Comex Registered Gold Inventories - 'Deliverable Gold' At Current Prices

As someone asked, since hardly anyone is buying gold on the Comex and taking it out, why would be concerned about any inventory levels of deliverable gold?

Indeed, why be concerned about price if it is just all a part of an extended game of liar's poker between speculative interests?

It is almost just a betting parlor now, hence the title The Bucket Shop.

However, that does call into question its role in price discovery in the global trade around the world, much if not most of which is physical.

And that price discovery in London at the LBMA is asserted almost every day in one of the clearest patterns of price manipulation that one might even try to imagine.

As I have said on a number of occasions, I am not looking for a 'default' in NY.   How can one default when forced settlements in cash can be easily accomodated at the Fed's window at any time?

No, the first cracks in the facade of the modern Gold Pool will appear in a key node of the physical market, most likely in London or Switzerland as fails to deliver.  Perhaps even in Shanghai.

However, like the ebbing of the tide, a ready supply of gold for delivery will likely start disappearing from the shelves around the world at both the wholesale and retail level as the vortex of actual delivery in Asia consumes the ready supply at current prices.  The cost of 'borrowing' gold will increase dramatically as the risk of a counterparty failure to return the bullion will intensify.

There will be a divergence between the price for immediate delivery of bullion and the paper price in the future, until the discrepancy becomes so obvious that there is a 'run' on the available short term physical supply, and real gold bullion goes to 'none offered' at any price close to the 'price discovery' of the paper markets.  And then there will be a halt, a settling, and a reset.

If the source where you hold your bullion does not offer a guarantee of the bullion itself, rather than the 'value of the bullion' then chances are unacceptably high that you will be force settled in cash prior to a reset of the price substantially higher.

This is what happened in the US in 1933 when the official gold currency in circulation was recalled.   People who had gold stored in the Banks had their monetary gold taken,  a paper payment was received for it at the official price, and then afterwards the price of bullion in US dollars was set 41% higher.  The increase in reserves was used to help prop up the insolvent banking sector.

Although such an action today is less likely since gold is no longer a monetary metal with a claim from the state, nevertheless such an action in a force majeure breakdown in the financial system whereby borrowed and 'shared' gold could not be returned at the current price faces a similar fate.  This is how the failure of MF Global was recently resolved, and I can easily see the same rules applying for a market break in any leveraged system of ownership.

Related:  Why the Federal Government Seized Gold In 1933

Gold 'Claims Per Ounce' Spikes Back Up to 126:1

The 'claims per ounce of gold' deliverable at current prices has spiked higher once again, to 126:1.

As soon as the 'active month' of August was over at The Bucket Shop, JPM took a chunk of gold back off the registered for delivery roster.   In the silver market JPM is gaining the reputation for a large physical silver hoard, and the role of a 'fireman' to maintain the stability of leverage in supply and demand.

These spikes higher in the ratio of open interest to deliverable bullion at current prices is not something that has happened in the past fifteen years at least.   And neither has the steady increase in the ratio which we have been seeing in the past couple of years.  This is shown in the last chart.

The Financial Times has finally noticed that the price for 'borrowed' gold bullion that is taken to Switzerland for re-refining and then final shipment to Asia for purchase and withdrawal is rising.

These are signs that one might expect to see in a late stage gold pool in which the manipulation of a market has gone too far for too long.   One thing you can say about the financial speculators is that they never know when to quit.   Remember the London Whale?   He never stopped trying to rig the prices until the rest of the professional participants raised a fuss that he was disrupting the entire market!

The clever quislings for the bullion banks will note that an actual default on the Comex is unlikely, and they are right.  It is not really a 'physical delivery' exchange, but is now primarily a betting shop.  There is plenty of gold in the warehouses, if you do not concern yourself with the niceties of property rights.  And claims can be force settled in cash on a declaration of force majeure.  

