar. 

One of the more interesting facets of this will be how this new monetary group deals with the bucket shops on the Hudson, that great price setting mechanism without a firm tie to reality.  I believe that recent developments are suggesting that they will make those markets as they are less relevant to the real world, which is precisely both their strength and their weakness. 

Their strength is that they may set price without the necessary reference to real world market supply and demand for surprisingly protracted periods of time.  And this is also their weakness, because with the right push in the right direction it will not take much to displace them since they do not have their feet firmly planted on anything substantial. 

The trick to be to throw them over without undue collateral damage to the real economy, a task that is not without some significant efforts.  If only the Banks would show the same forethought and courtesy when triggering their own financial crises.

16 April 2011

A Review on Where We Stand with Regard to Deflation, Hyperinflation and Stagflation

Well, the good news for everyone is that nothing seems inevitable here, that there is almost always a choice, but it is often wrapped up in a nice looking rationale, with all the compulsion of a necessity, for the good of the people.  Us versus them in a battle for survival and all that. 

And clever leaders on the extremes provide the 'them' to be dehumanized and objectified.  The leftist wishes to murder the bankers, and the fascist the lower classes and outsiders.  The extremes of both end up making life miserable for almost everybody except for a privileged few.

And so I reiterate that in a purely fiat currency, the money supply is indeed fiat, by command.

People like to make arguments about this or that, about how so and so has proved that the Fed does not or cannot do this or that, that banks really create money only by borrowing, that borrowing must precede this or that.

It's mostly based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what money is all about, with a laser beam focus on hair-splitting technical definitions and loquacious arguments more confusing than illuminating, lost in details.  In a simple word, rubbish.

Absent some external standard or compulsion, the only limiting factor on the creation of a fiat currency is the value at exchange of the issuers bonds and notes, and currency which is nothing more than a note of zero duration without coupon.

If I had control of the Fed, unless someone stopped me, I could deliver to you hyperinflation or deflation without all that much difficulty from a technical standpoint. The policy reaction of those who might be in a position to fire or lynch me is another matter.  The Fed not only has the power to influence money creation in the private banking system.  It has the ability to expand its balance sheet and take on existing debt of almost any type at will and at any price it chooses.

But that is the case as long as the Fed has at least one willing partner in the primary dealers, and the Treasury is in agreement. And even that requirement for a primary dealer is not all that much of an issue given the amounts of existing sovereign and private debts of which the Fed might avail itself for the forseeable future.

So at the end of the day, a thinking deflationist is almost reduced to the argument that 'the authorities will not allow it' or 'will choose deflation rather than inflation'  And this is technically correct. However, let us consider my earlier statement about those who might fire or lynch one for making a highly unpopular choice.

It is economic suicide for a net debtor to willingly engage in deflation when they have other options at their disposal, and especially when those decisions involve people outside the system.

That is not to say that the deciders could not opt for economic suicide, but the people designated to suffer and die for that choice and cause might not take kindly to it. Deflation favors the creditors significantly, and those creditors tend to be a minority of domestic elites and foreign entities.   Both the extremes, hyperinflation and deflation, are choices best implemented in autocratic governments.

There are those who observe that Franklin Roosevelt 'saved capitalism' by his actions in the 1930's and I believe they are correct. If one considers the various other outcomes in large developed nations to the Great Depression, whether it be Italy, Germany, Russia, or Spain, the US came out of it fairly intact politically. People conveniently overlook the undercurrent of insurrection and violence that was festering amongst the suffering multitudes, and the growth of domestic fascist and communist organizations.  There were several plots to overthrow the elected government by military means, although the history books tend to overlook them.

So it is really about making the best choice amongst bad choices. This is why governments choose to devalue their currency, either with quantitative easing, or explicitly against some external standard as the US did in 1933. Because when the debt is unpayable, it must be liquidated, and the pain will be distributed in a way that best preserves the status quo.

Hyperinflation and a protracted deflation are both very destructive choices. So therefore no rational government will choose either option.

They *could* have those choices imposed upon them, either by military force, political force, or by economic force. Economic force is almost always the cause of hyperinflation.

So you can see why a 'managed inflation' is the most likely outcome at least in the US. The mechanism has been in place and performing this function for the last 100 years.

The problem or twist this time around comes when the monetary stimulus does not increase jobs and the median wages, because of some inherent and unreformed tendency in the economy to focus money creation and its benefits to a narrow portion of the populace. The result of this is stagflation which although not indefinitely sustainable can be maintained for decades. 

Most third world republics are like this.  A vibrant and resilient middle class is sine qua non for a successful democratic republic, and this has strong implications for the median wage.  The benefits and the risks of growth and productivity must be spread widely amongst the participants.  Oligarchies tend to spread only the risks, keeping most of the benefits to themselves.

This is essentially the reasoning that occurred to me when I looked at the US economy and monetary system in the year 2000.

The one point I remain a little unclear on is how 'hard' the law is regarding the direct monetization of debt issued by the Treasury. I am not an attorney, but I am informed by those familiary with federal statutes that this is a gray area in the existing law but currently prohibited.  But it is easily overcome as I said with the inclusion of one or two amiable primary dealers who will allow the debt issued by Treasury to 'pass through' their hands in the market, on its way to the Fed at a subsidized rate.  For this reason, and for purposes of policy matters, and occasional economic warfare, countries may tolerate TBTF financial institutions with whom they have 'an understanding.' 

I have also come to the conclusion that no one knows the future with any certainty, so we must rely probability and risk management to guide our actions.

So really absent new data the argument is pointless, a matter of uninformed opinions. The dollar will continue to depreciate, (but the DX Index will be highly misleading - Jesse) and gold and silver and harder currencies appreciate (Well that one has gone sideways for now in this metals bear market - Jesse), until the fundamental situation changes and the US economic system is reformed.

I think there are other probable outcomes that involve world government and a currency war, and this also is playing out pretty much as I expected.  Fiat currency can take on the characteristics of a Ponzi scheme, whose survival is only possible by continuing growth until all resistance is overcome.

This is the conclusion I came to in 2000. I admit I was surprised by the Fed's willingness to create a massive housing bubble, and the willingness of the US government to whore out the middle class in their deals with mercantilist nations; their hypocrisy knows no bounds.

So that is the basis of much of my thinking and I wanted to take a moment to share it with you in a compact, highly condensed format.

I remain a little unsettled on the issue of hyperinflation, because there is the possibility that a large bloc of countries could join together to repudiate the dollar. Since so much dollar debt is held in these foreign hands, that is the kind of exogenous force that could trigger a bout of what might be termed hyperinflation. I don't see the dollar going to zero in this, but rather the dollar having a couple of zeros knocked off it, with a new dollar being issued. I have read John Williams case for hyperinflation several times now, and see nothing more compelling in it.

