Showing posts with label price manipulation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label price manipulation. Show all posts

15 December 2009

Is the Price of World Silver the Result of Legitimate Market Discovery?


"...one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces. As extreme as JPMorgan’s position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

This makes claims that the COMEX short position represents a legitimate hedge of mine production a lie. The total short position represents almost 100% of the total visible and recorded silver bullion in the world, and 50% of the total one billion ounces thought to exist."

One cannot tell what is truth here easily, because of the still much too opaque nature of the US markets. But I do have a bias here, and I must disclose it up front. I have little confidence in the ability of the US regulators to do their jobs competently, and now approach anything that is said by the Obama administration regarding the financial markets with great skepticism.

In a fair market with transparent and symmetric distribution of key price information the identity of any holders of positions of over 5% of the market would be made known, so that people might understand the character of the market.

Further, any justification for these outsized positions and the 'backing' for them should also be made known publicly, and not just to a few insiders or regulators who expect to be trusted when past history shows that US regulators cannot be trusted to manage their markets reliably.

If this information about the silver market is indeed true, if J.P. Morgan is this short the silver market and unable to deliver even under duress, then perhaps the US should close down the Comex, because it has shown itself unable to be the price setter for the rest of the world in a metal with such broad industrial usage.

If it is not true, then the CFTC should publish its findings from its latest study of the silver market, and give the public the assurance that there is no manipulation in the silver market, and most importantly, why.

We have little confidence in the Obama Administration these days, which includes CFTC chairman, Clinton Alumni and ex-Goldman partner Gary Gensler as well, despite tough talk about position limits to quell speculation.

"The time for talk is over" should be a general theme in the Obama presidential term. They talk a good game, but never seem to deliver any meaningful reforms already promised, except those that might favor their own special interests.

This is important. It is important because in free markets producers must commit substantial amounts of capital in exploration and production to insure an adequate supply of any industrial commodity. And purchasers and other buyers and investors must be able to make their decisions with confidence.

Other parts of the world are moving towards establishing their own market clearing mechanisms in oil and key commodities outside of the sphere of the Anglo-American exchanges. If London and New York would prefer to continue to see their importance decline, then failing to regain the trust of the world through transparent reform after the enormous scandals that are still shaking world markets and financial systems would be advised, as they continue to do today.

It is not about pay. It is not about worrying that the traders might leave. It is time to show some concern for your customers, and about honest price discovery in a fair market, and making good after you have engaged in a massive fraud which the US and the Wall Street banks seem loathe to discuss when they worry about 'confidence.'

Is Mr. Butler wrong? Good, then show us why, not by belittling him personally, or picking details out of what he says and twisting them to try to undermine the whole of what he has to say. Public records show that there is an enormous short position in the silver metals market, that looks to be utterly out of bounds with physical reality and deliverability. If this is just a paper game then we need to know who is doing it and why, and why the world should accept this sort of nonsense as a basis for real production and real capital allocation.

And if this extreme speculation in silver is shown to be true, how do we know if this is the case in other US exchange based markets, like oil, and energy, and other metals, and food? Can the world afford to allow the US to set prices given the flaws which have been disclosed in their risk ratings and pricing mechanisms of late, despite the stony silence of their compliant media and the assurance of captive regulators? The pervasive fraud involved in the latest banking scandals has not yet been addressed adequately, and it is part of a pattern of misconduct going back to the 1990's at least. And even now, little or nothing has changed. The Partnership Between Wall Street and the Government Will Continue Until the System Collapses?

Show us the market. Show us who is holding the outsized longs and shorts, and what their motivations might be, whether it is a hedging producer, or as an agent for users and who they might be. And who the speculators are, and what limits on speculative manipulation might exist.

What sort of leverage is JPM employing? Are they hedging proven reserves for legitimate customers, or are they shoving prices around the plate using derivatives, simply because they can. It does not reassure us that in the not too distant past the London group of AIG was a major short side speculator in the silver market.

There is too much trading in insider and asymmetric information in the US markets, which is the cause of their opacity and the recent successes of con men, sometimes despite the repeated attempts by concerned market participants to bring suspected abuses to the attention of the regulators in what were later found to be obvious and outrageous frauds.

And as for reassurances that the regulators have conducted a study, with the details withheld, and have in their considered opinion found nothing amiss, don't make us laugh. After the Madoff Ponzi Scheme, the Enron energy manipulation, and the mortgage CDO scandal, US regulators have amply demonstrated their inability to manage their stewardship honestly and competently. At this stage they should be making amends and regaining confidence, and not dictating terms to a bunch of helpless domestic customers who continue to accept such shoddy and arrogant treatment by self-serving financial institutions, who dare to charge even good customers 26% credit card interest rates and outrageous fees, in the spirit of the Obama financial reform.

If the world were of a mind to it, they could buy those futures contracts, and demand physical delivery, and bring Wall Street to its knees. Except as we know it would not work, because the exchange would dictate terms, a settlement in paper, and Ben would provide it, at the buyer's ultimate expense. This is the degraded nature of the US dollar reserve currency regime as it exists today. It is become, as they say in Chicago, a 'racket.' Time for honesty again. This is the reform for which the American people elected a new government.

But yet even today, there is a lack of self-awareness, a lack of proportion and an ignorance of history, that allows many otherwise educated and responsible people to make statements like this excerpt quoted below, a neo-colonial variation of the white man's burden, and bet their future that this dependency on the Wall Street banking cartel will be sustained in perpetuity, because it is a kind of a natural law. This point of view is not an aberration, and underlies the comments of many Anglo-American financial institutions today.
"The dollar is the backbone of the world central banking system. It is the backbone of the China money system. The white cliffs of Dover are as likely to collapse."
I am not saying that Mr. Butler is right. I am saying that I no longer trust your markets and their integrity, and the honesty and competency of your agencies and regulators. And there is a groundswell of people around the world, and a quiet but growing majority in your own country, who feel the same way.


Extreme Speculation
By Ted Butler

...The main reason for my recurring thoughts that silver trading may be terminated on the COMEX someday is because that exchange is at the heart of the silver manipulation. If we are closer than ever to witnessing the end of the long-term silver manipulation, as I believe, it must mean an end the extreme concentration on the short side of COMEX silver futures. But the concentrated short position in COMEX silver futures is so extreme, that it is hard to imagine how it can be resolved in an orderly manner. The most recent data from the CFTC indicate that one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces. You have not seen anyone refute those findings, nor is it likely that you will.

