Gold, Eurodollars, and the Black Swan That Will Devour the US Futures and Derivatives Markets

The Eurodollars estimate in the chart below is based on the BIS Banking Statistics from Commercial Banks and may not include official reserves held by Central Banks. 

As you know the Federal Reserve stopped reporting Eurodollars some years ago, with the consequence that it also stopped reporting M3 money supply.

I like to think of Eurodollars and banking system derivatives as the Fed's off-balance-sheet method of monetization and policy implementation, with plausible deniability.  

Swap lines are provided to other Central Banks, and they in turn make the loans to their member banks, and from there to their customers.  So this eurodollar creation is made outside the real domestic economy, and therefore has no immediate effect on domestic money supply and prices at the end of the money chain.  But the effect is there, and the smart money closer to the financial system sees it coming. 

I do not know if the Fed's swap line activity actually shows up immediately in their Balance Sheet and therefore the Adjusted Monetary Base.  But I think it is fairly obvious that if swaps are used to create dollars by foreign central banks, who in turn loan those dollas to their own members, the impact of that broader dollar creation will only be felt with a significant lag in the domestic US economy.   But it will be felt at some point.

When the Fed was tracking Eurodollars, I believe that they were not counting certain assets, or liabilities from the banks point of view, as money.  What exactly those assets might be and how liquid they are is a open question.  How much of them were held in Agency debt, and how much in Treasury debt?  Is a liquid obligation held by a foreign source part of the broad money supply, or not?  Since it can be quickly converted into dollars, and then into another currency, leaves little question that it is potential money at least.

At least part of the problem being faced by Europe in this crisis is the sharp point of the deleveraging of US assets underlying dollar denominated debt.   And if foreign confidence in the US dollar debt breaks, the losses would be daunting for the holders of that debt, so there will first be a rush into Treasuries and away from Agency debt and CDOs.  This will be like the ocean retracting, causing people to flock to the shore in wonder at the cheapness of the debt.  But eventually the returning tsunami of US dollars may very well swamp the Fed's Balance Sheet and the domestic US economy and the savings of many.

The hyper-inflation of financial paper is happening quietly and  off the books. The growth rate in derivatives held by the Banks is mind boggling.  And how this will manifest in the real world economy is not fully known.  A good sized chunks of the financial system may simply vaporize.  And I suspect that the policy makers will heavily allocate the damage to the least powerful members of the private sector. 

Ownership of the real economy will continue to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Stagflation is the most likely outcome because of this lack of reform and the rise of a self-serving oligarchy.

As for the US Dollar, as I have said on numerous occasions, inflation and deflation are at the end of the day a policy decision.  Period.  Those who see a hyper-deflation or a hyper-inflation as inevitable elude my knowledge of the facts as they are.   The Fed owns a printing press, and it uses it selectively. 

Speaking of lags, I think the unusually long lag between the growth in Eurodollars and the price of Gold can be attributed to the gold sales programs by the Western Central Banks. Once those programs were suspended, and the Banks turned again into net buyers, the gold price rose dramatically.

The most recent Eurodollar operation of the Central Banks in relieving the Dollar short squeeze in euro is not yet in the totals.

It should also be noted that there are other correlations one can use in determining the gold price, most notable 'real interest rates.' However, there are linkages amongst all the variables, given a non-organic increase in the money supply and artificially low interest rates for example being among them.

So, when will the price of gold stop rising? Most likely when the Central Banks stop printing money, and return to transparently set market based interest rates and a productively reformed financial system.

'Not on the horizon' does come to mind.

I do not know if it will happen in gold or silver first, but the price management schemes that have been in place for a few decades now in the metals markets are reaching a tipping point.

To paraphrase what Kyle Bass recently said, 'There is $80 billion in open interest in gold futures and options, and there is $2.4 billion in deliverable gold at the exchange. The exchange is a fractional reserve system, and they plan for a one percent redemption. In the event of a greater demand for redemption, they assume that price will take care of it. The decision for a fiduciary is simple; take your billion in gold out now.'

And the situation in the silver market is even worse. It is a disaster waiting to happen.

At some point a 'black swan' event, or perhaps something the classical world would have simply called 'nemesis,' is going to knock the US futures market off its foundations.   The government and exchanges will seek to force a solution on market participants through the de facto seizure of positions and accounts, with a settlement dictated by the Banks.   MF Global looks like a dry run for that much larger default.