Indeed I think the reissue of the dollar with a few zeros gone is inevitable. It is the timing of that event that is problematic. It could be one year, or it could be fifty years. There is a big difference there for your investment strategy.

“One day you will go the ATM and the dollars will be Blue---not Green ---and you will get a few less than you expected.”

And yes, the government could just get medieval on your asses, and seize all the gold and silver, force you to take the value of the dollar at whatever they say it should be.  (As the MMT crowd has suggested - Jesse)   They could also seize all the farm land, all the means of production, and tell certain groups of people to get on freight trains for resettlement in Nevada. I think we can stipulate that governments can do this, and the people can accept it to varying degrees. If you wish to make this the dominant assumption in your planning then by all means.

For those who simply say "I disagree" or "Go read so and so he has proved this or that" I say that people believe lots of things, and can find data selectively to support almost any outcome they prefer,  But the market is the arbiter here, and the verdict so far is beyond all question. The Fed is doing exactly what they said they would do, so there should be no surprises. And they have more in their bag of tricks.

If there is new data I would certainly adjust my thinking but absent that I now consider this settled to my satisfaction, and wish to turn instead to more thinking on what changes need to occur to prevent the system breaking down, and restoring it to some semblance of reasonable functionality.

The Great Fallacy at the Heart of Modern Monetary Theory

As with all theories that miss the mark, Modern Monetary Theory presents some insights into the matter of course, but seems to hinge on one or two key assumptions that are more matters of assertion than historical or even practical experience. It is founded not so much an economic theory, but on a belief without a firm foundation.

This paragraph taken from Yves Smith's recent article about MMT

"The sovereign government cannot become insolvent in its own currency; it can always make all payments as they come due in its own currency because it is the ISSUER of the currency, not simply the USER (as a household or private business is).

This issuing capacity means that the government does not face the same kinds of constraints as a private sector user of money, which in turn exposes the fallacy of the household analogy, so beloved in popular economics discourse."

The finances of a sovereign are most assuredly NOT like those of a household. And those of a Bank are not like a household either.

In several ways they can be the inverse of a household in their motivations. For example, when household spending is slack because of an economic shock, the government may wish to engage in more spending to counteract this.  Some think it is the role of government to keep the economy out of what is called a liquidity trap or as I understand it a feedback loop of cutbacks that greatly exacerbate the problem of slack demand.

This is one of the points of having a government, that is, to do things that the individual cannot do well alone, no matter how powerful they may think that they are, and to protect the rights of the many from those who are more powerful, both foreign and domestic.

But here is the matter of disputation, emphasis in caps theirs, in italics mine. "The sovereign government cannot become insolvent in its own currency; it can always make all payments as they come due in its own currency because it is the ISSUER of the currency, not simply the USER."

Do you see what is missing here, and more importantly, what is implied?

What is missing is the acknowledgement that the users of a currency, call them 'the market,' can and will and have quite often throughout history questioned the valuation of a currency, and often to the point of practical worthlessness, if certain actions are taken by the sovereign in creating their currency.

 

This speaks to a principle that I spelled out some time ago, that the practical limit on a sovereign government in printing money is the willingness of the market to accept it at a certain value. And this applies to any sovereign, more readily perhaps if they are smaller and weaker, but always given time nonetheless.

If Russia, for example, were to merely start printing more rubles and set a target valuation for them, they could enforce this internally. And in fact, many sovereigns have done so throughout history. I remember visiting Moscow shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, and marveling at the disconnect between the official stated valuations and the actions of the ordinary people in seeking alternatives like the US Dollar, gold, diamonds, and even Western style toilet paper, a more useful sort of paper than the ruble.

Technically Russia could not become insolvent in rubles, because they could always print more of them to pay all their debts, make purchases, and salary payments. The great caveat in this is that Russia had to maintain a measure of control and enforcement to make that principle 'stick.'

And this is what probably makes MMT inadvertently statist, and dangerous. That is because this belief only works within a domain in which the state exercises complete control over valuation.

In the case of the US dollar as a global reserve currency, if this theory is applied, and one of my great fears is that it will be, then there is an inherent need for the Dollar Cartel to continuing expanding their span of control over all of the producing and purchasing world, in order to enforce this belief.

I am sorry to have to disagree with people whom I like and enjoy reading, but as you can see I think there is an important point of disagreement here. And given the number of sovereigns who have defaulted, causing significant pain in their people and in the lives of others, it is not a trivial thing.

I suppose that there are many other things in MMT that are correct, as it seems to be quite the usual thing in many ways, but there is an important exception in the assertion that the state has no limit to its power to set value, because that is exactly what is implied in the canard that a sovereign cannot default in its own currency. Technically it cannot because it can always print more than enough pay off debts and make more purchases. But it can create money in such a way as to break the confidence of the market, and call its valuation into question. And this is a de facto default.

What happens when the people refuse to accept it at their stated value?  What happens to people who do not agree that the State can do no wrong?  Because if the State can never be at fault in creating and spending money, that makes it a problem and a source of great mischief.

 

In the historical examples the government always resorts to force of some sort in varying degrees, and official exchange rates, and other actions not only on their own people but on their neighboring sovereigns who refuse to submit to the valuation of a currency by official diktat.

It is a dangerous statement that might be remedied by an acknowledgement that there are practical limitations on the power of the State in creating money, and that it is related to the willing acceptance and confidence of the people in its fairness and justice, and especially people who are not part of that same economic sphere of influence.   And if the adherents of a belief cannot agree with this, then it calls into question all the other aspects of a belief that is based on such an absurdity a priori principle. 

 

So it was with the 'efficient market hypothesis,' which believed that people acting in a group are naturally good and rational, and therefore needed little or no regulation.  It was widely accepted in economic circles, and those who did not accept it were dismissed as unsophisticated.  And it did not matter that this assumption was shown to be blatantly incorrect to anyone who is familiar with the reality of the marketplace, or has ever driven on a modern high speed motorway.

People on the whole are not naturally rational, good, and self-regulating to a degree sufficient to permit with the dispensation of the rule of law.  If only this were true!  And a persistent minority among them are so much not inclined to the good as to be sociopaths and inclined to be criminals.

And unfortunately politicians who act for the State are not angelically good and beneficent either. But this is what is implied in creating a system that allows for their acquiring and exercising almost unlimited power that is beyond question, in money or in anything else, but in particular something as important as the general means of exchange and valuation.

