Swiss Refiner: Physical Tightness in the Flow of Gold Is 'Reflected in the Price Not at All

"No correlation to the physical market.

On-going tightness in the physical gold markets.

physical tightness of flow is reflected in the price not at all.

Gold is moving in one direction from west to east with small exceptions over the last year.

The danger of less supply moving forward is more likely than the comfort of more supply."

I found this discussion between John Ward of Physical Gold Fund SP and an executive at one of the top Swiss Refiners highly informative, and suggest that you give it a listen.

The most difficult part I have found in presenting information is that once a group has amassed a great deal of data and putting it into some organized form of information, an arduous task indeed,  the next step of taking that information and putting it into a relatively simple and easier to understand format is a very important task and none too easy in itself.

I certainly learned that lesson through years of making presentations to the principal executives of Fortune 100 companies.  Most of the time they wish to have everything on one sheet or slide, with backup optional for their staffs or key questions they may ask in 'drilling down.' If you have ever worked at a large company I am sure you know the feeling.

I hope to have something out on this issue later day.

But this is quite interesting and stands alone.  We have been hearing about this 'tightness' from quite a few quarters recently including some bank analysts and Peter Hambro.


You may read about this and listen to the actual podcast at Physical Gold Fund.

The gentleman we are interviewing is part of senior management of one of the largest Swiss refineries. His refinery is one of only 5 global LBMA referees, which takes samples from other refineries around the world and certifies them to produce gold meeting the purity and form factor of the LBMA good delivery standard, which makes it part of the very core of the industry globally.

He has over 30 years experience in the gold markets and has in our view one of the most authoritative perspectives into global physical gold flows in the world. His unique outlook, formed from internal data on gold flows through the refinery, combined with colleagues throughout the industry including the largest bullion banks (versus news outlets) is an invaluable source of information and paints an important picture for the gold markets moving forward.


Topics include:

*Why trying to correlate physical flows with the price can be misleading;

*On-going tightness in the physical gold markets;

*There is less liquidity in the physical market;

*The physical tightness of flow is reflected in the price “not at all”;

*As long as the spot market is settled with cash settlement, the physical flows are not determining price;

*If investors dealing in cash markets begin to take delivery, the physical is just not around;

*The current pricing mechanism can continue indefinitely unless investor behavior changes to taking delivery versus cash settlement;

*The gold price has “no correlation to the physical market”;

*If this behavior changes (to taking physical delivery) it could become dramatically dangerous;

*Gold is moving in one direction from west to east with small exceptions over the last year;

*90% of the refinery’s business is currently supplying demand from the east (India, China) and 10% to western markets;

*China has imposed a new standard on the LBMA good delivery system of 1 kilo, 999.9 fineness;

*400oz bars being melted and refined to 1 kilo 999.9 fine bars and shipped into China are coming out of London and particularly the ETF’s such as GLD;

*In the next gold upleg, scrap may not be readily available – overall scrap has decreased remarkably;

*Declining investment in the mining sector and geo-political issues affecting mining viability will unavoidably reduce gold supply moving forward;

*The danger of less supply moving forward is more likely than the comfort of more supply.

Timely Caution Is Advisable With Your Gold Holdings

In the light of how the MF Global debacle was sorted out by the courts, and based on a growing body of circumstantial evidence and market indicators, if you are holding your gold bullion 'insurance' in the form of unallocated or opaque holdings, or a hypothecated paper claim in one of the major exchange trading warehouses, you may wish to take measures to safeguard your ownership claims without much delay.

I wrote something overnight, On the LBMA and Their Unallocated Holdings, in which I lay out the case, based on facts and some presumably informed speculation from Jim Rickards,  that there is a serious physical shortfall in gold bullion developing that may not resolve as readily as it did in 1999, when the Bank of  England presumably bailed out the trading houses.

Commodity backwardation is not all that unusual.  But it is somewhat unusual in the precious metals. And in combination with a few other items, it seems worthy of note and some preventative measures.

Koos Jansen notes that gold is now in backwardation in both London and New York.

"Not often in financial markets is the future price of gold is lower than the spot price (live), but lately we’ve witnessed such an event in both the New York and London gold market. This is called backwardation, the opposite of contango.

What causes backwardation and will it increase the price of gold? In my opinion there are two possible scenarios: the market expects the gold price to fall in the future, or there is scarcity now."

You may read the entire article here.

And we now hear from Ronan Manly that staff in the central banks have been restricted from discussing their gold holdings.

Please note that I am not suggesting that you should rush out and take large long positions in gold with the maximum leverage, pile into penny miners hoping for a 'home run'.

I suppose that quite a few will miss this caution since it is not heralded with blaring headlines of imminent doom, but perhaps those who need to hear it will do so.  And I am sure that the apologists and the paperati will find their usual ways to dismiss all this, and urge us to ignore all these odd doings in the warehouses.  Such are the times.

And I am not ruling out a much larger development behind the scenes with regard to the international monetary regime, that is 'leaking out' from official sources to banking cronies who may act on it ahead of time.  But I have no strong indications of that.   The IMF seems incapable of resolving the developing monetary crisis because of Anglo-American intransigence.

