John C. Williams: The Federal Reserve's Brand of Modern Monetary Theory

I will comment more on this later but I thought it was interesting and probably quite important for future reference.

One point of contention for me has been this whole issue of the Fed paying interest on excess reserves, essentially incenting banks, if the rate is high enough, to cause banks to hoard reserves at the Fed rather than lend the money out to the real economy.

This point was argued quite vociferously some years ago during the first quantitative easing.  We were told by the New York Fed, as I recall, that this was not the case, and that the payment of interest on excess reserves was only a means for the Fed to manage rates at the zero bound, and did not affect the levels of reserves which are only an accounting identity, after all.

Williams seems to contradict this now.  But I have to give it an extra careful reading in this case.

However, some might look at his data and his reasoning and conclude that while the Fed's policies have been doing quite a bit to provide solvency to the banking system, it has not done well by the real economy.  The GDP and employment numbers seem to bear this out.

One might conclude that reducing the interest paid on reserves would cause the banks to make more loans to the real economy.  And yet not so long ago the NY Fed and several of their economists also argued against what seems like common sense that this was not the case, not at all.

So it might be important to pin the Fed down a bit on this now.  Their thinking could be evolving, or it might just be dissembling to suit the changing situation.   One might gather from what Mr. Williams is saying about rewriting established theory that they don't quite know what it is that they are doing, but instead are feeling their way along in uncharted waters.

This of course widens the risk of a policy error enormously.  Greenspan's Fed was replete with policy errors, but of course he was the gure, the infallible one.  And we should trust these same economists who lionized him now for what reason?

From my own perspective the Fed has spun what they are doing in so many different ways at different times that it is difficult to take what they are saying here at face value.

And that is another feature of the credibility trap.

I believe this speech by John C. Williams is significant, in the manner of Bernanke's famous printing press speech.  Deflation: Making Sure It Doesn't Happen Here. 

Let's give it a careful read and see if it provides any additional clues to what they are thinking, and what they might do next.

San Francisco Federal Reserve Bank
Monetary Policy, Money, and Inflation
John C. Williams, President and CEO
2 July 2012

Good morning. I’m very pleased to be in such eminent company, especially that of my former advisor at Stanford, John Taylor. And I’ll begin my presentation with a reference to another pathbreaking monetary theorist. Milton Friedman famously said, “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon in the sense that it is and can be produced only by a more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output.” 1

We are currently engaged in a test of this proposition. Over the past four years, the Federal Reserve has more than tripled the monetary base, a key determinant of money supply.   Some commentators have sounded an alarm that this massive expansion of the monetary base will inexorably lead to high inflation, à la Friedman.

Despite these dire predictions, inflation in the United States has been the dog that didn’t bark. As Figure 1 shows, it has averaged less than 2 percent over the past four years. (Past performance is not an indicator of future success - Jesse)  What’s more, as the figure also shows, surveys of inflation expectations indicate that low inflation is anticipated for at least the next ten years.  (Did they anticipate the financial collapse? - Jesse)

In my remarks today, I will try to reconcile monetary theory with the recent performance of inflation. In my view, recent developments make a compelling case that traditional textbook views of the connections between monetary policy, money, and inflation are outdated and need to be revised. As always, my remarks represent my own views and not necessarily those of others in the Federal Reserve System.

I’ll start with two definitions. The monetary base is the sum of U.S. currency in circulation and bank reserves held at the Federal Reserve. Figure 2 shows the key components of the monetary base since 2007. Up until late 2008, it consisted mostly of currency, with a small amount of bank reserves held mostly to meet regulatory requirements. Since then, the monetary base has risen dramatically, primarily because of a $1.5 trillion increase in bank reserves. The money stock is a related concept. It is the total quantity of account balances at banks and other financial institutions that can easily be accessed to make payments. A standard measure of the money stock is M2, which includes currency, and certain deposit and money market accounts.

Here I should make an important point about something that often confuses the public. The worry is not that the Fed is literally printing too much currency. 2 The quantity of currency in circulation is entirely determined by demand from people and businesses. It’s not an independent decision of monetary policy and, on its own, it has no implications for inflation. (It is the money stock that concerns people, not the adjusted monetary base per se - Jesse)

The Federal Reserve meets demand for currency elastically. If people want to hold more of it, we freely exchange reserves for currency. If people want less, then we exchange it back. Of course, currency doesn’t pay interest. People hold it as a low-cost medium of exchange and a safe store of value. In fact, over the past four years, U.S. currency holdings have risen about 35 percent. This reflects low interest rates, which reduce the opportunity cost of holding currency. It’s also due to worries about the economy and the health of the banking system, both here and abroad. In fact, nearly two-thirds of U.S. currency is held outside our borders. 3  U.S. currency is widely seen as a safe haven. When a country is going through economic or political turmoil, people tend to convert some of their financial assets to U.S. currency. Such increased demand for U.S. currency is taking place in Europe today.

For monetary policy, the relevant metric is bank reserves. The Federal Reserve controls the quantity of bank reserves as it implements monetary policy. To keep things simple, I’ll start with what happens when the Fed doesn’t pay interest on reserves, which was the case until late 2008. I’ll return to the issue of interest on reserves toward the end of my talk.

Before interest on reserves, the opportunity cost for holding noninterest-bearing bank reserves was the nominal short-term interest rate, such as the federal funds rate. Demand for reserves is downward sloping. That is, when the federal funds rate is low, the reserves banks want to hold increases. Conventional monetary policy works by adjusting the amount of reserves so that the federal funds rate equals a target level at which supply and demand for reserves are in equilibrium. It is implemented by trading noninterest-bearing reserves for interest-bearing securities, typically short-term Treasury bills.

Normally, banks have a strong incentive to put reserves to work by lending them out. If a bank were suddenly to find itself with a million dollars in excess reserves in its account, it would quickly try to find a creditworthy borrower and earn a return. If the banking system as a whole found itself with excess reserves, then the system would increase the availability of credit in the economy, drive private-sector borrowing rates lower, and spur economic activity. Precisely this reasoning lies behind the classical monetary theories of multiple deposit creation and the money multiplier, which hold that an increase in the monetary base should lead to a proportional rise in the money stock.

Moreover, if the economy were operating at its potential, then if the banking system held excess reserves, too much “money” would chase too few goods, leading to higher inflation. Friedman’s maxim would be confirmed. Here’s the conundrum then: How could the Fed have tripled the monetary base since 2008 without the money stock ballooning, triggering big jumps in spending and inflation? What’s wrong with our tried-and-true theory?

A critical explanation is that banks would rather hold reserves safely at the Fed instead of lending them out in a struggling economy loaded with risk. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is low, while the risks in lending or investing in other assets seem high. Thus, at near-zero rates, demand for reserves can be extremely elastic. The same logic holds for households and businesses. Given the weak economy and heightened uncertainty, they are hoarding cash instead of spending it. In a nutshell, the money multiplier has broken down. 4

The numbers tell the story. Despite a 200 percent increase in the monetary base, measures of the money supply have grown only moderately. For example, M2 has increased only 28 percent over the past four years. 5  Figure 3 shows that the money multiplier—as measured by the ratio of M2 to the monetary base—plummeted in late 2008 and has not recovered since. Nominal spending has been even less responsive, increasing a mere 8 percent over the past four years. As a result, the ratio of nominal gross domestic product, which measures the total amount spent in the economy, to the monetary base fell even more precipitously, as the figure shows. This ratio also has not recovered, illustrating how profoundly the linkage between the monetary base and the economy has broken.

A natural question is, if those reserves aren’t circulating, why did the Fed boost them so dramatically in the first place? The most important reason has been a deliberate move to support financial markets and stimulate the economy.  By mid-December 2008, the Fed had lowered the federal funds rate essentially to zero. Yet the economy was still contracting very rapidly. Standard rules of thumb and a range of model simulations recommended setting the federal funds rate below zero starting in late 2008 or early 2009, something that was impossible to do. 6  

Instead, the Fed provided additional stimulus by purchasing longer-term securities, paid for by creating bank reserves. These purchases increased the demand for longer-term Treasuries and similar securities, which pushed up the prices of these assets, and thereby reduced longer-term interest rates. In turn, lower interest rates have improved financial conditions and helped stimulate real economic activity. 7 

The important point is that the additional stimulus to the economy from our asset purchases is primarily a result of lower interest rates, rather than a textbook process of reserve creation, leading to an increased money supply. It is through its effects on interest rates and other financial conditions that monetary policy affects the economy.

