The Trends Are Extended, Start Thinking Consolidation and Reversals, But Wait For It

The trends are extended on quite a few charts. The action in the US markets is being artificially inflated and supported by monetization and liquidity so it *could* continue on for some time, even until the November election. It is being fueled by the expectation of a large quantitative easing by the Fed shortly thereafter. That QE, when it arrives, is likely to be sold if it is not significant enough to meet expectations.

I am more cautious on short term positions here, and have had some short hedges on in the overnight, but deftly. It is important not to exhaust yourself expecting a trend change before it is ready to happen, and one cannot anticipate exogenous events by definition. Still, the time is ripe for one to have a significant effect should it occur.

The long term trends are all intact, but we have reached a position where we might be looking for intermediate tops and consolidations.  The Fed is not infallible or omnipotent, but rather determined and capable within its limits.  The combination of government and the monied interests is powerful and ruthless.  Manage your money tightly and wait for the market to reveal its intentions if you are trading.

Gold and Silver, SP 500 and NDX December Futures Daily Charts

Gold met the intermediate measuring objective of 1375 today.  The slope of this rally is a bit strenuous and a consolidation of some sort, even a bit of a retracement, would not be out of order and might even be welcome for traders to catch their breath and square up positions. However, gold may not oblige as this breakout is particularly violent having built such a long and broad handle in its base formation. This bull market has a long way to go.

Silver is taking out $24 oz. in what is an extraordinary rally following JPM's closing of Blythe Master's proprietary trading group.

Financiers Offer Terms to the Rest of World in the Currency Wars

Anglo-American financiers to the Rest of World: We've a Gun to Our Heads, Better Surrender.

"To put it crudely, the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world."

Destroy the world economy by trashing the global reserve currency? Yes we can.

I hate to make light of this because it does offer a useful vignette of the deployment of opposing lines and basic strategies in the currency war, at least from one perspective. Several years ago I forecast that the Bankers would make the world an 'offer they cannot refuse,' or at least that the Bankers think that they cannot refuse. Hank Paulson made such an offer to the US Congress, and now it appears that the financiers are extending a similar type of offer to the rest of the world.

And quiet flows the Don.

Financial Times
Why America is going to win the global currency battle
By Martin Wolf
October 12 2010 22:30

Currencies dominated this year’s annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund. More precisely, two currencies did: the dollar and the renminbi, the former because it was deemed too weak and the latter because it was deemed too inflexible. But, behind the squabbles, lies a huge challenge: how best to manage the global economic adjustment.

In his foreword to the new World Economic Outlook, Olivier Blanchard, the IMF’s economic counsellor, states: “Achieving a ‘strong, balanced and sustained world recovery’ – to quote from the goal set in Pittsburgh by the G20 – was never going to be easy ... It requires two fundamental and difficult economic rebalancing acts.”

The first is internal rebalancing – a return to reliance on private demand in advanced countries and retrenchment of the fiscal deficits that opened in the crisis. The second is external rebalancing – greater reliance on net exports by the US and some other advanced countries and on domestic demand by some emerging countries, notably China. Unfortunately, concludes, Professor Blanchard, “these two rebalancing acts are taking place too slowly”.

We can consider this rebalancing on two dimensions. First, the erstwhile high-spending, high-deficit advanced countries need to de-leverage their private sectors on the journey to what Mohamed El-Erian of Pimco, the investment company, called “the new normal”, in his Per Jacobsson lecture. Second, the real exchange rates of economies with robust external positions, strong investment opportunities, or both, need to appreciate, while expansion of domestic demand offsets the consequent drag from net exports.

Aggressive monetary policy by reserve-issuing advanced countries, particularly the US, is an element in both processes. The cries of pain now heard around the world, as markets push currencies up against the dollar, partly reflect the uneven impact of US policy. Still more, they reflect the stubborn unwillingness to accept the needed changes, with each capital recipient trying to deflect the unwanted adjustment elsewhere.

To put it crudely, the US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates and domestic policies around the world.

If you wish to understand how aggressive US policy might become, read a recent speech by William Dudley, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. He notes that “in recent quarters the pace of growth has been disappointing even relative to our modest expectations at the start of the year”. Behind this lies deleveraging by US households, in particular. So what can monetary policy do about it? His answer is that “very low interest rates can help smooth the adjustment process by supporting asset valuations, including making housing more affordable and by allowing some borrowers to reduce debt interest payments. Beyond this ... to the extent that monetary policy can ‘cut off the tail’ of the distribution of potential adverse economic outcomes ... it can help encourage those households and businesses with money to spend to do so”.