Gold Daily and Silver Weekly Charts - O Brave New World

Oh, wonder! How many goodly creatures are there here!
How beauteous mankind is! O brave new world,
That has such people in ’t!

William Shakespeare, The Tempest

The capping of gold and silver at these levels continues.

This being an inactive month for the metals, the CME offers even less insight as to what is going on in the real world than it normally does.

Three futures traders have filed a lawsuit alleging a conspiracy of price rigging and deception at the CME. 

The LBMA has decided to give up the silver fix, for a lack of interest in a thoroughly corrupted system of price discovery. Principled resignation is more of a British tradition; the Yanks will hang on, stubbornly to their lies, until the bitter end.   So I don't expect to see any reforms on the CME until it is forced into a de facto default and a conversion to pure paper.

I do not expect to see a real hyperinflation, or a 'proper bankruptcy' in the US.   On this the MMT crowd is most likely correct, at least technically, although all things are possible since the issue is one of human choice, and these jokers are certainly all too human in the worst sense.  If your debt is in dollars, and you can pay it in dollars, and you cant print dollars at will, the internal logic is sound.  But certainly circular and self-referential, and quite likely divergent from practicality.

There will likely be some sort of default on the debt, or a significant change in the system.  But technically it will not be a bankruptcy.   Again, more likely a serious bout of stagflation supported by increasing levels of fraud and force.

When the use of force starts to breaks down, if in fact it does, we will either see a managed devaluation, a consolidation, or a change in management.  We are in a long running Ponzi scheme of a fiat currency that must continue to keep expanding, or begin to collapse.

There is a method in the madness of Washington, and their insatiable desire for more.  But is has little or nothing to do with the public welfare or the health of the republic.  This is the 'me generation' and their watchword is greed. 

We may see Britain falter first.  Or a greater portion of Europe.  Self-love is throwing your own people and then your friends under the bus first, when your schemes begin to fall apart, because they are closest to hand.

We come in peace.

Have a pleasant evening.

Gold Premiums in Vietnam Hit $217 Over Spot In Heavy Demand

I think you have had to experience a collapsing currency first hand in order to truly appreciate the fundamentals of monetary value, and how these things can take on what seems like a force of nature.

I was doing business in Moscow during the 1990's, and saw the slow motion collapse of the rouble. Or at least it seemed like a slow motion collapse at first, until it gained quite a bit of momentum despite the measures the State took to maintain their 'official rates.'

Russia had a sovereign currency, right?  And so does Vietnam, and many of the other countries that experienced extraordinary currency depreciation, otherwise known as monetary inflation, since WW II.  Perhaps they just needed some better monetary theorists, or official enforcers with hairier knuckles. Their financial elite seems to have had plenty of false bravado.

But then again, they were not us. We are different. We are unique. We are the masters of all that we survey and purvey, the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals.  London and New York are where the elite meet to eat.

Here is what is happening with gold prices in southeast Asia now.  Ding dong.

This from Goldcore:

The Vietnamese Central Bank sold another 25,700 taels (1 tael = 37.5 grams or 1.2 troy ounces) at a gold bar auction on Friday in order to try and satiate the massive public demand for gold in Vietnam.

The Central Bank hopes that the sale of gold into the market will reduce the very high premiums paid by gold buyers in Vietnam, the largest buyer of gold in Southeast Asia after Thailand and one of the largest physical buyers of gold per capita in the world.

Vietnamese people hold gold as a store of wealth for protection against war, inflation and currency depreciation. In recent months, the bursting of bubbles in the stock market (see chart) and property market and the continuing devaluation of the dong has led to record demand in Vietnam and a surging premium over the spot price of gold.

Today, the premium was close to 5.5 million dong which is the equivalent of a very high premium of $217 per ounce over spot.

Modern Money: A Study In Confidence and Crisis

"Those who think there is little risk of a levy being imposed on other periphery members are missing the point. The seeds of doubt have been planted. As a saver facing zero yields on deposits and a potential haircut, why keep your savings in a bank? Sure it is convenient for electronic transactions, but individuals can adapt easily. As one of my more amusing colleagues put it, 'mattresses now hold a 10 per cent premium.'"

Ben Davies, Cyprus, Oh the Irony!


"Making small-scale savers pay is extremely dangerous. It will shake the trust of depositors across the Continent. Europe's citizens now have to fear for their money...

The Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese may not run to the banks today or tomorrow, but as soon as the crisis intensifies in a euro-zone country, the bank customers will remember Cyprus. They will withdraw their money and, by doing so, intensify the crisis."

Peter Bofinger, 'Europe's Citizens Now Have to Fear for Their Money,'  Der Spiegel, 18 March 2013

Modern money is a game of confidence, an arrangement based wholly on the perception of value founded in counterparty risk.

This sounds easy enough, but what is surprising is how few people really understand it. This is due to the illusion of the familiar.

We are so accustomed to using money in our daily lives that we give little thought to what it really is.  It seems solid, immutable, and lasting.  'As sound as a dollar.'

We forget that money, like much of society, is a man-made, artificial construction based on a series of agreements. Sometimes those agreements are based on implied force, such as punishment for breaking the laws. But by and large the enforcement is not equipped to deal with all but the outliers to a general compliance with the law. This is, of course, the basis of the power of civil disobedience, and why autocracies are so sensitive to any mass demonstrations of dissent.

The President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, recently elected from the conservative DISY party, blanched at the original bailout deal offered by the troika, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, to assess a levy only on the non-guaranteed deposits in the troubled Greek banks, which are those deposits in excess of €100,000.

He proposed instead to limit the levy on large deposits to 9.9%, and to make up the difference by violating what had been the general guarantee in Europe by assessing a lesser amount, of about 6.7%, on the 'guaranteed deposits' of less than €100,000 by small savers.  That the troika did not blanch at the prospect of violating what had been a generally established EU policy to ensure bank stability speaks volumes about their cravenness.

The arrangement was made all the more clever by promising equity in the (worthless) banks in return for the levy, and perhaps even a guarantee of return based on 'future natural gas discoveries' which seem to be of much less value to the EU and the government.

This was one of their conditions for a €10 billion loan to the government under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The other involved the usual austerity measures, which are a favorite of the International Monetary Fund.

The austerity proposal had been revealed last November and include cuts in civil service salaries, social benefits, allowances and pensions and increases in VAT, tobacco, alcohol and fuel taxes, taxes on lottery winnings, property, and higher public health care charges.

The troika did not care about the details of the levy as long as the 'bail in' by depositor funds occurred. This was a sacrifice of a general European principle and was a serious policy error.