But, once the economy improves sufficiently, won’t banks start lending more actively, causing the historical money multiplier to reassert itself? And can’t the resulting huge increase in the money supply overheat the economy, leading to higher inflation? The answer to these questions is no, and the reason is a profound, but largely unappreciated change in the inner workings of monetary policy. 

The change is that the Fed now pays interest on reserves. The opportunity cost of holding reserves is now the difference between the federal funds rate and the interest rate on reserves. The Fed will likely raise the interest rate on reserves as it raises the target federal funds rate. 8 Therefore, for banks, reserves at the Fed are close substitutes for Treasury bills in terms of return and safety. A Fed exchange of bank reserves that pay interest for a T-bill that carries a very similar interest rate has virtually no effect on the economy. Instead, what matters for the economy is the level of interest rates, which are affected by monetary policy.

This means that the historical relationships between the amount of reserves, the money supply, and the economy are unlikely to hold in the future. If banks are happy to hold excess reserves as an interest-bearing asset, then the marginal money multiplier on those reserves can be close to zero. As a result, in a world where the Fed pays interest on bank reserves, traditional theories that tell of a mechanical link between reserves, money supply, and, ultimately, inflation are no longer valid. In particular, the world changes if the Fed is willing to pay a high enough interest rate on reserves. In that case, the quantity of reserves held by U.S. banks could be extremely large and have only small effects on, say, the money stock, bank lending, or inflation.

As I noted earlier, inflation and inflation expectations have been low for the past four years, despite the huge increase in the monetary base. Of course, if the economy improved markedly, inflationary pressures could build. Under such circumstances, the Federal Reserve would need to remove monetary accommodation to keep the economy from overheating and excessive inflation from emerging. It can do this in two ways: first, by raising the interest rate paid on reserves along with the target federal funds rate; and, second, by reducing its holdings of longer-term securities, which would reverse the effects of the asset purchase programs on interest rates.

In thinking of exit strategy, the nature of the monetary policy problem the Fed will face is no different than in past recoveries when the Fed needed to “take away the punch bowl.” Of course, getting the timing just right to engineer a soft landing with low inflation is always difficult. This time, it will be especially challenging, given the extraordinary depth and duration of the recession and recovery. The Federal Reserve is prepared to meet this challenge when that time comes. Thank you.

End Notes

1. Friedman (1970), p. 24.

2. Technically, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing prints paper currency. The Federal Reserve is responsible for processing and distributing currency to the banking system. The Federal Reserve also distributes coins, which are distinct from paper currency, to the banking system, but the amount of coins in circulation is comparatively small.

3. See Goldberg (2010).

4. For a discussion of this, see Williams (2011a).

5. Similarly, an alternative measure of the money stock, MZM, increased 26 percent over the past four years.

6. See Chung et al. (2011) and Rudebusch (2010).

7. See Williams (2011b) for details.

8. For details on the Fed’s planned exit strategy, see the minutes for the June 2011 FOMC meeting (Board of Governors 2011).

Shock B: I'll Bust a Cap in Your Curve, And Then Some...

Ben Bernanke and his gangsta bankas have been following the approach outlined in this paper from 2004, Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, which is excerpted below, and also in his famous 'printing press' speech on avoiding deflation from 2002.

I have written about this before several times over the years, but perhaps it is a good time to review the Fed's game plan.

The first item, communications to model and influence the perception of the markets, is obvious. Jawboning is a major element of any financial intervention. Acknowledging or denying the intervention is all about the message as well.

The most recent statement from the Fed, for example, about keeping rates at the zero bound for the next two years, depending on how the economy fares, is a good example of this. Other actions they may take through their own speeches, and the statements of informal intermediaries in the industry and the press, are good examples as well.

The expansion of the Fed's Balance Sheet is also known as quantitative easing, and that has been done at least twice now, and in epic proportions.

The third option, the targeted purchasing of certain assets, has been done to a large extent to support the banking and mortgage system, but not necessarily the real economy.  This is the program by which the Fed has been taking non-traditional assets into its portfolio in the various vehicles it has constructed in order to shore up the shaky creditworthiness of the TBTF asset profiles.

What the Fed is not doing in a major program yet, although it certainly has done it in the past, is to conspiculously shift the duration of its Treasury bonds portfolio in order to achieve certain interest rate objectives, effectively setting caps on target rates up the curve.

In 1961 in a program called Operation Twist, the Fed moved the duration of its portfolio to help lower longer term rates.  It should be noted that OT1, if you will,  was conducted during the fixed exchange rate period known as Bretton Woods I, which included the redeemability of dollars for gold.  Also, although the short end of the Treasury curve was not at the zero bound,  it was not viewed as adjustable for policy constraints than the zero bound.

So there are some subtle differences perhaps in any OT2 which the Fed might announce this week, or soon thereafter.

John F. Kennedy was elected president in November 1960 and inaugurated on January 20, 1961. The U.S. economy had been in recession for several months, so the incoming Administration and the Federal Reserve wanted to lower interest rates to stimulate the weak economy. Under the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system then in effect, this interest rate differential led cross-currency arbitrageurs to convert U.S. dollars to gold and invest the proceeds in higher-yielding European assets. The result was an outflow of gold from the United States to Europe amounting to several billion dollars per year, a very large quantity that was a source of extreme concern to the Administration and the Federal Reserve.

The buying of the longer end of the curve, moving out from the bills to the shorter notes, has been telegraphed repeatedly to the markets this year. So it does appear likely.

The effects would be to lower real rates more broadly across the curve, perhaps taking them all negative, or at least closer to zero on the longer end depending on how one wishes to calculate inflation. I think the Fed uses their chain deflator.  I doubt its accuracy for practical purposes, but let's not quibble.

This is 'bad' for the dollar and good for gold and longer dated Treasuries which will enjoy a brief rally. However it will drive yield hungry investors to seek other alternatives, perhaps in the stock market and overseas.   It may shake up the Treasury markets on the longer end moreso than we might expect if there is an erosion in confidence in the US' ability to put its house in order without devaluation of the dollar debt.  That erosion may be well-founded.

Such a policy move is intended to stimulate consumption and investment in situations where the middle of the curve and out is used as a benchmark for setting non-governmental interest rates.  There is thinking that by moving out from the short maturies, the pull lower on the even longer rates will be more pronounced.

I do not think this alone will work. Banks are reluctant to lend at any price, and lowering the rates would not improve the credit risk profile of potential borrowers.

The Fed could also reduce the interest it pays on reserves to zero, or even place a negative rate on it. This would stimulate banks to put the money to work in the markets for projects with positive yields. This is not so different from the Fed's actions in driving consumers out of short term bonds and zero interest savings accounts, which they have done from time to time.

There is some further indications that the Fed will be using a reverse repo mechanism in order to grow bank credit in a more targeted fashion.  I will not get into that further here, because if it does develop I am sure there will be much more lucid explanations given in some detail based on Fed announcements.

But it does follow the theme of actively stimulating lending in ways other than lowering rates, even on the longer ends of the curve.

The Fed might couple this with government guarantees on loans for example, for certain situations where the government wishes to stimulate activity, such as housing for example. It is hard to imagine anything like this passes through the dysfunctional Congress.

There is another option that the Fed has, which is not cited in the summary of this paper shown below.

