15 December 2009

Is the US Financial Crisis Over?


This frankness and honest statement of the situation is the reason that Paul Volcker, one of the most credible advisors in the Obama Administration, is a marginalized voice as compared to Larry Summers and Turbo Tim. Ironic, because only by assuming Volcker's leadership style can the US President hope to get his country out of this cycle of monetary bubbles, systemic fragility, and chronic imbalances driven by an outsized, counterproductive financial sector.

DER SPIEGEL: But even though there are still more people being fired than hired, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke is saying that the recession is technically over. Do you agree with him?

Paul Volcker: You know, people get very technical about these things. We had a quarter of increased growth but I don't think we are out of the woods.

SPIEGEL: You expect a backlash?

Volcker: The recovery is quite slow and I expect it to continue to be pretty slow and restrained for a variety of reasons and the possibility of a relapse can't be entirely discounted. I'm not predicting it but I think we have to be careful.

SPIEGEL: What is the difference between this deep recession and all the other recessions we have seen since World War II?

Volcker: What complicates this situation, as compared to the ordinary garden variety recession, is that we have this financial collapse on top of an economic disequilibrium. Too much consumption and too little investment, too many imports and too few exports. We have not been on a sustainable economic track and that has to be changed. But those changes don't come overnight, they don't come in a quarter, they don't come in a year. You can begin them but that is a process that takes time. If we don't make that adjustment and if we again pump up consumption, we will just walk into another crisis.

SPIEGEL: The US has not yet instituted any kind of reform policy. What we see is the government and the Federal Reserve pouring money into the economy. If one looks beyond that money, one sees that the economy is in fact still shrinking.

Volcker: What should I say? That's right. We have not yet achieved self-reinforcing recovery. We are heavily dependent upon government support so far. We are on a government support system, both in the financial markets and in the economy...

The rest of the interview can be read here

The net Treasury International Capital flows came in light today at 20.7B versus 38.7B expected. GE was a drag on the big caps because of Immelt's lack of enthusiasm for any US recovery.

As a reminder, tomorrow the FOMC will make its December rate decision public at 2:15 EST. Traditationally there will be shenanigans abounding. In the morning the US will be revealing its premiere fantasy economy number, the Consumer Price Index.

As a heads up, Gold often gets hit with a bear raid on FOMC day. Since the miners were hit a bit today with possible front-running that might be a good bet. Who can say in these thin markets?

The US economy is much like this stock market rally: big on show and thin on substance.


Is the Price of World Silver the Result of Legitimate Market Discovery?


"...one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces. As extreme as JPMorgan’s position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

This makes claims that the COMEX short position represents a legitimate hedge of mine production a lie. The total short position represents almost 100% of the total visible and recorded silver bullion in the world, and 50% of the total one billion ounces thought to exist."

One cannot tell what is truth here easily, because of the still much too opaque nature of the US markets. But I do have a bias here, and I must disclose it up front. I have little confidence in the ability of the US regulators to do their jobs competently, and now approach anything that is said by the Obama administration regarding the financial markets with great skepticism.

In a fair market with transparent and symmetric distribution of key price information the identity of any holders of positions of over 5% of the market would be made known, so that people might understand the character of the market.

Further, any justification for these outsized positions and the 'backing' for them should also be made known publicly, and not just to a few insiders or regulators who expect to be trusted when past history shows that US regulators cannot be trusted to manage their markets reliably.

If this information about the silver market is indeed true, if J.P. Morgan is this short the silver market and unable to deliver even under duress, then perhaps the US should close down the Comex, because it has shown itself unable to be the price setter for the rest of the world in a metal with such broad industrial usage.

If it is not true, then the CFTC should publish its findings from its latest study of the silver market, and give the public the assurance that there is no manipulation in the silver market, and most importantly, why.

We have little confidence in the Obama Administration these days, which includes CFTC chairman, Clinton Alumni and ex-Goldman partner Gary Gensler as well, despite tough talk about position limits to quell speculation.

"The time for talk is over" should be a general theme in the Obama presidential term. They talk a good game, but never seem to deliver any meaningful reforms already promised, except those that might favor their own special interests.

This is important. It is important because in free markets producers must commit substantial amounts of capital in exploration and production to insure an adequate supply of any industrial commodity. And purchasers and other buyers and investors must be able to make their decisions with confidence.

Other parts of the world are moving towards establishing their own market clearing mechanisms in oil and key commodities outside of the sphere of the Anglo-American exchanges. If London and New York would prefer to continue to see their importance decline, then failing to regain the trust of the world through transparent reform after the enormous scandals that are still shaking world markets and financial systems would be advised, as they continue to do today.