When this 'levy' on bank deposits was revealed over the weekend during a bank holiday, because it had to be submitted to a vote by the Cypriot Parliament, there was a general revulsion expressed amongst the markets and the people of Cyprus at such blatant misuse of the money power.

Monetary inflation, such as had been used in the US and UK, is more often used because so few people see their loss as blatantly as when the government simply confiscates 10 percent of their wealth on deposit. It is much easier done in smaller amounts, over longer periods of time. But one needs to have their own currency to do it.  These days monetary policy and inflation is merely the continuation of bank fraud and plunder by other means.

By the way, this is why I thought the 'platinum coin' of a notional and whimsical trillion dollars in value was such an awful, dangerously cynical idea. It exposed the farce of monetary inflation in too great an amount, in too short a period of time, in a way in which too many people would readily understand it.  And it therefore had the potential of fomenting a money panic.

Cyprus had been reasonably stable before the financial collapse, but was rocked by the Greek bond restructuring. What dealt a fatal blow was the impediment to borrowing because of a credit downgrade to BB+, which made the Cypriot bonds unacceptable as collateral to the ECB, and certainly not viable on the public markets.

And like many small, warm weather island nations, it's economy was overly dependent on tourism, retirement, and an outsized financial sector. Since Cyprus had been a British crown colony, its legal system resembles that of Britain, which still maintains significant military bases on the island, involving approximately 3,500 serving members.

Cyprus is in a bit of a box, because it really needs to leave the Eurozone and default on its obligations, and issue a currency of its own at a devaluation to the euro. But how would they recapitalize their banks, and what would the basis be for any reasonable valuation on this new currency?

If Cyprus owned gold reserves, or even forex reserves of some stable currency, they could make this the basis of their currency, while imposing capital controls. They could liquidate, nationalize if you will, the banks, and keep the depositors whole. Although the conversion to the new Cyprus currency would be a haircut of sorts, and likely impair their banking haven status.

Iceland was able to do something like this, and so was Russia for that matter, when they defaulted, devalued, and reissued the rouble back in the 1990's.

What would the Eurozone say if Cyprus forged a deal with Russia and provided them with military bases similar to the Sovereign Base Areas, currently occupied by the British, in return for a Russian bailout? Russia is a key debtholder and a major stakeholder in Cyprus. Their interests and presence must be dealt with, and carefully.

The question of Cyprus is important, not because it is a large and significant portion of the Eurozone economy. It is most certainly not, being much less than one percent of the total.

Rather, Cyprus is showing the fatal flaws in the conception of the Eurozone, and their single currency without real fiscal union, transfer payments, a common system of taxation, and a banker of last resort.

And it has also demonstrated the weakness of the guarantees by the bureaucrats, not only in Europe but elsewhere, when it comes to money. 

This is a lesson that every central banker around the world should keep in mind.  And the bureaucrats should remember that there is a step beyond which they may go, which will shatter the confidence of the people.  And once that confidence is broken, it is very hard to recover it.

There is one lesson I hope that the people of the world take away from this.  And that is to remember that a single currency is not possible without a complete union of monetary policy, and therefore a fiscal and political union that is complete and comprehensive.  Otherwise a powerful group will wield monetary policy for their own benefit, and the rest of the currency area be damned.

When the single world currency proponents come around again with their proposals, what they are really proposing is a one world government to be established in the ensuing crisis which their actions will eventually provoke.

And despite the consistent capping of the precious metal markets, it demonstrates that there is only one money of last resort, that provides for no counterparty risk.  And that is gold.  And to a lesser extent the reserve currency of the world, which for now is the dollar. 

It is confidence that sustains the integrity of a system based on counterparty risk,  and it is that confidence that supports modern money.  And where confidence declines, force is required.  And where both force and faith fail, a break in confidence happens, and hyperinflation ensues. Hyperinflation is not simply a very high level of inflation.

A hyperinflation is a break in confidence, a monetary panic.

And in what is certainly a bit of historic irony, the German people are once again flirting with bank failures and a hyperinflation.  But in this case it is because they, in their righteous indignation, are imposing the same kind of collective punishment, in terms and conditions of economic austerity and privation on others, that were imposed on them in post war reparation.  Oh the irony, indeed.

Spring is in the air.  Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Related: New Zealand Adopts 'Cyprus style' Levies to Protect Their Banks From Insolvency

Fiat Monetary Theory: The Gamblers

'The Gamblers'

"The historical behavior of interest rates and growth rates in U.S. data suggests that the government can, with a high probability, run temporary budget deficits and then roll over the resulting government debt forever.

The purpose of this paper is to document this finding and to examine its implications. Using a standard overlapping-generations model of capital accumulation, we show that whenever a perpetual rollover of debt succeeds, policy can make every generation better off.

This conclusion does not imply that deficits are good policy, for an attempt to roll over debt forever might fail. But the adverse effects of deficits, rather than being inevitable, occur with only a small probability."

Ball, Elmendorf, Mankiw, The Deficit Gamble

As with most Ponzi schemes, modern fiat currencies are a matter of degree, belief, and tipping points.

There are always limitations in any system, and in paper money systems the debt must be balanced by real growth and investment, an organic growth that makes the rolling debt burden, which is really the basis of the money itself, sustainable and productive.    That growth must be broadly based in order to support consumption from within the system itself, and this implies income commensurate with increasing productivity.

The failure of every fiat currency has been tied to the abuse of power, in the non-organic use of created money not to increase the productive growth of the economy, but to establish monopolies, cartels, speculation, and of course, aggressive war, all in pursuit of the outsized enrichment of a relative few who define themselves as an elite.

And human nature being what it is, all paper money systems have failed within a few hundred years.

There is a variation of  Fiat Monetary Theory, also known as fiat money, which seeks to distinguish itself by its name in addition to its penchant for sophistry, called Modern Monetary Theory.

This variant eliminates the debt problem by switching from a debt based currency to a pure fiat currency issued directly by the government. The longer term problem of currency revulsion, or the rejection by the people of the stated value of the currency, is resolved by greater use of government force.

The resort to force is a tell tale marker of all ideological cults which are unable to achieve a natural stability and an informed, willing acceptance.  That force may include psychological persuasion including propaganda and ridicule.

We are seeing something like this today in Europe, with the compulsion to enforce austerity as the technocrats and careerists refuse to admit that, that by its very design, the Eurozone is inherently unstable. 

And the reforms required to avert disaster are unthinkable, because they will diminish their wealth and power.   And so they become increasingly desperate and self-destructive.

Since the leaders are naturally superior, it is the people that have failed them, because they did not believe enough, work hard enough, sacrifice enough. And so they must be punished.

