The Banking Crisis: Obama's Iraq Part 1

Its a step in the right direction, but its hardly reform.

Everything about the Obama Administration to date has been 'limp,' toothless, almost apologetic.

Obama is on the road to failure, getting an "A" for rhetoric but "F's" for vision, commitment, team-building, and action.


Bloomberg
Volcker Urges Dividing Investment, Commercial Banks
By Matthew Benjamin and Christine Harper

March 6 (Bloomberg) -- Commercial banks should be separated from investment banks in order to avoid another crisis like the U.S. is experiencing, according to former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker.

“Maybe we ought to have a kind of two-tier financial system,” Volcker, who heads President Barack Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said today at a conference at New York University’s Stern School of Business. (Uh, didn't we have one up until a few months ago when Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley put on the Fed feedbag? - Jesse)

Commercial banks would provide customers with depository services and access to credit and would be highly regulated, while securities firms would have the freedom to take on more risk and practice trading, “relatively free of regulation,” Volcker said. (OMG - Jesse)

Volcker’s remarks indicated his preference for reinstating some of the divisions between commercial and investment banks that were removed by Congress’s repeal in 1999 of the Great Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act.

Volcker’s proposals, included in a January report he wrote with the Group of 30, would allow commercial banks to continue to do underwriting and provide merger advice, activities traditionally associated with investment banking, he said.

Still, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley, which converted to banks in September, would have to exit some businesses if they were to remain as commercial banks, he said.

‘Separation’

“What used to be the traditional investment banks, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs so forth, which used to do some underwriting and mergers and acquisitions, are dominated by other activities we would exclude -- very heavy proprietary trading, hedge funds,” he said. “So there’s some separation to be made.”

Jeanmarie McFadden, a spokeswoman for Morgan Stanley, declined to comment. A Goldman spokesman couldn’t be immediately reached.

Volcker also said international regulations on financial firms are probably an inevitable consequence of the industry’s current problems.

“In this world, I don’t see how we can avoid international consistency” on securities regulations going forward, he said. “The U.S. is no longer in a position to dictate that the world does it according to the way we’ve done it.”

Volcker’s comments come as President Barack Obama seeks legislative proposals within weeks for a regulatory overhaul of finance, especially companies deemed vital to the stability of the financial system.

Glass-Steagall

The new regulatory framework may stop short of reinstating Glass-Steagall, analysts say, though banks may separate their business lines in order to avoid strong regulatory scrutiny.

Volcker, who ran the Fed from 1979 to 1987, said the financial industry’s problems stem from larger issues. “I don’t think this is just a technical problem, it’s a societal problem,” he said. He cited bankers on Wall Street receiving multimillion-dollar bonuses for engineering failed mergers.

“There’s something wrong with the system,” Volcker said. “What are the incentives, what’s going on here?”

GDP Number Far Worse Than Expected by Most Economists (But Not Here)

The Fourth Quarter GDP number came in at a negative 6.2% versus the original negative 3.8 percent announcement earlier this year.

That is not a big adjustment. It is a HUGE adjustment. That first number was so obviously cooked by a high side inventories estimate and a lowball chain deflator that it was a knee-slapping howler to anyone who is following this economy closely.

This decline did not happen overnight. It is merely being reported that way.

There should be little doubt in most people's minds that Bernanke, Greenspan, Paulson, and many in the Bush Administration were deceiving us about the state of the economy, for years, almost routinely as a matter of course.

That is important to understand. This was no act of God, no hurricane or meteor strike. And a lot of folks on Wall Street and in Washington playing dumb now knew what was coming. You can decide their motives for yourself, but fear and greed should be high on the top of your list.

The economy has been rotten for a long time, since at least 2001 if not before, and as it worsened more and more money was taken off the table by the Bush Administration and their corporate cronies through no bid contracts and welfare for the wealthy. Coats of paint were slapped over the growing imbalances, market manipulation, malinvestment, fraud and corruption.

Remember that. Don't let it go. Because as sure as the sun will rise, these jokers will be back in business given half the chance. They are shameless, greedy beyond all reason, and persistent. The fiscal responsibility being preached now by the Republican minority is repulsive hypocrisy.

That is why it is so disappointing to see what looks like business as usual from the Obama Administration. Larry Summers appears to be a tragic choice as chief economic advisor. And Tim Geithner, while a capable fellow, is not a thinker, but a doer, an implementer, and a disciple of the fellows that caused this mess.