This is a purely circumstantial case.  As was the case that Harry Markopolos presented for years on Bernie Madoff.  And it may be wrong, or it may be right and vastly understated.  But I think that we have means, motive, and opportunity, and so one may advisably act with caution.   And so I have discharged my conscience in not remaining silent while potential trouble looms and the denizens of the markets take care of themselves.  It is not so easy a decision to make when you do not have sound evidence because of secrecy and misinformation.  And I am sure many will take this, use it as their own, and wrap this in florid headlines and dire predictions of doom.

I suspect at this point that a price correction is still possible as a remedy, but I am not so optimistic to rule out a greater effort to cover it all up that will make things exponentially worse, in the manner of the London Whale and MF Global and LTCM and so many examples of reckless hubris.

There is quite a bit of official interest in bailing out these wanton rich boys from their gambling debts and assorted scrapes, as Sir Eddie George of the Bank of England noted in 1999.  And the central banks may rise to the occasion and lease out the people's gold on the cheap to get them out of this one as well.  And all under the radar, hush hush.  Insiders never speak ill of insiders, or do anything to inhibit the kleptocracy.

"Nor can private counterparties restrict supplies of gold, another commodity whose derivatives are often traded over-the-counter, where central banks stand ready to lease gold in increasing quantities should the price rise."

Alan Greenspan, Congressional Testimony, July 24, 1998

The denouement of the New York-London Gold Pool is coming, but it may not be here yet. These things tend to drag on and on, wearing most everyone who suspects them out. Lots of people make claims about 'paper markets'. They paper the landscape with them. And if something happens, they will all claim to be the first. The point is to drill down and attempt to assemble the data against determined effort to distort and obfuscate and hide it.

There are people who make calls, and people who make money. I don't make 'calls.' I try to calculate odds, and then take some guidance from the probabilities. There are no sure things in this life, except that we will all meet the same end, and I believe will be called to account for our actions.

Timely caution is advisable, perhaps on a number of fronts.

"The August turbulence in global [equity] markets has produced significant shifts, including a 6.6% fall in equity prices. The currencies of emerging market countries have depreciated substantially against the G-4, while emerging market borrowing rates for sovereigns and corporates [bonds] have moved higher. Global oil prices have been whipsawed as have G-4 bond yields.

The speed and magnitude of these movements is reminiscent of past episodes in which financial crises emerged or the global economy slipped into recession. However, nothing appears to be breaking. Global activity indicators have, on balance, disappointed but remain consistent with a modest pickup in the pace of growth. Additionally, despite the turbulence in financial markets, there is no sign of unusual stress in short-term funding markets or of a credit crisis in any large Emerging Markets economies."

Bruce Kasman, Chief Economist, JP Morgan

So be of good cheer, nothing appears to be breaking, yet.

Gold Daily and Silver Weekly Charts - Desperation, Deception, and the Elusive Denouement

"The real problem isn’t what the Fed may do, but the ultimately unavoidable consequences of what the Fed has already done. The cost of reckless Fed-induced yield seeking will likely be felt first in the financial markets as previous paper gains evaporate, while defaults on excessive low-quality covenant-lite credit will emerge over the course of the economic cycle, and the impact of malinvestment will be to limit productivity and economic growth over the longer run. This is all rather inevitable except in the eyes of those who haven’t watched and memorized a dozen adaptations of the same movie."

John Hussman, The Beauty of Truth and the Beast of Dogma

There was little to no delivery action at The Bucket Shop yesterday in both gold and silver.  Delivery and withdrawal of gold in New York seems to have become unfashionable since 2013.

As for the warehouses, they apparently continue to slowly bleed out bullion, as you can see from the reports attached.

We are all informed by very serious people that all of this means nothing.  Nothing means nothing, except whatever it is that they say that day.  Sounds like politics as usual.

There was intraday commentary about the latest public relations campaign against thinking seriously about the precious metals market at Bullion Bank Apologists and Precious Metals.

All is well.

There are a number of odd things happening in the markets.   I do not know exactly why they are happening, or what it all means.   But I do know that many of the 'explanations' for them which we hear are directed at things that are not under contention, as a dodge, and are often heavily layered with hair-splitting jargon that hits everywhere except the target.

And quite a few times they obviously and clumsily make stuff up, and then attack that to prove their points, when fear and intimidation fail.

I think we will cut this Gordian knot with a call to deliver that fails.   I think it will precipitate in the London market, maybe in Switzerland.   And other markets, like The Bucket Shop, will more likely be downstream collateral after the fact.  We might see some indications there, but not the reckoning if we arrive at the resolution that I anticipate..

I know that the wiseguys are quite confident, in thinking that no one will ever catch up to them.  They tell us so in words and actions.  But it is this very lack of reasoned judgment and moral sense that is likely to trip them up.

Maybe these jokers and their enablers are right.   But I certainly have not heard anything that would persuade me, particularly if you watch the tape during the day and see their clumsy antics close up.  No, there is no ring of truth in their words, just a slightly better form of childish rationalizations when caught in the act of doing something that they ought not to have done.

The big tickle this week is the FOMC meeting.   They would dearly love to raise rates, but are afraid of the reaction of the global equity and bond markets.

I have included the lease rates for silver and gold in two charts below, because someone asked to see them.  They are slightly elevated.   But should we even trust these figures?  When have the financial firms released numbers that were not to their short term advantage?   Libor and CDS much?   This is one of the challenges that makes such a liar out of the 'efficient markets hypothesis.'

There was some additional intraday commentary about The Corruption of the Institutions by the Powerful.   Moral behaviour is as out of fashion among the ruling elite as spats and garters, I know, except for some self-righteous Puritanism.   And there are consequences to this disordered outlook, large and in charge.