What Time Is the Next Crisis? - An Historic Warning From John Hussman

"The enemy of the conventional wisdom is not ideas but the march of events."

John Kenneth Galbraith

This is from John Hussman's latest weekly observations which you can read here.

In every instance he cites with which I am familiar, any concerns about the gross mispricing of risk were lightly dismissed, because 'the market says that everything is all right.'   As if the financial markets were some prescient, infallible instrument, and not overtaken by the manipulation of insiders and the monied interests. 

The 'rising market' kept most criticism of the policy errors in the growth of the credit bubble cowed and quiet, until the inevitable market break and crisis. That the financiers have not yet completely destroyed the global economy is not particularly reassuring, while they are still working at inscribing their arrogance, writ large on the pages of history, chapter by dreadful chapter.

Or more cynically one can conclude that yes, things are getting out of control, but we must keep dancing while the music is playing, and say nothing while the money is flowing in order to 'save the system,' while disabling the smoke alarms and stuffing one's pockets.

As long as the Fed can keep printing money and delivering it to the Banks and the one percent, and not to the real economy, through its purchases of their (fraudulently) mispriced financial assets, this could keep going, while maximizing the damage.  While it does give the financial engineers some feeling of control, it really does nothing constructive except to delay the essential reforms.

The combination of constructively applied stimulus and sweeping financial reform was the genius of Roosevelt, and the lack of it is the failure of Obama.

And the big correction might not even show up all that readily, in nominal terms at least, in the equity markets for some time, being papered over by a blizzard of new money.  And so that implies a crash in the bond markets, as we saw a few years after the Great Crash of 1929.  But they are getting better at the cover ups, so who can say.

The tail of financialization and leverage is still 'wagging the dog' of the real economy.   After reading the current thoughts in mainstream economics, and Modern Monetary Theory, it seems quite likely that history is about to deal out another hard lesson in real wealth and value.

I am ambivalent to the exact timing since I cannot know it.    And so if another year passes and 'nothing happens' I may not be cheered by it while the fundamentals like median wage continue to deteriorate.  This is the mechanism in which bubbles develop, and we have seen more of them than most, and with increasingly intensity.

But I am more confident that the punchline to this comedy, if it continues unabated, will be the devaluation of the currency and at least a de facto default on the debt which can take several forms. And the usual yahoos will rise up and seek power, promising an hysterical people to take away their pain, while inflicting it on 'the others.'

"Present market conditions now match 6 other instances in history: August 1929 (followed by the 85% market decline of the Great Depression), November 1972 (followed by a market plunge in excess of 50%), August 1987 (followed by a market crash in excess of 30%), March 2000 (followed by a market plunge in excess of 50%), May 2007 (followed by a market plunge in excess of 50%), and January 2011 (followed by a market decline limited to just under 20% as a result of central bank intervention). These conditions represent a syndrome of overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising yield conditions that has emerged near the most significant market peaks – and preceded the most severe market declines – in history:

1. S&P 500 Index overvalued, with the Shiller P/E (S&P 500 divided by the 10-year average of inflation-adjusted earnings) greater than 18. The present multiple is actually 22.6.
2. S&P 500 Index overbought, with the index more than 7% above its 52-week smoothing, at least 50% above its 4-year low, and within 3% of its upper Bollinger bands (2 standard deviations above the 20-period moving average) at daily, weekly, and monthly resolutions. Presently, the S&P 500 is either at or slightly through each of those bands.
3. Investor sentiment overbullish (Investors Intelligence), with the 2-week average of advisory bulls greater than 52% and bearishness below 28%. The most recent weekly figures were 54.3% vs. 22.3%. The sentiment figures we use for 1929 are imputed using the extent and volatility of prior market movements, which explains a significant amount of variation in investor sentiment over time.
4. Yields rising, with the 10-year Treasury yield higher than 6 months earlier.

The blue bars in the chart below identify historical points since 1970 corresponding to these conditions.

The Moral Hazard of the Fed's Current Policy: The Resurgence of Fraudulent Paper

"As a dog returns to its vomit, so a fool returns to his folly."

Proverbs 26:11

A reader who works in commercial real estate finance shared a warning, informed by his own private industry perspective today. This was in response to my post this morning on the Fed's policy error of indiscriminately pumping money into an unreformed banking system, without adding safeguards and provisions for its employment in productive investment rather than wealth transfer control frauds.

It is almost tragically funny to see the economic principles learned from the Great Depression applied so blindly and haphazardly as advocated by some economists and policy makers. 

It is hard to explain the realities of things to people who see the rough world of the markets through the abstractions of their theory and models.

Yes, the approach used by the government in the Great Depression favoured the stimulus of government work and investment programs for a depression and liquidity trap, and a certain amount of financial security to ease the pain.  But it would have never been so wilfully complacent about the underlying fraud that caused it in the first place as the government is today.

And austerity without reform is a form of economic suicide.  FDR came right at Wall Street and the Banks with serious reform that saved capitalism from itself, and worked for a generation to hold back its darker impulses.  This is a lesson that we have apparently forgotten.

If the Fed attempts their old fix once again, they may do what I thought was almost inconceivable, and go a step beyond mere stagflation which is bad enough, and cause an actual break in confidence, and the bond of their word, the currency. The people of the world will not be fooled forever.

As Hyman Minsky once said, and the moderns seem to have forgotten, "Anyone can create money; the problem is in getting it accepted." He should have added, except by force.

Reform goes hand in hand with recovery.

From a reader:

CDO Resurgence Could Meet Resistance From RE Investors
Law360

A recent bump in demand for collateralized debt obligations has some experts predicting an onslaught of new deals in the coming months, but real estate attorneys caution that even with a more conservative structure, CDOs could be a hard sell with those still reeling from their role in the 2008 crash.

Also, Commercial Mortgage Alerts reflected commercial mortgage backed securities issuance of $48 billion last year (2012) - up from about $33 billion (2011). Remember the Fed is buying up to $45 billion in mortgage backed bonds per month!

"I believe the Fed has succeeded in provide the banks the incentive to begin issuing fraudulent paper again, the infamous CDO's. That's the only way the banks can meet the demand for higher yielding paper given their reluctance to engage in productive investments.

They know the game now, despite the real estate lawyers who are either wrong or just propagandizing. Open-ended QE.

The banks will issue large amounts of the CMBS paper and CDO paper and probably come up with other bond schemes and even LBO's that are fraudulent and probably worthless.

They'll sell them to whomever, because if the fraud is ever revealed, it will get charged to the Fed who will buy the paper from the investors or off the banks' books for near 100 cents on the dollar.