What to do? Let them know now we expect reform. Don't fall for the same old rhetoric from the 'conservative' think thanks and paid pundits who misled you for the past eight years. They are not conservatives. They are jackals who play on your emotions. And let's not accept a new batch of paid pundits and clever deceivers either. But don't give up and pull over a blanket of cynicism.

Typically Americans will give a new president like Obama 100 days to get his bearings and deal with a tidal wave of problems that he did not create. We do not expect him to fix them, but we want to see a decent start in the right direction. We gave Bush far too much allowance, primarily because of 911 which his handlers played for all it was worth.

So far, with some noted exceptions in non-financials, we the people have not seen what we voted for last November.

President Obama recently said that Wall Street reform is coming, but it will take time.

Mr. President, you may not have the leisure to show us that you know what needs to be done. You are riding a high tide of bipartisan support in the people who voted for you. Once you lose them it will be very difficult to get them back.

We must demand action from the Congress and the Administration who we recently put in place through the elections to clean this mess up and then change the system that delivered it.

Contact the White House

Contact Your Senator

We do not want fewer, bigger banks exacting a fee on every commericial transaction in this country.

1. Bring back Glass-Steagall.

2. Clean up the derivatives market, starting with J.P. Morgan and their 90 Trillion dollar positions.

3. Enforce the various anti-trust laws, enacting new ones where necessary, and break up the media and banking conglomerates.

4. Enact aggregate position limits in all commodity markets and transparency with immediate disclosure of all position over 5% in any market.

5. Effective restrictions and enforcement of naked short selling, price manipulation, reinstatement of the 'uptick rule,' the prohibition of regulated banks from engaging in any speculative markets either for themselves or as agents, and usury laws and regulation of all interstate financial transactions at the national level.

And for the sake of the country, establish a vision, a model, of what the system should look like in accord with the Constitution. And then strike out for it, as painful as that may be, and stop this management by crisis.


Bloomberg
U.S. Economy Shrank 6.2% Last Quarter, Most Since ’82
By Timothy R. Homan

Feb. 27 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy shrank in the fourth quarter at a faster pace than previously estimated as consumer spending plunged, companies cut inventories and exports sank.

Gross domestic product contracted at a 6.2 percent annual pace from October through December, more than economists anticipated and the most since 1982, according to revised figures from the Commerce Department today in Washington. Consumer spending, which comprises about 70 percent of the economy, declined at the fastest pace in almost three decades.

The recession is forecast to persist at least through the first half of this year as job losses mount and purchases plummet. The Obama administration’s attempts to break the grip of the worst financial crisis in 70 years are unlikely to bring immediate relief as companies from General Motors Corp. to JPMorgan Chase & Co. cut payrolls.

“There has been no evidence that the pace of decline is slowing at all, there are other shoes waiting to drop,” Bill Cheney, chief economist at John Hancock Financial Services Inc. in Boston, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “There is a chance that the stimulus package will kick in” in the middle of this year, he said.

Europe to Push Broader Regulatory Agenda at G20

This is interesting because it tees up the European agenda ahead of the G20 meeting, and helps to highlight some points of contention between Europe and the Anglo-American financiers.

The IMF subject is a reflection of Europe's decentralized status. The ECB does not possess the broad powers of the Federal Reserve Bank, and there is a difference of opinion in Europe about its future role, and the centralization of power overall.

This is highly reminiscent of the US debate between the Federalists and the Jeffersonians.

MarketWatch
Europe supports broad financial regulation
By MarketWatch
12:42 p.m. EST Feb. 22, 2009

SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- The European leaders of the Group of 20 called Sunday for more transparency and regulation of all financial markets, products and investors, including hedge funds, according to published reports.

Heads of state and finance ministers from France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Luxembourg met in Berlin to come up with a European position ahead of the G20 summit in London scheduled for April 2...

Leaders also reportedly proposed increasing to $500 billion the International Monetary Fund's financial resources for crisis management, in light of problems recapitalizing banks in Central and Eastern Europe. The IMF now has $250 billion in resources and already used $50 billion.

The call for increased IMF funding follows remarks from French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde, who said Thursday that euro-zone countries should come to the aid of any troubled member-state and avoid IMF involvement, if a bailout becomes necessary....

Volcker's Vision of a Return to Narrow Banking

A return to 'narrow banking' is in the cards. This is the kind of bank which takes depositors funds and originates and services loans to its own customers.

These banks will be separate from investment banks and hedge funds, which will perform the speculation and packaging, and what can loosely be called financial engineering.

But look for much more uniform regulation and transparency to appear in these non-banking operations, and less acceptance for 'dark pools' and opaque market manipulation.

