Prince Alwaleed Takes a Haircut

Prince Alwaleed Loses 19% of Wealth on Global Slump
By Shaji Mathew

Dec. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, Citigroup Inc.’s largest individual investor, lost 19 percent of his personal wealth in the past year as the global economic slump reduced the value of banking and property assets, according to Arabian Business.

The Saudi billionaire was ranked the wealthiest Arab with assets worth $17.08 billion as of Dec. 2, the 2008 Rich List, published on the Dubai-based magazine’s Web site today said. That compares with $21 billion a year ago, the magazine reported, citing Alwaleed’s private financial accounts.

“Everyone has been guessing for 20 years” about the assets, Alwaleed was quoted by Arabian Business as saying. “I want you to get it right -- to get it absolutely right.”

Financial firms worldwide have taken $980 billion of writedowns, losses and credit provisions since the start of the current turmoil in the financial markets, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. More than 200,000 jobs have been cut across the industry and the U.S. benchmark Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has dropped 40 percent this year.

Making Money

Alwaleed, a nephew of the late King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, stands out among more than 2,000 Saudi princes because he’s made money. After earning a bachelor’s degree from Menlo College near San Francisco, he returned to the Persian Gulf and parlayed an inheritance of less than $1 million into a billion- dollar fortune in the 1980s, mostly through real-estate investments, according to Riz Khan’s biography “Alwaleed: Businessman, Billionaire, Prince” (William Morrow, 2005.) (Meaning no offense, great Prince, but we are a little skeptical of these stated results and methods. - Jesse)

The Prince, 53, built his fortune by investing in brand-name companies he considered undervalued, including Apple Inc., News Corp. and Time Warner Inc. Forbes magazine estimated he was worth $21 billion in March, ranking him 19th among the world’s billionaires.

Alwaleed was lauded by Time magazine as the Middle East’s answer to Warren Buffett, the Sage of Omaha, after his 1991 investment in Citicorp, Citigroup Inc.’s predecessor, helped make the Saudi billionaire one of the world’s five richest people.

This year, Alwaleed’s investments haven’t kept pace with regional benchmarks. The shares of his Riyadh-based Kingdom Holding Co. have slumped 60 percent -- more than Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul All-Share Index or Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Kingdom Holding said Nov. 20 Alwaleed will boost his Citigroup stake, his largest holding, to 5 percent. The bank’s stock has fallen more than 70 percent since Jan. 1.

Assets

Kingdom Holding’s assets are valued at $7.98 billion, while the Prince owns real estate worth $3.196 billion and his media assets such as LBC and Rotana Holding are valued at $1.6 billion, Arabian Business said, citing financial accounts of the billionaire.

“The Prince keeps a significant amount of cash at all times, which is instantly accessible,” the magazine reported, without giving further details.

Alwaleed’s other major assets are valued at $1.679 billion, and include a Boeing 747, an Airbus A380, yachts and 400 vehicles, a collection of jewelry, and investments in a French port and stakes in Lebanese and Palestinian companies.

The billionaire is one of two Middle Eastern investors racing to build the world’s first kilometer-high skyscraper in the Persian Gulf. On Oct. 13, Kingdom Holding announced plans for the Kingdom Tower, part of the $27 billion Kingdom City real-estate project in the Red Sea city of Jeddah.

Capitalism II: Brave New World

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew." Abraham Lincoln

"All conservatism is based upon the idea that if you leave things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone you leave it twisting in a torrent of change." G.K.Chesteron

"If you don't like change, you are going to like irrelevance even less." US Army General Eric Shinseki

When you have thoroughly made a mess of things, and realize that it is time for a change, one goes to wise mentors and more experienced friends, if you are lucky enough to have them, for constructive and sound advice.

But there are times when hearing from your critics as well is a good idea, because they will often tell you things too difficult for a friend to say openly and directly.

This essay below by Michael Hudson and Jeffrey Sommers strikes me as such a critical analysis of the US economy as it exists today. It is useful because it looks at the US from the eyes of the non-G7 countries through the lenses of what the authors call 'Managed Capitalism' in contrast to what they call Neo-Liberalism but what I might refer to as "Financial Capitalism."

There are things with which I disagree in this essay especially in terms of recommended courses of action. But there are a significant number of observations "from the other guy's point of view" that makes it worth reading, carefully.

We need to recognize that Japan, China, and many countries today are not free markets, and that they embrace a very strong industrial policy formed by central bureaucracies. We may even have more of a structure such as this than we realize, with our outsized financial sector. These countries have a form of Managed Capitalism.

The argument against that form of economic structure is that centralized decision making, especially as it applies to the particular, tends to get it wrong much more often than consensus decisions widely spread among market participants if information is transparently dispersed.

This is because bias and temperament tend to be blended out to the tails in a broad consensus. Yes you may get a run of great leadership every so often in a centrally planned economy, but you will too often get a Hitler, Stalin, or a Mao, and the damage they can do to a country is measured in the millions of the dead in addition to economic and structural loss.

To me, financial capitalism is a clear excess, a distortion of free market capitalism in the same way that managed capitalism is. They both assert unbalancing forces on the course of the neural structure of natural decision making and transmission of values to productivity.

I do not think the US status quo is willing change yet. Why should it? The strong dollar has served the financial sector well. The change will first occur in the international trade mechanisms, with the displacement of that lynch pin of the Washington consensus, the dollar as reserve currency. More change and restructuring will necessarily flow from that.

It is useful to read this essay not because you agree with it, but because a number of other countries who are your critics will agree, and change is coming. That is without doubt. The current financial system is inherently unstable because the self-correcting market and price discovery mechanisms are broken.

The solution for the US will be to move back to a more progressive, less financially-oriented, more productive economy.

The cult of pervasive globalization is a hoax, an excuse to centralize power that is not compatible with a world in which people have choices, and wish to maintain societies with the values and policies of their choosing.

If the US stays on its current course and seeks to maintain the status quo, the next step will be an attempt to establish stronger central planning, and a New World Order. One can already see those in the Anglo-American establishment and the Neo-cons trying to pave the way for it.

It is true always and everywhere that if you surrender the management of your currency to another you have handed over the keys to your fiscal and societal freedom, because the control of the money supply strikes to the heart of your economy in ways that permeate interest rates, industrial production, health care, and personal freedoms. Social choices are also economic choices.

As an aside, it will be interesting to see how Europe progresses in this, and whether the European Union will grow and transform, or fragment. The great variable will be leadership and vision.

Change is coming, whether we like it or not. It will be coming from the outside if not from within.

The days of both Soviet and Dollar imperialism are ending. The latest attempt to establish a New World Order is already failing.

The world's superpowers are dismantling neo-colonial empires once again, and decision making will be moving from a central planning for the world at the Federal Reserve and Washington, as well as Moscow, and back to individual countries who for good or ill will be trying to manage their own economies for themselves.

"Few will have the greatness to bend history itself; but each of us can work to change a small portion of events, and in the total of all those acts will be written the history of this generation." Robert Kennedy

Counterpunch
What is to be Done?
The End of the Washington Consensus
By MICHAEL HUDSON and JEFFREY SOMMERS
December 12, 2008

Wall Street’s financial meltdown marks the end of an era. What has ended is the credibility of the Washington Consensus – open markets to foreign investors and tight money austerity programs (high interest rates and credit cutbacks) to “cure” balance-of-payments deficits, domestic budget deficits and price inflation. On the negative side, this model has failed to produce the prosperity it promises. Raising interest rates and dismantling protective tariffs and subsidies worsen rather than help the trade and payments balance, aggravate rather than reduce domestic budget deficits, and raise prices. The reason? Interest is a cost of doing business while foreign trade dependency and currency depreciation raise import prices.

But even more striking is the positive side of what can be done as an alternative to the Washington Consensus. The $700 billion U.S. Treasury bailout of Wall Street’s bad loans on October 3 shows that the United States has no intention of applying this model to its own economy. Austerity and “fiscal responsibility” are for other countries. America acts ruthlessly in its own economic interest at any given moment of time. It freely spends more than it earns, flooding the global economy with what has now risen to $4 trillion in U.S. government debt to foreign central banks.