For this we have to turn to Chairman Bernanke's famous speech on Deflation in 2002 in which he stated that 'the Fed's owns a printing press' and highlighted various steps which they might take to insure that deflation does not happen in the US, the ability and the resolve of the Fed to prevent it, and some of the options the Fed might have if they reach the infamous zero bound:

However, a principal message of my talk today is that a central bank whose accustomed policy rate has been forced down to zero has most definitely not run out of ammunition. As I will discuss, a central bank, either alone or in cooperation with other parts of the government, retains considerable power to expand aggregate demand and economic activity even when its accustomed policy rate is at zero. In the remainder of my talk, I will first discuss measures for preventing deflation--the preferable option if feasible. I will then turn to policy measures that the Fed and other government authorities can take if prevention efforts fail and deflation appears to be gaining a foothold in the economy...

What has this got to do with monetary policy? Like gold, U.S. dollars have value only to the extent that they are strictly limited in supply. But the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services. We conclude that, under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation.

So what then might the Fed do if its target interest rate, the overnight federal funds rate, fell to zero? One relatively straightforward extension of current procedures would be to try to stimulate spending by lowering rates further out along the Treasury term structure--that is, rates on government bonds of longer maturities.

There are at least two ways of bringing down longer-term rates, which are complementary and could be employed separately or in combination. One approach, similar to an action taken in the past couple of years by the Bank of Japan, would be for the Fed to commit to holding the overnight rate at zero for some specified period. Because long-term interest rates represent averages of current and expected future short-term rates, plus a term premium, a commitment to keep short-term rates at zero for some time--if it were credible--would induce a decline in longer-term rates.

A more direct method, which I personally prefer, would be for the Fed to begin announcing explicit ceilings for yields on longer-maturity Treasury debt (say, bonds maturing within the next two years). The Fed could enforce these interest-rate ceilings by committing to make unlimited purchases of securities up to two years from maturity at prices consistent with the targeted yields. If this program were successful, not only would yields on medium-term Treasury securities fall, but (because of links operating through expectations of future interest rates) yields on longer-term public and private debt (such as mortgages) would likely fall as well.

Lower rates over the maturity spectrum of public and private securities should strengthen aggregate demand in the usual ways and thus help to end deflation. Of course, if operating in relatively short-dated Treasury debt proved insufficient, the Fed could also attempt to cap yields of Treasury securities at still longer maturities, say three to six years. Yet another option would be for the Fed to use its existing authority to operate in the markets for agency debt (for example, mortgage-backed securities issued by Ginnie Mae, the Government National Mortgage Association). Historical experience tends to support the proposition that a sufficiently determined Fed can peg or cap Treasury bond prices and yields at other than the shortest maturities...

If lowering yields on longer-dated Treasury securities proved insufficient to restart spending, however, the Fed might next consider attempting to influence directly the yields on privately issued securities. Unlike some central banks, and barring changes to current law, the Fed is relatively restricted in its ability to buy private securities directly. However, the Fed does have broad powers to lend to the private sector indirectly via banks, through the discount window. Therefore a second policy option, complementary to operating in the markets for Treasury and agency debt, would be for the Fed to offer fixed-term loans to banks at low or zero interest, with a wide range of private assets (including, among others, corporate bonds, commercial paper, bank loans, and mortgages) deemed eligible as collateral. (Obviously the Fed has already been doing this as well).

Although a policy of intervening to affect the exchange value of the dollar is nowhere on the horizon today, it's worth noting that there have been times when exchange rate policy has been an effective weapon against deflation. A striking example from U.S. history is Franklin Roosevelt's 40 percent devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1933-34, enforced by a program of gold purchases and domestic money creation. The devaluation and the rapid increase in money supply it permitted ended the U.S. deflation remarkably quickly. Indeed, consumer price inflation in the United States, year on year, went from -10.3 percent in 1932 to -5.1 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1934.17 The economy grew strongly, and by the way, 1934 was one of the best years of the century for the stock market. If nothing else, the episode illustrates that monetary actions can have powerful effects on the economy, even when the nominal interest rate is at or near zero, as was the case at the time of Roosevelt's devaluation.

Each of the policy options I have discussed so far involves the Fed's acting on its own. In practice, the effectiveness of anti-deflation policy could be significantly enhanced by cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. A broad-based tax cut, for example, accommodated by a program of open-market purchases to alleviate any tendency for interest rates to increase, would almost certainly be an effective stimulant to consumption and hence to prices. Even if households decided not to increase consumption but instead re-balanced their portfolios by using their extra cash to acquire real and financial assets, the resulting increase in asset values would lower the cost of capital and improve the balance sheet positions of potential borrowers. A money-financed tax cut is essentially equivalent to Milton Friedman's famous "helicopter drop" of money. (I think the Obama Administration used this as the rationale for extending the Bush tax cuts).

Of course, in lieu of tax cuts or increases in transfers the government could increase spending on current goods and services or even acquire existing real or financial assets. If the Treasury issued debt to purchase private assets and the Fed then purchased an equal amount of Treasury debt with newly created money, the whole operation would be the economic equivalent of direct open-market operations in private assets. (I believe the Fed has already been doing this with the help of a few Primary Dealers.)

In summation, I think Bernanke's next move will be to start capping the two and three year rates, with the five year to follow. The purpose will be to keep rates low for the purpose of enabling spending and devaluing the dollar. I do not think he will have to expand the Fed's Balance Sheet to accomplish this.

But it is important to note that while the Congress can enforce a debt ceiling on the US Treasury, there is no such hard ceiling on the Fed's Balance Sheet. And this is probably the genesis of Presidential candidate Perry's scarcely veiled threat to Mr. Bernanke and the use of the word 'treason.'

I am not saying that the Fed is right in what they are doing. I am using Bernanke's thinking, and his own words, to determine what the Fed is likely to do next. I have been using this model for the past five years, and it has served me well. 

I have some sympathy for Bernanke, because he has few allies, especially among the libertine left and the luddites of the right, and the serpentine Obama.  The major obstacle to the US recovery is a failure in governance.

I have very little sympathy for the manipulation of certain markets traditionally viewed as safe havens, based on the rationale outlined in Larry Summer's paper about Gibson's Paradox, and the linkage between interest rates and gold.  That appears to be roughly analagous to machine-gunning the lifeboats.
Deflation or inflation are truly policy decisions in an unconstrained fiat currency regime such as that enjoyed by the US. On this Mr. Bernanke is correct, and anyone who thinks otherwise does not understand a fiat money system.  It really is that simple.  To their credit, the Modern Monetary Theorists understand it very well, except for the downside of excessive money creation in a co-dependent world, even if one does enjoy the exorbitant privilege of the world's reserve currency.

Various interests have been seeking to restrain the Fed, ranging from large creditors such as China, and the domestic monied interests who have already received their bonuses and bailouts, and who do not wish to see their dollar wealth erode. One is richer if all around them are made relatively poorer, or so some lines of thinking go.  And of course there are the prudent savers, who have been fleeing the dollar to the relative safety of some foreign currencies and hard assets like gold and silver.

I would hope that by now that any reader here would know that, at least in my judgement, deflation through hard money and austerity, or inflation through stimulus and money printing, are both unable to achieve a sustainable economic recovery because the system is caught in a credibility trap in which the governance of the country is unable to act justly and reform the system without implicating themselves in the compliant corruption that caused the unbridled credit expansion, massive frauds, and financial collapse in the first place. 

This was a major contributor to Japan's lost years.  The lack of will was in the failure of their largely single party system to correct the inefficiencies and crony capitalism of the banks and their keiretsus that provided a drag on all stimulus and the real economy, siphoning off the additional money into unproductive projects and support for zombie corporations.

The Banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, with balance restored to the economy, before there can be any sustained recovery.

Federal Reserve
Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment

Ben S. Bernanke, Vincent R. Reinhart, Brian P. Sack

8 April 2004


Abstract

 The success over the years in reducing inflation and, consequently, the average level of nominal interest rates has increased the likelihood that the nominal policy interest rate may become constrained by the zero lower bound.

When that happens, a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions and must rely on “non-standard” policy alternatives. To assess the potential effectiveness of such policies, we analyze the behavior of selected asset prices over short periods surrounding central bank statements or other types of financial or economic news and estimate “no-arbitrage” models of the term structure for the United States and Japan.