Above all, today’s low and falling inflation is potentially calamitous. At worst, the economy might succumb to debt-deflation. US yields and inflation are already following the path of Japan’s in the 1990s (see chart). The Fed wants to stop this trend. That is why another round of quantitative easing seems imminent.

In short, US policymakers will do whatever is required to avoid deflation. Indeed, the Fed will keep going until the US is satisfactorily reflated. What that effort does to the rest of the world is not its concern.

The global consequences are evident: the policy will raise prices of long-term assets and encourage capital to flow into countries with less expansionary monetary policies (such as Switzerland) or higher returns (such as emerging economies). This is what is happening. The Washington-based Institute for International Finance forecasts net inflows of capital from abroad into emerging economies of more than $800bn in 2010 and 2011. It also forecasts massive intervention by recipients of this capital, albeit at a falling rate (see chart).

Recipients of the capital inflow, be they advanced or emerging countries, face uncomfortable choices: let the exchange rate appreciate, so impairing external competitiveness; intervene in currency markets, so accumulating unwanted dollars, threatening domestic monetary stability and impairing external competitiveness; or curb the capital inflow, via taxes and controls. Historically, governments have chosen combinations of all three. That will be the case this time, too.

Naturally, one could imagine an opposite course. Indeed, China objects to the huge US fiscal deficits and unconventional monetary policies. China is also determined to keep inflation down at home and limit the appreciation of its currency. The implication of this policy is clear: adjustments in real exchange rates should occur via falling US domestic prices. China wants to impose a deflationary adjustment on the US, just as Germany is doing to Greece. This is not going to happen. Nor would it be in China’s interest if it did. As a creditor, it would enjoy an increase in the real value of its claims on the US. But US deflation would threaten a world slump.

Prof Blanchard is clearly right: the adjustments ahead are going to be very difficult; and they have also hardly begun. Instead of co-operation on adjustment of exchange rates and the external account, the US is seeking to impose its will, via the printing press. The US is going to win this war, one way or the other: it will either inflate the rest of the world or force their nominal exchange rates up against the dollar. Unfortunately, the impact will also be higgledy piggledy, with the less protected economies (such as Brazil or South Africa) forced to adjust and others, protected by exchange controls (such as China), able to manage the adjustment better.

It would be far better for everybody to seek a co-operative outcome. (Co-operative outomce is code for 'obey our will and give obesiance to the financiers' - Jesse).  Maybe the leaders of the group of 20 will even be able to use their “mutual assessment process” to achieve just that. Their November summit in Seoul is the opportunity. Of the need there can be no doubt. Of the will, the doubts are many. In the worst of the crisis, leaders hung together. Now, the Fed is about to hang them all separately....

The theme for the next ten years is self-sufficiency.

Gold and Silver, and SP 500 and NDX December Futures Daily Charts

"As a dog returns to its vomit, so the Fed returns to its folly." Prov 26:11

Financial Times
Fed tilts to more monetary easing
By James Politi in Washington and Robin Harding in St Louis
October 12 2010 19:15

The likelihood that the US will soon launch a fresh burst of “quantitative easing” has increased, as minutes from the Federal Reserve’s latest meeting revealed that officials were nearing an agreement on the need for additional monetary stimulus. The official record from the September 21 gathering of the federal open market committee, which sets interest rates, showed that “many” officials thought a new round of monetary easing might be necessary to breathe life into the sluggish US recovery...

Net Asset Value of Certain Precious Metal Trusts and Funds

The gold premiums are highly contracted.

This could be the result of arbitrage hedging which we have discussed in the past. Essentially one could buy the futures and sell short PHYS and pocket any premium differential.

Traditionally it had been a sign of a lack of 'exuberance' in the specs over the future price moves.

The premiums tended to expand during speculative public buying AND short squeezes in the unit trusts.

Over Ten Million Served

...since February of 2008.

Thank you for your patronage.

SP 500 and NDX December Futures and Gold Daily Charts

Selling in the London and NY paper markets is being met by determined buying. Today was another record high close as the bear raid was 'stuffed.'