This amount is unpayable, given the chronic U.S. trade deficit and overseas military spending. But it does pose an interesting problem: why can’t other countries do the same thing? Is today’s policy asymmetry a fact of nature, or is it merely voluntary and the result of ignorance (spurred by an intensive globalist ideological propaganda program, to be sure)? Does India, for instance, need to privatize its state-owned banks as earlier was planned, or is it right to pull back? More to the point, have the neoliberal programs imposed on the former Soviet Union succeeded in “Americanizing” their economies and raising production capacity and living standards as promised? Or, was it all a dream, indeed, a nightmare?

The three Baltic countries, for instance – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – have long been praised in the Western press as great success stories. The World Bank classifies them among the most “business friendly” countries, and their real estate prices have soared, fueled by foreign-currency mortgages from neighboring Scandinavian banks. Their industry has been dismantled, their agriculture is in ruins, their male population below the age of 35 is emigrating. But real estate prices added to the net worth on their national balance sheets for nearly a decade. Has a new “moment of truth” arrived? Just because the Soviet economic system culminated in bureaucratic kleptocracy, has the neoliberal model really been so much better? Most important of all, was there a better alternative all along?

We expect the post-Soviet economies to go the way of Iceland, having taken on foreign debt with no visible means of paying it off via exports (the same situation in which the United States finds itself), or even further asset sales. Emigrants’ remittances are becoming a mainstay of their balance of payments, reflecting their economic shrinkage at the hands of neoliberal “reformers” and the free-market international dependency that the Washington Consensus promotes. So, just as this crisis has led the U.S. government to shift gears, is it time for foreign countries to seek to become more in the character of “mixed economies”? This has been the route taken by every successful economy in history, after all. Total private-sector markets (in practice, markets run by the banks and money managers) have shown themselves to be just as destructive, wasteful and corrupt and, indeed, centrally planned as those of totally “statist” governments from Stalin’s Russia to Hitler’s Germany. Is the political pendulum about to swing back more toward a better public-private balance?

Washington’s idealized picture of how free markets operate (as if such a thing ever existed) promised that countries outside the United States would get rich faster, approaching U.S.-style living standards if they let global investors buy their key industries and basic infrastructure. For half a century, this neoliberal model has been a hypocritical exercise in poor policy at best, and deception at worst, to convince other economies to impose self-destructive financial and tax policies, enabling U.S. investors to swoop in and buy their key assets at distress prices. (And for the U.S. economy to pay for these investment outflows in the form of more and more U.S. Treasury IOUs, yielding a low or even negative return when denominated in hard currencies.)

The neoliberal global system never was open in practice. America never imposed on itself the kind of shock therapy that President Clinton’s Treasury Secretary (and now Obama’s advisor) Robert Rubin promoted in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet bloc, from the Baltic countries in the northwest to Central Asia in the southeast. Just the opposite! Despite the fact that America’s own balance of trade and payments is soaring, consumer prices are rising and financial and property markets are plunging, there are no calls among its power elite to let the system self-correct. The Treasury is subsidizing America’s financial markets so as to save its financial class (minus some sacrificial lambs) and support its asset prices. Interest rates are being lowered to re-inflate asset prices, not raised to stabilize the dollar or slow domestic price inflation.

The policy implications go far beyond the United States itself. If the United States can create so much credit so quickly and so freely – and if Europe can follow suit, as it has done in recent days – why can’t all countries do this? Why can’t they get rich by following that path that the United States actually has taken, rather than merely doing what its economic diplomats tell them to do with sweet self-serving rhetoric? U.S. experience itself provides the major reason why the free market, run by financial institutions allocating credit, is a myth, a false map of reality to substitute for actual gunboats in getting other countries to open their asset markets to U.S. investors and food markets to U.S. farmers.

By contrast, the financial and trade model that U.S. oligarchs and their allies are promoting is a double standard. Most notoriously, when the 1997 Asian financial crisis broke out, the IMF demanded that foreign governments sell out their banks and industry at fire-sale prices to foreigners. U.S. vulture capital firms were especially aggressive in grabbing Asian and other global assets. But the U.S. financial bailout stands in sharp contrast to what Washington Consensus institutions imposed on other countries. There is no intention of letting foreign investors buy into the commanding U.S. heights, except at exorbitant prices. And for industry, the United States has once more violated international trade rules by offering special bailout money and subsidies to its own Big Three U.S. automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler) but not to foreign-owned automakers in the United States. In thus favoring its own national industry and taking punitive measures to injure foreign-owned investments, the United States is once again providing an object lesson in nationalistic economic policy.

Most important, the U.S. bailout provides a model that is far preferable to the Washington Consensus-for-export. It shows that countries do not need to borrow credit from foreign banks at all. The government could have created its own money and credit system rather than leaving foreign creditors to accrue interest charges that now represent a permanent and seemingly irreversible balance-of-payments drain. The United States has shown that any country can monetize its own credit, at least domestic credit. A large part of the problem for Third World and post-Soviet economies is that they never experienced the successful model of managerial capitalism that predated the neoliberal model, advocated since the 1980s by Washington.

The managerial model of capitalism, predominating during the post-World War II period until the 1980s (with antecedents in 18th-century British mercantilism and 19th-century American protectionism), delivered high growth. Postwar planners, such as John Maynard Keynes in England and Harry Dexter White in the United States, favored production over finance. As Winston Churchill quipped, “nations typically do the right thing [pause], after exhausting all other options.” But it took two world wars, interspersed by an economic depression triggered by debts in excess of the ability to pay, to give the final nudge required to promote manufacturing over finance and finally do “the right thing.”

Finance was made subordinate to industrial development and full employment. When this economic philosophy reached its peak in the early 1960s, the financial sector accounted for only 2 per cent of U.S. corporate profits. Today, it is 40 per cent! Carrying charges on America’s exponentially growing debt are diverting income away from purchasing goods and services to pay creditors, who use the money mainly to lend out afresh to borrowers to bid up real estate prices and stock prices. Tangible capital investment is financed almost entirely out of retained corporate earnings – and these too are being diverted to pay interest on soaring industrial debt. The result is debt deflation – a shrinkage of spending power as the economic surplus is “financialized,” a new word, only recently added to the world’s economic vocabulary.

Since the 1980s, the U.S. tax system has promoted rent seeking and speculation on credit to ride the wave of asset-price inflation. This strategy increased balance sheets as long as asset prices rose faster than debts (that is, until last year). But it did not add to industrial capacity. And meanwhile, tax cuts caused the national debt to soar, prompting U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney to comment, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.”

On the international front, the larger the U.S. trade and payments deficit, the more dollars were pumped into foreign hands. Their central banks recycled them back to the U.S. economy in the form of purchases of Treasury bonds and, when the interest rates fell almost to zero, securitized mortgage packages. Current Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson assured Chinese and other foreign investors that the government would stand behind Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as privatized mortgage-packaging agencies, guaranteeing a $5.2 trillion supply of mortgages. This matched in size the U.S. public debt in private hands.

Meanwhile, the Treasury cut special deals with the Saudis to recycle their oil revenues into investments in Citibank and other U.S. financial institutions – investments, on which they have lost many tens of billions of dollars. To cap matters, pricing world oil in dollars kept the U.S. currency stronger than underlying economic fundamentals justified. The U.S. economy paid for its imports with government debt never intended to be repaid, even if it could be (which it can’t at today’s $4 trillion level, cited earlier). The American economy, thus, has seen its trade deficit and asset prices rise in accordance with economic laws that no other nation can emulate, topped by the ability to run freely into international debt without limit.

Managerial capitalism mobilized rising corporate net worth and equity value to build up in the real economy. But since the 1980s, a new breed of financial managers has pledged assets as collateral for new loans to buy back corporate stock and even to pay out as dividends. This has pushed up corporate stock prices and, with them, the value of stock options that corporate managers give themselves. But it has not spurred tangible capital formation.

