The Japanese Stagnation

This is interesting, and probably an eye-opener for most Western readers.

Most Japanese mortgages are 'recourse' loans meaning that the borrower still owes the full amount of the loan even in the event of foreclosure. One of the reasons for this is that so many Japanese residential buildings are not intended to outlast the 35 year mortgage and depreciate from the day they are bought.

The Japanese government promoted officially backed mortgage programs to keep the economy going, cutting down payments to zero from the traditional 20 percent. This lured in buyers who really could not afford the houses, and are often the first to have their pay cut in an economic downturn.

Japan uses a semi-annual bonus system as part of its pay structure for employees, the bonus portion of which is more readily sacrificed for the company good.

Please consider these things in the context of the governance of Japan which as we have said is semi-feudal, ruled by a few corporations and the wealthy elite in partnership with essentially a one party government.

This will go a long way in helping to understand the "Japanese disease" of economic stagnation. You start by crippling the middle class through debt indebtedness to a corporate elite.

The Japan Times
The only bonus you'll get this summer is the sun
By Philip Brasor
June 28, 2009

One of the cleverest ideas developed by the Japanese business world is the distribution of semiannual "bonuses" to employees. Usually, a bonus is tied to a company's good fortune or an employee's performance. Japanese workers have always deemed them to be part of their salaries and tend to plan their finances accordingly. Employees and employers look at bonuses differently: The former see them as an entitlement, while the latter use them as a safety valve.

With the onset of the recession, Japanese companies have exercised their option to reduce or even cancel bonuses, and for the past month the media has been buzzing with a new term — June crisis — to describe the situation of workers who may not be able to meet mortgage payments as a result.

June and December are bonus months, and 45 percent of Japanese people with housing loans have contracts that require them to pay larger amounts in these months than they do in other months, in some cases as much as five times.

Publications and TV news shows have been filled with human-interest stories about people suddenly faced with the possibility of losing their homes. The Asahi Shimbun tells of a 40-year-old housewife whose husband did not receive a bonus this month and apparently won't receive one in December either. Even worse, his salary has been cut by 20 percent. They have 20 years left on their 35-year mortgage. They pay only ¥80,000 a month toward the loan, but during each bonus month they pay ¥400,000. With one child in university and another in junior high school, they have saved very little. "When we took out our mortgage," the woman says, "it was unthinkable that my husband's bonus would be zero."

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, homeowners now spend an average of 20.5 percent of their disposable income on housing loans, the highest portion ever. Meanwhile, the Japan Business Federation has reported that total bonus payments this June is 19 percent less than the total for last year, the greatest year-on-year drop since they started compiling statistics in 1959.

In the past, company labor unions would protest to employers when bonuses were cut, calling bonuses "life expenses," but recently they have taken management's side and agreed that bonuses should be tied to company performance. But the roots of the June crisis go deeper. Housing has always been the government's main means of economic stimulation. During the 1990s, when the economy was stagnant, housing was pretty much the only sector keeping the economy going thanks to the Flat 35 scheme, which allowed home buyers to take out loans with only 10 percent down payments instead of the usual 20 percent. The government's new stimulus measures eliminate down payments altogether for Flat 35. These loans are guaranteed by a government entity called the Japan Housing Finance Agency.

A person who wouldn't normally be able to buy a home can more easily buy one, and as we have seen with the subprime loan fiasco in the United States, lowering the bar for home ownership can have disastrous consequences. People who bought homes in the '90s under the Flat 35 scheme with "relaxed" (yutori) interest rates are the ones most affected by the June crisis.

NHK illustrated this tendency on the program "Yudoki Network" with the story of a former taxi driver who received a notice from JHFA saying that since he was delinquent for six months he would have to pay the balance of his loan — more than ¥24 million for a ¥36 million condo he bought in 1998 — or the condo would be auctioned off. The man's situation is worse than it sounds, because if his condo is repossessed, he still has to pay off his loan.

Japanese mortgages are recourse loans, meaning the borrower is still liable even after foreclosure. Depending on the state, most banks in America offer nonrecourse loans, which are secured by collateral, usually the property itself. Once they foreclose, the borrower's debts are gone. If you default on a recourse loan, you're messed up three times: you lose your home, you lose all the money you sunk into it, and you still have debt. Wait, make that four times — your credit rating is garbage.