It is not about pay. It is not about worrying that the traders might leave. It is time to show some concern for your customers, and about honest price discovery in a fair market, and making good after you have engaged in a massive fraud which the US and the Wall Street banks seem loathe to discuss when they worry about 'confidence.'

Is Mr. Butler wrong? Good, then show us why, not by belittling him personally, or picking details out of what he says and twisting them to try to undermine the whole of what he has to say. Public records show that there is an enormous short position in the silver metals market, that looks to be utterly out of bounds with physical reality and deliverability. If this is just a paper game then we need to know who is doing it and why, and why the world should accept this sort of nonsense as a basis for real production and real capital allocation.

And if this extreme speculation in silver is shown to be true, how do we know if this is the case in other US exchange based markets, like oil, and energy, and other metals, and food? Can the world afford to allow the US to set prices given the flaws which have been disclosed in their risk ratings and pricing mechanisms of late, despite the stony silence of their compliant media and the assurance of captive regulators? The pervasive fraud involved in the latest banking scandals has not yet been addressed adequately, and it is part of a pattern of misconduct going back to the 1990's at least. And even now, little or nothing has changed. The Partnership Between Wall Street and the Government Will Continue Until the System Collapses?

Show us the market. Show us who is holding the outsized longs and shorts, and what their motivations might be, whether it is a hedging producer, or as an agent for users and who they might be. And who the speculators are, and what limits on speculative manipulation might exist.

What sort of leverage is JPM employing? Are they hedging proven reserves for legitimate customers, or are they shoving prices around the plate using derivatives, simply because they can. It does not reassure us that in the not too distant past the London group of AIG was a major short side speculator in the silver market.

There is too much trading in insider and asymmetric information in the US markets, which is the cause of their opacity and the recent successes of con men, sometimes despite the repeated attempts by concerned market participants to bring suspected abuses to the attention of the regulators in what were later found to be obvious and outrageous frauds.

And as for reassurances that the regulators have conducted a study, with the details withheld, and have in their considered opinion found nothing amiss, don't make us laugh. After the Madoff Ponzi Scheme, the Enron energy manipulation, and the mortgage CDO scandal, US regulators have amply demonstrated their inability to manage their stewardship honestly and competently. At this stage they should be making amends and regaining confidence, and not dictating terms to a bunch of helpless domestic customers who continue to accept such shoddy and arrogant treatment by self-serving financial institutions, who dare to charge even good customers 26% credit card interest rates and outrageous fees, in the spirit of the Obama financial reform.

If the world were of a mind to it, they could buy those futures contracts, and demand physical delivery, and bring Wall Street to its knees. Except as we know it would not work, because the exchange would dictate terms, a settlement in paper, and Ben would provide it, at the buyer's ultimate expense. This is the degraded nature of the US dollar reserve currency regime as it exists today. It is become, as they say in Chicago, a 'racket.' Time for honesty again. This is the reform for which the American people elected a new government.

But yet even today, there is a lack of self-awareness, a lack of proportion and an ignorance of history, that allows many otherwise educated and responsible people to make statements like this excerpt quoted below, a neo-colonial variation of the white man's burden, and bet their future that this dependency on the Wall Street banking cartel will be sustained in perpetuity, because it is a kind of a natural law. This point of view is not an aberration, and underlies the comments of many Anglo-American financial institutions today.
"The dollar is the backbone of the world central banking system. It is the backbone of the China money system. The white cliffs of Dover are as likely to collapse."
I am not saying that Mr. Butler is right. I am saying that I no longer trust your markets and their integrity, and the honesty and competency of your agencies and regulators. And there is a groundswell of people around the world, and a quiet but growing majority in your own country, who feel the same way.


Extreme Speculation
By Ted Butler

...The main reason for my recurring thoughts that silver trading may be terminated on the COMEX someday is because that exchange is at the heart of the silver manipulation. If we are closer than ever to witnessing the end of the long-term silver manipulation, as I believe, it must mean an end the extreme concentration on the short side of COMEX silver futures. But the concentrated short position in COMEX silver futures is so extreme, that it is hard to imagine how it can be resolved in an orderly manner. The most recent data from the CFTC indicate that one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces. You have not seen anyone refute those findings, nor is it likely that you will.

So extreme is JPMorgan’s silver short position that it cannot be closed out in an orderly fashion. How could such a large position be closed out quickly, or otherwise, without strongly disturbing the market? If it could be closed out, it is reasonable to assume it would have already been closed out or greatly reduced to avoid the allegations of manipulation it raises. It’s not like the banks are presently universally loved and admired. The intent of anti-concentration guidelines and surveillance is to prevent the precise monopoly that JPMorgan has amassed on the short side of COMEX silver. Having erred egregiously in allowing this concentrated short position to develop, the CFTC is stuck with coming up with a solution to disband it. There is no easy solution.