A real estate bubble in all countries has been fueled by rising mortgage debt. To buy a new home, buyers must take on a lifetime of debt. This has made many employees afraid to go on strike or even to press for better working conditions, because they are “one check away from homelessness,” or mortgage foreclosure. Meanwhile, companies have been outsourcing and downsizing their labor force, eliminating benefits, imposing longer hours, and bringing more women and children into the workforce.

Today’s “new economy” is based not on new technology and capital investment, as former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan trumpeted in the late 1990s, but on price inflation generating capital gains (mainly in land prices, as land is still the largest asset in the U.S. and other industrial economies). The economic surplus is absorbed by debt service payments (and higher priced health care), not investment in production or in sharing productivity gains with labor and professionals. Wages and living standards are stagnant for most people, as the economy tries to get rich by “the miracle of compound interest,” while capital gains emanating from the financial sector provide a foundation for new credit to bid up asset prices, all the more in a seemingly perpetual motion credit-and-debt machine. But the effect has been for the richest 1 per cent of the population to increase its share of interest extraction, dividends and capital gains from 37 per cent ten years ago to 57 per cent five years ago, and nearly 70 per cent today. Savings remain high, but only the wealthiest 10 per cent are saving – and this money is being lent out to the bottom 90 per cent, so no net saving is occurring.

Internationally, too, the global economy has polarized rather than converged. Just as independence arrived for many Third World countries only after their former European colonial powers had put in place inequitable land tenure patterns (latifundia, owned by domestic oligarchies) and export-oriented production, so independence for the post-Soviet countries from Russia arrived after managerial capitalism had given way to a neoliberal model that viewed “wealth creation” simply as rising prices for real estate, stocks and bonds. Western advisors and former emigrants descended to convince these countries to play the same game that other countries were playing – except that real estate debt for many of these countries was denominated in foreign currency, as no domestic banking tradition had been developed. This became increasingly dangerous for economies that did not put in place sufficient export capacity to cover the price of imports and the mounting volume of foreign-currency debt attached to their real estate. And nearly all the post-Soviet countries ran structural trade deficit, as production patterns were disrupted with the breakup of the U.S.S.R.

Real estate and capital gains from asset-price inflation (not industrial capital formation) were promoted as the way to future prosperity in countries whose profits from manufacturing were low and wages were stagnant. The problem is this alchemy is not sustainable. An illusion of success could be maintained as long as Washington was flooding the globe with cheap money. This led Swedes and other Europeans to find capital gains by extending loans to feed neighboring countries from Iceland to Latvia, above all via their real estate markets. For some exporters (especially Russia), rising oil and metal export prices became the basis for capital outflows into Third World and post-Soviet financial markets. Some of the backwash, for example, flowed into the world’s burgeoning offshore banking and real estate sectors – only to stop abruptly when the real estate bubble burst.

In these circumstances, what is to be done? First, countries outside the United States need to recognize how dysfunctional the neoliberalized world economy has been made, and to decide which assumptions underlying the neoliberal model must be discarded. Its preferred tax and financial policies favor finance over industry and, hence, financial maneuvering and asset-price inflation over tangible capital formation. Its anti-labor austerity policies and un-taxing of real estate, stocks and bonds divert resources away from growth and rising living standards.

Likewise destructive are compound interest and capital gains over the long term. The real economy can grow only a few per cent a year at best. Therefore, it is mathematically impossible for compound interest to continue unabated and for capital gains to grow well in excess of the underlying rate of economic growth. Historically, economic crises wipe out these gains when they outpace real economic growth by too far a margin. The moral is that compound interest and hopes for capital gains cannot guarantee income for its retirees or continue attracting foreign capital. Over a period of a lifetime, financial investments may not deliver significant gains. For the United States, it took markets about twenty-five years, from 1929 to the mid-1950s, to recover their previous value.

Today’s desperate U.S. attempt to re-inflate post-crash prices cannot cure the bad-debt problem. Foreign attempts to do this will merely aid foreign bankers and financial investors, not the domestic economy. Countries need to invest in their real economy, to raise productivity and wages. Governments must punish speculation and capital gains that merely reflect asset-price inflation, not real value. Otherwise, the real economy’s productive powers and living standards will be impaired and, in the neoliberal model, loaded down with debt. Policies should encourage enterprise, not speculation. Investment seeks growing markets, which tend to be thwarted by macroeconomic targets such as low inflation and balanced budgets. We are not arguing that inflation and deficits can be ignored, but rather that inflation and deficits are not all created equally. Some variants hurt the economy, while others reflect healthy investment in real production. Distinguishing between the two effects is vital, if economies are to move forward to achieve self-dependency.

In sum, a much better economy can be created by rejecting Washington’s financial model of austerity programs, privatization selloffs and trade dependency, financed by foreign-currency credit. Prosperity cannot be achieved by creating a favorable climate for extractive foreign capital, or by tightening credit and balancing budgets, decade after decade. The United States itself has always rejected these policies, and foreign countries also must do this if they wish to follow the policies, by which America actually grew rich, not by what U.S. neoliberal advisors tell other countries to do to please U.S. banks and foreign investors.

Also to be rejected is the anti-labor neoliberal tax policy (heavy taxes on employees and employers, low or zero taxes on real estate, finance and capital gains) and anti-labor workplace policies, ranging from safety protection and health care to working conditions. The U.S. economy rose to dominance as a result of Progressive Era regulatory reforms prior to World War I, reinforced by popular New Deal reforms put in place in the Great Depression. Neoliberal economics was promoted as a means of undoing these reforms. By undoing them, the Washington Consensus would deny to foreign countries the development strategy that has best succeeded in creating thriving domestic markets, rising productivity, capital formation and living standards. The effect has been to decouple saving from tangible capital formation. They need to be re-coupled, and this can be achieved only by restoring the kind of mixed economy by which North America and Europe achieved their economic growth.


Michael Hudson is professor of Economics at the University of Missouri (Kansas City) and chief economic advisor to Rep. Dennis Kucinich. He has advised the U.S., Canadian, Mexican and Latvian governments, as well as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). He is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002). He can be reached via his website, mh@michael-hudson.com.

Jeffrey Sommers is a professor at Raritan Valley College, NJ, visiting professor at the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, former Fulbrighter to Latvia, and fellow at Boris Kagarlitsky’s Institute for Global Studies in Moscow. He can be reached at jsommers@sseriga.edu.lv.

Citadel Suspends Withdrawals to Halt the Run on Two Funds

Are the hedge fund runs the modern day equivalent of the bank runs of the 1930's or even the Panic of 1907?

That is not as glib an observation as you might think at first. The hedge funds like Citadel and Fortress resemble the private banks of New York in the early 1900's in many ways.

As in the case of Bernie Maddow, as a type of Richard Whitney, we're seeing echoes of certain periods in the past in many of the events today.

This is clearly not your father's recession, but we are not quite sure what it will be yet, and are often unpersuaded by those who think they do.

"Why can't you just accept that this is deflation?" It is clearly a deflation in terms of aggregate demand, no question. All one has to do is look at GDP. But we do not see it as a true straightforward money deflation with a sustainable increase in the value of the dollar. The dollar is a financial asset and not a store of value. It is an artifice.

Something is going to replace the dollar, but we cannot tell what it will be yet.

The Fed and Treasury have given away three trillion dollars at least so far, with commitments to give away five more. It only seems to be a deflation if you are not on the list of the chosen few, and take a shower before leaving for work instead of after. In the short term deleveraged cash is king, no doubt about it. Risk is still high, and we have much further to do to the downside. Stocks are poison and debt is unstable.

The dollar is decoupled from reality, far from the conventional mechanisms of savings and investment. Its all policy now in the short term, and then the next phase of this transformation will begin, and it will contain a surprisingly large portion of the unexpected, the unanticipated, on the order of the stagflation of the 1970's that left so many economists with their mouths gaping open.

The natural question is "But Jesse, this is all well and good, and it makes my head hurt. What is the endgame? Where should I put my money now?"