The great fraud machine is stirring. The debt bubble is reflating.

There is no underlying strength in the economy, so the loans being securitized will not be repaid in real terms and the banks and the investors will ultimately offer them to the Fed, who will buy them at non-market prices.

What's to stop this? There's nothing stopping it.

There is no threat of prosecution for fraud. There is no shame or sense of morality.

There is only a ton of money to be earned by the banks/hedge funds/private equity with no threat of punishment for engaging in massive fraud."

This later from another reader.  To be fair, CDO's are not in and of themselves bad assets, but they do tend to operate nicely in lending themselves as a vehicle for misstating risks because of their complexity and sometimes convoluted terms.  Therefore in that spirit, Deutschebank Selling CDO's to Meet Its Capital Goals.  And Private Equity Getting Deeper into Debt as Multiples Rise as well as Hampton's Average Home Price Hits Record.  

If this is productive debt with risks well-priced then no worries.  But I wonder if we will see a return to the LBO's, bond abuses, and dodgy IPO's of the past given the current climate of loose regulation and increased pressure to make easy money.

Hyperinflation and the Pernicious Myth of Modern Monetary Theory: Dollar Vigilantes

"One might argue that when the government has to find a private sector buyer for its debt first, rather than selling the debt directly to the central bank, that imposes a certain degree of market discipline on fiscal policy. But it’s hard to see that there is all that much of a disciplinary bonus here.

When a central bank announces that it is prepared to buy government securities, the announcement automatically guarantees an eager private sector market for the securities – if there wasn’t one already. If dealers know that they can promptly re-sell newly purchased securities to the central bank, at some amount over the purchase price no matter how low, then they know they can make a profit from the purchase...

This is why we have no need to worry about those dreaded bond vigilantes in a country like the US that controls its own currency and monetary operations. To the extent that the Fed signals it is willing to buy US debt aggressively, the Treasury can set almost any price it wants for its debt. So it’s not just that there is no insolvency threat haunting US public debt. There is also not a bond vigilante attack threat – not unless the Fed allows that attack to occur."

New Economic Perspectives, Neoliberal Mythologies

The limit of the Fed’s ability to monetize sovereign debt is the value of the dollar and its acceptance, at value, for the exchange of goods in a non-compulsory environment.   And there is nothing neo-liberal about this. I don't like the neo-liberal approach, but this notion of pain-free monetization is nuts.

If one chooses to not worry so much about the ‘bond vigilantes,’ history suggest that they may well have a care for what I would call the ‘dollar vigilantes.’

The Fed may be hard pressed to buy dollars with — dollars.

The problem with such an approach is that one can ignore the risk for a time, trusting to probability and chance, but when the possible becomes more likely with repetition, it often results in a disaster. It is sort of like driving while texting, a tourist eating street food in Asia, or a small speculator being a non-insider customer at the Comex.

In a increasingly Machiavellian way, they could set up a reciprocity with another central bank or two, say, the BofE and BofJ, and perhaps even the ECB, and I think this has been done even if informally in the past.  

But the limitations are still there, even if hidden in a fog of financial engineering.   Such an arrangement, which I think exists somewhat informally today,  is merely kicking the can of currency failure down the road. 

"This is why we have no need to worry about those dreaded bond vigilantes in a country like the US that controls its own currency and monetary operations."

Overt monetization only works for a protracted period in a system in which one has political control over everyone who uses that currency. The logical outcome of a global dollar regime with unilateral monetization is an eventual bid for a one world government where a false vision of reality can be enforced with -- force. Force and fraud are the perennial instruments of economic tyranny. 

Hence we are in what is called 'the currency war' wherein the US dollar monetarists are attempting to increasingly impose their will on the rest of the world, and a portion of the rest of the world defers to accept that arrangement.

Blatant exposure is the most dreaded pitfall of any Ponzi scheme.  A fiat currency is based on faith and confidence, and the monetary magicians can hardly show their hand, directly monetizing debt without any independent restraint, for fear of provoking a panic, first at the fringes and then at the core of the nation, or empire.

That is the policy error that is also known as 'hyperinflation,' a break in confidence in a currency that is analogous to a 'run on the bank.'  It is the case for hyperinflation which I am watching, and still give a low probability.   I am fairly sure that even Zimbabwe Ben would not fall for such an obvious trap.  But the craven dissembling of Alan Greenspan was also hard to imagine, until it happened.

Instances of Hyperinflation from Diocletian to Bernanke

There are other ways to deal with unpayable debts than merely printing money.  A novel idea is to make the issuers and holders of the bonds bear the negative effects of their bad judgement, as in the case of Iceland.  But the Banks will always try to shift the burden, which they have created, to the financially illiterate and the weak.   

And the problem is not even so much the Fed's propensity to stimulation in the manner of Keynes.  The problem is that they are pouring the stimulus into an unreformed rathole of corruption, in the manner of sending aid to a country where it is intercepted by thieves and regional warlords, with little reaching the people.

The US does not have a spending problem so much as it has a 'corrupt financial system problem,' a 'wealth inequality problem with a stagnant wage base,' an 'unsustainable healthcare model problem,' and 'a free trade without adequate domestic policy based boundaries problem.'   It was not all that long ago that the US was holding a small annual surplus.  What changed was financial deregulation with the financialization of the economy, the easing of trade conditions, concentration of corporate power, tax cuts for the wealthiest, a corrupting political campaign bubble, and unfunded discretionary wars with their associated profiteering.

Forcing small business and workers to compete with state directed slave labor while maintaining a social system founded on private business and median worker wages is insane.  The capitalists are not yet selling them the rope, but they are certainly selling them the 97%, and with them the bulk of their customer demand over time.

Perhaps the biggest problem is, as Lord Acton observed, that when you have a concentration of power, men with the mentality of gangsters have taken control. And the US financial system and corporate structure are highly concentrated based on historical standards, resembling the worst of the gilded age of robber barons, or some third world oligarchy in which the people live in voiceless misery.

In summary, I call this 'just monetize the debt without restraint' alternative  the “pernicious myth of modern monetary theory.”   There are quite a few examples of how this sort of other worldly myth, like the efficient market hypothesis, the Black-Scholes risk model, and the benefits of unrestricted trade, have turned out in the past.  When you crush the reality out of a model with a few key assumptions that allow you to obtain a license to do what you will, you often open a Pandora's Box.

The real shame is that an economic tragedy is not outside the plans of some of the worst of the country's elite. Crisis provides opportunity if one is powerful enough, positioned for it, and egotistically twisted enough to think that they can control the madness once it is unleashed. I suggested that the Bankers would make the country another 'offer that they think it cannot refuse' as they did in the manner of TARP. The so called fiscal cliff may be the wrapping paper for it.