Heck, as we saw in the case of MFGlobal,  when JPM shoved to the front of the assets allocation line, even receipts for actual physical gold owned outright can be forced settled in cash.   If you hold gold in a registered warehouse or an unallocated account,  then your ownership is philosophically 'conceptual.'

The physical delivery exchanges are in other places, like the LBMA in London and especially the markets of Asia such as the Shanghai Gold Exchange.

And this is where we will see the first signs of a breakdown in the gold price manipulation pool of the bullion banks, first as signs of 'tightness' in the delivery of metals, and then in the initial 'fails to deliver.'

Rising prices will provide relief.  But the pool operators are not shy about pressing and doubling down, in a familiar pattern of overreach.  Remember the eventual demise of 'the London Whale?'

And although it is hard to believe, perhaps rising prices may not be so easily allowed.

"We looked into the abyss if the gold price rose further. A further rise would have taken down one or several trading houses, which might have taken down all the rest in their wake.   

Therefore at any price, at any cost, the central banks had to quell the gold price, manage it." 

Sir Eddie George, Bank of England, September 1999

And it might not surprise anyone if it turns out that the wiseguy bullion banks are operating under the 'cover' of some bureaucratic boobs and a policy exercise gone horribly wrong.  It would be like giving a platinum credit card to a gambling addict.  Except you do not think that you ever have to pay the bills when they come due, since you are playing with other people's money.

"I have one other issue I'd like to throw on the table. I hesitate to do it, but let me tell you some of the issues that are involved here. If we are dealing with psychology, then the thermometers one uses to measure it have an effect. I was raising the question on the side with Governor Mullins of what would happen if the Treasury sold a little gold in this market.  (just a little)

There's an interesting question here because if the gold price broke [lower] in that context, the thermometer would not be just a measuring tool. It would basically affect the underlying psychology.

Now, we don't have the 'legal' right to sell gold but I'm just frankly curious about what people's views are on situations of this nature because something unusual is involved in policy here. We're not just going through the standard policy where the money supply is expanding, the economy is expanding, and the Fed tightens. This is a wholly different thing."

Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Minutes from May 18, 1993

Just a little 'perception management' gone horribly wrong, right?   And no one could have seen it coming.

Financial Media Wakes Up to 'Physical Tightness' In London Gold Bullion Market

How interesting that the Financial Times has finally noticed 'tentative signs of increased demand for bullion from consumers in emerging markets.'  You know, those obscure places with difficult names such as I-N-D-I-A and C-H-I-N-A.

It's not all that new of a phenomenon, mates.   Our friend Nick has been tracking it, and we have been talking about that here at Le Cafe, for a couple years now.  Well, maybe almost a decade.  See the charts below.

And we have also been hearing about 'physical tightness in the market for gold for immediate delivery.'  While the 'cost of borrowing gold has risen sharply in recent weeks.'

Even while the price of gold was shoved lower on the non-delivery paper markets of The Bucket Shop, helping to crater the deveopment and production of mining companies.

Sounds like borrowing gold for physical delivery is starting to be a dodgy business, a little hard to manage at such high leverage of claims to items.

Wait until people start realizing that there is a diminishing mix of deliverable and of 'borrowed gold' backing up a pyramid of derivatives and paper claims.   Is that the sound of a spoon scraping the bottom of the pot yet?

What happened to the theory of higher prices to relieve demand in excess of supply?

And where is that 'borrowed gold' coming from, by the by?  It must belong to someone, and they may even think it is safely tucked away while it is on its way to Asia via Switzerland.

If the LBMA has been doing what some think they have been doing with demand and available supply, then we haven't seen anything yet.

Never be the last one out of the pool.

But let's see how all this plays out.

Gold Demand from China and India Picks Up

By Henry Sanderson
Financial Times, London
Wednesday, September 2, 2015

London's gold market is showing tentative signs of increased demand for bullion from consumers in emerging markets, after the price of the precious metal fell to its lowest level in five years in July.

The cost of borrowing physical gold in London has risen sharply in recent weeks. That has been driven by dealers needing gold to deliver to refineries in Switzerland before it is melted down and sent to places such as India, according to market participants.