Cash. The safer stores of value of wealth. Its no coincidence that short term Treasuries have spiked to negative returns, and manageable forms of gold and silver bullion are in scarce supply. And then we wait and see what happens next. Take risks if you must, but only with a very small percentage of your portfolio, and sit on the rest, get out of debt, cut consumption, and wait.

There is no way to adequately measure and assess risk in a system in which the price discovery mechanisms are broken, and the standards of value are changing to something radically different, and success and failure can rely on the somewhat arbitrary policy decisions of a few politicians and bankers and the decisions of foreign governments.


Citadel Suspends Withdrawals in Two Hedge Funds After 50% Drop
By Saijel Kishan and Katherine Burton

Dec. 12 (Bloomberg) -- Citadel Investment Group LLC, the Chicago-based hedge-fund firm run by Kenneth Griffin, halted year- end withdrawals from its two biggest funds after investors sought to take out $1.2 billion, according to a letter sent to clients.

The Kensington and Wellington funds, which together manage about $10 billion, have lost 49.5 percent of their value this year through Dec. 5. Withdrawals may resume as early as March 31, said the letter, signed by Griffin and sent to investors today.

“We have not made this decision lightly,” Griffin wrote. “We recognize how a suspension impacts our investors, especially those with current financial obligations of their own to meet.”

Citadel joins hedge funds including Fortress Investment Group LLC and Tudor Investment Corp. in limiting withdrawals as hedge funds head for their biggest annual losses since at least 1990. Hedge funds have declined 18 percent, on average, this year through Nov. 30, according to Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.

As of October, 18 percent of hedge-fund assets, or about $300 billion, managed by 5 percent of hedge funds, were subject to some sort of restriction on withdrawals, according to Peter Douglas, principal of Singapore-based hedge-fund consulting firm GFIA Pte.

Citadel normally allows clients to withdraw up to 1/16th of their assets quarterly. If total withdrawals exceed 3 percent of the fund, investors must pay a fee back into the fund ranging from 5 percent to 9 percent. Redemptions have never before surpassed the limit.

Citadel will also absorb “a substantial portion” of the funds’ expenses this year, the letter said. Citadel clients usually pay these charges, which have traditionally amounted to about 3 percent to 4 percent of assets.

The fund is holding between 25 percent and 30 percent of its assets in cash.

Katie Spring, a spokeswoman for Chicago-based Citadel, declined to comment.

Before 2008, Citadel had posted just one losing year since Griffin started the firm in 1990, dropping 4 percent in 1994. Three Citadel funds, whose returns are tied to the firm’s market- making business, have climbed about 40 percent this year. Those funds manage about $3 billion.

US Dollar Weekly Chart with COT for the Week Ending 12 December

Comparison of 1928-32 and 2007-11

There are important differences in the nature of the declines. The current series looks like a bear market in the form of 1973-4 whereas 1929-32 was much more precipitous. This may be attributed to the extraordinary actions of the FED and Treasury. However, this may only soften the blow and not the outcome, most likely adjusted for inflation.




The Intraday Volatility matches up nicely so far as we have aligned them Peak to Peak without regard to pricing. It will be in the market action going forward where the model will be assessed here.

If You Use Levered ETFs Read This

Thanks to Paul Kedrosky for a clear and useful analysis.

Levered ETFs, with the various targeted multipliers, reset their basis at the end of each trading day, which means that you are levered up only for that day.

This can have some remarkable and counter-intuitive results over a trend.

There is also a signficant amount of intraday slippage in volatile markets.



More Fun with Levered ETFs - Paul Kedrosky - Seeking Alph

SP Monthly Chart Update

Charts in the Babson Style for 11 December

Former NASDAQ Chairman Charged in $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme

"Do you know where your money is?"


Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities is the 23rd largest market maker on the Nasdaq for hedge funds and banks handling about 50 million shares per day.

The firm specialized in handling orders from online brokers in some of the largest U.S. companies, including General Electric Co. and Citigroup Inc.

Their Financial Advisory Business is separate from their market-making business with approximately 20 customers.

The $50 billion in confessed total losses does not quite square up with $17 billion under management at the advisory firm, even in these heady days of leverage.

Where and when is the unidentified loss of $33 billion going to hit?

Naked shorts which cannot be covered? Levered positions that are now vaporized?

Who are the twenty or so customers of the Financial Advisory business?

Who was his auditor? Who in the NASD knew about this? Who was handling his back office work?

Is the ghost of Richard Whitney walking the floor of the Exchange tonight?

cf. Richard Whitney, President of the NYSE 1930-35

Richard Whitney Warning Against the Securities Act of 1934 - Video

Securities and Exchange Commission
SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-293

Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 2008 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Bernard L. Madoff and his investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, with securities fraud for a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that he perpetrated on advisory clients of his firm. The SEC is seeking emergency relief for investors, including an asset freeze and the appointment of a receiver for the firm.

The SEC's complaint, filed in federal court in Manhattan, alleges that Madoff yesterday informed two senior employees that his investment advisory business was a fraud. Madoff told these employees that he was "finished," that he had "absolutely nothing," that "it's all just one big lie," and that it was "basically, a giant Ponzi scheme." The senior employees understood him to be saying that he had for years been paying returns to certain investors out of the principal received from other, different investors. Madoff admitted in this conversation that the firm was insolvent and had been for years, and that he estimated the losses from this fraud were at least $50 billion. (From 17 billion under management? Offer him the position of Treasury Secretary. This guy is a financial genius! - Jesse)

"We are alleging a massive fraud — both in terms of scope and duration," said Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "We are moving quickly and decisively to stop the fraud and protect remaining assets for investors, and we are working closely with the criminal authorities to hold Mr. Madoff accountable."

Andrew M. Calamari, Associate Director of Enforcement in the SEC's New York Regional Office, added, "Our complaint alleges a stunning fraud that appears to be of epic proportions."

According to regulatory filings, the Madoff firm had more than $17 billion in assets under management as of the beginning of 2008. It appears that virtually all assets of the advisory business are missing.

Madoff founded the firm in 1960 and has been a prominent member of the securities industry throughout his career. Madoff served as vice chairman of the NASD, a member of its board of governors, and chairman of its New York region. He was also a member of NASDAQ Stock Market's board of governors and its executive committee and served as chairman of its trading committee.

The complaint charges the defendants with violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In addition to emergency and interim relief, the SEC seeks a final judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from future violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and ordering them to pay financial penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest.

The SEC's investigation is continuing.

The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.

Moscow Memories of 1997

The last trip I had to Moscow was in the spring of 1997 as the ruble crisis was getting seriously underway towards the Russian debt default in August 1998.

US dollars were king, and you could buy almost anything except diamonds and gold with them as the public was beginning to panic out of the ruble and even basic commodities were in incredibly short supply. Our driver would take the windshield wipers off his car at night so that they would not be stolen.

The black market was alive and well. The city had the flavor of the Wild West as the Russkaya Mafiya was out in force in trademark long black woolen overcoats. A shipment of the coats had arrived the previous year at a local flea market and were impressively sinister, amenable to concealment, yet effective against the cold, thereby creating the signature gangsta look.

On that trip I had a driver/bodyguard, and an interpreter as I had no Russian, just a smattering of loosely related slavic languages from childhood. The Japanese immersion course just completed in Princeton for another long term project was not particularly useful. French was in slight demand, but it might have been more useful in Leningrad. I was able to read some instruction for a video camera that used SECAM, but that was about it.

The interpreter was a lady who mildly resembled Tatiana Romanova in From Russia with Love, but with the disposition of Odd Job. She was serious and highly professional, but did have a weakness for Dunhill cigarettes and the curious two tone bloody Mary's they serve there. Her boss was an Italian ex-pat who was a real character.

One should always treat the local associates well and with respect, because not only will they keep you out of trouble, but they will often slip you a bit of valuable information, even during an active translation. They take pride in their work, and are not servants. It is not only a matter of good manners but also good business sense. The way in which the average American businessman behaves is too often clumsily embarrassing, vacillating between boorish and aloof.