And for those who say we will lose this type of person to less regulated overseas venues, there will be a new attitude to cross border banking and restrictions on the activity of institutions that do not adhere to a uniform set of standards.

It will be an even greater step in the right direction if we can realize that this same sort of regime should prevail in overseas trade as well. There will be little taste for the toleration of sweatshops, child labor, and the virtual slavery that multinational business craves, and justifies with the most venal and shallow of arguments.

AP
Volcker sees crisis leading to global regulation
By Eileen Aj Connelly, AP Business Writer
Friday February 20, 6:29 pm ET

Volcker sees greater international cooperation on regulations growing from economic crisis

NEW YORK (AP) -- "Even the experts don't quite know what's going on."

Speaking to a number of those experts Friday, Paul Volcker, a top economic adviser to President Barack Obama, cited not only the lack of understanding of the global financial meltdown but the "shocking" speed with which it had spread across the world.

"One year ago, we would have said things were tough in the United States, but the rest of the world was holding up," Volcker told a conference featuring Nobel laureates, economists and investors at Columbia University in New York. "The rest of the world has not held up."

In fact, the 81-year-old former chairman of the Federal Reserve said, "I don't remember any time, maybe even the Great Depression, when things went down quite so fast."

He noted that industrial production is falling in countries across the globe faster than in the U.S., one result of the decline caused by the breakdown of unbridled financial markets that operated on a global scale.

"It's broken down in the face of almost all expectation and prediction," he noted.

Volcker didn't offer specifics on how long he thinks the recession will last or what will help start a recovery. But he predicted there will be some lasting lessons from the experience.

"I don't believe it will be forgotten ... and we will revert to the kind of financial system we had before the crisis," he said.

While he assured his audience of his confidence that capitalism will survive, Volcker said stronger regulations are needed to protect the world economy from such future shocks.

And he said he is concerned about the amount of power central banks, treasuries and regulatory agencies have acquired while trying to contain the meltdown.

"It is evident in the United States, and not just in the United States, the central bank is taking on a role that is way beyond what a central bank should be taking," he said.

Volcker stressed the importance of international cooperation in creating a new regulatory framework, particularly for major banks that operate across national boundaries -- the reverse of what's happened in recent years.

"The more international agreement we have on where we want to get to, the better off we'll be," Volcker said.

And while major banks should be more tightly controlled and less able to make the sort of risky bets that led to their current debacle, Volcker said there should also be more oversight of some kind for hedge funds, equity funds and the remaining investment banks.

He scoffed at the notion that those entities must be free to innovate -- stating that financial "innovations" like asset backed securities and credit default swaps have brought few benefits. The most important "innovation" in banking for most people in the last 20 or 30 years, he maintained, is the automatic teller machine.

Why Is There No Reform?

First the reform of the financial system, and then the stimulus can find a footing. The existing level of debt obligations are too large and unproductive of cash flows to service.

The debt must be written down and the currency devalued to increase the wages of debt payers relative to them. This is an unacceptable alternative at the moment because politically the debt holders and the big money center banks are running the system. The parallels to Japan are remarkable, where the inability to realize their losses caused an entire country to lose its way for a decade.

Until we break up the big money center banks into their parts, and write off their debt obligations, we are pouring money into a Wall Street sinkhole of corruption. This will involve the reinstatement of Glass-Steagalls.

"The United States should emerge from the economic crisis with a two-part financial system that places tighter restrictions on banks, says former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker.

To prevent another banking crisis from undermining the economy, the U.S. financial system must turn back the clock to a time when commercial banks were the core of the credit system, said Mr. Volcker...

The system that Mr. Volcker envisions "looks more like the Canadian system than it does like the American system," he told a Toronto audience last night..."

And there will be no recovery, only increasing pain, until we break the pattern.

“The Government should allow every distressed bank to go bankrupt and set up a fresh banking system under temporary state control rather than cripple the country by propping up a corrupt edifice…

…amounts to swapping taxpayers’ ‘cash for trash,’ Stiglitz said yesterday in a panel discussion at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. ‘You shouldn't chase good money after bad. We’re talking about a national debt that’s very hard to manage.'" Joseph Stiglitz

What is the reason then that we are following a path that will fail? Are those who know what is happening afraid to admit it, to tell the truth? Is it simple looting until the harsh medicine is taken? Is it the cowardice of the Democrats? Is it the obstructionism of old line thinkers like Larry Summers and Tim Geithner?