Further, it is not just JPMorgan’s 200 million ounce COMEX silver short position that threatens the continued orderly functioning of COMEX silver trading. As extreme as JPMorgan’s position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

This makes claims that the COMEX short position represents a legitimate hedge of mine production a lie. The total short position represents almost 100% of the total visible and recorded silver bullion in the world, and 50% of the total one billion ounces thought to exist. These are truly preposterous amounts. By comparison, the net total short position in COMEX gold futures, admittedly no slouch in the short category, represents a little over 2% of the gold bullion that exists (45 million oz total net COMEX short position versus 2 billion oz). When it comes to the amount of real material, or mine production, in the world backing up the COMEX silver short position, the word “inadequate” takes on new meaning.

Because of the extreme mismatch between what is held short on the COMEX and what exists or could be produced to be potentially delivered against the short position, a very dangerous market situation exists. It is this dangerous situation that haunts me and causes me to contemplate a closing of the COMEX silver market. It has to do with what I see developing in the silver physical market and by putting myself in the other guy’s shoes. The other guy, in this case, is Gary Gensler, chairman of the CFTC.

It seems to me that there may be real stress in the wholesale physical silver market. All the factors I look at, including flows into ETFs, the shorting of SLV, the decline in COMEX silver inventories, the strong retail and institutional investment demand in silver, the now growing world industrial demand, etc., suggest tightness and the potential for a silver shortage like never before. This, in essence, is the real silver story. In spite of a large and growing concentrated short position, the price of silver suggests that it is the manipulation that is under stress. At some point, a physical silver shortage will destroy any amount of paper short selling. We may be very close to that point.

When the silver shortage hits, the price will explode. On this, there is no question. Industrial users, at the very first sign of delay in silver shipments, will immediately buy or try to buy more silver than they normally buy, in order to protect against future operation-interrupting delays. This is just human nature. The world has never experienced a true silver shortage ever, so the price impact is clearly unknown. I’ll try not to overstate how high I think the price will go in a true silver shortage and how quickly it will occur, so that I don’t sound too extreme. But the price move will give new meaning to “high” and “fast.”

Please remember, I am only talking of the price impact of the industrial users scrambling to secure silver supplies for their operations. This has always been my “doomsday machine” future silver price event. I am not speaking of new investment demand or short covering. Users, anxious to keep their assembly lines running and their workers employed will care less about price and more about availability and actual delivery. The users will buy with an urgency and reckless abandon rarely witnessed. That the price explosion caused by user buying will destroy the shorts is beyond doubt. So certain and devastating will be this destruction, that you must start asking questions as to what the regulatory reaction is likely to be. This is where you must try to put yourself in the other guy’s shoes. When the industrial silver shortage hits and prices explode, what would you do if you were Chairman Gensler?...

Read the rest of Mr. Butler's essay here.

14 December 2009

The Bankers Summit and Some Significant No-Shows


Some White House Banking summit.

A one on one with Jamie Dimon and a few second tier, TARP-bound moneylenders.

John Stumpf of Wells Fargo is running late but surely on his way. Tied up signing some last minute foreclosures. The opening topic must be how to spin 26% credit card interest rates as a consumer benefit.

Ken Lewis of Bank of America is there. LOL. Trying to pick up an unemployment check and cop a plea.

It appears that Goldman's Lloyd Blankfein, John Mack of Morgan Stanley, and Dick Parsons of Citgroup will not be able to make the meeting today with The One regarding executive pay and the failure to lend by the Wall Street Welfare Queens.

The excuses are not the usual: end of year performance reviews, too busy with the office redecorators, trying to settle the tab at Scores, on hold with the Neiman Marcus trophy-wife and office-chippy department, making plans to fix the Superbowl.

The boys were flying commerical to show their solidarity with the homeless people who fly coach, and are encountering traffic delays on their flights out of New York to Washington. Reagan National Airport is closed by fog. It doesn't get much more symbolic than that. Are Dulles and BWI are closed too? No. Jeez, these guys don't bother with alternate plans to visit the White House?

"We're sorry Timmy, but frankly the President DID call him a 'fat cat' last night on 60 Minutes. Did you really expect our guy to show up for coffee today like nothing happened? Larry had assured us that he knows his place. Besides, it worked better when he came up to see us the last time anyway."
It would be cool to be sitting at the gate with Lloyd. Think he is schmoozing there with the people? "Bagels and coffees for the terminal, on me."

Jamie did not condescend to act the plebe, and flew down in his corporate jet. And we do think Vikram was particularly ballsy in sending a delegate, executive figurehead, with a note that he is too busy negotiating the repayment of TARP in order to secure those year end bonuses for the troops.