So extreme is JPMorgan’s silver short position that it cannot be closed out in an orderly fashion. How could such a large position be closed out quickly, or otherwise, without strongly disturbing the market? If it could be closed out, it is reasonable to assume it would have already been closed out or greatly reduced to avoid the allegations of manipulation it raises. It’s not like the banks are presently universally loved and admired. The intent of anti-concentration guidelines and surveillance is to prevent the precise monopoly that JPMorgan has amassed on the short side of COMEX silver. Having erred egregiously in allowing this concentrated short position to develop, the CFTC is stuck with coming up with a solution to disband it. There is no easy solution.

Further, it is not just JPMorgan’s 200 million ounce COMEX silver short position that threatens the continued orderly functioning of COMEX silver trading. As extreme as JPMorgan’s position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

This makes claims that the COMEX short position represents a legitimate hedge of mine production a lie. The total short position represents almost 100% of the total visible and recorded silver bullion in the world, and 50% of the total one billion ounces thought to exist. These are truly preposterous amounts. By comparison, the net total short position in COMEX gold futures, admittedly no slouch in the short category, represents a little over 2% of the gold bullion that exists (45 million oz total net COMEX short position versus 2 billion oz). When it comes to the amount of real material, or mine production, in the world backing up the COMEX silver short position, the word “inadequate” takes on new meaning.

Because of the extreme mismatch between what is held short on the COMEX and what exists or could be produced to be potentially delivered against the short position, a very dangerous market situation exists. It is this dangerous situation that haunts me and causes me to contemplate a closing of the COMEX silver market. It has to do with what I see developing in the silver physical market and by putting myself in the other guy’s shoes. The other guy, in this case, is Gary Gensler, chairman of the CFTC.

It seems to me that there may be real stress in the wholesale physical silver market. All the factors I look at, including flows into ETFs, the shorting of SLV, the decline in COMEX silver inventories, the strong retail and institutional investment demand in silver, the now growing world industrial demand, etc., suggest tightness and the potential for a silver shortage like never before. This, in essence, is the real silver story. In spite of a large and growing concentrated short position, the price of silver suggests that it is the manipulation that is under stress. At some point, a physical silver shortage will destroy any amount of paper short selling. We may be very close to that point.

When the silver shortage hits, the price will explode. On this, there is no question. Industrial users, at the very first sign of delay in silver shipments, will immediately buy or try to buy more silver than they normally buy, in order to protect against future operation-interrupting delays. This is just human nature. The world has never experienced a true silver shortage ever, so the price impact is clearly unknown. I’ll try not to overstate how high I think the price will go in a true silver shortage and how quickly it will occur, so that I don’t sound too extreme. But the price move will give new meaning to “high” and “fast.”

Please remember, I am only talking of the price impact of the industrial users scrambling to secure silver supplies for their operations. This has always been my “doomsday machine” future silver price event. I am not speaking of new investment demand or short covering. Users, anxious to keep their assembly lines running and their workers employed will care less about price and more about availability and actual delivery. The users will buy with an urgency and reckless abandon rarely witnessed. That the price explosion caused by user buying will destroy the shorts is beyond doubt. So certain and devastating will be this destruction, that you must start asking questions as to what the regulatory reaction is likely to be. This is where you must try to put yourself in the other guy’s shoes. When the industrial silver shortage hits and prices explode, what would you do if you were Chairman Gensler?...

Read the rest of Mr. Butler's essay here.

08 September 2009

Barrick Capitulates


Barrick Gold and their bullion bank partner J.P. Morgan were the target of lawsuits by the gold bulls, most recently Blanchard and Company, for price manipulation through the use of forward sales in their hedge book. The contention was that the selling was being used to manipulate the price of gold.

Barrick's initial defense was that if they were acting in conjunction with the central banks, they were therefore immune from prosecution since the central banks are immune from prosecution. Details of that story are here. The public document that Blanchard had put forward was shocking in its implications indeed, and can be seen here.

Almost as shocking as the complete lack of interest and follow up in such a potential scandal by the financial community, market regulators, and the media.

One has to wonder what Barrick's management now sees in the precious metal markets, in order to accept this significant shareholder dilution to take down those fixed price contracts now.

On a related note, one of the current largest holders of the gold ETF (GLD) is now reported to be J.P Morgan, which is also a holder of one of the largest short gold positions on the COMEX. There was a bit of a row last year when it was revealed that the rules of the exchange would allow holders of short gold positions to make delivery good in, wait for it, the GLD ETF rather than in physical bullion.

In an ideal, efficient market there would have been transparency and symmetric disclosure of information under the auspices of the CFTC and the SEC, rather than cross accusations and lawsuits. The exact details of what had transpired are not known as the Blanchard lawsuit was settled.

The CFTC seems to be finally willing to act to place position limits on some of the commodity markets, such as oil, that have been the subject of speculative manipulation in recent years. Perhaps some day this will also include other reforms, and will include all the commodity markets.

How sweet it must be for the 'gold bugs' who had repeatedly cautioned Barrick's management on their use of hedges and fixed priced arrangement with the bullion banks.

Although for a large shareholder or group of shareholders in Barrick, one would think that a much more complete disclosure of the nature of this loss and the counter parties would be expected. How involved was J. P. Morgan? Was the Federal Reserve or any other central bank an actual counterparty or collaborator as Barrick apparently claimed in court in 2003? Does this have anything to do with China's recent position on derivatives obligations held by its State Owned Enterprises?

It does sound like there is now a Barrick put under the price of gold, in addition to the China put, that is, a floor under the price of the metal in the front month or spot markets.

In these opaque markets one can still only wonder what is really going on behind the scenes, in a number of financial arrangements. Yes we can.


Reuters
Barrick to Sell $3 Billion in Stock to Buy Back Hedges
By Cameron French
Tuesday, September 8, 2009

TORONTO -- Barrick Gold, the world's biggest gold producer, said on Tuesday it will issue $3 billion in stock and use the proceeds to buy back all of its fixed-price gold hedges and a portion of its floating hedges.