The taxi driver opted to sell his condo before it went on the block (where it would probably sell for about 80 percent of its market value), but the realtor he hired said she could get, at most, ¥25 million for it. With all the fees involved, he'd still end up ¥3 million in the hole. Fuji TV's "Sakiyomi" profiled an unemployed sushi chef facing foreclosure who still owes ¥9 million on his three-bedroom Chiba Prefecture house. All the realtors he's talked to say his property is worth about ¥5 million but the only offer he's gotten is ¥2.5 million. His family has already left him and he's contemplated suicide. These cases are accompanied by advice from financial planners that boils down to refinancing the loan so that monthly payments are reduced. But that means extending the loan period and, as a result, paying more money in the end for a home that will likely be worth nothing, which they rarely mention. Recourse loans are directly related to Japan's infamous "scrap-and-build" housing policy. Banks can't be expected to lend money for houses that start losing value the moment construction is completed if those houses are used as collateral.

There are more than 6 million vacant houses in Japan. Most will never be sold, because they're pieces of crap that were never meant to outlast their 35-year mortgages. Condominiums are no better. On average, Tokyo "mansions" built in 1990, when land values peaked, were selling for half their original prices by 2004.

Interviewed on NHK Radio, economist Akiko Hagiwara said that people who realistically can't afford homes have been suckered into buying them in order to prop up the economy. People in this income bracket are also typically the first to get laid off or have their bonuses cut. "They're victims of the government," she said.

The Particularity of Japan from an Economic and Demographic Perspective

Since Japan is so often, and as we think incorrectly, cited as a likely deflationary pattern for the US in monetary outcomes, and since so few who discuss this subject have an understanding of Japanese culture and social structures, I thought it would be timely to point out a basic fact that should be reasonably well known but is so often overlooked.

Japanese population growth is flat, and the percent of the population that is no longer economically productive is growing rather quickly.

So would we be so suprised that Japan's GDP is flat, and that their money supply growth is sluggish? One should not be, unless they are not bothering to look at the data.

America also has an aging population as do many countries, but Japan is unique because of its extraordinarily low rates of immmigration due to the very homogenous nature of Japanese society.



Japanese population is now estimated at about 127.7 million people with a very nominal immigration rate of about 20,000 people per year and a negative birth-death rate.



When one mixes a negative native birth-death rate and very low immigration due to a rigid approach to race and citizenship, it should be no suprise that Japan has an unusually high level of elderly citizens.



The charts seem to suggest that countries with significantly aging populations with low population growth will experience a natural slow growth in GDP.

As you know we tend to like to view money supply growth and GDP in relation with each other and to per capita variables.

When one adds to this demographic mix the Japanese cultural bias to low domestic consumption and a high savings rate, and a bureacratic bias to a mercantilist industrial policy, the reasons for Japan's economic status become rather obvious.



I am not suggesting that Japan must change. I have spent many happy moments in Japan, and spent a great deal of time to learn the language and understand the culture, albeit with results inadequate to my hopes.

I have had many Japanese friends, and find great enjoyment in their art and music and social personality. I regret that I have not been to visit there in some years, and have forgotten so much and miss so many old acquantances. And I am particularly at a loss for their wonderful cuisine which I find fascinating, uniquely refreshing and delightful.

It is important to understand a country in its context, and with some attention to detail and its particulars, if one is going to perform an economic analyis and then perform broad comparisons and construct models.

Demographically speaking, Japan is an outlier with some unique characteristics. If one does not consider this, it can be a source of false conclusions.

Balance Sheet Recessions and Japan Redux

Here are a few excerpts from an essay by Axel Leijonhufvud at VoxEU which was brought to my attention by xyphius from Japan.

The essay in particular was quite good, but the introductory comments in the email from xyphius were also quite to the point that we've been making here for some time.

"I've been wondering about the consequences of what Japan did in the lost decade and whether there are any lessons to be learnt from it. I remember asking a (Japanese) friend in the early part of this decade (before Chinese Viagra revived the moribund economy) why after so many years with so little to show from policy there was little pressure for change - his reply: "We aren't hurting enough to want to change."

I take my cue from that answer: Deficit spending was a palliative that bought off demands for political reform, and propping up the banks and by extension their insolvent clients prevented a liquidation in which a meaningful transfer of assets could have occurred. In short, the political, bureaucratic and business oligopoly maintained the status quo ante.

What might become of the cocoon years? A horrible festering mess?!"

It could be something beautiful if Japan embraces reform and becomes a more vibrant, open democracy and breaks up the keiretsu economy and the tyranny by bureaucracy. It is as likely if not moreso that Japan would choose a return to national fascism. But having expended the flower of its youth in the last great War, and with zero population growth, Japan would likely need a more youthful ally. War is an old man's game, but younger men provide the fuel.

The object lesson here for us of course is that the US is going down the same path, with a military-financial complex that resists change, and may subject the country to enough of a economic scourging to set the stage for rescue by a 'great man' as national saviour. Fascism was a rather popular choice the last time the world went through a deflationary depression.

To make it pointedly clear, the US must reform its financial system which requires breaking up the big Wall Street money center banks. Once broken up they may more easily be reintegrated into an organic economy, and stimulus may take root in a real economy.