There is some evidence that central bank communications can help to shape public expectations of future policy actions and that asset purchases in large volume by a central bank would be able to affect the price or yield of the targeted asset.


Non-Technical Summary

 Central banks usually implement monetary policy by setting the short-term nominal interest rate, such as the federal funds rate in the United States. However, the success over the years in reducing inflation and, consequently, the average level of nominal interest rates has increased the likelihood that the nominal policy interest rate may become constrained by the zero lower bound on interest rates. When that happens, a central bank can no longer stimulate aggregate demand by further interest-rate reductions and must rely instead on “non-standard” policy alternatives.

An extensive literature has discussed monetary policy alternatives at the zero bound, but for the most part from a theoretical or historical perspective. Few studies have presented empirical evidence on the potential effectiveness of non-standard monetary policies in modern economies. Such evidence obviously would help central banks plan for the contingency of the policy rate at zero and also bear directly on the choice of the appropriate inflation objective in normal times: The greater the confidence of central bankers that tools exist to help the economy escape the zero bound, the less need there is to maintain an inflation “buffer,” bolstering the argument for a lower inflation objective.

In this paper, we apply the tools of modern empirical finance to the recent experiences of the United States and Japan to provide evidence on the potential effectiveness of various nonstandard policies. Following Bernanke and Reinhart (2004), we group these policy alternatives into three classes:

1. using communications policies to shape public expectations about the future course of interest rates;
2. increasing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet, or “quantitative easing”; and
3. changing the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet through, for example, the targeted purchases of long-term bonds as a means of reducing the long-term interest rate.

We describe how these policies might work and discuss relevant existing evidence...

Additional Reading:
The Upcoming Expansion of US Bank Credit - Alasdair MacLeod

Gold and Interest Rates: More than Joined at the Hip - Rob Kirby

“The study of money, above all other fields in economics, is one in which complexity is used to disguise truth or to evade truth, not to reveal it.”

John Kenneth Galbraith

Inflation and Deflation: US Money Supply Figures - We're Not In Kansas Anymore Toto

Here are the latest Money Supply Figures from the St. Louis Fed.

I start with the narrowest measure, the Monetary Base and widen out to M2 which is the broadest measure of US money supply currently available, with MZM serving a similar function for the short term.

Previously I have commented on the 'shadow M3' figures done by a few enterprising fellows. As you may recall the Fed stopped publishing M3 a few years back. M3 itself was not the issue but rather the Fed chose to stop reporting a key component of M3 called 'eurodollars' or US dollars held offshore in Europe or anywhere else.  The rationale was that it was too expensive to obtain this data. There are those who found this to be a bit disingenuous for a non profit seeking organization that operates on a cost plus budget.

Those who are attempting to estimate M3 gather what actual remaining data  they can, and estimate eurodollars by  'modeling' them based on trends and correlations as they were in place when the Fed stopped reporting.

As I cautioned before from my own work in the BIS currency reports, there were huge flows of dollars into Europe during what I called the eurodollar short squeezes. The problem with BIS however is that their reporting lags by almost nine months, so the figures are never really current.

I suspect that as these figures unfold we will see that the Fed has created and made available large amounts of dollars that were presented to European institutions, and that this money is not being captured in any of the existing money supply figures, except perhaps the Monetary Base, and that estimates of M3 are likely to the low side because of this change in trend of eurodollars.

So what does all this mean, what is the important 'takeaway?'  It means that deflation is not occurring at the moment because the Fed has taken those actions which it said it would do, plain and simple.  On the other hand there is some inflation appearing but nothing notable with the exception of health care, service fees particularly financial, and a few hard assets. This could start changing even in the face of slack aggregate demand, but not in the face of another significant economic collapse such as in Europe or China. 

And unfortunately recent evidence suggests strongly that the Fed has been misrepresenting what it has done in the financial crisis.  This is unfortunate because it suggests that not only other things were misrepresented, but that there is an ongoing coverup of what has been done, and likely what is being done today.    Coverups tend to feed on themselves, and provoke other new abuses of the public trust.  Also it calls into question all that a private and guarded institution has said in the past based on their reputation.  I do not think people fully realize the implications of this yet. 

In this stage of the Currency War we seem to be in something like the phase of WW II called the 'Phoney War' that occurred between September 1939 and May 1940.   But it does seem to be heating up.

Those who wish deflation to occur badly enough will find it where they will, whether it be in M3 estimates or credit figures. I find it highly ironic that when estimated M3 recently seemed to be showing deflation it was embraced by a particular chatboard site who previously had forbidden its mention when it had showed inflation some years ago. Further, credit is not money. Credit is a source of money creation as is the Fed's balance sheet. The Fed's Balance Sheet is not 'money' per se. It is a source of money creation.

It should also be remembered at this point that a fiat currency is backed by the economy of a country and its official cashflows (primarily taxes) as well as its reserves. As a country's GDP and cashflow deteriorates the soundness of its currency can deteriorate even if the nominal levels of money remain unchanged. I think we are seeing quite a bit of this today.  This deterioration in the backing of a currency is no different from a devaluation in its effect.

Can deflation occur? Absolutely. Give me control of the Fed and I will give you a rip snorting deflation by raising the overnight rate to 20 percent and calling in the reserves so to speak.

But one cannot deal in possibilities when investing, merely safeguard or hedge against them based on the estimates of probability. Well, you can deal in possibilities, but this is largely a means of self-deception, a means of continuing to embrace a theory or investment strategy that has been proven incorrect when it is too difficult to give it up and admit your error.  That difficultly may arise from practical matters, but it is my experience that it is normally attributable to stubbornness, or pride, and sometimes even corruption.

"Faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof." John Kenneth Galbraith

Obviously gold and silver and some other things have been rallying smartly for the past ten years in response to the decisions made by the Fed and the US government of both political parties, whether they will admit it or not. When this changes, when the dilution of the currency stops and begins to recover to strength, then I would think it appropriate to change my own particular investment strategy, which is hedged against the unexpected even now. But not until then.  I do not expect inflation to obtain serious traction until foreign governments start rejecting the dollar in size, or the velocity of money begins to obtain some traction in the real economy.   The Fed assures us that they will act to control the spread of inflation when the time comes. But for now the banks appear overstuffed with cheap liquidity, something I like to call hot money.

This type of abundantly cheap, hot money tends to seek higher beta or risk, often in the form of equities and dodgy financial schemes and investments, rather than productive lending.  As the CEO of a Fortune 500 was heard to observe in private, having paid an absolutely eyebrow raising sum for another company in the heady time of the tech bubble, "Yes I paid a high price, but my currency (company stock) is cheap."  He was willing to take an outsized risk because he believed that his overvalued currency was going to become worth a lot less.  He just did not realize at the time that it would eventually become nearly worthless. It did and he was sacked.  I think the analogy to Ben and his Fed, and the way in which they are throwing dollars around, to private and especially to foreign banks,  is quite analogous.  The looting will continue until the value of the overpriced stock is depleted.  That Wall Street will be taking about 8 percent of the total short money supply as its bonuses this year speaks volumes about the value of the dollar and its future.

I saw this coming in 2001 but have to admit I was terribly wrong on timing in 2004, having underestimated the Fed's willingness to obtain international banking cooperation, primarily from Japan the UK and Europe, to generate a massive housing bubble. I will not make that mistake again I hope.

And if you have been wrong in your assumptions or assessment, it is never a shameful thing to admit it, gather yourself together, and go forward from there, because all this indicates is that you have received new information and that you accept it, which is the high mark of intellect and objective science.

Even the mighty Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has recently expressed his disillusionment with Mr. Obama's Hooverism, Freezing Out Hope.

"What’s even more puzzling is the apparent indifference of the Obama team to the effect of such gestures on their supporters. ... Mr. Obama almost seems as if he’s trying, systematically,... to convince the people who put him where he is that they made an embarrassing mistake."

Contrast this with his earlier chastisement of those who were already recognizing that Barry the reformer was either an ineffective nincompoop or an establishment shill.