Let's see how the week unfolds, especially around the end with the mighty FOMC meeting.

Will they or won't they?  And is there any reason for a system to operate in such an obtuse manner?

Have a pleasant evening.

Bullion Bank Apologists and Physical Versus Paper Gold

I see that the apologists for the status quo are actively 'refuting' the tightness of physical gold in the London markets, largely by ignoring that and concentrating on the Comex, which they assert is 'well-stocked.'

Clever people learn from the political process to ignore the tough questions that they do not wish to answer, and to misconstrue the question into whatever it is they would rather answer, often squirming through the issues to put some proposition in the most favorable light for their firms.

So we see this in so much commentary from the bullion bank and trading house apologists this past week.  I won't dignify them by citing their names, but I think you will know who they are.

Peter Hambro's recent point was fairly clear.  It is almost impossible to obtain sizable amounts of physical gold in London which is the center of the Western physical gold trade.

"It is virtually impossible to get physical gold in London to ship to those countries now. We get permanent requests in Russia now. Would we please sell our physical gold to India and to China?

Because there is not enough physical about.  There are endless promises. And I worry that the market, the paper market, could be stamped on and people say 'sorry we're going to have a financial closeout' and it's all over. If you want to be in the gold business, you ought to be in the physical business."

 Peter Hambro

The gold apologists bravely assert that there is plenty of gold in the Comex, relative to the demand there.  Never better.  More on that later.

As I have pointed out on any number of occasions, the amount of physical gold in all of the Comex warehouses of any categories is a rounding error on the physical markets of Asia.  As I said the other day:

I am certainly not suggesting that there will be hard default at the Comex.  How could one expect that in a relatively small market that almost always settles in cash and is dominated by a few, very large insiders who are actively working both sides of the trade?    No, if there is a default anywhere, it will precipitate in a physical marketplace where bullion changes hands and form, more likely in London, perhaps even Switzerland.  And then it will cascade to all the other markets quickly.

The portion of the gold in London that is not specifically 'spoken for' and held closely is considered to potentially be part of 'the float.' 

That was the key point that the apologists are ignoring.  They ignore the physical market, and concentrate on a scenario at the Comex which is becoming almost atavistic, but still worth noting nonetheless as a kind of barometer.  Comex seems to have lost its position as a source of genuine price discovery relative to the greater market of physical demand and supply.

The Comex gold warehouses, all of them, are a rounding error on the physical gold demand in India and China alone.  The Comex serves as a diversion from the developing situation with the supply of bullion.

As you know if you frequent this site, there is an interesting phenomenon of diminished deliveries and stocks of gold at Comex that is 'for sale' that extends back to 2013.

Further, the volumes of paper contracts traded against the physical backing for them is reaching unprecedented numbers of leverage, even going back twenty or more years.

You may see this information at Record Low 'Deliverable' Gold At the NY Comex - Unusual Tightness of Supply In London.

Yes Comex is well supplied in relation to its deliveries if one is to assume that it is just a betting parlor unrelated to the physical market worldwide for which it presumably provides price discovery.  

The analyst for Mitsubishi was speaking directly to the booming demand for physical bullion in India and China, and to the current conditions in London as you can see by reading Financial Media Wakes Up to 'Physical Tightness' In London Gold Bullion Market.

And so his concerns are answered by apologists again pointing to plenty of supply on the Comex.

Anyone who questions this situation, who looks at the data, who sees the almost daily slamming of the price of gold into the London PM fix and the New York trade, is obviously a hysterical conspiracy theorist, right?  And we must do what is required to intimidate them, to shut them up.

After all, what could be odd about such a multi-year pricing pattern like this in a market that purports to genuine price discovery, not for two cities alone, but for the world?

One *could* explain this by saying that Asia is buying, and the West, particularly London and New York, are selling.  And you could cast aspersions on the foolish Orientals for wasting their money on 'pet rocks.'  All of this has been done.

That is not the point.  The point is that there is such a phenomenon, it is valid, and it tells us something that some people apparently do not wish us to think about.

Given the opaque nature of the markets, and the lack of honest disclosure and discussion of what is happening, it is difficult to engage in reasoned arguments about this, especially when the sides quickly degenerate into hysteria, name calling, and all too often in search of headlines.

 It happens on both sides of the argument, although I will confess that the paid professionals are getting rather good at it, and may confound many.  Clever boys are well taken care of by this foul and rotten financial system.  Oh you think I exaggerate?  Where have you been the last ten years?

No, this situation will be resolved by a hard failure to deliver, and most likely in London or Switzerland. The last place I will look for a clear indication of the market is at the Comex, although as Hambro was suggesting it is likely to be significant collateral damage.  That is what he said.

And then when that tide goes out, we will see who is who and what is what. And we may have to wait awhile. But given that so many major markets have been proven to have been manipulated for the benefit of a few powerful firms, even though perhaps justice has not been done and settlements made without criminal admission, I think questioning the odd events and integrity of this particular market is certainly worthwhile in the light of its recent performance.

And for my own part, the arguments that seek to 'explain' the oddness in these markets are found to be wanting at the very least, and disingenuous in far too many. But I understand that one must do what their position requires.

So tell me fellows, is London well stocked relative to gold available AT THESE PRICES?  Are we secure in the knowledge that continuing levels of demand from 'Chindia' and elsewhere will be met AT THESE PRICES?    Is the true state of the Comex and the LBMA transparent to all market participants?