The point is not to save the banks. The point is to save the depositors, the pension funds, and the good regional banks that are banks, and not vehicles of financial engineering.

The dollar must relinquish its role as the reserve currency of the world, because our hobbits, dwarves, and men have shown themselves incapable of wielding that power gracefully. It is too great a temptation and its misuse will result in our own destruction. But we must also reform the international trade system and prevent the blatant market manipulation of the Asian tigers, China and Japan.

There are those who say, "Why can't things just go on as they have done?" The awareness that things have changed will penetrate the public consciousness slowly. It's over. It's done. Things must go forward, and we can never go back. You cannot keep trying to rebuild the unsustainable, because eventually the great forces of probability will crush you.

Our fate should we fail to reform our system is to change into something more horrible than we can possibly imagine.

And here are the excerpts from the VoxEU essay by Axel Leijonhufvud.

Richard Koo (2003) coined the term “balance sheet recession” to characterise the endless travail of Japan following the collapse of its real estate and stock market bubbles in 1990. The Japanese government did not act to repair the balance sheets of the private sector following the crash. Instead, it chose a policy of keeping bank rate near zero so as to reduce deposit rates and let the banks earn their way back into solvency. At the same time it supported the real sector by repeated large doses of Keynesian deficit spending. It took a decade and a half for these policies to bring the Japanese economy back to reasonable health.

The Swedish policy following the 1992 crisis has been often referred to in recent months. Sweden acted quickly and decisively to close insolvent banks, and to quarantine their bad assets into a special fund. Eventually, all the assets, good and bad, ended up in the private banking sector again. The stockholders in the failed banks lost all their equity while the loss to taxpayers of the bad assets was minimal in the end. The operation was necessary to the recovery but what actually got the economy out of a very sharp and deep recession was the 25-30% devaluation of the krona which produced a long period of strong export-led growth. Needless to say, the US is in no position to emulate this aspect of the Swedish success story.

Why not?

The lesson to be drawn from these two cases is that deficit spending will be absorbed into the financial sinkholes in private sector balance sheets and will not become effective until those holes have been filled. During the years that national income fails to respond, tax receipts will be lower so that the national debt is likely to end up larger than if the banking sector’s losses had been “nationalised” at the outset.

No Ordinary Recession by Axel Leijonhufvud

The Stock Index - Gold Ratios and a Brief Aside on Japan

The Stock Index - Gold Ratios are important in gauging significant stock market declines.

Stocks may go nominally lower or gold can increase to make the ratios go lower in their reversion to a more sustainable pre-bubble level. Gold is the anti-bubble which is why it is so detested by the bubblemaniacs.

A key question of course is when did the bubble begin? Many would say almost certainly with the advent of the Greenspan Fed Chairmanship in 1987. There is a case to be made for Reaganomics and supply side experimentation.

Estimates of nominal levels are probably not valid based on pre-1971 examples because of the constraints on monetary policy imposed by the gold standard.

As you know we dislike the facile comparisons with Japan because their recent economic experience was driven by some outrageous policy errors that could only occur in a kereitsu dominated economy with a heavily bureaucratic political structure. Japan has been essentially a one-party electoral system since their adoption of democracy, and remains widely misunderstood in the West, and perhaps even by themselves. Japan is in the process of becoming, which is why we prefer to think of its 'lost decades' as its cocoon years. It will be interesting to see what emerges.

Japanese Economist Urges Selective Default on US Treasury Debt

Here is an intriguing proposal for a 'selective default' of US Treasury debt to head off a massive devaluation of the dollar, and to promote the US recovery from the ravages of its self-inflicted financial damage.

No matter how one wishes to describe it, the US will have to default on its sovereign debt, most likely on a selective basis, writing down the rest through an inflated dollar. The Japanese recognize this and are volunteering a tentative plan to accomplish it to support their industrial policy.

Although there is a potential for a voluntary debt forgiveness from Japan as a loyal client state, we wonder if the rest of the world will be inclined to accept an unreformed dollar hegemony.

Can the economic world so woefully lack the will, knowledge, and the imagination to develop a more equitable mechanism for international trade?

Financial reforms, although not even on the table yet, are certain to come with any sustained recovery. There has been nothing even seriously proposed yet as Bernanke and Paulson rush to supply fresh capital to prop up the status quo and aid their cronies on Wall Street.

We can surely do better than this.


Bloomberg
Japan Should Scrap U.S. Debt; Dollar May Plummet, Mikuni Says
By Stanley White and Shigeki Nozawa

Dec. 24 (Bloomberg) -- Japan should write-off its holdings of Treasuries because the U.S. government will struggle to finance increasing debt levels needed to dig the economy out of recession, said Akio Mikuni, president of credit ratings agency Mikuni & Co.