They will say once again that 'no one could see it coming.'  And the truth will fall into the same credibility trap that has swallowed all the other financial scandals, cover ups and bailouts since the S&L crisis.

"Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007-8, when the global financial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable.

It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artificial suppression of volatility -- the ups and downs of life -- in the name of stability. It is both misguided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability "tail risks" to disappear from policymakers' fields of observation...

Complex systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface.

Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting fluctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artificially constrained
systems become prone to “Black Swans” — that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers.

Such environments eventually experience massive blowups, catching everyone off-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems."

Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan of Cairo, Foreign Affairs

It is not yet clear when, or exactly how, but it seems inevitable that this scheme of the Anglo-American banking cartel will founder on the hard rocks of gold, silver, and the will of the people to be free, if they have but the mind to use it.

Going the Way of AIG with Dollar Holders as Patsies

The Guidotti-Greenspan rule states that a nation's reserves should equal short-term (one-year or less maturity) external (foreign) debt, implying a ratio of reserves-to-short term debt of 1. The rationale is that countries should have enough reserves to resist a massive withdrawal of short term foreign capital.

The rule is named after Pablo Guidotti – Argentine former deputy minister of finance – and Alan Greenspan –former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of the United States. Guidotti first stated the rule in a G-33 seminar in 1999, while Greenspan widely publicized it in a speech at the World Bank (Greenspan, 1999).

Guzman Calafell and Padilla del Bosque (2002) found that the ratio of reserves to external debt is a relevant predictor of an external crisis.

This is an interesting application of the Greenspan-Guidotti Rule by Porter Stansberry below because it includes the value of the gold at market prices, as well as the oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and all the foreign reserves on the books of the US against the total foreign debt owed in using the Greenspan-Guidotti rule for its default assessment.

Those who argue for a stronger dollar because of deflation due to domestic credit destruction overlook the reality of the yawning imablance of US debt to external creditors, and the need to deal with it without writing it off like a home mortage.

Yes, the US has lots of buildings, and minerals in the ground, and forests and proprietary software, and overpriced financial assets, and tranches of dodgy mortgages to sell. We are discussing AAA liquid assets here, without significant counterparty risk. Those peddling US debt instruments to Asia these days are getting a very cold reception.

What Porter Stansberry says is valid, with the important exception that the US still owns the world's reserve currency. Otherwise it would be well on its way to a hyperinflationary climax.

This is why we do not expect the default to be like the Lehman Brothers over-weekend implosion, nor as dramatic as the crisis in Dubai, or more historically the failure of the post-Soviet Russia. The US is too big to fail.

The dollar will devalue to unexpected lows, not with a bang but a whimper.

More AIG than Lehman, with high profile big-talking executives, self-serving accounting, bonuses to the perpetrators, de facto bailout and subsidies from frightened central bankers, and all that until the rest of the world can adjust. The US will most likely wallow in stagflation until it can get itself together again, barring a global conflict.

There are structural issues for sure. The US is still the consumer of the world's export products, especially manufactured goods. The problem is that they are paying for it with paper that is increasingly worthless. And it is militarily the only remaining superpower.

Do not expect this to be a straightfoward default. The US money center banks are wielding weapons of financial mass destruction, and are not afraid of gooning it up in the markets for real products, as they still exercise significant pricing power.

It may be our currency, but it's your problem.'' John Connolly, Treasury Secretary, in response to European anger at the 1971 US gold default

So, it will take time for the exporting nations to grow their domestic markets, and to find new customers at home and abroad. It will take time for the nations to agree on a new currency regime, as the US has now pulled the rug out from under them once again with the quantitative easing of the dollar. But that adjustment effort is now well underway. With regard to change, "It is not necessary to change. Your survival is not mandatory." - W. Edwards Deming

The downside of structural change after a long decline is that once it occurs, it is difficult to obtain one's prior reputation and position.

"When governments go bankrupt it's called "a default." Currency speculators figured out how to accurately predict when a country would default. Two well-known economists - Alan Greenspan and Pablo Guidotti - published the secret formula in a 1999 academic paper. That's why the formula is called the Greenspan-Guidotti rule.

The rule states: To avoid a default, countries should maintain hard currency reserves equal to at least 100% of their short-term foreign debt maturities. The world's largest money management firm, PIMCO, explains the rule this way: "The minimum benchmark of reserves equal to at least 100% of short-term external debt is known as the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. Greenspan-Guidotti is perhaps the single concept of reserve adequacy that has the most adherents and empirical support."