The total amount of ALL gold held by ALL market participants at ALL the Comex warehouses, whether it is on offer or not, is about 218 tonnes.  That is less than one month's demand for physical bullion in China and India and India alone.   And by far the vast majority of that gold is not for sale AT THESE PRICES.

And given the leverage of paper claims everywhere, not just Comex but at the more important LBMA, and one can see that a misstep by the gambling goofballs of Wall Street could lead to quite a messy market situation.  This also is what Peter Hambro said.

Oh no, they would NEVER overextend their positions in the quest for easy money.  Who could even think that?

It is good to keep a level head, and be guided by common sense.  And I think it is all too easy to fall into the habit of either shutting up and keeping your head down, or answering ridiculous excuses with equally ridiculous assertions, and so leave the poor bewildered investor in a state of confusion.

Let's recall what Kyle Bass, who is not so easily dismissed as a 'crank' had to say.

LBMA Apparently Altered Its Gold Refining Flow Statistics By 2,200 Tonnes

Ronan Manly has published a fascinating analysis of the LBMA gold refining statistics today.

The gold refined by LBMA 'good delivery' refiners is sometimes involved in converting existing gold bars into kilobars which are suitable for export to the Asian Markets.

Ronan Manly offers quite a bit of detail with regard to a very large revision in the LBMA 2013 refining data and suggests that such a large restatement of gold statistics, almost 1/3, without explanation, seems odd.

The supposition is that the LBMA originally counted gold bars that were taken from existing sources, such as their own stores, ETFs, and the Bank of England and re-refined them into kilobars for delivery into Asia.  Later they restated the number much lower, by 2,200 tonnes.   We have not been given the exact reason for this, but one suggestion is that the gold did not come from new mining or traditional recycling.  And the LBMA was reluctant to advertise such a huge spike in gold refining spurred on by Asian demand.

Depending on how the GFMS and the WGC uses the statistics and sources, this could result in a significant (~2,200 tonnes) understatement of the flow of gold from Western sources into Asia in just that one year.  Considering how tight gold supplies have been this might explain quite a bit.

What exactly is the LBMA policy decision here, and what about subsequent years of 2014 and 2015?

What is the source of this gold?  And what is so special about 2013?

The one thing that seems significant about 2013 is that the price of gold was hit rather hard by selling after hitting a peak in 2012, and the total amount of gold held in Western depositories and ETFs dropped considerably concurrent with that hit in price.  A chart is included below for your convenience.

So far we have more questions than answers.  Perhaps more information will be forthcoming.  I am given to understand that the LBMA is not open to discussing the matter.

I have my own hypothesis.   There was a major effort to hold down the price of gold in 2013 after it had run to a new high.  That effort to suppress the price resulted in a huge spike in physical demand from China.

'Stopgap measures' were taken to meet that physical demand, but without allowing the price to increase.

As more and more gold was shaken loose from various sources, a campaign of stifling Western interest in gold was undertaken to permit even more gold to be taken out of ETFs and repositories.

However, the demand from China and India were not passing events, and have continued until even now. And so the stopgap measures of 2013 have turned into an ongoing shuffling around of existing bullion to try and keep the price of gold from running higher, and threatening some of the bullion banks and institutions who cannot possibly replace all that has been loaned out and sold at anything near today's prices.

Or it *could* be something else entirely.  Time will tell I am sure.  But I think that there are now two events that might be remembered as potentially pivotal:  one in 2007 in which the world's central banks became net buyers of gold for the first time in about thirty or more years, and 2013, in which the flow of gold from West to East put the Gold Pool into unsustainable endgame from which it could not recover without allowing prices to eventually run higher.

Ronan Manly suggests that he will have a follow up article explaining his own analysis, and I will most likely defer to his more informed judgement and wait to see what he says.  I do not have all the information and a few things still puzzle me a bit.  But  I do congratulate him on finding this and writing it up so well with so much thought.

For the detailed analysis about what happened read the entire piece Ronan Manly, The LBMA’s shifting stance on gold refinery production statistics

This is a quote from his article:

"There are 2,200 tonnes of 2013 gold refining output in excess of combined mine production and scrap recycling being signalled within the 6,601 tonnes figure that was removed from the LBMA’s reports on 5th August 2015.

Could it be that this 6,601 tonne figure included refinery throughput for the huge number of London Good Delivery gold bars extracted from gold ETFs and LBMA and Bank of England vaults and converted into smaller gold bars in 2013, mainly using LBMA Good Delivery Swiss gold refineries? And that maybe this 6,601 tonne figure stood out as a statistical outlier for 2013 which no one wanted to talk about?

The objectives of HM Treasury’s Fair and Efficient Markets Review (FEMR) include transparency and openness. It would appear that altering already published gold refinery statistics, especially for 2013, seems not to be in the spirit of these FEMR objectives.

Part 2 of this analysis of the LBMA’s 2013 gold refinery statistics looks behind the 6,601 tonne number at the phenomenon of Good Delivery bars being processed through the Swiss gold refineries in 2013, the gold withdrawals from the London-based gold ETFs, and the huge shipments of gold from the UK to Switzerland in 2013. Part 2 also examines the 2013 withdrawal of gold from the Bank of England, and how GFMS and the World Gold Council tried to, or tried not to, explain the non-stop processing of Good Delivery gold bars into smaller finer kilobars during 2013."