Barrick will take a $5.6 billion charge on its third-quarter earnings as a result of the move.

During times of weak prices, gold miners often sell a portion of their future production to protect, or hedge, against the possibility that prices will fall.

When prices rise, as they have done since 2001, the company suffers because value of the future production they've sold does not increase with the gold price. (The central banks of the world have turned from net sellers to buyers of gold this year, led by the BRIC countries who wish to hedge their reserves against a declining dollar - Jesse)

"The gold hedge book has been a particular concern among our shareholders and the broader market, which we believe has obscured the many positive developments within the company," Barrick Chief Executive Aaron Regent said in a statement.

Barrick stopped hedging, or forward-selling, its gold in 2003.

It exited its production hedge book two years ago, and the company has faced repeated questions from analysts and shareholders since then about its plans for the remaining 9.5 million ounces it had hedged to finance projects.

The equity deal comes as a resurgent gold price and healing credit markets have prompted investors to snap up gold stocks, bullion and equity.

The metal's price hovered just below $1,000 an ounce on Tuesday.

Barrick will issue 81.2 million shares at $36.95 a share, a 6 percent discount to the stock's New York closing price of $39.30 on Tuesday.

The company will use $1.9 billion of the proceeds to eliminate all of its fixed-price gold contracts -- on which the company effectively lost money every time the gold price rose -- by purchasing gold on the open market and delivering it into the contracts.

It will use about $1 billion to eliminate some of its floating spot price contracts. (Are they buying them out from the counterparties? Is J. P. Morgan one of them? - Jesse)

After the deal, Barrick will still hold floating hedges with a negative mark-to-market value of $2.7 billion, but the $5.6 billion charge will remove it from the balance sheet. (It sound as if they are writing them off as a loss - Jesse)

Bill O'Neill, a partner at LOGIC Advisors in Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, said the deal would not likely have a material impact on the gold market. (Off the cuff, the Barrick statement implies that they will be purchasing 4% of total world production in the open market for bullion which is already tight at these prices in addition to taking an enormous amount of forward selling off the market. Unless, of course, they can take delivery directly from existing reserves, such as from the Fed via the IMF. - Jesse)


02 June 2009

Saving Private Greed


As best we can figure, this rally is providing cover for the big Wall Street banks who are issuing equity as fast as their little hooves can move, to qualify for the TARP payback mechanism.

By 'proving' that the market wishes their debt and equity, Timmy says they will be permitted to pay back their TARP funds, and be released from scrutiny on their bonuses.

While the volumes stay thin and the Fed's wallet remains fat, this rally make continue. Or at least an optimistic trading range.

As a side note, I made the first borscht of the summer season yesterday with very nice beets from a local source. Slowly roasted the beef and beef bones, onions, and celery to carmelize in a foil pan on a grill outside, and then cooked it up with the already cleaned and boiled beets, beef stock, seasoning, a little sugar and vinegar in a big pot for a couple hours. We then allowed it to chill overnight. It was a thin clear broth but a deep purple, and loaded with diced pieces of beef and beets, with a few very small round redskin potatoes.

With a dollop of sour cream and chopped sweet onion, DELICIOUS! and refreshing.

By far the best, and a delightful distraction from this wretched market.

26 May 2009

What Caused This Rally?


"Consumer Confidence" came in higher than expected based on numbers from The Conference Board. The market started rising well ahead of the release of this 'news' which is no surprise as the source is a somewhat leaky bucket.

This despite the housing data in the Case-Shiller Index which was much worse than expected.

Our take is always that those who look for fundamental reasons for short term market moves are often on a fool's errand.

The reason for this rally today is best captured by an old stock market adage.

"Never short a dull market."


10 March 2009

SP Futures Hourly Chart at 1 PM EDT - An Appearance of False Vitality Amidst Wasting Disease


Breakout or Fakeout?

The trigger for this rally was an internal memo to the Citigroup employees from Vikram Pandit, designed to bolster morale and most likely the stock price when it was widely leaked to the press. Vik gets a freebie on this one since the memo was 'internal.' No accounting for numbers, right? lol.

Citi CEO Pandit Defends Group Strength

Traders are choosing to interpret this as a positive sign that 'the worst is over' and are squeezing the short interest from an oversold condition. Here is a story on Citi from the WSJ. Does this sound like all is smooth sailing?

U.S. Weighs Further Steps for Citi: Regulators Plan for Contingency - WSJ

Anyone who actually believes the financial crisis is over based on this 'leaked internal memo' is a true believer indeed. In what we are not sure.

Let's see how this rally plays out. Here are the support and resistance levels.

Anything is possible here in the Speculation Nation.

By the way, Turbo Timmy Geithner will be on PBS' Charley Rose talk show this evening. He will say that things are getting dramatically worse in the US economy. But they are committed to fix our dire financial problems no matter what they must do. (hint: print).



06 March 2009

Merrill Lynch Discloses "Trading Irregularities" to Regulators in London


Plenty of smoke here, with the fire to come over the weekend and/or next week.

Why don't we hear about this sort of thing from the US media until after hours? Are they too busy asking softball questions?

The timing of this disclosure, after the BofA acquisitions and the billions in last minute bonuses paid, is priceless.


Economic Times (India)
Merrill review spots trading 'irregularity'

7 Mar 2009, 0047 hrs IST, Bloomberg

LONDON: Merrill Lynch & Co, the securities firm acquired by Bank of America Corp, said it uncovered an “irregularity” during a review of its trading operations.

The bank informed regulators immediately of the discrepancy in “certain trading positions”, Merrill Lynch said in a statement from London. The bank said it’s working with the authorities to investigate further. A spokeswoman for the bank declined to comment further.

Merrill Lynch may have lost hundreds of millions of dollars on currency trading and credit derivatives last year, the New York Times reported earlier on Thursday.

The losses did not “spill into plain view” until after Bank of America investors had approved the $33 billion takeover in December and Merrill Lynch disbursed $3.6 billion in bonuses to bankers, the newspaper said. Bank of America later sought additional government funding. “Senior managers of the business are focused on the issue and believe the risks surrounding possible losses are under control,” Merrill Lynch said in the statement.

Bank of America Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis is trying to rein in Merrill’s traders after their losses brought the bank to the brink of collapse, the New York Times said.