The rise "does indicate there is physical tightness in the market for gold for immediate delivery," said Jon Butler, analyst at Mitsubishi. ...

... For the remainder of the report:

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/eae18206-5154-11e5-b029-b9d50a74fd14.html

The Gross Mispricing in the Gold Market Risks the Global Financial System - A Fraud Too Far

With a physical commodity like gold, as several others have pointed out, 'supply' is not how much there may be, since most of the gold that has ever been mined is closely held in treasuries and private vaults, and is not on offer, available for purchase.

It is a monetary metal, a store of wealth, with some industrical applications.

The amount that has ever been mined would likely fit in a modern four bedroom house. In other words, there is not a lot of it, and the supply is increasing at a fairly slow rate over time.

Physical Supply On Offer

So 'physical supply' is that which is thought to be for sale at the current prices.

At the Comex, this bullion is designated as 'registered' or deliverable to someone who chooses to exercise a contract for it at the current price.

Demand

And also at the Comex, 'demand' is synonymous with open interest, that is, a contract created when someone goes long, or buys a contract that had not previously been owned by another. 

Yes, there are significantly larger physical markets for gold bullion, almost all of which exist outside the US.  But let us put those aside for now.

Rising open interest with rising prices and a steady or rising supply is easy enough to understand. More people are seeking to go long or buy a claim on some gold bullion, and the price rises to entice more who have their gold in storage to meet that demand.

What is also easy to understand, if you have a mind to open your eyes, is when demand is steady and historically high, but the price and the physical supply for delivery is falling. The explanation is naked shorting, the creation and selling of contracts based on increasing leverage.  

That is, speculators, of whatever size and for whatever reasons, are nakedly meeting demand with an artificial inflated supply that ordinarily could not possibly be met in an efficient physical market.

This is why I have come to think that the Comex precious metals market is like The Bucket Shop, although technically it does not meet the statutory definition since 'a transaction on a exchange' has been made.

The bullion banks and the Exchange are playing 'The Bank' in a situation in which an actual physical transaction is unlikely to occur.  And, given a reasonable probability of execution, impossible to demand at anything like the prices being quoted.

Leveraged Speculation

So why does it happen, and why does it matter?

It happens because gold is in this case is now being treated purely as a paper instrument, a derivative, although it is representing and price setting for a vast global industry and physical market from which it has become increasingly decoupled.

This is not surprising because rampant speculation in derivatives and paper assets has become de rigueur in these financially captured markets, and radically so since 1999. 

And the same forces that blew up the collateralized debt obligations and their mispricing of risk derivatives in 2007 seem as though they are going to blow up the global commodities markets, starting with the precious metals. 

The exchanges in this case may try to force settle everything in cash and for pennies on the dollar.  And so they dismiss the risks, and since the 'right people' are making money, no one will say a word.

Consequences

While the sources of new supply dry up with the decline of the mining industry, the urge to grab the available physical supply while it lasts continues to intensify.

But like the financial derivatives collapse in 2007 quickly metastasized to the global financial system, this relatively small precious metals market will also shaken the global financial system, and threaten to bring down the Too Big To Fail institutions once again.

I am not speaking of a 'default' on the exchange.  A paper exchange cannot default when cash settlement in paper can be enforced.  Rather, I am talking about a 'break in confidence' that finally persuades the rest of the world that the Anglo-American financial markets are a long con.   Let's call it 'a fraud too far.'  

We certainly have seen some mind-boggling systemic frauds and market rigging exposed in everything from derivatives pricing to LIBOR in recent memory.  We keep sloughing these events off in our walking amnesia.  But such things have long term and highly corrosive effects.

But just like the last time, while the money is flowing and the music is playing, the players will keep dancing, and the regulators and politicians will be keeping their eyes and ears closed.

'Nobody saw' the last crisis coming, except a few.   That is because they who should have known knew, but went along to get along.