"Look, Obama didn’t pose as a Nation-type progressive, then turn on his allies after the race was won. Throughout the campaign he was slightly less progressive than Hillary Clinton on domestic issues — and more than slightly on health care. If people like Ms. [Naomi] Klein are shocked, shocked that he isn’t the candidate of their fantasies, they have nobody but themselves to blame." Paul Krugman, NYT June 16, 2008

I am not going to get into the relative merits of one course of public policy decision or another here. My point rather is to demonstrate once again that with a fiat currency the matter of inflation or deflation, within a range of exogenous constraints, is a public policy decision tied intimately into the form of government that one holds as its objective and the nature of the society that you wish to encourage.

I do not wish to single out Krugman with the tautological indictment of being human. He almost appears as a Diogenes, a beacon of objectivity, compared to his ideological counterparts. Too often economists cloak themselves in the robes of a quantitative and objective science, with such canards as the efficient markets hypothesis, supply side economics, the inefficiency of regulation versus unregulated markets, and bailoutism as hard facts, when they are nothing more than arguments in favor of one set of government policies or another.

And far too often they are doing it for pay it appears, which is intellectual dishonesty, malpractice if you will, that is inexcusable and contemptible, one of the reasons why economics is considered by some a disgraced, although not irredeemable, profession these days.  But since these fellows are generally associated with the 'greed is good' school, which elevates the ends above all else, once ought to expect to hide the silverware, whiskey and women when they come to town.

Many things are possible, but not all things are equally probable. As Walter Bagehot famously observed, 'Life is a school of probability.'

For a nation that is a net debtor, deflation is tantamount to suicide. But other nations, most recently Germany in the past century, committed a form of national suicide in service to hubris, and an elite few, and a mistaken understanding of what constitutes a civil society and what it means to be human. They are certainly not the only society to have done this, and I would not presume that they are the only people who will have fallen prey to this self-destruction in the future.

So there is some precedent for disaster. Germany was certainly not the only society to have done this, given the examples of China, Russia, Japan, and Italy, and I would not presume that they are the only people who will fall prey to this self-destruction as well. Having high ideals or having previously suffered oppression is no guarantee of future goodness. Rather it is the attitude of yourself in relation to the 'other.' That is the whole of the law.

Indeed, such a temptation to dehumanisation is tailor made for a generation raised on the notion of their natural goodness, accepting themselves as they are, rejecting and tearing down any external standards of goodness and worth in other people. They see no need to change and work together, but rather to give in, to wallow, in their basest and most selfish impulses, self-centeredness, the greed-is-good meme of the me generation, in a time of general apostasy to all but the lowest form of our self. Class War and the Decline of the West

The madness of crowds seems to have been all the rage in the twentieth century, and what I see now are people who are more technically proficient, more cunning, more skilled in the ways of mass deception and intrigue, but alas, perhaps not more compassionate and wise, and understanding of what it means to be human, truly content with themselves, and simply happy.

So bear these things in mind and protect yourselves as best you can despite the temptations and deceptions of our all too human frailties. It will not be easy, but it was not easy for our parents or grandparents, and theirs and those before them, because it never is. That is the nature of this world.  And even the once triumphant West at some point must learn to pull together again, or founder in a new season of infamy.

"For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places." Eph 6:12

The Inflation and Deflation Debate Deconstructed

'What most people call reason is really rationalization. Given a new set of data, most people will search through it only for those examples that support their existing beliefs. Their beliefs are really opinions, a tenuous collection of myths, anecdotes, slogans, and prejudices based largely on justifying personal fear and greed. This is what makes modern propaganda so powerful; people do not bother to think critically and objectively and act for the greatest good. And in their ignorance they can find the will to do increasingly monstrous things, and rationalize them.' Jesse

In a purely fiat regime, the question of a general (monetary) deflation and inflation is a policy decision. Anyone who does not understand this does not understand the modern mechanism of money creation. As the pundit said, "The mind rebels..."

But rather than engage in the usual facile intramurals about the topic, let's consider something more important. How does one 'play this' which is really what all these discussions are about: self interest.

The champion of deflation is the Treasury Bond (and the Dollar), and of the inflationists, Gold.

There are extremes on both sides, and probably more sense in the middle, since life rarely sustains the extreme unless there are people messing about with it. The only naturally efficient markets are in ... nature, and that only as measured over the long term.

Anyone who doesn't think Treasuries have been in a long bull market are blind fools.

But the same is true of gold.

I will leave the dollar aside for now to simplify the discussion, but it hardly lends itself to the deflationary theory.

People who have taken positions and held them in both Treasuries and Gold over the past ten years have made money, a very nice return. When one has a theory that consistently and reasonably encompasses that, you might have something worthwhile.

The deflationists will say that gold is a bubble fueled by mistaken speculators, and the inflationists will say that the Treasuries are being supported and manipulated by the Fed. Neither is able to look out from their deep wells of subjectivity.

You may wish to consider that the great part of this discussion, inflation versus deflation, is a diversion. But that is a discussion for another time.

The question for all failing theories is, as always, what next. What is the alternate count.

Oh boy oh boy, [our desired outcome] is finally coming and when it gets here its going to be good. We are finally turning [Japanese / Weimar].

Things are in bull markets, or bear markets, until they are not. The undeniable trend break is the best indication of change in momentum.

But things in the world of complexity are rarely as simple or straightforward as the average mind will allow, or can accept.

Anyone who thinks the Fed is impotent has not been paying attention to the last one hundred years. The Fed is not impotent, merely constrained. Their constraint is the policy arm of the government, the dollar, and the bond, in the absence of some external standards including external force.

Until one understands that, nothing can or will make sense. That is why the current discussion is so nasty and propaganda-like. It is not about what will happen, but rather about a public policy decision, about what people want to happen.

Consider that these debates are merely diversions, to distract people away from the most significant factors in their troubles, which are exploitation and fraud, and a military-industrial complex that is largely unproductive in terms of organic growth, and is quite simply no longer sustainable.

Paid professionals who were arguing the virtue of credit expansion as the bubbles blossomed are now arguing just as strenuously for austerity now that the bubbles are collapsing, their masters having taken their spoils. They will say for pay, without regard for the solutions that are in the best interest of the country. Few are thinking of their country anymore, as the individual is conditioned to think of themselves as globalized abstractions.

As always, be careful what you wish for, because you may get it. In this current climate, this class warfare, the American nation is a house divided. And you know what happens to those.

And the winners may inherit the wreckage, a pyrrhic victory indeed, but they can console themselves with the satisfaction that they have won the irrelevant debate.

M3 Hysteria and a Look M2, MZM, GDP and PPI

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has a bold headline US Money Supply Plunges at 1930s Pace that is sure to provide much referential action for the UK Telegraph.

I like to read AEP, but have to admit that he is given to sensational headlines on rare occasion. That is because it sells papers, and also draws blog clicks, as posters on the web are sometimes wont to emulate. Fear sells. The financial sectors also thrives on rumours and panic selling. It clears the decks for new Ponzi rallies. And it seems as though fear has become an inseparable partner and helpmate to central governments these days.

But there were some mildly disappointing elements to this particular piece in addition to its somewhat overstated headline. The US stopped publishing M3 several years ago. At the time I was not happy about this, and complained quite a bit.

Several enterprising fellows, including my friend Bart over at Now and Futures, as well as John Williams at Shadowstats, have been attempting to extrapolate the M3 figures, and doing a fine job given what they have to work with. In an added footnote, AEP says he is using John Williams' service. He also incorrectly states that the still Fed publishes all the components. They do not disclose eurodollars. The basis for discontinuing M3 was to eliminate the 'inordinate expense.' Obviously if they still published all the components, that could not be a credible case. This is not just being picky. Eurodollars are a remarkably volatile component these days, and also a method of buying Treasuries via London if one were so inclined to monetize US sovereign debt that way. Could the BoE and the Fed be scratching each other's backs as they say? The BoJ has already paid for one false US recovery, so they deserve a break.

Here is a quick review of the components of the Monetary Supply figures including M3 for your review. You may also wish to refresh your knowledge here: Money Supply a Primer.

