America's Lost Decade in Equities

For the first time since the 1930's this decade represents negative returns for the SP500. Remarkably this chart represents nominal total returns.

Adjusted for the weaker dollar and inflation, the 'buy and hold' philosophy, especially for those nearing their retirements, has been a disaster. But it has been great times for speculators and insiders and the productive economy.

Part of the problem is with the 401k concept as a supplement if not replacement for pensions and savings, as well as portfolios for educational purposes. Their implementation offers too few choices for the average person. Do you wish to buy corporate stocks or corporate bonds? Or money market funds where the value is not guaranteed? Short term Treasuries, if you are fortunate.

The piling into corporate bonds in the US today may be in part driven by this lack of genuine choice, the seeking for 'conservative choices' and is setting up the many for staggering losses in the event that stagflation does indeed occur. Bond funds are no safe havens.

Two tax reforms, or at least stimulus, that the US might consider is increasing the annual allowance of $3,000 which the taxpayer may claim from prior capital losses against current income. The amount has been the same for many years, and an increase would help the average person clean their books up a bit. A second program might be stimulus, in allowing the average person to take for example $10,000 out of their IRA or 401k tax free for one time.

The Reformer will not do anything that does not benefit Wall Street, but if the US wishes to obtain some serious reforms in its financial system there is a rich ground to sow the seeds of renewal, given the neglect and abuse of the last twenty years.

The banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, and balance restored to the economy before there can be any sustained recovery.

Going the Way of AIG with Dollar Holders as Patsies

The Guidotti-Greenspan rule states that a nation's reserves should equal short-term (one-year or less maturity) external (foreign) debt, implying a ratio of reserves-to-short term debt of 1. The rationale is that countries should have enough reserves to resist a massive withdrawal of short term foreign capital.

The rule is named after Pablo Guidotti – Argentine former deputy minister of finance – and Alan Greenspan –former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. Guidotti first stated the rule in a G-33 seminar in 1999, while Greenspan widely publicized it in a speech at the World Bank (Greenspan, 1999).

Guzman Calafell and Padilla del Bosque (2002) found that the ratio of reserves to external debt is a relevant predictor of an external crisis.

This is an interesting application of the Greenspan-Guidotti Rule by Porter Stansberry below because it includes the value of the gold at market prices, as well as the oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and all the foreign reserves on the books of the US against the total foreign debt owed in using the Greenspan-Guidotti rule for its default assessment.

Those who argue for a stronger dollar because of deflation due to domestic credit destruction overlook the reality of the yawning imablance of US debt to external creditors, and the need to deal with it without writing it off like a home mortage.

Yes, the US has lots of buildings, and minerals in the ground, and forests and proprietary software, and overpriced financial assets, and tranches of dodgy mortgages to sell. We are discussing AAA liquid assets here, without significant counterparty risk. Those peddling US debt instruments to Asia these days are getting a very cold reception.

What Porter Stansberry says is valid, with the important exception that the US still owns the world's reserve currency. Otherwise it would be well on its way to a hyperinflationary climax.

This is why we do not expect the default to be like the Lehman Brothers over-weekend implosion, nor as dramatic as the crisis in Dubai, or more historically the failure of the post-Soviet Russia. The US is too big to fail.

The dollar will devalue to unexpected lows, not with a bang but a whimper.

More AIG than Lehman, with high profile big-talking executives, self-serving accounting, bonuses to the perpetrators, de facto bailout and subsidies from frightened central bankers, and all that until the rest of the world can adjust. The US will most likely wallow in stagflation until it can get itself together again, barring a global conflict.

There are structural issues for sure. The US is still the consumer of the world's export products, especially manufactured goods. The problem is that they are paying for it with paper that is increasingly worthless. And it is militarily the only remaining superpower.

Do not expect this to be a straightfoward default. The US money center banks are wielding weapons of financial mass destruction, and are not afraid of gooning it up in the markets for real products, as they still exercise significant pricing power.