Related follow up article from Ronan Manly:  How Many Gold Bars Are In the London Vaults

Gold 'Claims Per Ounce' Spikes Back Up to 126:1

The 'claims per ounce of gold' deliverable at current prices has spiked higher once again, to 126:1.

As soon as the 'active month' of August was over at The Bucket Shop, JPM took a chunk of gold back off the registered for delivery roster.   In the silver market JPM is gaining the reputation for a large physical silver hoard, and the role of a 'fireman' to maintain the stability of leverage in supply and demand.

These spikes higher in the ratio of open interest to deliverable bullion at current prices is not something that has happened in the past fifteen years at least.   And neither has the steady increase in the ratio which we have been seeing in the past couple of years.  This is shown in the last chart.

The Financial Times has finally noticed that the price for 'borrowed' gold bullion that is taken to Switzerland for re-refining and then final shipment to Asia for purchase and withdrawal is rising.

These are signs that one might expect to see in a late stage gold pool in which the manipulation of a market has gone too far for too long.   One thing you can say about the financial speculators is that they never know when to quit.   Remember the London Whale?   He never stopped trying to rig the prices until the rest of the professional participants raised a fuss that he was disrupting the entire market!

The clever quislings for the bullion banks will note that an actual default on the Comex is unlikely, and they are right.  It is not really a 'physical delivery' exchange, but is now primarily a betting shop.  There is plenty of gold in the warehouses, if you do not concern yourself with the niceties of property rights.  And claims can be force settled in cash on a declaration of force majeure.  

Heck, as we saw in the case of MFGlobal,  when JPM shoved to the front of the assets allocation line, even receipts for actual physical gold owned outright can be forced settled in cash.   If you hold gold in a registered warehouse or an unallocated account,  then your ownership is philosophically 'conceptual.'

The physical delivery exchanges are in other places, like the LBMA in London and especially the markets of Asia such as the Shanghai Gold Exchange.

And this is where we will see the first signs of a breakdown in the gold price manipulation pool of the bullion banks, first as signs of 'tightness' in the delivery of metals, and then in the initial 'fails to deliver.'

Rising prices will provide relief.  But the pool operators are not shy about pressing and doubling down, in a familiar pattern of overreach.  Remember the eventual demise of 'the London Whale?'

And although it is hard to believe, perhaps rising prices may not be so easily allowed.

"We looked into the abyss if the gold price rose further. A further rise would have taken down one or several trading houses, which might have taken down all the rest in their wake.   

Therefore at any price, at any cost, the central banks had to quell the gold price, manage it." 

Sir Eddie George, Bank of England, September 1999

And it might not surprise anyone if it turns out that the wiseguy bullion banks are operating under the 'cover' of some bureaucratic boobs and a policy exercise gone horribly wrong.  It would be like giving a platinum credit card to a gambling addict.  Except you do not think that you ever have to pay the bills when they come due, since you are playing with other people's money.

"I have one other issue I'd like to throw on the table. I hesitate to do it, but let me tell you some of the issues that are involved here. If we are dealing with psychology, then the thermometers one uses to measure it have an effect. I was raising the question on the side with Governor Mullins of what would happen if the Treasury sold a little gold in this market.  (just a little)

There's an interesting question here because if the gold price broke [lower] in that context, the thermometer would not be just a measuring tool. It would basically affect the underlying psychology.

Now, we don't have the 'legal' right to sell gold but I'm just frankly curious about what people's views are on situations of this nature because something unusual is involved in policy here. We're not just going through the standard policy where the money supply is expanding, the economy is expanding, and the Fed tightens. This is a wholly different thing."

Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Minutes from May 18, 1993

Just a little 'perception management' gone horribly wrong, right?   And no one could have seen it coming.

The Investment of the Millennium: 'Pet Rocks'

"Gold has worked down from Alexander's time.

When something holds good for two thousand years I do not believe it can be so because of prejudice or mistaken theory."

Bernard M. Baruch

Who would have thought it?

So why haven't the precious metals been 'working' since they spiked higher in 2011?

"We hypothesize that, having learned from the misadventures of the 1960s, the policy elites, well-versed in the practice of financial engineering and market manipulation, would have seen no need to dump stocks of government gold reserves onto the market, 1960s style, to keep the price in check. 

Instead, synthetic gold, sourced in pyramids of credit extended to bullion bankers by central banks with little or no claim on physical substance, have provided a more efficient, better-camouflaged form of intervention. COMEX synthetic gold and related over-the-counter derivatives are traded in macro strategies implemented by hedge funds, high-frequency trades, and commodity funds in pair trades with interest-rate, currencies, equity futures, or even more exotic offsets. The volumes traded are huge, and bear little resemblance to actual flows of physical metal. 

We suspect that shorting gold has come to seem like a riskless proposition as long as there is confidence in the Fed. Synthetic gold is the perfect substance for a carry trade: an easy borrow with very low carrying cost and little upside basis risk. Such a hypothesis, in our opinion, does much to explain the incongruity of a declining gold price while fundamentals for paper currency, and the U.S. dollar in particular, obviously deteriorate; while demand for physical gold has exceeded new mine supply for several years running; and while above-ground 400-ounce .995-gold bars located in London, New York, and other financial capitals (in cohabitation with speculative trading activity in paper markets) have steadily dwindled and disappeared into Asian financial centers reformulated as .9999 kilo bars."