The chief component that is 'missing' these days which must be estimated is "eurodollars," which as you may recall are US dollars being held overseas. You know, those dollars that Bernanke has been sending over to Europe en masse lately through the swaplines.

The fellows can estimate this, but the reporting of eurodollars lags by a quarter or more, the only reliable source of information being the forex commercial banking reports from BIS.

I would very much like to have M3 back, but in particular I would like the Fed to be releasing a more accurate and contemporary measure of Eurodollars, the dollar overhang overseas, particularly in light of the huge swings in the DX index, and its almost undeniable relationship to the recent dollar short squeezes on the European banks. The Dollar Rally and the Deflationary Imbalances in the US Dollar Holdings of Overseas Banks.

But alas, we do not have this, so we can only estimate M3, particularly the eurodollar component. But the good news is that we still have both M2 and MZM.

Here are the most recent figures for MZM and M2 from the St. Louis Fed, expressed as a percent of change YoY, not adjusted for seasonality. For good measure I have added GDP and PPI Finished Consumer Goods in the mix.



It might also be wise also to keep in mind that after a period of sharp growth in response to a developing recession that flattens out afterward, the year over year percentage growth can fall precipitously and look quite impressive on a growth chart without necessarily providing a meaningful decline in the nominal values. This can be seen in the M2 chart below.

And it is also true that during a period of slack growth in GDP the demand for money is lessened such that normal or even flat money supply growth would seem to the Fed monetarists to be 'inflationary.' This does not mean that they have forgotten where the 'ON' button to printing press is located. Of all the things that might concern us about the Bernanke Fed, the least of them is that they will be too stringent in supplying liquidity when and where it might be needed, in substantial volumes, at least to the banking system.



MZM is the broadest measure of liquidity, and is very much a creature of the Adjusted Monetary Base. As one can see from the chart, the Fed, using their various policy tools, jams the short term money supply higher in response to a lagging economy, and the broader measures like M2 tend to follow with a lag.

The Fed then backs off, and waits to see the effect of their actions, as well as any accompanying fiscal programs, on the real economy as measured by GDP, with an eye on inflation. In this case I am using PPI, but I greatly prefer John Williams' unadulterated CPI measure. Unfortunately I do not have it in the proper format for this study. But PPI finished goods will do.

Now, looking at this chart, it appears that the Fed is following their usual gameplan. The excess reserves that the banks are holding, at least indirectly in response to the balance sheet expansion and interest rate payments on their own deposits by the Fed, are enormous and unprecedented. If the Fed were to start pulling some levers to motivate those reserves into the real economy through loans, the impact could be dramatic. The Fed will do this if their fear of inflation begins to be overcome by their fear of deflation.

For the moment, the great bulk of liquidity is being used by the banks to bolster their reserves, and their unresolved bad debt, as if the bad debt itself was the cause of the problem. The problem is that a credit bubble left consumers with the inability to pay their debts, and while nothing is done for the median wage, and the bad debt is not written off, the problem continues. This was the story of the zombie economy of Japan's lost decade, because their kereitsu corporate combines would not take the 'hit' for their land bubble.

Right now it appears to me that they are overly preoccupied with the status of the biggest of the banks and their asset quality problems an under stimulating the real economy. I think this will be regarded as a policy error as were the actions of the Federal Reserve in 1932 wherein the Fed overreacted to a spike in CPI and tightened prematurely. The Fed may be engaged now in a policy error of a different sort.



I am not saying what MUST or WILL happen. I am not arguing from theory. I am just attempting to demonstrate what is happening now based on the data. And right now Ben is indeed printing money, and figuratively dropping it from helicopters. The problem is that the helicopters are hovering over Wall and Broad Streets, and not Main Street. And so we obtain asset bubbles in paper favored by the denizens of the Street.

If you want to know the theory, in a perfectly fiat system (no external standard constraint) deflation and inflation are always the outcome of policy decisions amongst a number of variables and competing interests. Period. That is how it is, and that is why central banks prefer it to the discipline of an external standard like gold.

Once the US relaxed its adherence to the gold standard and devalued the dollar, deflation became a moot point. What was not handled well was the continuing lack of organic aggregate demand, and velocity of money, because of the resistance of the Republican minority in Congress to jobs creation, and the overturning the New Deal minimum wage initiatives and labor reforms by the US Supreme Court. Consumers cannot generate healthy demand when they are unemployed, or being paid near starvation wages. But if you are in a well-to-do minority, things couldn't seem better, unless of course you were living in Germany, Italy, or perhaps even Japan.





I am not saying what the 'right thing' to do is. But what I am attempting to get across is that one way or the other, excess financial sector debt is going to be liquidated, either through default, or through inflation, or through a mixture of higher taxes and sluggish growth with a disparity of income that increasingly resembles 19th century serfdom and political instabilty, the rise of demagogues, and some vicious ghosts from the past.

At some point this dynamic is going to become less 'economic' and more political and the equilibrium will be reached. A good leading example of this is found in Iceland.

See also The Case for Deflation, Stagflation, and Implosion

For those relying on the Output Gap and slack Aggregate Demand please see Price, Demand, and Money Supply as They Relate to Inflation and Deflation

People tend to become very emotional over this sort of topic. There are many who are afraid that what they have will be taken, and there is even a vocal minority of the self-identified elite who wishes to obtain greater power and riches by leveling the middle class and the poor to improve their own supreme vistas. The funny thing is that to the genuinely powerful these 'elites' are about as significant as a bug on the wall, and their turn will come if that is the way it goes.

The most touching example of delusion that I have witnessed recently was an unwavering prediction about what will happen in the future because 'the majority of the people on the this chatboard have agreed on it.' Well, perhaps history gives a hoot. But I suspect that we are in His hands now more than ever. And you might do well to prepare yourself accordingly.

By the way, and this is just a stab at my own theory, a strawman as opposed to an examination of the data, I think the US is hammering the ECB to devalue the Euro, because they wish to further devalue the US dollar. If the major fiat currencies can be devalued in a relatively uniform manner, and some other statistics and prices controlled, the people can be subtly relieved of their savings and wealth, and be none the wiser. But those stubborn Germans had to be brought to heel first. And so it is.

Here is something from an old trading acquaintance of ours. Stage Set For Another Bernanke Adventure - Brady Willett of FallStreet

Unadjusted Producer Price Index

One picture is worth 1000 words.

World of Wall Street - Unadjusted Year Over Year: Producer Price Index Up 6.1%

So Why Is the Stock Market Going HIgher?

Q: But Jesse, if things are so bad, why is the stock market going up?

A: There is no doubt that equity markets, when judged in nominal terms, can do amazing things when the Fed spikes the punch bowl with grain liquor. Especially when market regulation has been weakened by decades of mistaken ideology and corruption.

The German stock market during the Weimar Crack Up Boom showed some remarkable gains, and was actually a lifesaver for many investors, for a time.

Bull markets are generally corrosive of the average intellect. That is why statists with something to hide love them so much. No matter what era, people willingly surrender their common sense to the bubble, if only for pragmatic reasons.

Those actively playing the deflation trade, short stocks and commodities, are getting killed for now. They are obviously early. The real deflation in paper asset prices will eventually come as the bust follows boom, but more selectively than most imagine, except temporarily if there is a genuine crash and not a long slow decline. Some assets will soar even higher as the dollar devaluation gains momementum and not retrace significantly as the dollar collapses in slow motion.

As Ludwig von Mises noted:

"This first stage of the inflationary process may last for many years. While it lasts, the prices of many goods and services are not yet adjusted to their altered money relation

There are still people in the country who have not yet become aware of the fact that they are confronted with a price revolution which will finally result in a considerable rise of all prices, although the extent of this rise will not be the same in the various commodities and services.

These people still believe that prices one day will drop. Waiting for this day, they restrict their purchases and concomitantly increase their cash holdings. As long as such ideas are still held by public opinion, it is not yet too late for the government to abandon its inflationary policy...