It is most probable that there are still just too many of those who say, "Why can't things just go on as they have done before?" The awareness that the game has changed will penetrate the public consciousness slowly.

It's over. We cannot keep trying to rebuild the unsustainable, because eventually the great forces of probability will crush us and destroy us, all that we have.

But until the people are ready for change, to accept that reforms are necessary, the Administration must tread lightly. As de Tocqueville said, "The most dangerous moment for bad government is when it begins to reform."

Only time will tell. Until then you know what to do.

P.S. An early responder said, "I presume that you mean buying gold" about 'you know what to do.' And then they laid out the reasons and ways in which the government would confiscate it.

Sorry to have been cryptic, and its my fault. Let me give you the more straightforward answer that I gave to them.

"Actually it's "need little, want less, and love more" which is at the bottom of he blog.

But if it does become the kind of government that blatantly confiscates wealth through whatever means, where will you hide? First they came for gold...

Ok don't buy gold. What you will buy? Whatever wealth you do have will be taken eventually. There are no bystanders if a government turns to lawlessness.

Better to get your head screwed on straight now and realize it is not about gold, it is not about the right investments, it is about freedom."

Balance Sheet Recessions and Japan Redux

Here are a few excerpts from an essay by Axel Leijonhufvud at VoxEU which was brought to my attention by xyphius from Japan.

The essay in particular was quite good, but the introductory comments in the email from xyphius were also quite to the point that we've been making here for some time.

"I've been wondering about the consequences of what Japan did in the lost decade and whether there are any lessons to be learnt from it. I remember asking a (Japanese) friend in the early part of this decade (before Chinese Viagra revived the moribund economy) why after so many years with so little to show from policy there was little pressure for change - his reply: "We aren't hurting enough to want to change."

I take my cue from that answer: Deficit spending was a palliative that bought off demands for political reform, and propping up the banks and by extension their insolvent clients prevented a liquidation in which a meaningful transfer of assets could have occurred. In short, the political, bureaucratic and business oligopoly maintained the status quo ante.

What might become of the cocoon years? A horrible festering mess?!"

It could be something beautiful if Japan embraces reform and becomes a more vibrant, open democracy and breaks up the keiretsu economy and the tyranny by bureaucracy. It is as likely if not moreso that Japan would choose a return to national fascism. But having expended the flower of its youth in the last great War, and with zero population growth, Japan would likely need a more youthful ally. War is an old man's game, but younger men provide the fuel.

The object lesson here for us of course is that the US is going down the same path, with a military-financial complex that resists change, and may subject the country to enough of a economic scourging to set the stage for rescue by a 'great man' as national saviour. Fascism was a rather popular choice the last time the world went through a deflationary depression.

To make it pointedly clear, the US must reform its financial system which requires breaking up the big Wall Street money center banks. Once broken up they may more easily be reintegrated into an organic economy, and stimulus may take root in a real economy.

The point is not to save the banks. The point is to save the depositors, the pension funds, and the good regional banks that are banks, and not vehicles of financial engineering.

The dollar must relinquish its role as the reserve currency of the world, because our hobbits, dwarves, and men have shown themselves incapable of wielding that power gracefully. It is too great a temptation and its misuse will result in our own destruction. But we must also reform the international trade system and prevent the blatant market manipulation of the Asian tigers, China and Japan.

There are those who say, "Why can't things just go on as they have done?" The awareness that things have changed will penetrate the public consciousness slowly. It's over. It's done. Things must go forward, and we can never go back. You cannot keep trying to rebuild the unsustainable, because eventually the great forces of probability will crush you.

Our fate should we fail to reform our system is to change into something more horrible than we can possibly imagine.

And here are the excerpts from the VoxEU essay by Axel Leijonhufvud.

Richard Koo (2003) coined the term “balance sheet recession” to characterise the endless travail of Japan following the collapse of its real estate and stock market bubbles in 1990. The Japanese government did not act to repair the balance sheets of the private sector following the crash. Instead, it chose a policy of keeping bank rate near zero so as to reduce deposit rates and let the banks earn their way back into solvency. At the same time it supported the real sector by repeated large doses of Keynesian deficit spending. It took a decade and a half for these policies to bring the Japanese economy back to reasonable health.

The Swedish policy following the 1992 crisis has been often referred to in recent months. Sweden acted quickly and decisively to close insolvent banks, and to quarantine their bad assets into a special fund. Eventually, all the assets, good and bad, ended up in the private banking sector again. The stockholders in the failed banks lost all their equity while the loss to taxpayers of the bad assets was minimal in the end. The operation was necessary to the recovery but what actually got the economy out of a very sharp and deep recession was the 25-30% devaluation of the krona which produced a long period of strong export-led growth. Needless to say, the US is in no position to emulate this aspect of the Swedish success story.