Consider the consequences of repeatedly ignoring the risks of excessive speculation.  I do not think that we can afford it.

This chart is from Nick Laird at sharelynx.com.

Gold Daily and Silver Weekly Charts - Distorted Markets, Financial Sophistry, and Moral Hazard

There was intraday commentary here that included an interesting perspective from the audacious one percent and their enablers.

And there was another about the current state of political discussion in Britain, a recent awkwardly stated reflection by the Prime Minister that may have revealed the mindset of their powerful, and its possible relationship with the continuum of politics and 'statism' here.

Oddly enough, both seem to have some implications for another question that was raised by a reader who shared this from another site. It was in reference to a posting earlier this week at Le Café that showed that the number of potential claims on actual available gold at the Comex was back to a record high.  

 

And it is further related to a familiar theme about the relationship between a thing masquerading as a market, The Bucket Shop on the Hudson, and THE marketplace for precious metals in Asia and the Mideast.  And the potential longer damages implicit in their protracted divergences.

"It is not meaningful that there are 107.7 claims per registered ounce. you should consider that the ratio between paper SPY and real SPY is infinity.

You are making the fundamentally flawed assumption that you need a physical commodity to determine price. You do not.

It doesn’t matter how many physical ounces there are per claim. It can be 1 or 1000 or 107.7 or infinity and it simply doesn’t matter.

The purpose of commodity markets is not to trade commodities, it is to determine price. There are zero SPY physical contracts and the market works just fine.>

I was a commodities broker and part of the test is to ask the function of commodity markets. Every commodity broker understands you don’t need a physical product.

It’s not a broken system, it’s existed in one form or another for a longer time than currency in any form. But to use it you have to understand it and you do not.

Everyone who owns physical gold or silver bought it with paper. There is no difference, they are fungible. The only difference is the price you are willing to take or to give. Physical and paper are exactly the same.

Saying that financial markets are manipulated is about as meaningful as saying the sun rises in the East. Well, duh?"

What this person is saying is that price really has nothing to do with actual supply and actual demand for a physical thing.   And much worse, they seem to have a remarkable disregard for risk and leverage.  I was originally going to ignore this since it smelled like teen spirit.  But when they came back and announced their expertise, how could I resist using this as an occasion of some education.

Futures are derivatives, bets. They are wagers that are indicative of where professionals think that price is going, should be going, given a set of known and unknown factors with certain assumptions and other factors, including fraud and gaming the system with bluffs, etc.

These types of futures markets began as a means for people who actually used and supplied things like commodities to factor in the risk in the 'future' and to essentially spread the risk around.

The 'futures market' is not the market.   No derivatives market is the market.  It is a reflection of THE market, and that reflection or representation varies in its quality and efficiency from market to market and over time.   This is why we have rules and regulations and enforcement.

A derivatives market is a creature of risk arbitrage, and leverage, and it is a reliable indicator of price to the extent that risk is correctly perceived and priced, leverage managed, and these exchanges are REGULATED against the short term gaming that speculators are often wont to do. 

I really do not blame the guy who thinks these things in his statements above since he knows what he has been taught, and what the financiers think these days are distorted by moral hazard.

The notion that the paper markets can set prices as they will without regard to risk or leverage is a not uncommon assumption held by those in the pursuit of unearned wealth.  That is why we have market crises and crashes.

This willfulness of paper is at the heart of some interpretations of Modern Monetary Theory that enthrones the principle of fiat in determining value above all other considerations, including the willingness of actors in the physical marketplace to accept it at a stated value.  At its worst it is a reflection of a kind of statism.

This flawed assumption of the extensible power of fiat is the basis of every black market and currency crisis in history. 

Commodities are different than stocks, because a stock is itself a derivative wager, a share in the future profits, dividends, and losses of a company.   How can any broker fail to know that?  Pretty basic stuff.   That is the difference between buying bullion and a mining stock.  A futures contract is a promise to buy and sell a thing at some future date.  It is not the thing itself, but it is based on the promise that you CAN do what you say you do.