But then, finally, the masses wake up. They become suddenly aware of the fact that inflation is a deliberate policy and will go on endlessly. A breakdown occurs. The crack-up boom appears. Everybody is anxious to swap his money against 'real' goods, no matter whether he needs them or not, no matter how much money he has to pay for them. Within a very short time, within a few weeks or even days, the things which were used as money are no longer used as media of exchange. They become scrap paper. Nobody wants to give away anything against them.

It was this that happened with the Continental currency in America in 1781, with the French mandats territoriaux in 1796, and with the German mark in 1923. It will happen again whenever the same conditions appear. If a thing has to be used as a medium of exchange, public opinion must not believe that the quantity of this thing will increase beyond all bounds. Inflation is a policy that cannot last."

Until then, be aware that the paper chase is on, backed by the full faith and credit, and desperate lies, of some very frightened, but still very powerful and increasingly ruthless, men. There is a good case to be made that the financial sector, led by Wall Street, hijacked the US productive economy and bought off the politicians and has been managing it for their own benefit most notabley since. This is not the first time, and it will most likely not be the last.

Try to stay out of their way as they thrash about, looking for something to fill the hollowness of their being, more fuel for the bonfires of the profane.

China May Lead Coalition of Nations to Topple the US Petrodollar

It does make sense that this would happen, and many including ourselves have been forecasting this outcome as a viable trigger for a significant, but orderly, dollar devaluation.

The US has violated the premise under which the Dollar served as the world's reserve currency. As Alan Greenspan himself said, the US Dollar regime worked because it was managed as though it was still under an external monetary standard, mimicking the rigor of a hard currency while maintaining a flexibility for monetary policy adjustment. We questioned the veracity of that claim when he made it, but it was the appearance, if not the reality, of responsibility and discipline that made things work for the monetary wizards.

Ironically enough, the closet goldbug Mr. Greenspan shattered that discipline with a gearing up of financial engineering in response to economic and trading crises starting with 1987 and reaching higher notes with LTCM and the Asian currency crisis.

China devalued the yuan against the dollar, and was able to promote an aggressive program of industrialization through multinationals like Walmart who desired cheap labor. The Chinese were able to persuade Bill Clinton and then George Bush to grant them favored nation trading status, without the condition of a freely traded currency. This allowed China to import manufacturing jobs, and made the US politicians and financiers happy with their personal donations and profits.

The dogs of war were loosed by the Fed in 2002 with a remarkably reckless expansion of debt through over easy interest rates, with an explosion of fraudulently rated US dollar financial assets from an Anglo-American banking system grown utterly corrupt and in full bloom of a credit bubble.

Bernanke has taken the dollar into its endgame, while insiders grab fistfuls of dollars and quietly sell their financial assets behind the scenes during this recent market rally. Obama and his team are either corrupt or incompetent. The same can be said of his two predecessors, at least.

"The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them."
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

However this plays out over the next nine years, it will be history in the making, and interesting to say the least. It will be neither straightforward, nor easy, nor transparent to the public. But it seems inevitable that the days of Empire based on dollars backed by oil and global military reach are over and gone-- until the next time.

The Independent UK
The demise of the dollar
By Robert Fisk
Tuesday, 6 October 2009

In a graphic illustration of the new world order, Arab states have launched secret moves with China, Russia and France to stop using the US currency for oil trading

In the most profound financial change in recent Middle East history, Gulf Arabs are planning – along with China, Russia, Japan and France – to end dollar dealings for oil, moving instead to a basket of currencies including the Japanese yen and Chinese yuan, the euro, gold and a new, unified currency planned for nations in the Gulf Co-operation Council, including Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Qatar.

Secret meetings have already been held by finance ministers and central bank governors in Russia, China, Japan and Brazil to work on the scheme, which will mean that oil will no longer be priced in dollars.

The plans, confirmed to The Independent by both Gulf Arab and Chinese banking sources in Hong Kong, may help to explain the sudden rise in gold prices, but it also augurs an extraordinary transition from dollar markets within nine years.

The Americans, who are aware the meetings have taken place – although they have not discovered the details – are sure to fight this international cabal which will include hitherto loyal allies Japan and the Gulf Arabs. Against the background to these currency meetings, Sun Bigan, China's former special envoy to the Middle East, has warned there is a risk of deepening divisions between China and the US over influence and oil in the Middle East. "Bilateral quarrels and clashes are unavoidable," he told the Asia and Africa Review. "We cannot lower vigilance against hostility in the Middle East over energy interests and security."

This sounds like a dangerous prediction of a future economic war between the US and China over Middle East oil – yet again turning the region's conflicts into a battle for great power supremacy. China uses more oil incrementally than the US because its growth is less energy efficient. The transitional currency in the move away from dollars, according to Chinese banking sources, may well be gold. An indication of the huge amounts involved can be gained from the wealth of Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar who together hold an estimated $2.1 trillion in dollar reserves.

The decline of American economic power linked to the current global recession was implicitly acknowledged by the World Bank president Robert Zoellick. "One of the legacies of this crisis may be a recognition of changed economic power relations," he said in Istanbul ahead of meetings this week of the IMF and World Bank. But it is China's extraordinary new financial power – along with past anger among oil-producing and oil-consuming nations at America's power to interfere in the international financial system – which has prompted the latest discussions involving the Gulf states.

Brazil has shown interest in collaborating in non-dollar oil payments, along with India. Indeed, China appears to be the most enthusiastic of all the financial powers involved, not least because of its enormous trade with the Middle East.

China imports 60 per cent of its oil, much of it from the Middle East and Russia. The Chinese have oil production concessions in Iraq – blocked by the US until this year – and since 2008 have held an $8bn agreement with Iran to develop refining capacity and gas resources. China has oil deals in Sudan (where it has substituted for US interests) and has been negotiating for oil concessions with Libya, where all such contracts are joint ventures.

Furthermore, Chinese exports to the region now account for no fewer than 10 per cent of the imports of every country in the Middle East, including a huge range of products from cars to weapon systems, food, clothes, even dolls. In a clear sign of China's growing financial muscle, the president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, yesterday pleaded with Beijing to let the yuan appreciate against a sliding dollar and, by extension, loosen China's reliance on US monetary policy, to help rebalance the world economy and ease upward pressure on the euro.

Ever since the Bretton Woods agreements – the accords after the Second World War which bequeathed the architecture for the modern international financial system – America's trading partners have been left to cope with the impact of Washington's control and, in more recent years, the hegemony of the dollar as the dominant global reserve currency.

The Chinese believe, for example, that the Americans persuaded Britain to stay out of the euro in order to prevent an earlier move away from the dollar. But Chinese banking sources say their discussions have gone too far to be blocked now. "The Russians will eventually bring in the rouble to the basket of currencies," a prominent Hong Kong broker told The Independent. "The Brits are stuck in the middle and will come into the euro. They have no choice because they won't be able to use the US dollar." (Look for the NWO to start making a stronger play to control the EU - Jesse)

Chinese financial sources believe President Barack Obama is too busy fixing the US economy to concentrate on the extraordinary implications of the transition from the dollar in nine years' time. The current deadline for the currency transition is 2018.

The US discussed the trend briefly at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh; the Chinese Central Bank governor and other officials have been worrying aloud about the dollar for years. Their problem is that much of their national wealth is tied up in dollar assets.

"These plans will change the face of international financial transactions," one Chinese banker said. "America and Britain must be very worried. You will know how worried by the thunder of denials this news will generate."

Iran announced late last month that its foreign currency reserves would henceforth be held in euros rather than dollars. Bankers remember, of course, what happened to the last Middle East oil producer to sell its oil in euros rather than dollars. A few months after Saddam Hussein trumpeted his decision, the Americans and British invaded Iraq.

Confessions of a 'Flationary Agnostic

I have no particular allegiance to either the hyperinflation or the deflationary camps. Both outcomes are possible, but not yet probable. Rather than being a benefit, occupying the middle ground too often just puts one in the middle, being able to see the merits in both arguments and possibilities, and being unwilling to ignore the flaws in each argument. But this is where reason takes me.