I am not suggesting that the current debt based currency system is optimal, not at all.  The continual theme here is that the financial system is broken, and that it is based on an unsustainable US dollar regime, and the excesses of money creation through credit expansion by private banks.  But to merely shift the corruption from the banks to their partners in the government Treasury is hardly a viable solution.

The answer, as I calculate it, is transparency and reform, and equal justice for all, with malice towards none, in the rule of law.   That is an ideal never fully achievable, but that is the benchmark, and one that is worth pursuing,  It is sustainable if held close, and continually renewed.   That is the spirit of the American experiment in equality and freedom, and is something worth fighting for.

“The man who is admired for the ingenuity of his larceny is almost always rediscovering some earlier form of fraud. The basic forms are all known, have all been practiced. The manners of capitalism improve. The morals may not.”

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty


"Gentlemen! I too have been a close observer of the doings of the Bank of the United States. I have had men watching you for a long time, and am convinced that you have used the funds of the bank to speculate in the breadstuffs of the country.

When you won, you divided the profits amongst you, and when you lost, you charged it to the bank. You tell me that if I take the deposits from the bank and annul its charter I shall ruin ten thousand families. That may be true, gentlemen, but that is your sin!

Should I let you go on, you will ruin fifty thousand families, and that would be my sin! You are a den of vipers and thieves. I have determined to rout you out, and by the Eternal, (bringing his fist down on the table) I will rout you out."

Andrew Jackson,  Andrew Jackson and the Bank of the United States (1928) by Stan V. Henkels


"Do not forget that every people deserves the regime it is willing to endure!

Please make as many copies of this leaflet as you can and distribute them.

The White Rose, First Leaflet, Munich, 1942

John C. Williams: The Federal Reserve's Brand of Modern Monetary Theory

I will comment more on this later but I thought it was interesting and probably quite important for future reference.

One point of contention for me has been this whole issue of the Fed paying interest on excess reserves, essentially incenting banks, if the rate is high enough, to cause banks to hoard reserves at the Fed rather than lend the money out to the real economy.

This point was argued quite vociferously some years ago during the first quantitative easing.  We were told by the New York Fed, as I recall, that this was not the case, and that the payment of interest on excess reserves was only a means for the Fed to manage rates at the zero bound, and did not affect the levels of reserves which are only an accounting identity, after all.

Williams seems to contradict this now.  But I have to give it an extra careful reading in this case.

However, some might look at his data and his reasoning and conclude that while the Fed's policies have been doing quite a bit to provide solvency to the banking system, it has not done well by the real economy.  The GDP and employment numbers seem to bear this out.

One might conclude that reducing the interest paid on reserves would cause the banks to make more loans to the real economy.  And yet not so long ago the NY Fed and several of their economists also argued against what seems like common sense that this was not the case, not at all.

So it might be important to pin the Fed down a bit on this now.  Their thinking could be evolving, or it might just be dissembling to suit the changing situation.   One might gather from what Mr. Williams is saying about rewriting established theory that they don't quite know what it is that they are doing, but instead are feeling their way along in uncharted waters.

This of course widens the risk of a policy error enormously.  Greenspan's Fed was replete with policy errors, but of course he was the gure, the infallible one.  And we should trust these same economists who lionized him now for what reason?

From my own perspective the Fed has spun what they are doing in so many different ways at different times that it is difficult to take what they are saying here at face value.

And that is another feature of the credibility trap.

I believe this speech by John C. Williams is significant, in the manner of Bernanke's famous printing press speech.  Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn't Happen Here. 

Let's give it a careful read and see if it provides any additional clues to what they are thinking, and what they might do next.

San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank
Monetary Policy, Money, and Inflation
John C. Williams, President and CEO
2 July 2012

Good morning. I’m very pleased to be in such eminent company, especially that of my former advisor at Stanford, John Taylor. And I’ll begin my presentation with a reference to another pathbreaking monetary theorist. Milton Friedman famously said, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.” 1

We are currently engaged in a test of this proposition. Over the past four years, the Federal Reserve has more than tripled the monetary base, a key determinant of money supply.   Some commentators have sounded an alarm that this massive expansion of the monetary base will inexorably lead to high inflation, à la Friedman.

Despite these dire predictions, inflation in the United States has been the dog that didn’t bark. As Figure 1 shows, it has averaged less than 2 percent over the past four years. (Past performance is not an indicator of future success - Jesse)  What’s more, as the figure also shows, surveys of inflation expectations indicate that low inflation is anticipated for at least the next ten years.  (Did they anticipate the financial collapse? - Jesse)

In my remarks today, I will try to reconcile monetary theory with the recent performance of inflation. In my view, recent developments make a compelling case that traditional textbook views of the connections between monetary policy, money, and inflation are outdated and need to be revised. As always, my remarks represent my own views and not necessarily those of others in the Federal Reserve System.

I’ll start with two definitions. The monetary base is the sum of U.S. currency in circulation and bank reserves held at the Federal Reserve. Figure 2 shows the key components of the monetary base since 2007. Up until late 2008, it consisted mostly of currency, with a small amount of bank reserves held mostly to meet regulatory requirements. Since then, the monetary base has risen dramatically, primarily because of a $1.5 trillion increase in bank reserves. The money stock is a related concept. It is the total quantity of account balances at banks and other financial institutions that can easily be accessed to make payments. A standard measure of the money stock is M2, which includes currency, and certain deposit and money market accounts.

Here I should make an important point about something that often confuses the public. The worry is not that the Fed is literally printing too much currency. 2 The quantity of currency in circulation is entirely determined by demand from people and businesses. It’s not an independent decision of monetary policy and, on its own, it has no implications for inflation. (It is the money stock that concerns people, not the adjusted monetary base per se - Jesse)

The Federal Reserve meets demand for currency elastically. If people want to hold more of it, we freely exchange reserves for currency. If people want less, then we exchange it back. Of course, currency doesn’t pay interest. People hold it as a low-cost medium of exchange and a safe store of value. In fact, over the past four years, U.S. currency holdings have risen about 35 percent. This reflects low interest rates, which reduce the opportunity cost of holding currency. It’s also due to worries about the economy and the health of the banking system, both here and abroad. In fact, nearly two-thirds of U.S. currency is held outside our borders. 3  U.S. currency is widely seen as a safe haven. When a country is going through economic or political turmoil, people tend to convert some of their financial assets to U.S. currency. Such increased demand for U.S. currency is taking place in Europe today.