Like the famous short seller Daniel Drew once said, 'He who sells what isn't his'n, must buy it back, or go to prison.'   But it is not always just a matter price to someone who might really wish to have the thing with they think they are purchasing.

I understand the mindset.  I really do.  It is the same mindset that Kyle Bass calls out in his video below about the Comex about why he chose to take delivery of his gold out of a sense of fiduciary responsibility. 

Commodities are by definition a real thing, and are not totally fungible with paper money at any and all times at a set price.  I think this is the MF Global school of thought, and it is fraught with injustice and moral hazard.  And it is nonsense to think that paper can paper over any and all action or any excess, except in a nation of willful thugs acting in a web of lies that come crashing down periodically.

If you believe in the pricing of things without reference to supply, demand, time, and risk, I invite you to go for a very long and solitary walk into the Sahara Desert, with only the price of a couple of gallons of water and a hotel room in New York in paper dollars in your pocket. 

Enjoy the refreshing and thirst quenching crunch of paper and your comfortable bed of sand.

It is a broken system in which these types of wagers can set price without reference to a realistic set of expectations based on supply, demand, leverage, and risks.  This is where bubbles are born and frauds dwell.

Leverage is a component of risk, but given the state of things, I feel the need to call it out separately since it seems to be fashionable now amongst 'market professionals' to believe that leverage is irrelevant to the point of infinity.   Maybe it is when you are playing with other people's money, and there are no consequences for your actions.

Such a self-referential system does not properly allocate capital for future investment in supply.  It does not inform the planners of changes in consumer interest, and the state of their own needs and conditions.  It does not give consumers the surety that they can actually obtain what they need and when they need it, and not be forced to accept some substitute at a dictated 'price.'

This sort of nonsense used to be relegated to the intraday antics, in which markets are just a voting machine, but you could rely on markets on the longer term to obtain some greater efficiency. The breakdown is that the grift has completely taken over, thanks to the policy errors of the Fed and the regulators.

The financial markets are an enabler, and not an end unto themselves.   And when they lose their proper place in the bigger scheme of economic things where the real markets and people exist, it is because of the moral hazards of an outsized and over-leveraged financial sector. 

It may take some time to catch up with us, but we know that at some point there will be hell to pay in the real world.   And there are those who simply do not care, who are sure they can just take their loot and blithely walk away, if they ever bother to think that far ahead.

How can we not see this lesson now, after all that we have seen and been through over the past twenty years?

We seem to be relearning that lesson about every seven or eight years, and then forgetting.  And until the consequences of their actions are visited on these infantile masters of the universe, I suspect we will have to keep relearning them because they are certainly not going to stop on their own.

 

This is the point of madness to which the sophists of finance have brought us, for any variety of motives.  I don't really care to discuss it any further with these sociopaths and willful fools at this late stage and after the carnage they have created.  It makes me sick to even think any longer about it and where it may be bringing us.

If you do not get this by now, then you probably will not 'get it' until you are searching in the rubble for your face after the next financial crisis. 

Have a pleasant weekend.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Market Manipulation, News, and Leverage

This piece on leverage and market manipulation came out a few weeks ago. Philip Byrne reminded me about it, and he is right.

Using leverage in these markets is a dangerous strategy.

I was also reminded of this because of the recent 'leak' of the FOMC minutes by the Fed that demonstrated that they had a 'preferred recipients' list who receive the information ahead of the markets, although normally not by a day.

And I think one might suspect and assume that there is more ad hoc leaking going on than the Fed would care to admit, and other key data points as well, especially from non-governmental sources.

So using leverage as an outsider is double deadly in a thin market based largely on policy and artificial flows of hot money.   In this case he had been speaking about shorting stocks with leverage in the stock market.  But he  draws the same lesson for levered long positions in commodities.

I also have to chuckle a little.  Some of the financial networks are pitching stocks heavily as a 'safe investment' now that commodities like gold have been proven to be unreliable.  And they are trotting out the usual suspects to make the pitch.