The dollar may lose as much as 40 percent of its value to 50 yen or 60 yen from the current spot rate of 90.40 today in Tokyo unless Japan takes “drastic measures” to help bail out the U.S. economy, Mikuni said. Treasury yields, which are near record lows, may fall further without debt relief, making it difficult for the U.S. to borrow elsewhere, Mikuni said. (We struggle a bit with the notion of Treasury yields falling without a substantial debt relief. One would think they would be increasing to uncomfortable levels as the risk of an involuntary default increases, unless the Fed plans to aggressively monetize them to peg the yield curve, trashing the Dollar in the process. - Jesse)

“It’s difficult for the U.S. to borrow its way out of this problem,” Mikuni, 69, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television broadcast today. “Japan can help by extending debt cancellations.” (We seem to have surpassed the Ponzi viability boundary. - Jesse)

The U.S. budget deficit may swell to at least $1 trillion this fiscal year as policy makers flood the country with $8.5 trillion through 23 different programs to combat the worst recession since the Great Depression. Japan is the world’s second-biggest foreign holder of Treasuries after China.

The U.S. government needs to spend on infrastructure to maintain job creation as it will take a long time for banks to recover from $1 trillion in credit-market losses worldwide, Mikuni said. The U.S. also needs to launch public works projects as the Federal Reserve’s interest rate cut to a range of zero to 0.25 percent on Dec. 16. won’t stimulate consumer spending because households are paying down debt, he said. (One would look for policies to increase the median hourly wage to facilitate this. So far we are seeing nothing, if not the opposite, to support this. - Jesse)

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama wants to create 3 million jobs over the next two years, more than the 2.5 million jobs originally planned, an aide said on Dec. 20. Obama takes office on Jan. 20.

Marshall Plan

Japan should also invest in U.S. roads and bridges to support personal spending and secure demand for its goods as a global recession crimps trade, Mikuni said.

Japan’s exports fell 26.7 percent in November from a year earlier, the Finance Ministry said on Dec. 22. That was the biggest decline on record as shipments of cars and electronics collapsed.

Combining debt waivers with infrastructure spending would be similar to the Marshall Plan that helped Europe rebuild after the destruction of World War II, Mikuni said.

“U.S. households simply won’t have the same access to credit that they’ve enjoyed in the past,” he said. “Their demand for all products, including imports, will suffer unless something is done.”

The plan was named after George Marshall, the U.S. secretary of state at the time, and provided more than $13 billion in grants and loans to European countries to support their import of U.S. goods and the rebuilding of their industries

Currency Reserves

The Japanese government could use a new Marshall Plan as a chance to shrink its $976.9 billion in foreign-exchange reserves, the world’s second-largest after China’s, and help reduce global economic imbalances, Mikuni said.

The amount of foreign assets held by the Japanese government and the private sector total around $7 trillion, Mikuni said.

Japan will also have to accept that a stronger yen is good for the country in order to reduce excessive trade surpluses and deficits, he said. The yen has appreciated 23 percent versus the dollar this year, the most since 1987, as the credit crisis prompted investors to flee riskier assets and repay loans in the Japanese currency.

“Japan’s economic model has been dependent on external demand since the Meiji Period” that began in 1868, Mikuni said. “The model where the U.S. relies on overseas borrowing to fuel its property market is over. A strong yen will spur Japanese domestic spending and reduce import prices, thereby increasing purchasing power.”

Japan Government to Buy 20 Trillion Yen in Stock to Support Their Markets

You have to wonder why they just don't give money directly to their people, and allow them to use their discretion to invest and consume, rather than use the money to prop up a zombie market at the direction of a central planning bureaucracy.

It probably speaks volumes about their priorities in valuing the keiretsu and its crypto-medieval organization over the individual. The artificial composition of their economy is remarkable, and understood by few economists in the West with the cultural bias of their models.

You have to wonder if there will be any auto stocks in that share festival.

Japan plans to buy $227 billion in shares to boost market
By Michael Kitchen
8:11 a.m. EST Dec. 18, 2008

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- Japan's government said Thursday it is submitting a bill to parliament allowing for the purchase of 20 trillion yen ($227 billion) in stock to help stabilize the Japanese stock market, Kyodo news reported.

Under the bill, the Banks' Shareholding Acquisition Corporation, originally created in January 2002, would resume buying shares from banks and other entities, the Japanese news agency reported.

The bill would be introduced early next month "with an eye to implementing the measure by the end of March," the report quoted lawmakers as saying. The Liberal Democratic Party had intially considered just 10 trillion in stock purchases, but the size was roughly doubled to 20 trillion yen at the request of its ruling coalition partner, the New Komeito party, the report said.