We switched hotels at the last minute as there was an unscheduled execution in the lobby of our intended lodgings the week before our arrival. The hotel we did have was nice, foreign owned out of Belgium as I recall, but the staff was a bit stiff if you know what I mean. It was more like a minimum security prison than a hotel. I'm sure our drivers and guards were getting kickbacks. Everyone was getting paid one way or the other.

That last trip was the culmination of a series of business trips in which we were opening up higher speed data and video communications to Moscow from the domestic US via reliable non-satellite connections. Keeping a lock on Sputnik from the US was a challenge given the inclination and its tendency to wobble somewhat erratically.

The 'last mile' in Moscow was a challenge given Moscow Telephone's tradition of non-attention to quality planning and somewhat eccentric layout of their central offices, as in the basement of an old house with a propensity for periodic flooding, generally during key events for ABC News or the State Department.

It may sound like a serious problem, but my team tended to take this sort of thing in stride, since it was a walk in the park, relatively speaking, compared to dropping satellite dishes into a simmering theater of war which we had often done before.

We teamed with another company named Sovintel instead, and chose to go with direct microwave shots from their tower to the multinational business and government locations who were the prime customers as they were the only ones who could still pay for premium services.

I liked Moscow and the people in particular. A walk in Red Square on a crisp night with falling snow, with St. Basil's ahead and GUM department store lit up on the left is very picturesqe. The Kremlin looks like the entrance to the kingdom of Mordor.

The Red Army guards were young and annoying, probably cranky because they were not getting paid. I remember walking through Lenin's tomb, which was utterly deserted, and being yelled at constantly to 'move along' by a young Russian soldier who looked like he had an urge to plant his jackboot on my face.

Ex-patriates in Moscow had an interesting time, living in $5000 per month apartments that were more indicative of their non-resident status than the amenities of their accommodations. We visited an apartment in one of the seven "Woolworth buildings" from the Stalin era that had a door which would have served for a very secure bank vault.

The ex-pats telex messages to us in the planning phase were concise: "Bring Western toilet paper." They tended to meet us every morning at the hotel, to take the toilet paper and soap out of our rooms and eat with us as our guests at the hotel breakfast buffet. It was a nice spread, and offered a more extensive fare than the grocery store we visited which offered only cabbages and big garishly orange boxes of Uncle Ben's rice.

We attended a performance at the Bolshoi Theater sponsored by some multinationals. Most notably, as a friend so slyly put it, the expats may be living poorly but it was nice to see them bring their attractive young daughters to the event. I don't think any of them were married, and we came away with the impression that people took assignments there to escape bad debts or bad marriages in the West.

There were a remarkable series of conversations with an interesting local acquaintances including one I called "Casper the Ghost," because of the promotional movie cap he always wore. From the way he spoke I became convinced that the primary occupation of those with savings was to convert it into hard currencies, gold and diamonds, and if possible get it out of the country.

Casper was busy amassing enough gold, while facilitating the efforts of others, in order to get out of Russia and move to the western US. He cynically wore the mafia signature black coat to scare off small time competition. "I go to same flea market and buy. Its no hard to do." He was a good source of information for a few drinks and the promise of a contact in Colorado. I think his real name was "Ben." That is how he answered the phone when I called him back from the States.

That, and multinationals with a local presence like McDonalds trying to figure out ways to work around currency controls or do something productive with their profits. I had the chance to visit the largest McDonald's in the world at that time, at the request again of the expats, and it was indeed impressive with 32 checkouts, but no customers.

They were desperate times, and you could see that there was a climactic crisis coming. It is easy to talk about this sort of thing, a thousand to one devaluation of your home currency, but harder to understand the impact. Imagine that you have $500,000 in savings for your retirement. Now imagine that within two years it is effectively reduced to $500 or less, and you will understand how disconcerting a currency crisis can be.

If you don't think a financial panic is possible here in the US, just take a look at the negative returns on short term T bills, and you will get a taste of the leading edge.

One of the best descriptions of the Weimar experience I have ever read was by Adam Fergusson titled "When Money Dies: The Nightmare of the Weimar Collapse." It is notoriously difficult to obtain, but it does the best job in describing how a currency collapse can come on like a lightning strike, although in retrospect everyone could have seen it coming. Denial is a strong narcotic. People believe in their institutions and ignore history until they are staring off the edge of the abyss.

But in Moscow as in everywhere life does go on. I left with pocketfuls of 1000 ruble notes which I *bought* along with the requisite matroyshka dolls and military medals, all for the kids to play with. Things became worse, much worse, and then eventually they became better.

I have often wondered if 'Casper' ever achieved his dream of taking his diamonds and gold and relocating to Colorado. I hope he did. If he is there, I wonder if he is thinking of moving again.

Bloomberg
Russians Buy Jewelry, Hoard Dollars as Ruble Plunges
By Emma O’Brien and William Mauldin

Dec. 11 (Bloomberg) -- ...Russians are shifting their cash into foreign currencies and buying things they don’t need as the economy stalls and the central bank weakens its defense of the ruble, signaling a larger devaluation may be on the way. The currency has fallen 16 percent against the dollar since August, when Russia’s invasion of neighboring Georgia helped spur investors to pull almost $200 billion out of the country, according to BNP Paribas SA.

The central bank today expanded the ruble’s trading band against a basket of dollars and euros, allowing it to drop 0.8 percent, said a spokesman who declined to be identified on bank policy.

With the specter of the 1998 debt default and devaluation in mind, Russians withdrew 355 billion rubles ($13 billion), or 6 percent of all savings, from their accounts in October, the most since the central bank started posting the data two years ago. Foreign-currency deposits rose 11 percent.

Oligarchs Pinched

Those withdrawals are increasing pressure for the ruble’s devaluation, according to Basil Issa, an emerging- markets analyst at BNP Paribas in London.

Property is now a protective investment, not just a status symbol, said Sergei Polonsky, founder of real estate developer Mirax Group, which is building Moscow’s tallest skyscraper.

“Lately our clients are mostly those who buy real estate not to live in but to secure their investments,” Polonsky said. “No one wants to be left with pieces of paper.”

The 25 wealthiest Russians on Forbes magazine’s list of billionaires, including Oleg Deripaska and Roman Abramovich, lost a combined $230 billion from May to October as asset values plummeted, according to Bloomberg calculations.

‘Feel Happy’

For the burgeoning middle class, investments of choice range from electronics to gold jewelry. Evroset, Russia’s largest mobile-phone chain, is telling people to buy anything they can.

“It’s better to feel happy that you own something than to fear losing the money you have earned,” Chairman Yevgeny Chichvarkin says in a letter posted at 5,200 Evroset stores. “If you need a car, buy a car! If you need an apartment, buy an apartment! If you need a fur coat, buy a fur coat!”

Sales at Technosila, the third-biggest consumer electronics chain, have doubled since September as customers rush to swap rubles for flat-screen TVs and laptops, spokeswoman Nadezhda Senyuk said by phone from Moscow, where the company is based.

Jewelry sales are also accelerating, particularly items made of gold and diamonds, said Vladimir Stankevich, advertising director at Adamas, Russia’s third-largest jewelry retailer.

“More cash appeared on the market and there’s an opinion among shoppers that gold is a good investment in times of crisis,” Stankevich said.

Natalya Kulikova has a different approach. The 31-year-old sales manager said she’s opened accounts in rubles, euros and dollars at three different banks -- one foreign and two domestic -- to guard her savings.

“My main goal is to save money,” she said.

Putin Pledge

Those who don’t want to spend are keeping more money at home or in safe-deposit boxes because the government guarantee on bank accounts is limited to 700,000 rubles, said Yulia Tsepliaeva, chief economist in Moscow at Merrill Lynch & Co.

Alfa Bank, Russia’s biggest non-state lender, said demand for boxes has increased about 40 percent since October, and there are few available.

“The Russian experience with saving is not that good and people prefer to consume and enjoy rather than save in pre-crisis situations,” Tsepliaeva said. “Buy cash dollars and put them in mattresses or safe deposit boxes but not in accounts because most crises are accompanied by banking crises.”