Why not?

The lesson to be drawn from these two cases is that deficit spending will be absorbed into the financial sinkholes in private sector balance sheets and will not become effective until those holes have been filled. During the years that national income fails to respond, tax receipts will be lower so that the national debt is likely to end up larger than if the banking sector’s losses had been “nationalised” at the outset.

No Ordinary Recession by Axel Leijonhufvud

How to Resolve the Mortgage Crisis

Chris Whalen, The Institutional Risk Analyst, is making more sense on a rational way of resolving the subprime mortgage crisis than Tim Geithner, Ben Bernanke, and Larry Summers rolled together.

This is a bit of a read. We're looking for a video of his interviews on Bloomberg the past few days, and today in particular. But his common sense approach makes more sense than anything we have heard from the Washington Whiz Kids.

On top of his recommendation, Obama needs to target the stimulus more precisely and concentrate on driving employment and the median wage in the short term with both money and policy changes.

In fact, it is from the policy changes that the greatest gains would be achieved. Obama and crew need to stop putting out fires ad hoc in the manner of Bush and start working on a serious and well thought plan that the market can understand, whether they may like it or not.

Much of the stimulus package looks like payoffs to constituents and special interests, a perennial problem in the Federal government. The Democrats have to stop playing 'Let's Make a Deal' and strike a vision, share it, and then go for it. That is what FDR did in his first hundred days. His crew made errors in implementation, but the vision was coherent.

Obama needs to find his footing and start thinking out of the box. And it is not likely he will obtain that from Geithner or Summers, and does not have time to wait for the Volcker Committee to weigh in with a compromised solution.

Its a tough spot for any manager. Crisis management shows the weakness of his managerial experience. Bush was dying on the vine on his own watch. It tests a person like nothing else.

Its also an opportunity for growth, and Obama has about three months of goodwill capital to spend, and some bright people on deck. Time to stop making deals, and listening to the vested interests of everyone, and get to work striking a vision that his team can implement towards. A good start would be to strike the note of reform and level with the people, and do something about it other than symbolic gestures and fine rhetoric. Its time to tell the truth.

Can We Fix the Banks, Help Homeowners, and Rebuild the Mortgage Markets? Can Do.

"Here's the basic approach:

* The US Treasury would tender for all of the private label CDO/MBS extending between a range of dates, say 2004 forward to year-end 2007, representing trillions of dollars in assets held by investors and banks globally. The pricing on this paper will reflect current market prices, but say the average price was 50% of face value. Only issues that actually have an enforceable legal claim to collateral will be eligible. Derivative structures without collateral will not be eligible.

* Treasury then transfers all of the purchased toxic paper to the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund, which acting as receiver under 12 USC restructures the trusts that are the legal issuers of the bonds and recovers legal ownership of the underlying collateral. The FDIC arguably has the power to call in all bonds and related investment contracts, and extinguish the claims of those parties which do not respond to the Treasury tender. The legal finality of an FDIC-managed receivership under 12 USC is what is required to end the toxic asset issue once and for all. The bankruptcy courts could be used in a similar fashion, but the unique legal authority of the FDIC suggests to us that this agency should run the process as part of its larger asset sale operations.

* This now "clean" whole loan collateral will then be re-sold to solvent banks in the localities where the property is located, using zip codes and other means to identify eligible buyers, priced at say 90 cents on the dollar, with a full recourse guarantee from the FDIC and financing from the Federal Reserve Bank in the relevant district. The banks will initially be guaranteed a minimum net interest margin and servicing income, and immediately begin to service the loan and manage the credit locally. Indeed, the participating bank must agree to retain and service the loan so long as government financing is used. The bank has the option to repay the financing from Treasury and take full, non-recourse possession of the loan.

We don't pretend that this simple outline is sufficient treatment of this proposal, but we have heard several permutations of this approach from veteran bankers in the loan origination channel all over the US. We see several advantages to this "community bank" approach to the crisis, which might be combined with modest additional capital infusions to solvent community and regional banks like WABC, if they even need it.

* First, it puts the trillions of dollars in now illiquid mortgage loan collateral trapped inside thousands of securitization deals back into strong local hands, who are responsible and incentivized to both manage and service the loan.