In a purely fiat regime, where a monetary authority has the ability and the willingness to monetize debt, there is NO mandated, no predetermined outcome for hyperinflation or deflation in the event of a credit crisis, unless that money is pegged to an external standard, which is ruled out by definition in a purely fiat regime.

In a credit crisis there is often a 'credit crunch' which is what was seen in the financial system when short term credit transactions seized up out of fear. This is not the same as a true monetary deflation which is a real contraction in the money supply, at the least. So far we have not seen this. And we may never.

Also, I would have to agree that the eventual fate of all fiat currency is failure and reissuance of a 'new' currency, due to the sustained erosion of a seemingly incessant, if gradual, inflation. This does not HAVE to be, but it is, as an outcome of human nature. Men will always and everywhere eventually succumb to the temptation of currency debasement, a free lunch, and so they cannot be trusted to manage a nation's affairs with the unrestrained keys to the Treasury.

And at the end of a currency's lifespan, there is quite often a bout of serious inflation that precipitates the reissuance and restructuring. How long this period of time can be no one can say.
That is the simple fact of it. The only limitation on the Fed's ability to inflate is the value of the dollar and the bonds; that is, their acceptability to 'creditors' who are willing to exchange goods and services with real value for paper.

And it should be perfectly clear that to choose a monetary deflation as a fiat policy decision for a country that is a net debtor would be bizarre to say the least.

Everything else is noise and generally ad hominem attacks. And the louder the noise, the less likely the person speaking knows anything about monetary systems.

I read that the Fed has taken on (a euphemism for 'monetized') roughly half of the Treasury debt issued in the second quarter of 2009. And it is quite likely that this is only a part of it, that a good portion of the rest of the debt was arranged for with other central banks, including those who are engaged in large scale currency manipulation of their own which is a de facto monetization on the road to default as China will be finding out most likely some day.

There is quite a bit of misunderstanding on the issue of deflation. As we have discussed before, deflation driven by slack demand is not uniform across product and service classes as it would be during a true monetary deflation. That is because goods and services vary in the elasticity of their demand.

Yes some prices will decrease, as one would expect, especially in those assets whose value has been inflated during a preceding bubble and discretionary items with a significant elasticity of demand.

But other items will remain stable or even increase in price, particularly essential items, and those provided from a sector with an oligopolistic framework.

Why? Because those who control access to essentials will seek to increase prices and 'rents' even during severe recessions to make up for lost revenue streams and profits in other areas of their business. Barring government intervention, every crisis has its profiteers.

So we have the phenomenon of banks being bailed out by the government, with public funds, not lending as they had promised, and greatly increasing fees and cutting services whenever and wherever they can on certain instruments such as credit cards, for example. Or other financial firms taking advantage systemic flaws and leverage and loopholes to game the markets, extracting what amounts to increased rents, a tax, on the nation's transactions, further dragging down the real economy.

Credit is not money. Debt is not money per se. These are things that are instrumental to the process of money creation and destruction.

If I 'owe you' ten dollars, are you ten dollars richer? Not unless you hold some sort of legally enforceable piece of paper to back it up, and even then there is a discount on the value of that paper which is repayment risk, the possibility that I might default on that arrangement.

Money is the sanction of the monetary authority on a particular debt arrangement. It is limited to only that which has been sanctioned, that which passes through the hands of the creditor "into" the money system. This may occur at the point of origin, the central bank, or one of its officially designated representatives, sanctioned by executive order or under the law created by the Congress.

One does not count a private debt obligation held by the creditor as money, in addition to the actual currency that was delivered to the debtor. That would be double counting, a misunderstanding of the accounting system. The debt held by the creditor is an asset, of varying liquidity and risk.

If you have an unused credit card with a $1000 credit limit, do you have $1000 dollars? Does that $1000 dollars exist anywhere? No, clearly not. You may act differently in having it, it may influence your behaviour, but it is not money.

Once you use that card, and 'borrow' $1000 on that credit line, then it does exist as money, and a corresponding liability of $1000 is created and is held by the bank as an asset.

Is that $1000 debt obligation being held by the bank the same as the $1000 in money that was created when you borrowed it and spent it, putting it into motion within the real economy? No. If anything we might have learned from this credit crisis should sink in, the value of collateralized debt obligations, a collection of assets on a variety of instruments, is deeply affected by risk.

This is why a private debt obligation cannot be money, because it is not significantly riskless and is more an asset. Anything that bears a significant risk of default that is not tied to the full faith and credit of the central monetary authority is not money. It is a product, some proxy for money.

Is the savings deposit in excess of FDIC at my local bank 'money?' Yes, but not of the same quality as cash in my pocket. That is why there are a variety of money supply figures.

Is the reduction of debt directly correlated to the levels of money in the nation's monetary supply? It depends on how it is accounted. The debt can be written off, and no 'money' is destroyed per se but the bank will take a writedown on assets. We are seeing this in action today, as vast amounts of CDS and MBS are devalued on the books of the banks.

We make a distinction obviously between the existence of the money itself, and the means or ability to create money through a particular process, which can itself be impaired, without a reduction in the aggregate supply of 'money' depending on how you account for it.

Here is an interesting chart. It clearly shows the precipitous dropoff in commercial lending, and the actions of the monetary authority and the government to step in and support lending, primarily in the programs of the Fed.



This lack of productive economic vigor is impairing the ability of the Fed to maintain an organic growth in the money supply. But it does not stop it. They have some limitation or impairment in their ability to manage the money supply, because of the slack demand in the economy and the loss of the aid of the 'money multiplier' and the moribund velocity of money. The money that is created by the Fed without a corresponding increase in economic activity is 'hot money' that is particularly dangerous from an inflationary perspective.

Here is an interesting paradox. At a time of slower growth rate of money supply, many might think that this is 'good' for the dollar, because less dollars means more value for each dollar, right? In essence, this is one of the major tenets of those called 'deflationists.'

First, there are not less dollars. The growth rate of dollars is slowing but as one can see, this is a relative thing historically.









But here is the key point.

The growth rate of dollars is slowing at the same time that the 'demand' for dollars, the velocity of money and the creation of new commercial credit, is slowing. GDP is negative, and the growth rate of money supply is still positive, and rather healthy. This is not a monetary deflation, but rather the signs of an emerging stagflation fueled by slow real economic activity and monetization, or hot money, from the Fed. The monetary authority is trying to lead the economic recovery through unusual monetary growth. All they are doing is creating more malinvestment, risk addiction, and asset bubbles.

Money supply and the rate of money supply growth is a confusing topic, primarily because lots of commentators twist it and split hairs about it to make points, without really caring to explain what is actually happening to those who are not specialists. 'Experts' hide behind terminology to obfuscate the situation to support particular policy initiatives under a cloud of fear, uncertainty and doubt. Despicable.

We have not written it out and worked the details yet, and the lags and expectations are always a significant issue, but generally the growth in the broad money supply should bear a positive relationship to the growth rate of real economic activity, with the appropriate lags. It ought not to lead it or lag it artificially except in extreme circumstances. Using money as a 'tool' to stimulate or retard economic activity is a dangerous game indeed, fraught with unintended consequences and unexpected bubbles and imbalances, with a spiral of increasingly destabilizing crises and busts. The Obama Administration bears a heavy responsibility for this because of their failure to reform the system and restore balance to the economy in any meaningful way. Whether it is cowardice, ignorance, or corruption is difficult to judge, but it is a failure without regard to motives.

What makes matters worse is that given the cumulative years of government 'tinkering' some of the key economic measures are hopelessly spoiled. The Consumer Price Index is probably the best example as is shown at Shadowstats. Consumer inflation is a key problem because it is used, as the chain deflator, in calculating real GDP, the basic measure of economic activity in a nation.

And so after the cumulative years of financial engineering by the government and the Federal Reserve, here we are today, caught in an ugly cycle of boom and bust, with an outsized financial sector, a government controlled by the money interests, and a productive economy in a systemic decline.

And this is why we say:

The banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, and the economy brought back into a balance between the productive and administrative sectors, before there can be any sustained recovery.