“It was always going to be extremely difficult to integrate a retail bank like Bank of America with an investment bank like Merrill because the cultures are so different,” said Richard Staite, an analyst at Atlantic Equities LLP in London. He has an “underweight” rating on Bank of America’s shares.


19 January 2009

Murkiness in the NYMEX Pits As the Banks Hoard Oil


"Morgan Stanley hired an oil tanker to store crude oil in the Gulf of Mexico, joining Citigroup Inc. and Royal Dutch Shell Plc in trying to profit from the contango, two shipbrokers said in reports earlier today."

There is a sharp contango in the near months in the NYMEX oil pit, and it will get sharper as the attempts to suppress the price near term, most likely to punish Russia, Venezuela and Iran, falter. Then it will flatten as market adjusts prices to normalcy.

Let's see if Bloomberg gives us a more coherent update. But its funny that Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, and probably other banks are buying oil now to store in tankers and deliver later when the paper chase falters. Nice use of the bailout money. Why lend when you can speculate on market inefficiency which you help to create?

Bloomberg
Goldman Sees ‘Swift, Violent’ Oil Rally Later in Year
By Grant Smith

Jan. 19 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. commodity analyst Jeffrey Currie said he expects a “swift and violent rebound” in energy prices in the second half of the year.

Oil prices may have reached their lowest point already, after falling to $32.40 in mid-December, and are expected to rise to $65 by the end of this year, the analyst said. There is scope for a “new bull market” in oil, Currie said. (The December '09 futures are trading around there already - Jesse)

World oil demand is likely to fall by about 1.6 million barrels a day this year, the Goldman analyst said today at a conference in London. That’s bigger than the reduction expected by the International Energy Agency, which last week forecast a decrease of about 500,000 barrels a day, or 0.6 percent, this year.

A recent tactic of using supertankers to store crude oil to take advantage of higher prices later this year is “difficult” to profit from and is “near the end of this process” anyway, the Goldman analyst said. (We can only use the NYMEX 'front month' to punish Iran, Venezuela, and Russia for so long - Jesse)

New York crude futures for delivery in December, trading near $56 a barrel, currently cost some $15 a barrel more than March futures, a market situation known as contango, where prices are higher for later delivery. (This is poorly worded at best - Jesse)

The contango is likely to flatten as supply cuts by OPEC and other producers take effect, reducing the availability of oil for immediate delivery, Currie said. (Contango is when the future months are higher in price. This is the case for the futures. But December delivery, according to this article, is in backwardation, where true 'spot' is higher than paper prices, and a sure sign of price manipulation. - Jesse)

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries started another round of supply cutbacks at the start of this month. The group’s compliance with its overall efforts to cut production will probably peak at 75 percent, or a reduction of about 3 million barrels a day out of an announced aim of 4.2 million barrels a day, Goldman Sachs said.

In several steps, 10 OPEC members have pledged to reduce production to 24.845 million barrels a day, a cut of 4.2 million barrels a day from September’s level.

Morgan Stanley hired an oil tanker to store crude oil in the Gulf of Mexico, joining Citigroup Inc. and Royal Dutch Shell Plc in trying to profit from the contango, two shipbrokers said in reports earlier today.

18 January 2009

West Texas Intermediate Benchmark Diverging Widely from World Oil Prices


If there indeed is a glut of oil in the US at a bottleneck, as NYMEX appears to contend, then world prices should diverge, and more oil would be flowing to other venues.

Interestingly enough, there is also a huge difference in price between the February contract at 36.51 for WTI and the March contract at 42.57.

So let's see how this short term oil glut in Oklahoma gets squared away. Sure to be interesting. It would be a shame if the NYMEX loses some of its credibility as a price discovery mechanism.


Reuters
Signs of shift away from WTI
By Javier Blas in London
January 18 2009

Oil traders are quietly pricing some of their deals away from the West Texas Intermediate contract, traditionally the world’s most important oil benchmark, as it is being distorted by record inventories at its landlocked delivery point.

The move is a setback for the benchmark that since the launch of the Nymex WTI futures in the early 1980s has dominated physical and financial oil markets.

The surge in oil inventories in Cushing, Oklahoma, where WTI is delivered into America’s pipeline system, has depressed its value not only against other global benchmarks, such as Brent, but also against other domestic US crudes.

Julius Walker, an oil market analyst at the International Energy Agency in Paris, said there was “anecdotal evidence” of traders moving away from WTI and “doing deals based on other US oil benchmarks”.

The IEA monthly report said Brent was now “arguably more reflective of global oil market sentiment”. However, Bob Levin, managing director of market research at Nymex said that the WTI contract was performing “transparently”, reflecting a “loss in oil demand and sharply rising inventories”.

“WTI is better reflecting global oil fundamentals than Brent,” Mr Levin said. “The oil industry has not abandoned the WTI contract and it has confidence in it.”

Nevertheless, traders in London, New York and Houston confirmed a small number of transactions away from WTI after its price plunged last week to record discounts against other global and domestic benchmarks. The traders cautioned that the move could reverse if the WTI situation normalised. Lawrence Eagles, at JPMorgan, said any move away from WTI would face “strong resistance as none of the other US benchmarks have the price transparency of an exchange market”.

Highlighting the price disconnection with the global market, WTI, which usually trades at a premium of $1-$2 a barrel to Brent, last week plunged to an all-time discount of $11.73. The detachment hit the US market too, where Light Louisiana Sweet, jumped to a $9.50 premium, the highest in 18 years.

Brent ended last week at $46.18 a barrel, well above WTI at $36.

Walter Lukken, outgoing chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, told the FT the regulator was following “very closely” the WTI disconnection.

This is not the first time WTI has diverged from other benchmarks, but the discrepancy is far more severe this time.

24 December 2008

The CFTC Is Failing to Regulate Commodity Market Ponzi Schemes


Christopher Cox recently admitted that the SEC has willfully overlooked significant abuses in the equity markets. One thing on which we agreed with John McCain was that his tenure at the SEC is a national disgrace and he should have been dismissed. Given the US stock market bubbles over the past eight years one can hardly disagree.

It is becoming obvious that there is significant price manipulation in the commodity markets, to the point where they have become nothing more than Ponzi schemes in which the object of the investment will never be delivered, and a market roiling default will occur.