For monetary policy, the relevant metric is bank reserves. The Federal Reserve controls the quantity of bank reserves as it implements monetary policy. To keep things simple, I’ll start with what happens when the Fed doesn’t pay interest on reserves, which was the case until late 2008. I’ll return to the issue of interest on reserves toward the end of my talk.

Before interest on reserves, the opportunity cost for holding noninterest-bearing bank reserves was the nominal short-term interest rate, such as the federal funds rate. Demand for reserves is downward sloping. That is, when the federal funds rate is low, the reserves banks want to hold increases. Conventional monetary policy works by adjusting the amount of reserves so that the federal funds rate equals a target level at which supply and demand for reserves are in equilibrium. It is implemented by trading noninterest-bearing reserves for interest-bearing securities, typically short-term Treasury bills.

Normally, banks have a strong incentive to put reserves to work by lending them out. If a bank were suddenly to find itself with a million dollars in excess reserves in its account, it would quickly try to find a creditworthy borrower and earn a return. If the banking system as a whole found itself with excess reserves, then the system would increase the availability of credit in the economy, drive private-sector borrowing rates lower, and spur economic activity. Precisely this reasoning lies behind the classical monetary theories of multiple deposit creation and the money multiplier, which hold that an increase in the monetary base should lead to a proportional rise in the money stock.

Moreover, if the economy were operating at its potential, then if the banking system held excess reserves, too much “money” would chase too few goods, leading to higher inflation. Friedman’s maxim would be confirmed. Here’s the conundrum then: How could the Fed have tripled the monetary base since 2008 without the money stock ballooning, triggering big jumps in spending and inflation? What’s wrong with our tried-and-true theory?

A critical explanation is that banks would rather hold reserves safely at the Fed instead of lending them out in a struggling economy loaded with risk. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is low, while the risks in lending or investing in other assets seem high. Thus, at near-zero rates, demand for reserves can be extremely elastic. The same logic holds for households and businesses. Given the weak economy and heightened uncertainty, they are hoarding cash instead of spending it. In a nutshell, the money multiplier has broken down. 4

The numbers tell the story. Despite a 200 percent increase in the monetary base, measures of the money supply have grown only moderately. For example, M2 has increased only 28 percent over the past four years. 5  Figure 3 shows that the money multiplier—as measured by the ratio of M2 to the monetary base—plummeted in late 2008 and has not recovered since. Nominal spending has been even less responsive, increasing a mere 8 percent over the past four years. As a result, the ratio of nominal gross domestic product, which measures the total amount spent in the economy, to the monetary base fell even more precipitously, as the figure shows. This ratio also has not recovered, illustrating how profoundly the linkage between the monetary base and the economy has broken.

A natural question is, if those reserves aren’t circulating, why did the Fed boost them so dramatically in the first place? The most important reason has been a deliberate move to support financial markets and stimulate the economy.  By mid-December 2008, the Fed had lowered the federal funds rate essentially to zero. Yet the economy was still contracting very rapidly. Standard rules of thumb and a range of model simulations recommended setting the federal funds rate below zero starting in late 2008 or early 2009, something that was impossible to do. 6  

Instead, the Fed provided additional stimulus by purchasing longer-term securities, paid for by creating bank reserves. These purchases increased the demand for longer-term Treasuries and similar securities, which pushed up the prices of these assets, and thereby reduced longer-term interest rates. In turn, lower interest rates have improved financial conditions and helped stimulate real economic activity. 7 

The important point is that the additional stimulus to the economy from our asset purchases is primarily a result of lower interest rates, rather than a textbook process of reserve creation, leading to an increased money supply. It is through its effects on interest rates and other financial conditions that monetary policy affects the economy.

But, once the economy improves sufficiently, won’t banks start lending more actively, causing the historical money multiplier to reassert itself? And can’t the resulting huge increase in the money supply overheat the economy, leading to higher inflation? The answer to these questions is no, and the reason is a profound, but largely unappreciated change in the inner workings of monetary policy. 

The change is that the Fed now pays interest on reserves. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is now the difference between the federal funds rate and the interest rate on reserves. The Fed will likely raise the interest rate on reserves as it raises the target federal funds rate. 8 Therefore, for banks, reserves at the Fed are close substitutes for Treasury bills in terms of return and safety. A Fed exchange of bank reserves that pay interest for a T-bill that carries a very similar interest rate has virtually no effect on the economy. Instead, what matters for the economy is the level of interest rates, which are affected by monetary policy.

This means that the historical relationships between the amount of reserves, the money supply, and the economy are unlikely to hold in the future. If banks are happy to hold excess reserves as an interest-bearing asset, then the marginal money multiplier on those reserves can be close to zero. As a result, in a world where the Fed pays interest on bank reserves, traditional theories that tell of a mechanical link between reserves, money supply, and, ultimately, inflation are no longer valid. In particular, the world changes if the Fed is willing to pay a high enough interest rate on reserves. In that case, the quantity of reserves held by U.S. banks could be extremely large and have only small effects on, say, the money stock, bank lending, or inflation.

As I noted earlier, inflation and inflation expectations have been low for the past four years, despite the huge increase in the monetary base. Of course, if the economy improved markedly, inflationary pressures could build. Under such circumstances, the Federal Reserve would need to remove monetary accommodation to keep the economy from overheating and excessive inflation from emerging. It can do this in two ways: first, by raising the interest rate paid on reserves along with the target federal funds rate; and, second, by reducing its holdings of longer-term securities, which would reverse the effects of the asset purchase programs on interest rates.

In thinking of exit strategy, the nature of the monetary policy problem the Fed will face is no different than in past recoveries when the Fed needed to “take away the punch bowl.” Of course, getting the timing just right to engineer a soft landing with low inflation is always difficult. This time, it will be especially challenging, given the extraordinary depth and duration of the recession and recovery. The Federal Reserve is prepared to meet this challenge when that time comes. Thank you.

End Notes

1. Friedman (1970), p. 24.

2. Technically, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing prints paper currency. The Federal Reserve is responsible for processing and distributing currency to the banking system. The Federal Reserve also distributes coins, which are distinct from paper currency, to the banking system, but the amount of coins in circulation is comparatively small.

3. See Goldberg (2010).

4. For a discussion of this, see Williams (2011a).

5. Similarly, an alternative measure of the money stock, MZM, increased 26 percent over the past four years.

6. See Chung et al. (2011) and Rudebusch (2010).

7. See Williams (2011b) for details.

8. For details on the Fed’s planned exit strategy, see the minutes for the June 2011 FOMC meeting (Board of Governors 2011).