Tocqueville Gold Newsletter 2Q 2015

The physical market at some point is going to come bearing consequence for the schemes of the financiers.

I suspect that when the 'riskless proposition' of shorting gold starts to more visibly unwind, most likely under some significant duress, we are going to see what kind of rot has been concealed, and the bottom feeders that have thrived on it, as when the tide goes out.

This unwinding started in the spike in the metals after the financial crisis of 2008, but was held off by massive 'currency interventions' to 'save' the Western financial system in 2011.

Gold rose in 2009 from about +150% to +775% at the end of 2010, as measured from the beginning of the millenium in 2000.

The real longer term consequences of reckless monetary policy and irresponsible financial deregulation and a tolerance for massive frauds are still ahead of us.

Perhaps I am incorrect in this.  But nothing I have seen in the data makes me believe so.

Gold is still flowing in large numbers from West to East, and the central banks are still net buyers.

And once the bull market in metals resumes, which I believe that it will, the upside will be similar to the increase which was seen in the years from 2009 to 2011.

Change is coming.  That is the only certainty.  At some point I may be sharing some more thoughts about how this change might manifest it, and what forms the new 'closing of the gold window' may take.

The Global Monetary Phenomenon That Almost No One Is Seriously Discussing

I wish to present, in just a few charts, a remarkable monetary phenomenon that almost no one is discussing publicly.

 

As you can see below, the central banks of the world, largely those of the West led by the US and the UK, were net sellers of gold throughout the 1990's and through the turn of the century.  

 

As the Bankers to the world's reserve currency and sole global superpower, the Western central banks will make no major international policy decisions without the involvement of the Treasury, and especially the Federal Reserve and its constituent global banking machinery including the behemoth

Banks and the SWIFT system.

 

Gold purchases by central banks, at least those they were willing to publicly acknowledge, turned positive by 2010 at most.

 

The pundits did not expect this change to continue, as is shown in the 'forecast section' for 2012 and after in this first chart from RBC/Bloomberg below.

 

This chart shows most clearly perhaps how the Western central banks stepped up their gold selling attempting to control and then crush the price of gold, driving it down to a low of $250 in 1999-2001.

 

Interestingly enough this came to be known as Brown's Bottom.    England, under the leadership of Gordon Brown, then UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, very publicly sold 400 tonnes of its sovereign gold starting in late 1999 and 2001, reportedly to bail out some of the Banks who had gotten over their heads on short sale positions.

The largest net sales amount of gold reserves was in 2005, as the central banks attempted to dampen the price of gold which had risen from $250 to $450.   This selling was co-ordinated under the Washington Agreement, which was a so-called gentleman's agreement amongst some of the Western central banks, first created in 1999 and thereafter revised and extended in 2004. 

The banks included the ECB, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK.   Although it was not a signatory, the Federal Reserve was obviously involved.   In August 2009 this agreement amongst 19 central banks was extended for another five years. 

Spun positively by the financial media as 'good for gold,' this coordination of selling was designed to allow the Banks to coordinate their efforts, and not clumsily disrupt the markets as the Bank of England had done in 1999, allowing them to manage their sales and announcements for a smoother effect on price.  

As can be seen on the chart below, the central bank gold selling was unable to obtain traction, and the price of gold continued to rise as the Banks began to taper off their attempts to control the price through outright physical selling which seems to have had its last hurrah in 2007 as noted by Citigroup. 

"Official sales ran hot in 2007, offset by rapid de-hedging. Gold undoubtedly faced headwinds this year from resurgent central bank selling, which was clearly timed to cap the gold price. Our sense is that central banks have been forced to choose between global recession or sacrificing control of gold, and have chosen the perceived lesser of two evils. This reflationary dynamic also seems to be playing out in oil markets."

There are other non-bullion instruments which the central banks may employ to manage the price of gold which include strategic leasing, derivatives, and the use of proxies to influence markets in the manner in which certain financial entities have been recently exposed to be manipulating many other global prices and benchmarks, over periods of many years.   Yet there is still a great deal of denial over the central bank attempts to manage the price of gold relative to their currencies, despite an abundance of circumstantial, historical, and direct evidence.

 

This simple chart more vividly portrays how the forecasts of declining purchases of gold by central banks after 2011 were wrong-footed.

Since that time, central bank purchases have risen to 48 year highs.

One thing that we should bear in mind here is that the central bank numbers are based on 'official' numbers given to the World Gold Council.  

There is significant evidence that some of the central banks, notably China, are significantly understating their acquisition of gold as a matter of their own discretion.

 

Here is my own depiction below of the sea-change called 'The Turn' in global central bank purchases of gold.

This turn coincides with what I along with more important others have called the currency war,  most notably in a bestselling Chinese book published in 2007 by Song HongBing called Currency Wars (货币战争), and a book published in Nov. 2011 by Jim Rickards by the same name.

 This is different from the 'currency war' which the financial media likes to portray, as the devaluation of national currencies to obtain competitive advantage, is more of an artifact from the 1930's.   This new currency war involved a rethinking of the US as the global reserve currency, an unusual condition for a fiat currency which has been in place since at least 1971 when Nixon closed the gold window.  

 

From the end of WWII the Bretton Woods Agreement had set up the US dollar reserve as a proxy for gold, redeemable at least by other central banks and their governments.  After the closing of the gold window the world was pushed into a scenario of central monetary authority it had not experienced in recorded history:  a single country, through a semi-public banking entity controlled the issuance of the world's global reserve currency unencumbered by a hard reference to some neutral external standard. 