It may be our currency, but it's your problem.'' John Connolly, Treasury Secretary, in response to European anger at the 1971 US gold default

So, it will take time for the exporting nations to grow their domestic markets, and to find new customers at home and abroad. It will take time for the nations to agree on a new currency regime, as the US has now pulled the rug out from under them once again with the quantitative easing of the dollar. But that adjustment effort is now well underway. With regard to change, "It is not necessary to change. Your survival is not mandatory." - W. Edwards Deming

The downside of structural change after a long decline is that once it occurs, it is difficult to obtain one's prior reputation and position.

"When governments go bankrupt it's called "a default." Currency speculators figured out how to accurately predict when a country would default. Two well-known economists - Alan Greenspan and Pablo Guidotti - published the secret formula in a 1999 academic paper. That's why the formula is called the Greenspan-Guidotti rule.

The rule states: To avoid a default, countries should maintain hard currency reserves equal to at least 100% of their short-term foreign debt maturities. The world's largest money management firm, PIMCO, explains the rule this way: "The minimum benchmark of reserves equal to at least 100% of short-term external debt is known as the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. Greenspan-Guidotti is perhaps the single concept of reserve adequacy that has the most adherents and empirical support."

The principle behind the rule is simple. If you can't pay off all of your foreign debts in the next 12 months, you're a terrible credit risk. Speculators are going to target your bonds and your currency, making it impossible to refinance your debts. A default is assured.

So how does America rank on the Greenspan-Guidotti scale? It's a guaranteed default.

The U.S. holds gold, oil, and foreign currency in reserve. The U.S. has 8,133.5 metric tonnes of gold (it is the world's largest holder). That's 16,267,000 pounds. At current dollar values, it's worth around $300 billion. The U.S. strategic petroleum reserve shows a current total position of 725 million barrels. At current dollar prices, that's roughly $58 billion worth of oil. And according to the IMF, the U.S. has $136 billion in foreign currency reserves. So altogether... that's around $500 billion of reserves. Our short-term foreign debts are far bigger."

Porter Stansberry, The bankruptcy of the United States is now certain

Davidowitz: What Recovery? The US Consumer Is Struggling

Howard Davidowitz is our favorite retail analyst.

Appearance versus Reality is the theme in the Enron Nation.



And Winners of the Retail Apocalypse: Amazon, Walmart, Kohls and Dollar Tree.
Personally I like Costco, Amazon, and Lowes, because even thought they may not have the very lowest price, they provide exceptional value and a little something 'extra.'

David is probably right, because She-Who-Shops says he is, and is a hands-on expert.

Gold, the Comex and Exchange For Physical

This report below comes from John Cheney of Service Analytics.

We would not conclude that you cannot get gold from the Comex in the exercise of your futures contract. "Cash settled" is nothing new, and we ourselves have done this in the past. But we have been speaking with other traders and funds, and some are spotting a trend.

Comex is putting forward the offer of paper in the form of money or ETF positions aggressively, and it is the much easier alternative. Delivery of physical gold from the Comex is no longer as straightforward or even as semi-convenient as it had been in the past. In fact, it is difficult, and one must be persistent and wait long periods of time. At least, this is what we hear.

We would like to know if there has been a recent independent audit of the Comex stores, with a clean sheet of bar numbers and the status of same. From what we hear it is a mess, as bad or worse as the recent scandal in Canada and the 'missing bullion.'

"Some months ago a chap described changes in the comex rules for futures contract deliveries. Therein it was described that the EFP, exchange for physical, rules were amended to allow for delivery of GLD shares in lieu of bullion.

Well take a look at something new, at least for me, in Monday’s comex preliminary volume and open interest report. On page 3 of the attachment, notice that in addition to futures contracts listed under the EFP category, a new category is listed: “Delivery Cash Settled” = 2866 december gold contracts. Just so happens 2866 was exactly the number of delivery notices issued on FND as reported in the Nov 27 vol and op int report.

Conclusion: guess you can no longer get bullion via using comex contracts. This apparently is the next step in the evolution of gold trading."

The conclusion we reach for now is that if one is counting on the ability to receive delivery of physical gold from the Comex for whatever purposes, then don’t. You will wait and fight and stand in queue to obtain the goods from the Enron nation.

But one principle we have learned over the years is never to attribute to bad intents what can be attributed to human error and mismanagement.