A decade ago, many lost their life savings after the ruble plunged 71 percent against the dollar. Those fears prompted Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to pledge not to allow “sharp jumps” in the exchange rate, during a call-in television show Dec. 4.

‘Ideal Time’

Troika Dialog, Russia’s oldest investment bank, is betting the central bank will allow a one-time devaluation of the ruble of about 20 percent in January, following New Year’s and Orthodox Christmas celebrations.

“With the holidays at the beginning of January, companies won’t be fully working and people will be spending more money,” said Evgeny Gavrilenkov, Troika’s chief economist and a former acting head of the government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. “That means demand for rubles will increase and that means it’s an ideal time to allow a devaluation.”

Russia has drained almost a quarter of its foreign-currency reserves, the world’s third-largest, since August as it tries to slow the ruble’s decline. The central bank has widened the trading band five times in the past month, effectively reducing its defense of the currency amid plunging oil prices.

Devaluation Skeptic

Urals crude, Russia’s main export earner, has slumped 72 percent since reaching a record $142.94 a barrel July 4. It fell below $40 for the first time in three years last week, compared with the $70 needed to balance the country’s budget.

The government will avoid a large, one-step devaluation because it wants to prevent a run on the banks and lure back foreign investors, said Chris Weafer, chief strategist in Moscow at UralSib Financial Corp.

“I’m skeptical a 10 to 15 percent devaluation will provide a significant boost for the economy because the sector that it will most benefit, manufacturing, is just too small,” he said.

The ruble will probably be allowed to drop in small steps to as low as 33 per dollar by the middle of 2009, from about 28 now, Weafer estimates. It will end next year at 26.8 because of a recovery in oil prices and a weaker U.S. currency, he said.

Svetlana Guseva isn’t taking any chances.

The 32-year-old mother of two from the southern city of Sochi plans to take her 8-year-old daughter, Dasha, to Moscow for the New Year’s holiday, a trip that will cost twice her family’s monthly income of about 30,000 rubles.

“This way at least we’ll have some memories,” she said.

Are Markets Naturally Efficient? Are All People Naturally Rational and Good?

There is a ideology that would like to believe that all people are naturally good and rational, and that markets are therefore naturally efficient and free if just left alone to themselves and allowed to function without regulation or management.

This line of argument is often pursued by certain faux conservatives when arguing that the police should be dismissed and the locks removed from the doors, in advance of a period of sustained looting of the common folk by the wealthy elite.

One thing almost all idealists have in common is that their work exists largely on paper, and is rarely to be found in practical implementations over any sustained period.

That is why there are so few farmers and women in this camp of free market idealists because their daily struggle with disorder and decay teaches them that nothing goes the way of order and productive results without plenty of hard work, repeated effort and at least occasional observation.

It is the man in his easy chair reading his books that believes that the dishes clean themselves, the clothes are self-folding and storing, and the children organize their rooms and personal hygiene willingly without 'interference.'

This romantic belief in natural goodness is a great fallacy underlying the Greenspan-Reagan doctrine of trickle down easy money and the prima facie good of boundless deregulation.

It is similar to the belief in the natural goodness of all men and the self-ordering of large societies towards justice and equality without effort. It sounds nice, but in practice it is just ridiculous and almost utterly without support except in the minds of its philosophical adherents. No one who has ever driven in a major metropolitan area can possible believe it.

What people forget is that it takes rules and referees and a great deal of hard work and repeated efforts to create and maintain a fair game and a level playing field for the many who may wish to play.

So too with the notion of a natural tendency to free markets. Its just not true. Markets tend to gravitate to oligopoly, insider dealing, fraud and utter inefficiency. Free market capitalists quickly come to hate competition with their success, and are always seeking to avoid the zero profit outcome through unfair market advantages and the stifling of competition.

Markets can be over-regulated by central planners, and it is always the road to ruin. But they can also be under-regulated and allowed to degenerate into the same awful excesses that governments and peoples fall into at various times in their history, periods of seemingly collective madness, disregard for the individual, and the rise of the will to power.

Government is best that governs least indeed, but with the appropriate level of government to uphold the principles under which people come together to interact in a society and avoid despotism and anarchy. There is a range of good and evil in people, and they join in society for their mutual protection, and the accomplishment of efforts requiring a broad participation.

It is no accident that Jefferson was one of the framers of the Constitution, which although remarkable in its simplicity is ingeniously complex in its design, and fine balances of powers that endure with the commitment and sacrifice for the greater good of each succeeding generation.

Five Critical Decisions Leading to Our Financial Crisis: Joe Stiglitz Presents His Analysis

This is a benchmark document, a starting point, for finding our way out of the wilderness.

It validates the points that quite a few economic bloggers have been making for some time, with great effect because of Joe Stiglitz' reputation and accomplishments in his field.

Here is a summation of the Five Major Causes of our financial crisis. As Joe so correctly observes:

"What were the critical decisions that led to the crisis? Mistakes were made at every fork in the road—we had what engineers call a “system failure,” when not a single decision but a cascade of decisions produce a tragic result. Let’s look at five key moments."

1. Reagan's nomination of Alan Greenspan to replace Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman
2. The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Cult of Self-Regulation
3. Bush Tax Cuts for Upper Income Individuals, Corporations, and Speculation
4. Failure to Address Rampant Accounting Fraud Driven by Excessive and Flawed Compensation Models
5. Providing Enormous Bailouts to the Banks without Engaging Systemic Reform for the Underlying Causes of the Failure

There are other points that might be added, some that are not strictly financial in nature.

An international monetary exchange system that facilitates manipulation to create de facto barriers and subsidies in support of industrial trade policies. This creates destabilizing surpluses and deficits which may be the source of the next stage of the financial crisis.

The concentration of the ownership of the mainstream media in a handful of corporations has had a chilling effect on the newsrooms and commentators.

The lack of Congressional courage in exercising its obligations with regard to the extra-Constitutional excesses of the Executive Office. Certain mechanisms and instruments that facilitate the unilateral exercise of presidential power are tipping the balance of powers.

The existing system of funding inordinately expensive political campaigns is a breeding ground for favors and corruption.

The undue influence on prices, particularly global commodity prices, that is exercised by a handful of US banks operating far outside of traditional banking charters. This is a dangerously destabilizing influence on the real world economy and industrial growth and investment. A significant step forward would be the imposition of position limits, greater and more timely transparency for those with more than 10% of any market's open interest, and an uptick rule with stronger enforcement against naked shorting and other forms of short term price manipulation.

Vanity Fair
The Economic Crisis:
Capitalist Fools
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
January 2009

Behind the debate over remaking U.S. financial policy will be a debate over who’s to blame. It’s crucial to get the history right, writes a Nobel-laureate economist, identifying five key mistakes—under Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II—and one national delusion.

There will come a moment when the most urgent threats posed by the credit crisis have eased and the larger task before us will be to chart a direction for the economic steps ahead. This will be a dangerous moment. Behind the debates over future policy is a debate over history—a debate over the causes of our current situation. The battle for the past will determine the battle for the present. So it’s crucial to get the history straight.

What were the critical decisions that led to the crisis? Mistakes were made at every fork in the road—we had what engineers call a “system failure,” when not a single decision but a cascade of decisions produce a tragic result. Let’s look at five key moments.

No. 1: Firing the Chairman

In 1987 the Reagan administration decided to remove Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and appoint Alan Greenspan in his place. Volcker had done what central bankers are supposed to do. On his watch, inflation had been brought down from more than 11 percent to under 4 percent. In the world of central banking, that should have earned him a grade of A+++ and assured his re-appointment. But Volcker also understood that financial markets need to be regulated. Reagan wanted someone who did not believe any such thing, and he found him in a devotee of the objectivist philosopher and free-market zealot Ayn Rand.

Greenspan played a double role. The Fed controls the money spigot, and in the early years of this decade, he turned it on full force. But the Fed is also a regulator. If you appoint an anti-regulator as your enforcer, you know what kind of enforcement you’ll get. A flood of liquidity combined with the failed levees of regulation proved disastrous.