* Second, it re-liquefies the balance sheets of the US banking industry and it will vastly improve the prospects for home owners and housing markets around the country. If we are going to further lever the balance sheets of the Treasury and Fed, let's do it for a real reason and with a clear purpose.

* Third, the approach outlined above provides the Obama Administration and the US Treasury with maximum bang for the buck in terms of both addressing the solvency problems facing the banks and also helping the economy and the housing industry.

One downside: This new market paradigm suggests that loan servicing as a standalone business may be at risk. Once community banks begin to accumulate significant local servicing portfolios, they may rediscover the benefits of keeping the credits that they originate. Sorry Wilbur!

And what about valuation? Well, as our friend Kyle Bass of Hayman Capital likes to remind us, all of these assets are valued and traded every day. It's just a matter of organizing the purchase process in a transparent and competent fashion. Starting with our friends at shops like Hayman, Black Rock and RW Pressprich, we know people who know how to trade illiquid assets."

When Will the Wall Street Money Center Banks Be Nationalized?

"Most of the big banks need to be put into some form of bankruptcy and recapitalized, and I think everybody understands that." Ken Rogoff

The major US money center banks will be nationalized. The only questions are when and how.

When is difficult. Rumours abound. A common rumour is for a bank holiday sometime around the President's day holiday in the US on February 16, or later in February.

This may be too early, but no matter. It is coming.

Its the how that is more interesting in terms of meaningful speculation and the impact on any intended recovery.

How will we nationalize the banks? How far will nationalization have to go?

With regard to nationalization the bank toadies and spin doctors say things like "Would you want the government running the banks?" Well, we think this is the usual deceptive rhetoric we get these days instead of serious discussion and hard news.

In a nationalization it is highly unlikely that the government will want to 'run the banks,' although it is hard to see how they could do a job that would be much worse than the overpaid princes of Wall Street who now stand exposed as having ruined the national economy through incredible dereliction of any standard of sound and responsible management.

Rather, there is a range the process which will be called nationalization.

If we hold the current course at some point the government will place enough capital and hold enough preferred stock in the banks to effectively own them, but passively. The problem with that is the mismanagement and losses will continue to deepen, and the government (public) will own the acid core of thirty years of white collar crime, burning a hole in the fabric of the national economy and monetary system.

It will be a financial Vietnam, with Larry Summers playing Robert McNamara and Obama as LBJ. It will be a cascade of corruption and deception and will tear the country apart.

At the other end of the nationalization spectrum, he government will 'take over' the bad banks as they did in the S&L crisis, and restructure them.

There are between five to ten banks in the country that are hopelessly insolvent through mismanagement bordering on fraud. At the moment they are sucking up capital at a ferocious rate through bailouts, and crowding out constructive uses of capital.

They cannot precipitously fail, but they can and should be taken into receivership by the FDIC, their books opened, their assets sold, debts written off, and the remains either buried peacefully or allowed to emerge as new banks with different management if there is enough left to make it respectable.

Who will lend? The regional banks. They are the bulwark of the banking system. It is in the money center banks where the contagion continually spawns.

To attempt to maintain the status quo is no longer possible, no matter how much money and influence and political power that the ten Wall Street banks may wield in Washington.

The shareholders will be effectively zeroed out as they should, the bondholders handed a steep haircut on the order of 40%, the creditors paid 70 cents on the dollar, if that.

Credit default swaps and other bets will be dealt with harshly. If a bank has a heavy interaction with a money center bank in Credit Default Swaps or other 'weapons of mass destruction' to the point where it places it insolvent guess what, it can join the restructuring club.

The depositors will be, MUST be, kept whole, to almost 100% on all private non-corporate deposits. Pensions must be kept whole above and beyond the limits of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.

If the Congress, and this Administration, continued to bend the fate of this country to the bankers of Wall Street there will come a time when the people will simply say 'enough.' Of this we no longer have any doubt. And the pain from that will be much greater than the short term pain we will receive in restructuring the system now.

And it will be painful. But necessary. We do not have a cold. We do not have the flu or the sniffles, a temporary setback. We have a serious gangrenous infection that must be dealt with before it takes down the body politic.

We can choose to linger, to waste away in our corruption as Japan has done. But we do not think that the US public will accept the chains of servitude gracefully. They are too heavily equipped with options, thanks to the foresight of the founding fathers.

If this seems to harsh, too black and white, too unthinkable, here is a recent interview from Ken Rogoff with BBC Hardtalk to help punctuate the seriousness of the situation.

The simple truth is we no longer have any choice, any options. We elected the Obama Administration to reform Washington and the economic and political system in this country.