Below is one example in the oil markets. Silver is an even better example. Ted Butler has documented the abuse on numerous occasions, and has been ignored in the same way those exposing the Madoff Ponzi scheme to the SEC were also willfully and repeatedly ignored.

The problem with commodities price manipulation is even worse than the manipulation of stock prices since it involves the capital formation of the means of production with significant lead times. Not only does this manipulation cheat investors and small speculators, but it causes significant, damaging misalignments in supply and demand in the real economy. The example of the electricity markets in California and the Enron fraud was the wake up call that was ignored.

It is beyond simple fraud. This has disproportionate and severely damaging effects on other countries in the global economy.

The perfect solution, the complete market restructuring is complex, and is detailed below. Expect the market manipulators to wallow in the complexity and create loopholes for future exploitation.

However, there is an 80% effective solution that is simple. Transparency of positions is a first step. The second step is to impose strict position limits for those who are not hedging actual and verifiable inventory and production.

The position limits for the 'naked shorting' is appropriate for those who believe that the market price is incorrect. But there comes a time when the naked shorting becomes so large that it IS the market, and the consequences of such outrageous manipulation are real and significant.

Constantly tinkering with regulations and making them more complex is not the answer. The root of the problem has been the lack of enforcement and the bad actions of a handful of banks that have become serial market manipuators since the overturn of Glass-Steagall. There really are no new financial products or frauds. There are just variations on familiar themes.

It is not clear that the solution can come from within the US. Violence never works, and writing our Congress and voting for a reform candidate have now been done, although we should continue this.

A practical solution may be ultimately imposed on the US by the rest of the world, and that is a less attractive prospect than an internal solution.



Reuters
NYMEX oil benchmark again in question
By John Kemp
December 23rd, 2008

The record differential between the front-month and more liquid second-month contracts at expiry last week once again raised pointed questions about whether the NYMEX light sweet contract is serving as a good benchmark for the global oil market, or sending misleading signals about the state of supply and demand.

The expiring January 2009 contract ended down $2.35 on Friday at $33.87, while the more liquid February contract actually rose 69 cents to settle at $42.36 - an unprecedented contango from one month to the next of $8.49.


Criticism of the contract is not new, and past calls for reform have been successfully sidelined. But with policymakers taking a keener interest as a result of wild gyrations in oil prices this year, and a continued focus on regulatory changes to improve market functioning in future, there is at least a chance changes will be adopted as part of a wider package of futures market adjustments.

AN UNREPRESENTATIVE PRICE

During the surge to $147 per barrel earlier this year, OPEC repeatedly criticized the NYMEX reference price for overstating the real degree of tightness in the physical market and causing prices to overshoot on the upside. (That was the point, see Enron for details - Jesse)

While rallying NYMEX prices seemed to point to an acute physical shortage and need for more oil, Saudi Arabia could not find buyers for the 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) of extra oil promised to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon or the 300,000 bpd promised to U.S. President George Bush in June.

Bizarrely, rather than acknowledge there was something wrong with the reference price, some market participants suggested Saudi Arabia should increase the already large discounts for its physical crude to achieve sales in a market that clearly did not need the oil, and was not paying enough contango to make storing it economic (contango is where the futures price is above the spot market). (There is nothing bizarre about it. That is standard disinformation by the frauds and their mouthpieces - Jesse)

The NYMEX WTI price may have achieved unprecedented media fame as a result of the “super-spike”, but a futures price to which producers and consumers were paying ever larger discounts for actual barrels was clearly not a good indication of where the market as a whole was trading. (It was a fraud. Lots of people lost lots of money in it. It was a great excuse to build a Ponzi scheme in a market price, raise the price of gasoline to $4 gallon, and then take the market down. This is the 1929 model of market manipulation pure and simple - Jesse)

Now the market risks overshooting in the other direction. Intense pressure on the front month in recent weeks has more to do with the contract’s peculiarities (in particular storage restrictions at the delivery point) than a further deterioration in oil demand or a market vote of no-confidence in the 2.2 million barrels per day further cut in oil production announced by OPEC at the end of last week. (The beauty about price manipulation is that it works in both directions. Different damage, but the same jokers get to pocket their fraudulent gains - Jesse)

The collapse in NYMEX prices nearby risks exaggerating the real degree of oversupply and demand destruction, sending the wrong signal to producers and consumers about the wider availability of crude in the petroleum economy. (It may take a few countries along with it. But that may be by intent. Chavez and Putin are not on the Friends of W list - Jesse)

DOMESTIC PRICE, GLOBAL BENCHMARK

The NYMEX contract is for a very special type of crude oil (light sweet) delivered at a very special location (Cushing, Oklahoma) in the interior of the United States. It is not representative of the majority of crude oil traded internationally (most of which is heavier and sourer) and delivered by ocean-going tankers.

These specifications made sense when the contract was introduced as a benchmark for the U.S. domestic market.

U.S. refiners have a strong preference for light oils, for which they were prepared to pay a premium, because of their much higher yield to gasoline. The inland delivery location, centrally located and near the main Texas oilfields, rather than one on the coast, made sense for a contract that tried to capture the “typical” base price for crude oil paid by refiners across the continental United States.

But these specifications make much less sense now the NYMEX price is increasingly used a benchmark for the global petroleum economy, in which light sweet crudes are only a small fraction of total output. Just as NYMEX prices sent the wrong signals about physical oil availability on the way up, distorting the market and triggering more demand destruction than was really necessary, they now risk sending the wrong ones on the way down.

Earlier this year, the problem was a relative shortage of light sweet crude oils at Cushing, while all the extra barrels being offered to the market by Saudi Arabia were heavier, sourer crudes that could not be delivered against the contract. Moreover, extra Saudi crudes would have arrived by ship, and the pipeline and storage configurations around Cushing would have made it difficult to deliver them quickly against the contract.

Financial speculators were able to push NYMEX higher safe in the knowledge Saudi Arabia could not take the other side and overwhelm them by delivering physical barrels to bring prices down. The resulting spike exhibited all the characteristics of a technical squeeze: tight contract specifications ensured there could be shortage of NYMEX light sweet inland oils even while the global market was oversupplied by heavier, sourer seaborne ones.