Greenspan presided over not one but two financial bubbles. After the high-tech bubble popped, in 2000–2001, he helped inflate the housing bubble. The first responsibility of a central bank should be to maintain the stability of the financial system. If banks lend on the basis of artificially high asset prices, the result can be a meltdown—as we are seeing now, and as Greenspan should have known. He had many of the tools he needed to cope with the situation. To deal with the high-tech bubble, he could have increased margin requirements (the amount of cash people need to put down to buy stock). To deflate the housing bubble, he could have curbed predatory lending to low-income households and prohibited other insidious practices (the no-documentation—or “liar”—loans, the interest-only loans, and so on). This would have gone a long way toward protecting us. If he didn’t have the tools, he could have gone to Congress and asked for them.

Of course, the current problems with our financial system are not solely the result of bad lending. The banks have made mega-bets with one another through complicated instruments such as derivatives, credit-default swaps, and so forth. With these, one party pays another if certain events happen—for instance, if Bear Stearns goes bankrupt, or if the dollar soars. These instruments were originally created to help manage risk—but they can also be used to gamble. Thus, if you felt confident that the dollar was going to fall, you could make a big bet accordingly, and if the dollar indeed fell, your profits would soar. The problem is that, with this complicated intertwining of bets of great magnitude, no one could be sure of the financial position of anyone else—or even of one’s own position. Not surprisingly, the credit markets froze.

Here too Greenspan played a role. When I was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, during the Clinton administration, I served on a committee of all the major federal financial regulators, a group that included Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. Even then, it was clear that derivatives posed a danger. We didn’t put it as memorably as Warren Buffett—who saw derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction”—but we took his point. And yet, for all the risk, the deregulators in charge of the financial system—at the Fed, at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and elsewhere—decided to do nothing, worried that any action might interfere with “innovation” in the financial system. But innovation, like “change,” has no inherent value. It can be bad (the “liar” loans are a good example) as well as good.

No. 2: Tearing Down the Walls

The deregulation philosophy would pay unwelcome dividends for years to come. In November 1999, Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act—the culmination of a $300 million lobbying effort by the banking and financial-services industries, and spearheaded in Congress by Senator Phil Gramm. Glass-Steagall had long separated commercial banks (which lend money) and investment banks (which organize the sale of bonds and equities); it had been enacted in the aftermath of the Great Depression and was meant to curb the excesses of that era, including grave conflicts of interest. For instance, without separation, if a company whose shares had been issued by an investment bank, with its strong endorsement, got into trouble, wouldn’t its commercial arm, if it had one, feel pressure to lend it money, perhaps unwisely? An ensuing spiral of bad judgment is not hard to foresee. I had opposed repeal of Glass-Steagall. The proponents said, in effect, Trust us: we will create Chinese walls to make sure that the problems of the past do not recur. As an economist, I certainly possessed a healthy degree of trust, trust in the power of economic incentives to bend human behavior toward self-interest—toward short-term self-interest, at any rate, rather than Tocqueville’s “self interest rightly understood.”

The most important consequence of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect—it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture. Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money—people who can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top. There was a demand for the kind of high returns that could be obtained only through high leverage and big risktaking.

There were other important steps down the deregulatory path. One was the decision in April 2004 by the Securities and Exchange Commission, at a meeting attended by virtually no one and largely overlooked at the time, to allow big investment banks to increase their debt-to-capital ratio (from 12:1 to 30:1, or higher) so that they could buy more mortgage-backed securities, inflating the housing bubble in the process. In agreeing to this measure, the S.E.C. argued for the virtues of self-regulation: the peculiar notion that banks can effectively police themselves. Self-regulation is preposterous, as even Alan Greenspan now concedes, and as a practical matter it can’t, in any case, identify systemic risks—the kinds of risks that arise when, for instance, the models used by each of the banks to manage their portfolios tell all the banks to sell some security all at once.

As we stripped back the old regulations, we did nothing to address the new challenges posed by 21st-century markets. The most important challenge was that posed by derivatives. In 1998 the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Brooksley Born, had called for such regulation—a concern that took on urgency after the Fed, in that same year, engineered the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose trillion-dollar-plus failure threatened global financial markets. But Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, his deputy, Larry Summers, and Greenspan were adamant—and successful—in their opposition. Nothing was done.

No. 3: Applying the Leeches

Then along came the Bush tax cuts, enacted first on June 7, 2001, with a follow-on installment two years later. The president and his advisers seemed to believe that tax cuts, especially for upper-income Americans and corporations, were a cure-all for any economic disease—the modern-day equivalent of leeches. The tax cuts played a pivotal role in shaping the background conditions of the current crisis. Because they did very little to stimulate the economy, real stimulation was left to the Fed, which took up the task with unprecedented low-interest rates and liquidity. The war in Iraq made matters worse, because it led to soaring oil prices. With America so dependent on oil imports, we had to spend several hundred billion more to purchase oil—money that otherwise would have been spent on American goods. Normally this would have led to an economic slowdown, as it had in the 1970s. But the Fed met the challenge in the most myopic way imaginable. The flood of liquidity made money readily available in mortgage markets, even to those who would normally not be able to borrow. And, yes, this succeeded in forestalling an economic downturn; America’s household saving rate plummeted to zero. But it should have been clear that we were living on borrowed money and borrowed time.

The cut in the tax rate on capital gains contributed to the crisis in another way. It was a decision that turned on values: those who speculated (read: gambled) and won were taxed more lightly than wage earners who simply worked hard. But more than that, the decision encouraged leveraging, because interest was tax-deductible. If, for instance, you borrowed a million to buy a home or took a $100,000 home-equity loan to buy stock, the interest would be fully deductible every year. Any capital gains you made were taxed lightly—and at some possibly remote day in the future. The Bush administration was providing an open invitation to excessive borrowing and lending—not that American consumers needed any more encouragement.

No. 4: Faking the Numbers

Meanwhile, on July 30, 2002, in the wake of a series of major scandals—notably the collapse of WorldCom and Enron—Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The scandals had involved every major American accounting firm, most of our banks, and some of our premier companies, and made it clear that we had serious problems with our accounting system. Accounting is a sleep-inducing topic for most people, but if you can’t have faith in a company’s numbers, then you can’t have faith in anything about a company at all. Unfortunately, in the negotiations over what became Sarbanes-Oxley a decision was made not to deal with what many, including the respected former head of the S.E.C. Arthur Levitt, believed to be a fundamental underlying problem: stock options. Stock options have been defended as providing healthy incentives toward good management, but in fact they are “incentive pay” in name only. If a company does well, the C.E.O. gets great rewards in the form of stock options; if a company does poorly, the compensation is almost as substantial but is bestowed in other ways. This is bad enough. But a collateral problem with stock options is that they provide incentives for bad accounting: top management has every incentive to provide distorted information in order to pump up share prices.

The incentive structure of the rating agencies also proved perverse. Agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are paid by the very people they are supposed to grade. As a result, they’ve had every reason to give companies high ratings, in a financial version of what college professors know as grade inflation. The rating agencies, like the investment banks that were paying them, believed in financial alchemy—that F-rated toxic mortgages could be converted into products that were safe enough to be held by commercial banks and pension funds. We had seen this same failure of the rating agencies during the East Asia crisis of the 1990s: high ratings facilitated a rush of money into the region, and then a sudden reversal in the ratings brought devastation. But the financial overseers paid no attention.

No. 5: Letting It Bleed

The final turning point came with the passage of a bailout package on October 3, 2008—that is, with the administration’s response to the crisis itself. We will be feeling the consequences for years to come. Both the administration and the Fed had long been driven by wishful thinking, hoping that the bad news was just a blip, and that a return to growth was just around the corner. As America’s banks faced collapse, the administration veered from one course of action to another. Some institutions (Bear Stearns, A.I.G., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) were bailed out. Lehman Brothers was not. Some shareholders got something back. Others did not.