Note to Lloyd and John and Dick, if you are traveling commercial from NYC to Washington in the winter, you take the train. And if flying you leave early or come down the night before, with dinner at The Palm. I recommend the peas and onions as your side. Carville hangs at the bar sometimes. He's a fun kind of guy.

It is always iffy when flying into National in the winter, except on Oligarch Express. Even Senators know that, and their feet barely touch the ground when they walk.

The Wall Street boys don't bother to show up for a command performance at the White House on some lame travel excuse, except for house banker and Treasury Secretary to be Jamie. Lloyd doesn't need to be Treasury Secretary because he already has one.

This is too good. You can't make this stuff up.


Propaganda, Western Style: Moscow Memories II


As regular readers know, Le Proprietaire was doing business in Russia, mostly in Moscow and St. Pete, in the 1990's as part of the overall international business portfolio during his past corporate life.

It was an exciting and somewhat nerve-wracking experience, but one that vividly drove home certain lessons about government, currency, and the resilience of the human spirit that have served well in the following decade. Moscow Memories of 1997

I have to admit I was not aware of this series about Russia by the Wall Street Journal, given a long term preference for The Economist and The Financial Times. Thanks to Zero Hedge for bringing this story about it from The Nation (which I would have never read, being a long time conservative) about the Journal and Steve Liesman to light.

As someone involved there I can say that anyone who did not perceive the growing crisis was living in a bubble, or carrying some particularly optimistic slant in their outlook.

The decline of the Russian economy was oppressive, palpable, almost on everyone's mind. Hard to miss, even at the occasional showy party in English thrown by western corporations for an audience largely made up of ex-pats. The move out of the rouble into just about anything else with substance was becomng a groundswell, later to become unstoppable default. Any presentation about a Russian venture in the 1990's had better contain some plans regarding currency risk.

But why bring this up now? Le Cafe has no particular squabble with the Liesman, and since we do not watch CNBC anymore, are largely immune to whatever it is he says that does not appear in a youtube excerpt, generally involving his getting owned by Rick Santelli.

We bring it up because this article below exposes the typical modus operandi of the Western press, now and over the past twenty years. Carry a party line until the situation explodes, cover it up and distract the public with phony debates and verbal circuses, and then back to give breaking coverage of Armageddon, with a twist of shared guilt. No one is to blame.

Can you remember the coverage of the tech bubble of 2000 by the media? Giddy excitement as the numbers climbed higher, with reassurance as they turned down that this was just a temporary setback.

And I will never forget, as the stocks collapsed and people were wiped out, the CNBC regular arrogantly saying "Well, no one FORCED them to buy those stocks."

Keep this in mind, because we are nearing that point again, with the western media reassuring its public that all is well, while the insiders sell, and the grifters and grafters are draining the nation of its wealth, while the propaganda puppets mouth the slogans of the day. And after it blows up, they will shift gears without an afterthought, keeping the public mind moving on, trusting to the collective amnesia of a distracted populace.

As they said on Bloomberg this morning regarding the crisis just passed, 'We are all to blame; the regulators, the government, the rating agencies, the banks, and the public who was apathetic, who failed to act."

And then they moved on to let us know that Ashley Dupre will be providing a weekly advice column in the NY Post. Romance with a financial twist?

The difference here, at least it seems to me, is that the American public is still a believer in what the government says. The Russian people, at least by that time, did not. So perhaps there are a few more good years left.

The Nation
The Journal's Russia Scandal
By Matt Taibbi & Mark Ames
October 4, 1999

Just before Christmas in 1997, as a tumultuous stock-market
crisis ravaged emerging markets in every corner of the globe, readers of the
Wall Street Journal were treated to some good news: Russia was going to emerge
from the mess unscathed. While conceding that "few debt markets outside
Southeast Asia were hit harder by recent financial turmoil than Russia's," the
Journal's Moscow bureau chief, Steve Liesman, added quickly that "many analysts
believe an equally strong rebound may be in the offing." Moreover, Liesman
wrote, investors were rapidly coming to the realization that "Russia's problems
are far different and, for the moment, less dire than those that undermined
Asian economies." The December 16 piece was headlined, "Russian Debt Markets Due
for Rebound."

A few weeks later, Liesman and the Journal used even
stronger language to trumpet Russia's economic merits. They chided investors who
were too busy "fretting over Asia's financial crisis" to notice what they called
"one of the decade's major economic events: the end of Russia's seven-year
recession."

The Journal's prediction was more than a little precipitate.
Instead of getting better, things in Russia got worse. A lot worse. Nine months
after Liesman declared that Russia's debt market was due for a rebound, and just
over seven months after proclaiming the end of the Russian recession, the
Journal--like most US newspapers--found itself having to explain the near-total
collapse of Russia's economy and capital markets...

Read the rest here: The Journal's Russia Scandal - Matt Taibbi, The Nation 1999