Now the opposite problem is occurring. Crude stocks at Cushing have doubled from 14.3 million barrels to 27.5 million since mid-October. Stocks around the delivery point are at a near-record levels and approaching the maximum capacity of local tank and pipeline facilities (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/CUSHING.pdf).

As a result, the market has been forced into a huge contango as storage becomes increasingly expensive and difficult to obtain, ensuring the expiring futures trade at a substantial discount.

But Cushing inventories are not typical of the rest of the U.S. Midwest (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/PADD2_EX_CUSHING.pdf) or along the U.S. Gulf Coast (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/PADD3.pdf), where stock levels are high relative to demand but nowhere near as overfull as in Oklahoma.

Once again the problem is geography. Coastal refiners have responded to the downturn by cutting imports of seaborne crude, limiting the stock build. But the inland market is the destination for some Canadian crudes that have nowhere else to go, and the pipeline configuration means they cannot be trans-shipped to other locations readily.

Light sweet crude has been piling up in the region, with refiners choosing to deliver the unwanted excess to the market by delivering it into Cushing.

NEW GRADES, NEW DELIVERY POINTS

The easiest way to make NYMEX more representative would be to widen the number of crude grades that can be delivered, and open a new delivery point along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Both reforms would link the contract more tightly into the global petroleum economy. (The easiest way would be to do exactly as I suggested above. It can be done with the stroke of a pen and the kick of a few asses - Jesse)

NYMEX already permits some flexibility in delivery grades. Sellers can deliver UK Brent and Norwegian Oseberg at small fixed discounts to the settlement price, and Nigerian Bonny Light and Qua Iboe, as well as Colombia’s Cusiana at small premiums.

In principle, there is no reason the contract cannot be modified further to allow a wider range of foreign oils to be delivered at larger discounts to the settlement price.

More importantly, NYMEX could open a second delivery location along the Gulf Coast, increasing the amount of storage capacity available, and linking it more closely into the tanker market.

If prices spiked again, a coastal delivery location would make it much easier for Saudi Arabia to short the market and deliver its own barrels into the rally. By widening the physical basis, it would also make it easier to support the market by cutting international production and avert a glut trapped around the delivery location.

So far, the market has continued to resist change. But there are signs policymakers might enforce one. (No one likes to give up a successful fraud voluntarily until the clock runs out - Jesse)

Earlier in the year, Saudi Arabia strongly hinted western governments should look at reforming their own futures markets rather than call for production of even more barrels of oil that could not be sold at the prevailing (unrealistic) price. (Saudi Arabia is the US's creature so any criticism is coming from a loyal source and credible - Jesse)

Naturally, some of the reform impetus has ebbed along with prices and demand. But policymakers continue to show interest in structural reforms, as was evident at last week’s London Energy Meeting, and there is an increased willingness to challenge unfettered market dynamics.

It is still possible the incoming Obama administration might force contract changes as part of a wider package of reforms designed to improve the functioning of commodity markets, reduce volatility and send clearer, more consistent price signals to the industry and consumers.

19 December 2008

Japan Government to Buy 20 Trillion Yen in Stock to Support Their Markets


You have to wonder why they just don't give money directly to their people, and allow them to use their discretion to invest and consume, rather than use the money to prop up a zombie market at the direction of a central planning bureaucracy.

It probably speaks volumes about their priorities in valuing the keiretsu and its crypto-medieval organization over the individual. The artificial composition of their economy is remarkable, and understood by few economists in the West with the cultural bias of their models.

You have to wonder if there will be any auto stocks in that share festival.

Japan plans to buy $227 billion in shares to boost market
By Michael Kitchen
8:11 a.m. EST Dec. 18, 2008

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- Japan's government said Thursday it is submitting a bill to parliament allowing for the purchase of 20 trillion yen ($227 billion) in stock to help stabilize the Japanese stock market, Kyodo news reported.

Under the bill, the Banks' Shareholding Acquisition Corporation, originally created in January 2002, would resume buying shares from banks and other entities, the Japanese news agency reported.

The bill would be introduced early next month "with an eye to implementing the measure by the end of March," the report quoted lawmakers as saying. The Liberal Democratic Party had intially considered just 10 trillion in stock purchases, but the size was roughly doubled to 20 trillion yen at the request of its ruling coalition partner, the New Komeito party, the report said.


03 December 2008

Is Goldman Sachs Managing Its Earning Expectations?


An interesting story from the Columbia School of Journalism regarding the Goldman Sachs story featured at The Wall Street Journal the other day suggest some oddness in the WSJ story on Goldman Sachs newly expected losses.

Did Goldman Sachs leak its own results? Are they accurate? Or was this a setup to dampen expectations on the results?

Or merely to provide 'guidance' to the Street? Note the stories at the bottom that shows analysts turning increasingly bearish on Goldman in October, and that Katzke of Credit Suisse actually cut estimates precipitously the day before the WSJ story, from a decent gain to a sharp loss. What precipitated her reversal?

Let's see how Goldman's numbers and follow-on stories come out, and judge accordingly. For now it looks like a simple case of follow the leader, the leader being Katzke from Credit Suisse who did a remarkable turnaround on her earnings projections from a gain of $2.47 to a loss of $4.00.

The Audit
Columbia Journalism Review

December 02, 2008 10:06 PM
Weird Goldman Sourcing at the Journal
By Ryan Chittum

A [Wall Street] Journal scoop this morning—or at least its sourcing—may have confused some readers.

The paper reported that Goldman Sachs’s loss this quarter would be much worse than expected, news it attributed to “industry insiders.”

That’s funny attribution, but okay. But scan the rest of the story and you’ll find that it appears nobody from Goldman was ever given an opportunity to comment. (Odd because the follow on stories indicate Goldman declined comments to other news outlets - Jesse)

Now, it’s highly unlikely that these experienced reporters got a story on A1 in the WSJ without calling the company for comment.

What the lack of a Goldman attribution signals to us is that Goldman Sachs itself leaked this to the Journal as a way to feed hungry beat reporters and get bad news into its stock price before it reports earnings.