The original proposal by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, a three-page document that would have provided $700 billion for the secretary to spend at his sole discretion, without oversight or judicial review, was an act of extraordinary arrogance. He sold the program as necessary to restore confidence. But it didn’t address the underlying reasons for the loss of confidence. The banks had made too many bad loans. There were big holes in their balance sheets. No one knew what was truth and what was fiction. The bailout package was like a massive transfusion to a patient suffering from internal bleeding—and nothing was being done about the source of the problem, namely all those foreclosures. Valuable time was wasted as Paulson pushed his own plan, “cash for trash,” buying up the bad assets and putting the risk onto American taxpayers. When he finally abandoned it, providing banks with money they needed, he did it in a way that not only cheated America’s taxpayers but failed to ensure that the banks would use the money to re-start lending. He even allowed the banks to pour out money to their shareholders as taxpayers were pouring money into the banks.

The other problem not addressed involved the looming weaknesses in the economy. The economy had been sustained by excessive borrowing. That game was up. As consumption contracted, exports kept the economy going, but with the dollar strengthening and Europe and the rest of the world declining, it was hard to see how that could continue. Meanwhile, states faced massive drop-offs in revenues—they would have to cut back on expenditures. Without quick action by government, the economy faced a downturn. And even if banks had lent wisely—which they hadn’t—the downturn was sure to mean an increase in bad debts, further weakening the struggling financial sector.

The administration talked about confidence building, but what it delivered was actually a confidence trick. If the administration had really wanted to restore confidence in the financial system, it would have begun by addressing the underlying problems—the flawed incentive structures and the inadequate regulatory system.

Was there any single decision which, had it been reversed, would have changed the course of history? Every decision—including decisions not to do something, as many of our bad economic decisions have been—is a consequence of prior decisions, an interlinked web stretching from the distant past into the future. You’ll hear some on the right point to certain actions by the government itself—such as the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to make mortgage money available in low-income neighborhoods. (Defaults on C.R.A. lending were actually much lower than on other lending.) There has been much finger-pointing at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two huge mortgage lenders, which were originally government-owned. But in fact they came late to the subprime game, and their problem was similar to that of the private sector: their C.E.O.’s had the same perverse incentive to indulge in gambling.

The truth is most of the individual mistakes boil down to just one: a belief that markets are self-adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal. Looking back at that belief during hearings this fall on Capitol Hill, Alan Greenspan said out loud, “I have found a flaw.” Congressman Henry Waxman pushed him, responding, “In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right; it was not working.” “Absolutely, precisely,” Greenspan said. The embrace by America—and much of the rest of the world—of this flawed economic philosophy made it inevitable that we would eventually arrive at the place we are today.

Is the Fed Taking the First Steps to Selective Default and Devaluation?

We have been looking for an out-of-the-box move from the Fed, but this was not what we had expected.

The obvious game changing move would have been for the Treasury and the Fed to make an arrangement in which the Fed is able to purchase Treasury debt directly without subjecting it to an auction in the public market first. This is known as 'a money machine' and is prohibited by statute.

But as usual the Fed surprises us all with their lack of transparency. They are asking Congress about permission to issue their own debt directly, not tied to Treasuries.

This is known in central banking circles as 'cutting out the middleman.' Not only does the Treasury no longer issue the currency, but they also no longer have any control over how much debt backed currency the Fed can now issue directly.

If the Fed were able to issue its own debt, which is currently limited to Federal Reserve Notes backed by Treasuries under the Federal Reserve Act, it would provide Bernanke the ability to present a different class of debt to the investing public and foreign central banks.

The question is whether it would be backed with the same force as Treasuries, or is subordinated, or superior.

There will not be any lack of new Treasury debt issuance upon which to base new Fed balance sheet expansion. The notion that there might be a debt generation lag out of Washington in comparison with what the Fed issues as currency is almost frightening in its hyperinflationary implications.

This makes little sense unless the Fed wishes to be able to set different rates for their debt, and make it a different class, and whore out our currency, the Federal Reserve notes, without impacting the sovereign Treasury debt itself, leaving the door open for the issuance of a New Dollar.

What an image. The NY Fed as a GSE, the new and improved Fannie and Freddie. Zimbabwe Ben can simply print a new class of Federal Reserve Notes with no backing from Treasuries. BenBucks. Federal Reserve Thingies.

Perhaps we're missing something, but this looks like a step in anticipation of an eventual partial default or devaluation of US debt and the dollar.


Wall Street Journal
Fed Weighs Debt Sales of Its Own
By JON HILSENRATH and DAMIAN PALETTA
DECEMBER 10, 2008

Move Presents Challenges: 'Very Close Cousins to Existing Treasury Bills'

The Federal Reserve is considering issuing its own debt for the first time, a move that would give the central bank additional flexibility as it tries to stabilize rocky financial markets.

Government debt issuance is largely the province of the Treasury Department, and the Fed already can print as much money as it wants. But as the credit crisis drags on and the economy suffers from recession, Fed officials are looking broadly for new financial tools.

The Federal Reserve drained $25 billion in temporary reserves from the banking system when it arranged overnight reverse repurchase agreements.

Fed officials have approached Congress about the concept, which could include issuing bills or some other form of debt, according to people familiar with the matter.

It isn't known whether these preliminary discussions will result in a formal proposal or Fed action. One hurdle: The Federal Reserve Act doesn't explicitly permit the Fed to issue notes beyond currency.

Just exploring the idea underscores many challenges the ongoing problems are creating for the Fed, as well as the lengths to which the central bank is going to come up with new ideas.

At the core of the deliberations is the Fed's balance sheet, which has grown from less than $900 billion to more than $2 trillion since August as it backstops new markets like commercial paper, money-market funds, mortgage-backed securities and ailing companies such as American International Group Inc.

The ballooning balance sheet is presenting complications for the Fed. In the early stages of the crisis, officials funded their programs by drawing down on holdings of Treasury bonds, using the proceeds to finance new programs. Officials don't want that stockpile to get too low. It now is about $476 billion, with some of that amount already tied up in other programs.

The Fed also has turned to the Treasury Department for cash. Treasury has issued debt, leaving the proceeds on deposit with the Fed for the central bank to use as it chose. But the Treasury said in November it was scaling back that effort. The Treasury is undertaking its own massive borrowing program and faces legal limits on how much it can borrow.

More recently, the Fed has funded programs by flooding the financial system with money it created itself -- known in central-banking circles as bank reserves -- and has used the money to make loans and purchase assets.

Some economists worry about the consequences of this approach. Fed officials could find it challenging to remove the cash from the system once markets stabilize and the economy improves. It's not a problem now, but if they're too slow to act later it can cause inflation.

Moreover, the flood of additional cash makes it harder for Fed officials to maintain interest rates at their desired level. The fed-funds rate, an overnight borrowing rate between banks, has fallen consistently below the Fed's 1% target. It is expected to reduce that target next week.

Louis Crandall, an economist with Wrightson ICAP LLC, a Wall Street money-market broker, says the Fed's interventions also have the potential to clog up the balance sheets of banks, its main intermediaries.

"Finding alternative funding vehicles that bypass the banking system would be a more effective way to support the U.S. credit system," he says.

Some private economists worry that Fed-issued bonds could create new problems. Marvin Goodfriend, an economist at Carnegie Mellon University's Tepper School of Business and a former senior staffer at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, said that issuing debt could put the Fed at odds with the Treasury at a time when it is already issuing mountains of debt itself.

"It creates problems in coordinating the issuance of government debt," Mr. Goodfriend said. "These would be very close cousins to existing Treasury bills. They would be competing in the same market to federal debt."

With Treasury-bill rates now near zero, it seems unlikely that Fed debt would push Treasury rates much higher, but it could some day become an issue.

There are also questions about the Fed's authority.

"I had always worked under the assumption that the Federal Reserve couldn't issue debt," said Vincent Reinhart, a former senior Fed staffer who is now an economist at the American Enterprise Institute. He says it is an action better suited to the Treasury Department, which has clear congressional authority to borrow on behalf of the government.

The Long Bond Is Holding a High Note