I will never forget how former Fed Governor Wayne Angell remarked that 'the Fed will drive people out of their savings and money market funds and into stocks.'  This on a financial network in 2004, and it worked; people piled into financial assets and a housing bubble, with Greenspan himself as cheerleader.  And they got slaughtered in the 2008 market crash. 

Nicely done.  And now its come on back in suckers for another handoff.  Take your money out of the banks and commodities and pile into stocks, which have already been run up on some record thin volumes.   Its a safe haven!

This is from Phil Byrne:

"The best thing about yesterday is that the Fed gave us a glimpse of the future. Those people who owned gold with leverage were waiting to have their throats cut – almost begging for it.. The best part is that this market operation has created instability where they once had stability. Nobody will take a levered position against them anymore – not on the stocks short side and not on the levered long gold side.

Here’s what I wrote to clients a couple of weeks ago:

Market Manipulation

The price of gold is a good segue into explaining how the markets are being manipulated.

Anyone who has read about the Japanese martial art known as Judo knows that the basic tenet of the art is to use the attackers leverage against him. Instead of picking up one’s opponent and throwing them down, Judo experts redirect the force created in their opponent’s attacks to knock them down. It’s the same in the markets.

We’re not the only investment firm that understands the problems in our economy and markets. Since 2008, a lot of work has been done to understand the problems in the world and this work has led to bets on the market – oftentimes with leverage such as selling short a stock, buying a put option, or borrowing money and buying gold.

Whenever investors use leverage, they leave themselves vulnerable because leverage turns small losses into big losses – it’s the reason why Lehman Brothers is no longer around. Knowing this, the Fed and its agents wait for these traders to place leveraged bets, and then the Fed’s agents forcefully take the other side of the trade. This is why we include charts of the VIX – they represent leveraged option trades.

A year ago, US corporate earnings growth was slowing meaningfully, Japan was recovering from a nuclear disaster worse than Chernobyl – one that continues to get worse – and at the same time, southern Europe was at the point where nobody would buy their debt and traders were making extreme bets against European markets and the European currency.

All it took was a promise by Europe’s central bank to “do whatever it takes” to prevent bankruptcy and the markets reversed in a huge way. Anyone betting against the European central bank incurred heavy losses. Later in the year, the Fed, then the Bank of Japan did the same thing with similar rallies.

The market has figured out this strategy which is why nobody is willing to bet against the world’s central banks in a meaningful way any longer. It’s the reason why markets are going up despite the tremors we face such as Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Portugal, North Korea, China, Japan, Argentina, and economic stagnation in the US.

Without speculators to crush, the Fed’s ability to keep the markets moving higher is seriously compromised.

Gold was the final bet against the Fed – they’ve won and by winning, they’ve lost!"

Philip M. Byrne, CFA
Chief Investment Officer
GeoVest Advisors Inc.

Silver in Backwardation and the Emperor, Once Again, Nearly Naked

Growing panic in Paperville. The central banks have no silver, and the Comex is being depleted. Interesting that the SLV ETF inventories are experiencing large outflows. The patriotic miners are being called upon to hedge their deep storage inventories, that is, unrefined metal in the ground, to provide more paper.

This manipulation of silver and gold could be a John Law class debacle when it is exposed and collapses, depending on how high the leverage in paper has gone. And of course how deeply down the rabbit hole the people are willing to go in the discovery of real value and the truth.  Given what has recently transpired, I suspect not too far.

The mailbag this morning has the usual dose of overly kind words for which I am always grateful, useful information and notification of alas, typos. But also of hysteria, from those who fear the government is going to come and take their money, or who think that people like me are going to spoil their good thing by warning people about it. Thank God for spam settings.

I don't think most people realize how little their opinion matters anymore. At some point the truth is simply what it is, without regard to what we think about it, or whether we like it. Their good thing is over. It's in the end game now, and we are all in God's hands.