The Journal has a nearly iron-clad internal rule that says a story can’t say a source declined to comment if that source is quoted elsewhere in the story. That can make for awkward negotiations if a reporter is trying to protect the identity of a source who doesn’t want to be named. (Apparently the WSJ broke that rule because Goldman declined to comment, so who leaked the insider information? - Jesse)

I don’t know why Goldman was so finicky that it wouldn’t let the Journal use its standard “people familiar with the matter” phrasing, but I’ve dealt with similarly skittish/irrational sources.

But for what it’s worth as an insiderism, that’s your likely explanation.


The Wall Street Journal
Goldman Faces Loss of $2 Billion for Quarter
DECEMBER 2, 2008

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., known for avoiding many of the blowups that have battered its Wall Street rivals, now is likely to report a net loss of as much as $2 billion for its quarter ended Nov. 28, according to industry insiders.

The loss, equal to about $5 a share, would be more than five times as steep as the current analyst consensus for the Wall Street firm, as it faces write-downs on everything from private equity to commercial real estate.

Though analysts and investors already were bracing for Goldman's first quarterly loss since it went public in 1999, the ...


Reuters
Goldman shares fall as analysts see bigger loss

Tue Dec 2, 2008 12:26pm EST
By Joseph A. Giannone

NEW YORK, Dec 2 (Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc shares fell Tuesday on speculation the bank's fourth-quarter loss could be much larger than expected -- more than $2.5 billion -- fueled by the plunging value of many Goldman investments.

The shares fell as much as 6 percent, rose briefly in volatile trading, then settled at $64.78, off 1.5 percent. They are down 70 percent this year.

For the past month, Goldman has been widely expected to post its first quarterly loss since going public in 1999. But poor market conditions got even worse last month as the U.S. Treasury abandoned its proposal to buy hard-to-trade mortgage securities and other debt from hard-hit banks.

Atlantic Equities analyst Richard Staite on Tuesday widened his loss forecast for Goldman to $4.65 a share, or $2.3 billion, for the fiscal fourth quarter ended Nov. 28. Staite forecast that falling equity and debt values will trigger more than $9 billion of writedowns.

Within hours, veteran UBS brokerage analyst Glenn Schorr forecast an even bigger loss -- $5.50 a share, or $2.7 billion -- driven by writedowns approaching $5 billion. S&P Equity Research cut its forecast to a loss of $3.25 a share.

That's a big change from a month ago, when the average Wall Street forecast was a profit of $2.34 a share; six months ago, the average estimate was a profit of more than $5.40 a share.

Currently, analysts' average forecast is a loss of $1.46 a share excluding one-time items, according to Reuters Estimates. Individual forecasts range from a profit of 23 cents at Wachovia Securities to a loss of $5.50 at UBS.

The average loss forecast will only deepen as Wall Street analysts try to estimate the impact of market weakness on a range of assets held in Goldman's investment portfolio and by its traders.

Goldman has long been the industry's most aggressive player in deploying its capital into everything from power plants and Japanese golf courses to ethanol makers and distressed debt.

As a group, analysts turned bearish on Goldman at the end of October, with industry watchers like UBS' Schorr and Merrill Lynch's Guy Moszkowski predicting small losses


AP
Ahead of the Bell: Goldman Sachs faces $2B loss
Tuesday December 2, 9:09 am ET

Report: Goldman Sachs could lose as much as $2 billion for its fiscal 4th quarter

NEW YORK (AP) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. could face losses totaling $2 billion when it reports its fiscal fourth-quarter results because of continued market turmoil and the expectation for large write-downs, according to a report in The Wall Street Journal on Tuesday.

The report, citing industry insiders and analysts, said the potential loss of about $5 per share would be largely due to write-downs on a wide array of assets that have increasingly lost value over the past three months.

A spokesman for Goldman declined to comment, noting that Goldman does not provide earnings guidance and does not comment on outside forecasts.

It would be Goldman's first quarterly loss since it went public in 1999....


AP
Goldman falls with market, analysts cut estimates

Monday December 1, 8:29 pm ET

Goldman Sachs falls as analysts cut 4Q 2008 and 2009 estimates

CHARLOTTE, N.C. (AP) -- Shares of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. dropped sharply on Monday as the broader market tumbled on concern about the economy and analysts cut their earnings estimates to reflect a dismal quarter.

Shares of Goldman fell $13.23, or 16.8 percent, to $65.76.

Goldman's decline came as the Dow Jones industrial average fell 680 points to about 8,149 and the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index lost nearly 9 percent. The decline was the result of investors' concerns about holiday shopping and new reports showing manufacturing activity fell to a 26-year low in November and construction spending fell by larger-than-expected amount in October.

In a note to investors Monday, Credit Suisse analyst Susan Roth Katzke said she now expects the New York-based firm will lose $4 per share in the fourth quarter. She had previously forecast a profit of $2.47 per share.

She also lowered her 2009 earnings estimate to $12 per share from $14.50 per share.

Analysts polled by Thomson Reuters, on average, forecast a quarterly loss of 62 cents per share and $10.38 per share for 2009.

Katzke lowered her target price on the stock to $140 from a range of $175-$200...




26 November 2008

Chicago PMI Worst Report Since 1982


It may seem counterintuitive that US stocks are resilient after a morning of some of the bloodiest economic numbers to date.

Talking heads were on the financial channels proclaiming "Priced In!" and "a bottom is at hand."

It should be noted that this is a holiday-shortened week, heading into the November weekend close. Many financial institutions end their fiscal year in November.

The nation will not recover until the financial sector is brought back into a balance with the real economy.

Increasingly the public is not believing the usual lies and deceptions. A bottom may be in for the willing acceptance of fraud and a tolerance of white collar crime. The backlash could be terrific.



Dollar briefly extends declines vs yen after Chicago PMI
Wed Nov 26, 2008 9:58am EST

NEW YORK, Nov 26 (Reuters) - The U.S. dollar briefly extended declines versus the Japanese yen on Wednesday after a report on business activity in the Midwest fell more than expected...

The Institute for Supply Management-Chicago said its index of Midwest business activity fell in November to 33.8 from 37.8 in October. Economists polled by Reuters had forecast a drop to 36.7.

"The Chicago PMI is the worst number since Feb. 1982 and the numbers continue to show that the economy is still deteriorating," said Andrew Bekoff, chief investment officer at LPB Capital LLC in Doylestown, Pennsylvania.