Ok guys. Reform.

The deeper we go down this rabbit hole the more difficult it will be to return to the light of day.

You may wish to take the time to listen to Ken Rogoff in this BBC interview on Hardtalk. Mr. Rogoff is a noted economist who is completing an intense study of financial crises.

We obviously do not agree with everything Ken Rogoff says. That would be improbable.

He starts from the assumption that we have free trade in the world today and should maintain it, whereas we believe that free trade went out the window with the devaluation and pegging of the Chinese renminbi in the 1990's, if not before that with aggressive Asian mercantilism supported by US multinationals and Wal-Mart.

But other than that, it sounds like the standard fare served at Le Café Américain for the past two years at least, and it is a happy and humbling experience to see someone express similar ideas with such gravitas.

It is clearly stated, it is well thought, and it is absolutely essential. It is what a substantive news program looks and sounds like. We rarely get anything like it except on the Web and on Public Television.

Rogoff on BBC HardTalk

Are We Ready to Change the System?

"The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few, booted and spurred, ready to ride them..."
Thomas Jefferson

It is time to begin serious, and significant, systemic reforms in the financial system.

Maintaining the status quo will be fruitless because the system is broken. Trying to keep it from becoming 'more broken' is a nice short term fix, but we are beyond that now. This has been a long time in the works.

There has been a recent increase in noise from the Congress about changing a system which promotes excessive pay, and encourages the virtual looting of companies, by overpaid management and a corrupt financial system.

Rather than strike at the branches, and call a few individuals up before Congress for their ten minutes of tut-tutting, how about some serious change that cuts to the roots of the crisis?

One potential solution would be to institute a marginal income tax rate of, let's say, 80% at the 30 million dollar level of aggregate income in the AMT, with a significant raising of the minimum levels of income that trigger the AMT to about 4 million in aggregate income. It can graduate from 50% to 80% from the minimum to the maximum. The AMT was always intended to be a safeguard against loopholes for the highest income brackets. We can permit five year income averaging to allow the incredibly lucky to keep a bigger share. But rewarding luck encourages gambling and gaming the system, which is an open door to white collar crime and fraud.

And we have to ask, just how much is enough. Do you really think that having a 30 million dollar per year income is 'not enough?' Are we insane? Yes, allowing people to 'keep what they kill' is ingrained in our psyche by the last 100 years of a steady stream of propaganda, but its time to start thinking about social interaction and the protection of the innocent as well as the glorification of greed.

Yes, this will alarm the "Joe the Plumbers" out there who wish to fantasize about the looting of the system, or have pretensions of being the next American Idol, with a Pavlovian impulse to consider realistic expectations and a middle class life as socialism.

The top 1% of the wealthy Americans do not need additional incentive to take. They are, for the most part excepting the lucky and the idle heirs, psychologically driven to acquire beyond all rational need. What they need is restraint. And they will absolutely hate it.

But since most wannabe billionaires are delusional why let them drag us down under the bus with them? Let's stop legislating for the .1% probability, leaving the garden gate open for the pigs to come in.

We cannot continue to build and maintain this country if the most rewarding pursuits are gambling, gaming the system, fraud, and white collar crime. That game is over. We're done.

Reform the accounting rules for acquisitions and goodwill, inventory writedown with subsequent earnings effects. "Earnings management" is a tool of the price manipulation for stock option bonuses that is a source of market distortion.

Bring back Glass-Steagall. Let Goldman and Morgan get into the conventional banking business after passing through receivership. The point is to be solvent first BEFORE you get government support. And if you are not solvent we will help you become so through liquidation.

Back up the individuals, the savers and pensions, to the hilt, 100%, and put the financial institutions through the wringer, if not a meat-grinder. Stop beating this 'trickle down' approach in curing our problems by throwing money at the uber-wealthy and corporations. It does not work. It will not work. It is destroying our country.

Oh no, we cannot let honest people be limited in acquiring enormous wealth. Well, there probably aren't many completely honest people pulling down over 30 million per year in income. The criminal prosecution system is also horribly compromised, and we can fix it AFTER we stop the looting, and then the rules can be relaxed.

Direct the FBI and Justice Department to conduct a serious investigation of naked short selling and price manipulation. That aspect of the market is an open sore.

Institute aggregate position limits in commodities, and make them high enough so that they do not bother any legitimate speculators.

Refuse to admit any nation into the favored nation status unless their currency is open for trading on the world markets, free of pegs.

Stop the system of legalized bribery of the Congress and the Executive by lobbyists. That requires campaign funding reform, then let's do it now.