The equity markets are being managed higher on thin volumes led by the SP 500 futures.

Columbus Day (US) and Thanksgiving Day (Canada)

As a reminder Monday 11 October 2010 is Columbus Day in the US and the bond markets and banks will be closed, although the stock market will be open. It is not a settlement day for stocks however.

It is also Thanksgiving Day in Canada, and the equity markets and other financial markets will be closed. This may lead to thin trading in some of the mining and oil stocks.

Robert Reich: Aftershock

US Dollar: Long Term Trend and Triffin's Dilemma

AEIR
Triffin’s Dilemma, Reserve Currencies, and Gold
By Walker Todd

Nearly 50 years ago, Yale University economist Robert Triffin identified the inevitable future deterioration of the dollar in his book, Gold and the Dollar Crisis: The Future of Convertibility (1960). Essentially, Triffin argued, under the Bretton Woods system in which the U.S. dollar was the world’s principal reserve currency (instead of gold, for example), the United States had to incur large trade deficits in order to provide the rest of the world with the liquidity required for functioning of the global trading system.

Unfortunately, Triffin wrote, U.S. trade deficits eventually would undermine the foreign exchange value of the dollar because foreign accounts would hold an increasing quantity of dollars. Restating Triffin's argument in contemporary terms, as the proportion of dollar claims held abroad versus U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) increases, the foreign exchange value of the dollar must decline if dollar interest rates do not increase at about the same rate as the foreign dollar claims.

Issuing the reserve currency gives domestic policy makers an advantage by making it easier to finance either domestic budget deficits or foreign trade deficits because there always is a ready bidders' market for any financing instruments from that issuer. Issuing the reserve currency enables the domestic population to consume more goods and services from whatever source than otherwise would be feasible. And issuing the reserve currency gives foreign policy officials of that nation the upper hand in determining multilateral approaches to either diplomacy or military action.

This last reason probably is why U.S. policy makers clung to the original Bretton Woods format for about 10 years beyond the point at which it still was viable, with the whole apparatus finally collapsing in August 1971.

Let us reconsider the effect of reserve currency issuance on domestic and foreign trade for a moment. Unless the issuing authorities can discover a way to allow their currency to depreciate more or less in proportion to the growing foreign trade deficits—by reducing interest rates or otherwise stimulating domestic inflation, for example—then a sustainable equilibrium becomes impossible.

Either the currency remains overvalued (good for the reserve currency status) and the trade deficits continue to increase, or the currency maintains fair external value (implicitly, a proportional devaluation, which is bad for the reserve currency status) and the trade deficits either stabilize or shrink. This latter proposition is what Professor Triffin was writing about in 1960, and it has been called Triffin's dilemma ever since.

Lewis Lehrman and John Mueller revived the discussion of Triffin's dilemma, without calling it that, in an article that appeared on December 15, 2008, in National Review Online. They suggested that the proper international reserve currency should be gold. I agree and wrote as much in a commentary, in the Christian Science Monitor, November 17, 2008.

Lehrman and Mueller argue correctly that no country willingly should volunteer for the reserve currency role. Such an endeavor necessarily leads to the same pattern of persistent overvaluation and trade deficits that plagued the United States since European currencies became generally convertible in 1959. Our abandonment of the international gold exchange standard in August 1971 accelerated and intensified our external deficits and the volatility of exchange rates.

Among advanced economies that were key members of the old Bretton Woods system, tolerating large amounts of external claims in their currencies always was a sore point because they wanted to avoid de facto reserve currency status and the curse (Triffin's dilemma) that accompanies it.

In the last two decades, roughly since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, European countries have adopted the euro and allowed large external claims in euros to arise. The Japanese bubble of the 1980s finally burst and relieved the reserve currency pressure of large external claims there until the last couple of years. Recently prosperous nations like China, India, and Brazil linked their currencies to the dollar and managed exchange rates so as to avoid the accumulation of large external claims. Thus, none of the most likely candidates is volunteering for reserve currency status...

SP 500 and NDX December Futures Daily Charts

Wall Street is now starting to rally higher on bad economic news, pricing in a new round of monetary stimulus from the Fed. Unfortunately this is being done on thin volumes by cynical speculators, setting up possibly hazardous market conditions.