 

This currency regime has been maintained by military and political power, informal agreements, treaties and trade sanctions, between 700 to 900 foreign bases of power and influence, and the indirect control of key global resources such as oil, the so-called petrodollar.

 

 

I certainly cannot predict where this will end, except to point to the example of past endeavours such as the London Gold Pool, and suggest that absent draconian government actions, market forces tend to overcome and overwhelm such efforts over time.  

 

As I have forecast for many years, at least from 1999, the natural objective of a global fiat currency regime is a unipolar, or quite possibly a multipartite global government that is more centrally directed oligarchy than sovereign democracies.  

 

The relationships of the various countries with the central authority in the evolving Eurozone are an approachable example on a small scale, a test run for the inverted totalitarianism, or neo-corporatism, of the bureaucrats and their corporate sponsors, to be a bit extrapolative.  Although I think that the TTP and TTIP are glaring signposts along the way.

 

One particular point of frustration has been how slow on the uptake so many economists and financial commentators have been in thinking through the various monetary schemes that they promote.  I doubt if they understood where they were leading that they would support them, even as their objectives are thought to be good. 

 

 

Currency Wars, Gold Pools, and Comex Potential Claims Per Deliverable Ounce

Based on some interactions with newer patrons of Le Café, I thought it might be a good time to restate the general lay of the land in the gold market.   The occasion for this is the latest measure of what might be called leverage in the futures market, what it is, and what it may or may not mean and why.

Clearly the paper markets, involving associated trades in ETFs, mining company stocks, derivatives, and so forth are much broader than the futures market alone.  But the futures market is what one might call the locus of execution for our drama.

The potential claims number for gold at the NY Comex is calculated by Nick Laird at Sharelynx.com by taking the amount of gold bullion marked as 'registered' for delivery at current prices by the number of contracts open on the futures market at 100 ounces of gold per contract.

Yes there is more gold that the 373,000 ounces currently marked for delivery in all the warehouses.  But that gold is merely there in storage by its owners, so counting it towards delivery, without the prior consent of the owner, is a bit presumptuous to say the least.  One might safely assume that market rules apply, and more gold will become deliverable at higher prices.

With a potential 111 claims per ounce of gold marked 'registered' for delivery at these prices, one might expect to see quite a move higher in prices to reach a market clearing price, and perhaps even a significant short squeeze.

But we probably will not see any such short squeeze, and maybe not even a breakout from this price range, unless something unusual happens outside of the New York and London markets.

The Comex, aka The Bucket Shop on the Hudson, does not set prices in the usual supply and demand dynamics.  And London and New York are playing a tag team with any number of markets these days, from forex to LIBOR to bonds.

Gold could break out in a big way.  It would not take all that much for a large hedge fund, or even a well-heeled world class individual, to turn about three thousand of those contracts in for delivery AND take the gold bullion out of the warehouses, moving them to Asia and pocketing a substantial profit on the gain.  

This assault on an unsustainable price peg is how Soros and associates in Zurich took the Bank of England for over a billion in their selling of the pound against an unrealistic price  point. 

Why doesn't anything like this happen?  

Is it because people do not have the money to do it?  In times of billion dollar art auctions and $500M homes being built on spec?   Don't make us laugh.

Is it because people do not want gold bullion?    The Shanghai Gold Exchange is routinely moving  physical thirty to forty tonnes per week out of its warehouses.   Thirty tonnes is about 965,000 troy ounces, about three times the total deliverable at the Comex now in total.

No, it will probably not happen because the big money has been warned off the Banks' turf, and their game is to keep the wash and rinse price cycles running to provide a steady profit as long as they can.   

As long as price is the 'only component' in the market dynamics, with demand and supply artificially dampened by a 'no withdrawals' house rules,  the liar's pokers carney games based on very loosely regulated price action can continue.  

It is not all that dissimilar to a poker game in which there are unlimited raises, the rule of table stakes does not apply, and one does not have to show their cards, and can only be called if the house allows it. Those with the biggest wallets can keep selling paper gold as long as they wish at whatever price they wish, and never have to even show their cards, and cannot effectively be called unless they permit it. 

I know this example is a bit rough, but not all that much.   It almost looks like a scam, rigged in favor of the deepest pocketed players, doesn't it?   And what if they get additional information about the hands of the other players and the size of their wallets.  Well, now you know why I consider those smaller players who keep coming back to the action in that casino to be a bit out of touch.

So the bullion banks and their friends can keep cranking out steady profits while holding bullion prices within a range that is a comfort to the nervous money printers in the Federal Reserve.  This keeps the government happy, the regulators off their backs so to speak, and the wash and rinse cycles rolling.

The reason why this sort of imbalance could get sorted out in the currency markets but not in commodities is illustrated by the relative experiences of George Soros and the Hunt Brothers.

Lucky for Soros that the forex markets are so broad and deep that no single group of cronies can control the exchange rules in the 'cash markets' to suit their plays.  Yes some central banks can make it quite risky, even painful, but the solution is not so neat as what happened in with the Hunt Brothers and silver.  There the exchange the US regulators just changed the rules of the game and that was that.

If one were to do something about a price imbalance in a commodities market, as opposed to an unregulated global market, you would tend to wish to do it off exchange by slowly accumulating a large portion of the available global supply, as quietly as possible.  This only works obviously with a commodity that has inherently has a relatively stable supply.