John Law (baptised 21 April 1671 – died 21 March 1729) was a Scottish economist who believed that money was only a means of exchange that did not constitute wealth in itself and that national wealth depended on trade. He was appointed Controller General of Finances of France under King Louis XV.

In 1716 Law established the Banque Générale in France, a private bank, but three-quarters of the capital consisted of government bills and government-accepted notes, effectively making it the first central bank of the nation. He was responsible for the Mississippi Bubble and a chaotic economic collapse in France."

I believe that "modern monetary theory" owes much to John Law, and Money and Trade Considered, with a Proposal for Supplying the Nation with Money (1st ed., 1705; 2nd ed., 1720).

“An abundance of money which would lower the interest rate to two per cent would, in reducing the financing costs of the debts and public offices etc., relieve the King.”

John Law

Here is a brief discussion of John Law and the parallels for today's crisis from Buttonwood at The Economist.

I think there is a bit of disinformation going about. The implication from some corners is that those who sell silver as a hedge borrow it from existing physical supply, drawing down physical stocks. What they do not realize, or admit, is that borrowed silver is not held as allocated and discrete collateral in any system with which I am familiar, but is at best resold again into the bullion markets, if it ever experiences any movement at all beyond some multiple ledger entries.

The dirty little story of the metal markets is leverage and fractional ownership, not always disclosed, which some say is as high as 100 to 1. And this is in the so called physical bullion markets like the LBMA. I could not even imagine how badly mispriced the counter party risk is in the hedges. But when the music stops and the tide goes out, we may see who is naked, and there will most likely be a surfeit of some rather ugly bums.

Reuters
US silver term structure inverts as supply tightens
By Frank Tang
February 11, 2011

NEW YORK, Feb 11 (Reuters) - The tightest physical silver supplies in four years have tipped the U.S. silver futures market into backwardation this week, making near-term prices more expensive than more distant months.

Market watchers said that it has been more than 10 years since silver futures were last in backwardation, an unusual term structure, associated with shortage of physical supply. Warehouse stocks of the white metal have dropped to a four-year low on surging demand, while miners have hedged their future production.

Booming industrial demand for silver and record U.S. coin sales, combined with a surge in demand from mining companies to borrow the metal for their hedge programs have led to a squeeze in the physical silver market.

"The problem is that there is great industrial demand for a specific grade of silver, and there is not enough coming fresh from the mines," said Miguel Perez-Santalla, vice president of Heraeus Precious Metals Management.

"The stocks are being pulled for all the high grade and better materials, and that essentially put a squeeze on the physical market," he said.

Perez-Santalla said that silver futures have not been in backwardation since billionaire Warren Buffett bought 130 million ounces of silver between 1997 and 1998.

Backwardation is a condition where cash or nearby delivery prices are higher than the price for delivery dates further in the future. Usually, forward prices are higher than cash prices to reflect the costs of storage and insurance for stocks deliverable at a later date.

"The extent of the backwardation in silver is unprecedented. It suggests that retail investment and industrial demand internationally is very robust and the small silver bullion market cannot cater to the level of demand for refined coin and bar product," bullion dealer GoldCore said in a note on Friday.

Warehouse data from COMEX showed that silver stocks fell to a four-year low at 102.5 million ounces (3,188 tonnes) on Feb. 5, about 30 percent below a peak at over 141 million ounces (4,395 tonnes) in June 2007.

Strong silver coin sales have more than offset outflow from the world's largest silver-backed exchange traded fund iShares Silver Trust (SLV), which notched its biggest one-month drop in its silver holdings in January...

Most Wall Street Banks Using Lehman Style Accounting Trickery Enabled by the Fed to Hide Their Risk

"Progress is a nice word. But change is its motivator. And change has its enemies.” Robert F. Kennedy

This analysis from the Wall Street Journal indicates that most of the big US Banks are engaging in the same kind of repo accounting at the end of the quarter that Lehman Brothers was doing to hide their financial instability until deteriorating credit conditions and liquidity problems made them precipitously collapse, as all ponzi schemes and financial frauds do when the truth becomes known.