The principle behind the rule is simple. If you can't pay off all of your foreign debts in the next 12 months, you're a terrible credit risk. Speculators are going to target your bonds and your currency, making it impossible to refinance your debts. A default is assured.

So how does America rank on the Greenspan-Guidotti scale? It's a guaranteed default.

The U.S. holds gold, oil, and foreign currency in reserve. The U.S. has 8,133.5 metric tonnes of gold (it is the world's largest holder). That's 16,267,000 pounds. At current dollar values, it's worth around $300 billion. The U.S. strategic petroleum reserve shows a current total position of 725 million barrels. At current dollar prices, that's roughly $58 billion worth of oil. And according to the IMF, the U.S. has $136 billion in foreign currency reserves. So altogether... that's around $500 billion of reserves. Our short-term foreign debts are far bigger."

Porter Stansberry, The bankruptcy of the United States is now certain

Ladies and Gentlemen, the United States of America Is Insolvent

"In case you failed to catch it in our previous articles this year, we thought we’d state it outright for our readers this month: the United States Government is on a trajectory to default on their obligations. In its current financial condition, it will not be able to fund its forecasted budget deficits and unfunded Social Security and Medicare promises on top of its current debt obligations. This isn’t official yet, and we don’t know when the market will react to it, but there is no longer any doubt about the extent of their trajectory. There simply isn’t enough taxing power, value creation or outside capital willing to support its egregious spending...

The projected US deficit from 2009 to 2019 is now slated to be almost $9 trillion dollars. How on earth does anyone expect them to raise this capital? As we stated in a previous article, in order to satisfy US capital requirements, all existing investors would have had to increase their US bond purchases by 200% in fiscal 2009. Foreigners, however, only increased their purchases by a mere 28% from September 2008 to July 2009 - far short of what the US government required. The US taxpayer can’t cover the difference either. According to recent estimates, tax revenue from all sources would have to increase by 61% in order to balance the 2010 fiscal budget. Given that State government income tax revenues were down 27.5% in the second quarter, the US government will be lucky just to maintain its current level of tax revenue, let alone increase it.

The bottom line is that there is serious cause for concern here – and don’t be fooled into thinking this crisis will fix itself when (and if) the economy recovers. Just how bad is it?..." Sprott Asset Management

Just a reminder, in case you had forgotten in all the excitement of a bull market rally in US equities and a reasonably good baseball World Series.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the United States Is Insolvent, 29 May 2009

The States racked up some serious debt in keeping the world safe for democracy in the Second World War. On a percentage basis, it has recently spent a significant amount keeping its financial sector safe from productive effort and honest labour. They will raid the Treasury, take their fill, and then compel the government to confiscate the savings of a generation by defaulting on its obligations, its sovereign debt.

Latvia Goes "No Bid"

This bears watching. It may be nothing on the grander stage, but then again, there is a precedent for small events to trigger larger actions and reactions.

Latvia on the brink
By MarketWatch
Oct. 7, 2009, 10:04 a.m.

LONDON (MarketWatch) -- It's never good news when a government bond auction fails. It's particularly bad news when an auction fails for a note maturing in just six months. And it's really bad news when there isn't any bid at all.

Yet that's what happened Wednesday when Latvia tried to sell close to $17 million of paper. It's not hard to figure out why.

The Baltic country is squabbling with Western -- mostly Swedish -- leaders over spending cuts, and it's a very real possibility that the country may be forced to devalue its euro-pegged currency if emergency global funds don't arrive.

Were Latvia to devalue, that would hit economies in neighboring countries like Lithuania, and Swedish banks would rack up additional losses on the loans they have made throughout the region.

The real nightmare scenario would be the Swedish banks then pulling down other European banks, and then triggering Credit Crunch: Part 2.

There is, of course, a long way before that unwieldy scenario comes to pass. Latvia hasn't devalued -- yet - and, even if it does, that doesn't mean it would drag the Swedish banks under.

Lenders like Swedbank which has more branches in the Baltic countries and Ukraine than in Sweden -- have endured plenty of losses, and Swedbank, for one, just raised more than $2 billion to weather stormier times. See earlier story.

Still, investors might recall a minor matter involving teaser loans that only took down the entire world economy.

Not every domino falls. But there's one that's looking shaky.