The spoiler in the gold paper game might then be expected to be  those 'outside' the range of the gold pool.  They are those who do not do their business primarily in the betting parlors of New York and London.

If one cannot secure a sizable portion of supply via paper on the exchange where the cronies make the rules, one just cuts out the middlemen and buys it directly, and it works as long as they do it off exchange and have an unimpeachable line of credit.   And then one would keep stacking their physical metal while enjoying what they think are very attractive prices.

Some analysts think that they know 'what China wants.'   Who is China?   Have the Chinese had a meeting and hammered out a single, unified policy plan?  How about the Americans, and the Russians? Or are there various competing domestic factions in every country?   And even more significantly perhaps, are there special interest groups, a self-defining elite, without preferences except for themselves?  As you can see this is a complex scenario with many variables.  

And in compressing the complexity of the scenario, we lose information and applicability, always, and sometimes intentionally.  Simple sells, and is successful depending on your sales objective.  Nothing was simpler and more powerful than the efficient markets hypothesis with perfectly rational actors.   It led to an otherworldly market ideology that caused one of the greatest financial crises in history.

This is not the first time we have seen such a de facto pooling arrangement.  There was the London Gold Pool, which sought to 'stabilize the gold price' at $35 dollars from 1961 until it collapsed in 1968.   That mispricing caused a 'run' on the gold in the US, and  led to the Nixon shock in 1971,  the closing of the gold window,  and the eventual rise in the price of gold to $850 in 1980.

Or we could point to the long bear market in gold, which reached its trough with the sale of England's gold in Brown's Bottom around $250 between 1999-and 2002,  This was resolved with the so-called Washington Agreement, which provided a plan for more measured selling and leasing of Western central bank gold to control the price of bullion largely amongst the Europeans.

Their intention was to have had this agreement continue until 2009, but alas, the rising economies of Asia and the BRICS were not sharing their vision of the future.  And so the purchasing of central bank gold reserves turned positive for the first time in over twenty years around 2006-7, ahead of the collapse of the US housing and credit bubble. 

As you may recall, gold subsequently rose to around $1900 in a fairly short period of time, and has now fallen back to the current price range in dollars of $1180-1230. 

And where are we now?

The BRICS are still buying.   There is quite a bit of secrecy and jawboning surrounding the actual levels of bullion available and unencumbered in the Western central banks.  The IMF, a ringmaster for the States if you will, has offered (threatened) to sell the same gold on about ten occasions. 

Not all the Western banks are holding to plan.  Some are even taking the unusual steps of repatriating their gold from the Anglo-American vaults where it has been since the Second World War.  They fear that if things go off the rails, and there is a reckoning of ownership claims, possession will once again be nine-tenths of the law.

 

It will be interesting to see where the market forces take us eventually, if they are allowed to do so.  I do not assume necessarily that they will.     

However the fact remains that the existing 'Bretton Woods II' de facto reserve currency arrangement for global trade, based on a fiat US dollar, which was unilaterally put in place by the US in 1971 on the closing of the gold window, has reached its point of unsustainability.

I do not believe that there has ever been a purely fiat global currency of this magnitude before in recorded history.  So we should not be too surprised if the situation seems to evolve rather slowly,

There is already a great deal of posturing by cross national special interest groups, with 'negotiation' on multiple levels from financial to diplomatic.  We may even expect the abusive use of the military to push certain proposals forward rather forcefully.

Bureaucrats can become quite draconian when their schemes for personal power go awry.  And in my own monetary thinking a purely fiat currency for international trade ultimately implies the development, or imposition, of a global government controlled by the monetary authority, whatever they may choose to call themselves.  The imposition of fiat valuation relies on control, which means power, and often plenty of it.

 

The future composition of any world government is a very open question.  There is very obviously an Anglo-American faction for 'the New American Century.'  But there are also Pan-Asian, Pan-Pacific, sub-Saharan, Eurasian and Pan-European elements as well.  Although it is most likely a bit of a reach, one has to wonder if this odd construction of the European Monetary Union is not some sort of a testbed for the future cooperation of regional oligarchies. 

 

I am not saying that there is 'A Plan' but there are certainly plans that some groups are clearly pushing towards their own objectives and agendas, and have been doing so for some time.   Professor Carroll Quigley, Bill Clinton's mentor at Georgetown, has been instructive on this subject.

We are in exciting times with history being made it seems.  There are a number of possible outcomes, which quite frankly no one can accurately forecast at this point.  There are too many degrees of freedom, so they literally cannot.   But they can throw up theories and strawmen of what may happen, and charge you to read about it.  It is an honest source of income, rather like writing racing forms or novellas, or the weather report in the 1950's.  And it is fun to talk about while we watch things develop.

But make no mistake, when some of these fellows overreach with their claims of certainty, if they really knew what will happen they would  not be telling it to you.  They would be playing with their own money in the casino, for all they were worth.   Or running funds that increased their leverage for their theories, while providing a steady management income.  This is a longer term play after all, and so speculative leverage is a short term risk to be managed.  Banks like to catch the players indisposed.

And then, alas, there are those who play for pay, who promulgate their ideas for the special interests, spreading disinformation.  Or just make the most dramatic sort of stuff up, selling a kind of financial pornography.

This landscape is what I, and several others some more notable certainly, have called The Currency Wars.