The basic exercise is to hold big leverage and dodgy debt, but swap it off your books with the Fed at the end of each quarter for a short period of time when you have to report your holdings.

This could easily be corrected by requiring banks to report four week averages of their holdings for example, rather than a snapshot when they can hide their true risk profiles so easily, compliments of that protector of consumers and investors, the Fed.

This is nothing new to us. Many of us have noted this sort of accounting trickery and market manipulation at key events especially at end of quarter.

It is facilitated by the Federal Reserve, and FASB, and the agencies.

"Their Fraud doth rarely falter, and is subsidized, instead,
for none dare call it bank fraud, if it's sanctioned by the Fed."
(apologies to Ovid)

The US is Lehman Brothers on a scale writ large. And when it is exposed by some series of events, the implosion could be more sudden than any can imagine. But in the meantime the US is still the 'superpower' of the world's financial system, through its currency, its banks, and its ratings agencies.

WSJ
Big Banks Mask Risk Levels
By KATE KELLY, TOM MCGINTY and DAN FITZPATRICK
April 9, 2010

Quarter-End Loan Figures Sit 42% Below Peak, Then Rise as New Period Progresses; SEC Review

Major banks have masked their risk levels in the past five quarters by temporarily lowering their debt just before reporting it to the public, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

A group of 18 banks—which includes Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc.—understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42% at the end of each of the past five quarterly periods, the data show. The banks, which publicly release debt data each quarter, then boosted the debt levels in the middle of successive quarters.

Excessive borrowing by banks was one of the major causes of the financial crisis, leading to catastrophic bank runs in 2008 at firms including Bear Stearns Cos. and Lehman Brothers. Since then, banks have become more sensitive about showing high levels of debt and risk, worried that their stocks and credit ratings could be punished.

That practice, while legal, can give investors a skewed impression of the level of risk that financial firms are taking the vast majority of the time.

You want your leverage to look better at quarter-end than it actually was during the quarter, to suggest that you're taking less risk," says William Tanona, a former Goldman analyst who now heads U.S. financials research at Collins Stewart, a U.K. investment bank.

Though some banks privately confirm that they temporarily reduce their borrowings at quarter's end, representatives at Goldman, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan and Citigroup declined to comment specifically on the New York Fed data. Some noted that their firm's financial filings include language saying borrowing levels can fluctuate during the quarter.

"The efforts to manage the size of our balance sheet are appropriate and our policies are consistent with all applicable accounting and legal requirements," a Bank of America spokesman said.

The data highlight the banks' levels of short-term financing in the repurchase, or "repo," market. Financial firms use cash from the loans to buy securities, then use the purchased securities as collateral for other loans, and buy more securities. The loans boost the firms' trading power, or "leverage," allowing them to make big trades without putting up big money. This amplifies gains—and losses, which were disastrous in 2008.

According to the data, the banks' outstanding net repo borrowings at the end of each of the past five quarters were on average 42% below their peak in net borrowings in the same quarters. Though the repo market represents just a slice of banks' overall activities, it provides a window into the risks that financial institutions take to trade...

Read the rest here.

Here is an interactive visualization of the accounting deception.

Beta Monster: The Most Dangerous Banks In the World

The most leveraged bank by far is the-investment-bank-which-must-not-be-named. It is followed by J.P. Morgan on a percentage basis, but JPM is far larger nominally than these charts indicate because of its much larger capital base. Its in the nature of the difference between a cardshark (GS) and a pawnshop (JPM). Or perhaps just the capital requirements of the short versus the long con.

Luckily for the US financial system the big banks are incapable of making errors in risk management, and always seem to get by with a little helpful information from their friends, and a lot of money from the public.

We would ask Timmy for an explanation on how this could happen so soon after a crisis in which the Treasury had to ask Congress to stop financial armageddon overnight because of the perils of excessive leverage on dodgy capital, but he is taking dictation from Lloyd on line 1, and Jamie is on hold on line 2.