17 November 2008

Goldman Sachs Target of Naked Short-Selling and Price Manipulation Complaints in High Yield Loan Markets


The charge is that as an agent bank Goldman Sachs has access to private information that gives it an advantage in the opaque market of high risk debt, and they have been using that information to target certain portions of the market with naked short selling to drive down prices and reap large profits for themselves at the expense of their clients and other market participants.

This is the template for potential market fraud that we described previously on several occasions. The banks have privileged information and access to funds that precludes a level playing field with other market participants. The uneven enforcement of the rules by the SEC and CFTC and lack of transparency in other markets is another significant factor.

We should note that the fails in this end of the markets are relative small change when compared to the fails in the Treasuries markets as we have previously shown, overseen by the Fed.

Now that Goldman is trading with public funds from the Treasury granted without oversight or restrictions by their former chairman the situation becomes even more outrageous, almost incredible.

Perhaps there is no explicitly legal wrong-doing. And we are only using this allegation against Goldman Sachs as an example. But even a simple top down examination of the market structures shows the weakness of our regulatory process, and the failure of crony capitalism and laissez-faire self-regulation to create markets that are transparent and worthy of trust and confidence for all participants. They more closely resemble dishonest poker games.

Until the financial system is reformed there can be no sustainable recovery.

Bring back Glass-Steagall and honest, responsive, and transparent regulation of the markets.


Bloomberg
Goldman Targeted by Investor Complaints of Naked Short-Selling
By Pierre Paulden and Caroline Salas

Nov. 17 (Bloomberg) -- Investors in the $591 billion high- yield, high-risk loan market are accusing Goldman Sachs Group Inc. of naked short selling to profit from record price declines.

At least two fund managers complained verbally to officials of the Loan Syndications and Trading Association, saying they believe Goldman helped drive down prices by using the technique, according to people with knowledge of the objections. New York- based Goldman is acting against its clients by trying to profit at their expense, the investors said.

A $171 billion drop in the value of the loans in the past year is pitting banks against investing clients on assets once considered so safe they typically traded at par. The drop exposed flaws in an unregulated market where trades can take from several days to months to settle and banks may have information unavailable to investors. In a naked-short transaction, a firm would sell debt it didn’t already own, betting the price will fall before it purchases the loan and delivers it to the buyer.

“The LSTA is closely monitoring issues of naked short selling,” Alicia Sansone, head of communications, marketing and education at the New York-based industry association, said in an e-mail.

The group, comprising banks and money management firms that trade the debt, plans to tighten rules to ensure transactions are settled more quickly and prices reported accurately, Sansone said. She wouldn’t elaborate or discuss the claims against Goldman....

Most Aggressive

The bank was seen as the most aggressive in recent months in selling loans at prices below other dealers’ offers and taking longer than the LSTA’s recommended seven days to settle the deals, according to the investors complaining to the trade group.

There’s no rule preventing naked short selling of loans. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission this year banned the practice for 19 stocks including Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from July 21 to Aug. 12 as share prices plunged. New York-based Lehman, once the fourth-biggest securities firm, eventually went bankrupt and Fannie and Freddie, the two largest mortgage-finance providers, were brought under government conservatorship. (Excuse us but isn't naked short selling of stocks illegal in the US? The SEC just does not enforce the law and the list of 19 was just a declaration of vigilant enforcement for a select group of 'special companies.' - Jesse)/em>

The slump in loan prices during the global seizure in credit markets is causing particular disruption in the loan market because the debt typically trades close to 100 cents on the dollar. Prices never were below 90 cents until February this year. By October they had fallen to a record low of 71 cents, according to data compiled by Standard & Poor’s. The decline, which S&P said equated to losses of about $171 billion, helped drive the complaints from fund managers.

‘Shell-Shocked’

“Investors are shell-shocked” by the decline, said Christopher Garman, chief executive officer of debt-research firm Garman Research LLC in Orinda, California. “In many ways they’re all but wiped out.”

Because prices were so stable, short sales of loans were unheard of until now, Elliot Ganz, general counsel of the LSTA, said at the group’s annual conference in New York last month.

“No one ever shorted loans,” Ganz said. “Prices never went down.”


High-yield, or leveraged, loans are given to companies with below-investment grade ratings, or less than Baa3 at Moody’s Investors Service and under BBB- at S&P. Banks typically form a group to arrange the financing. They then find other investors to take pieces of the debt, helping spread the risk.

Those loan parts can trade through private negotiations between banks and hedge funds or mutual funds. One of the lenders involved in the initial deal remains the so-called agent bank, which keeps track of who owns what piece. Unlike bonds and stocks, the debt doesn’t trade on an exchange and has no central clearinghouse.

Agent Banks

When a loan changes hands, the agent bank must sign off on the transaction, meaning it knows exactly who is buying and who is selling. The rest of the market is in the dark. Getting an agent to sign off, also can delay settlement.

An agent will have a bird’s-eye view of who owns what and when,” said John Jay, a senior analyst at Aite Group LLC, a research firm that specializes in technology and regulatory issues in Boston. “They have information that no one else has....”

Three Days

In the bond market, the standard settlement time is three days following the trade. In a bond short sale, a trader acquires debt by borrowing the security in a deal known as a repurchase contract. The two sides specify how long the bond will be borrowed with the right to renew the pact. Because loans can’t be borrowed through such agreements, any short seller would have to go naked.

While the LSTA doesn’t track the amount of loans currently unsettled, at least 700 trades made by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. before it filed for bankruptcy hadn’t cleared, Ganz told last month’s conference....


30 October 2008

Even in a "Market Meltdown" and a "Once-In-A-Lifetime Financial Panic...."


...the Other People's Money (OPM) managers can still find time to paint the tape into the end of month.

When this coat dries, they *might* try to slip on one more layer of paint before the weekend, but if we break to the downside we would look for a complete retrace of this rally to retest the lows.

Why? Because it is based solely on speculation, market manipulation and esperimentation by the Fed and Treasury. It is not based on anything organic to the economy, neither reform nor restructuring.

Wall Street corruption is one of the biggest impediments to an economic recovery. It has become an inefficient obstacle to capital allocation, price discovery, and real economic growth.

The US financial system represents a general systemic risk to the rest of the world because of the manipulation of the US dollar as reserve currency to serve the short term secular interests of a small but powerful financial elite.