Stop selling this country short for the sake of 'competitiveness' and a perverted image of the "American Dream." If the Founding Fathers came back they would not be able to stop throwing up at what we now call 'freedom' and what we have done with their legacy for which they pledged their lives and sacred honor.

Europe needs to tell the Brits and the Yanks to piss off, fix the euro, take an enormous dose of humility, reform their financial system, and don't play the fool again so easily. Asia needs to take care of its own and grow a middle class, and stop treating its people as coolies. Australia needs to go walkabout with Europe. The Mideast is its own worst enemy. Africa is the shame of our world.

Too radical? Then you're not ready yet for the changes that are required to end this cycle of boom, loot and bust.

It is time to begin serious, and significant, systemic reforms in the financial system. It is preferable to the historically likely alternatives.

A Fresh Breeze of Reform Blows Through Foggy Bottom

"The very word 'secrecy' is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret oaths, and to secret proceedings... A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people."
John F. Kennedy

This is a change for the better, a step in the right direction.

"The way to make government responsible is to hold it accountable. And the way
to make government accountable is to make it transparent so that the American
people can know exactly what decisions are being made, how they're being made,
and whether their interests are being well served.

The directives I am
giving my administration today on how to interpret the Freedom of Information
Act will do just that. For a long time now, there's been too much secrecy in
this city. The old rules said that if there was a defensible argument for not
disclosing something to the American people then, it should not be disclosed.

That era is now over. Starting today, every agency and department should
know that this administration stands on the side not of those who seek to
withhold information but those who seek to make it known."

President
Barack H. Obama

US Treasury Department Official Allegedly Aided and Abetted Banking Fraud (Again)

Darrell Dochow earns $230,000 per year at Treasury in banking regulation. He reportedly gave Indymac some suggestions on cooking their books, and then allowed the exception to the rules to accomplish it. It appears to have been a blatant and obvious accounting fraud.

Mr. Dochow is also the official who presided over the Lincoln Savings and Loan scandal. Having looked into Charles Keating's eyes and seeing him a good man, he reportedly overrode the protests and findings of fraud from the banking experts. After his S&L debacle he was apparently demoted, but brought back into a position of importance under the Bush Administration. All the details on this have not yet been made public.

Mr. Dochow is unlikely to do any prison time, but may lose his job. That is because this is 'criminal with a small c' according to this news report.

When this sort of behaviour becomes criminal with a 'capital C' and when people like Dochow find themselves on the business end of FBI probes and Justice Department indictments at least as serious as the one mounted against Eliot Spitzer and his hooker, we might make some approach to honesty and reform in this country.

Ok, Obama Administration, the buck is on your desk now. Time to take meaningful action to back up the rhetoric.


ABC News, New York
Government regulators aided IndyMac coverup, maybe others
By Brian Ross, Justin Rood, and Joseph Rhee
Friday, January 16, 2009

A brewing fraud scandal at the Treasury Department may be worse than officials originally thought.

Investigators probing how Treasury regulators allowed a bank to falsify financial records hiding its ill health have found at least three other instances of similar apparent fraud, sources tell ABC News.

In at least one instance, investigators say, banking regulators actually approached the bank with the suggestion of falsifying deposit dates to satisfy banking rules -- even if it disguised the bank's health to the public.

Treasury Department Inspector General Eric Thorson announced in November his office would probe how a Savings and Loan overseer allowed the IndyMac bank to essentially cook its books, making it appear in government filings that the bank had more deposits than it really did. But Thorson's aides now say IndyMac wasn't the only institution to get such cozy assistance from the official who should have been the cop on the beat.

The federal government took over IndyMac in July, after the bank's stock price plummeted to just pennies a share when it was revealed the bank had financial troubles due to defaulted mortgages and subprime loans, costing taxpayers over $9 billion.

Darrel Dochow, the West Coast regional director at the Office of Thrift Supervision who allowed IndyMac to backdate its deposits, has been removed from his position but he remains on the government payroll while the Inspector General's Office investigates the allegations against him. Investigators say Dochow, who reportedly earns $230,000 a year, allowed IndyMac to register an $18 million capital injection it received in May in a report describing the bank's financial condition in the end of March.

"They [IndyMac] were able to maintain their well-capitalized threshold and continue to use broker deposits to make loans," said Marla Freedman, an assistant inspector general at Treasury. "Basically, while the institution was having financial difficulty, it kept the public from knowing earlier than it otherwise should have or would have."

In order to backdate the filings, IndyMac sought and received permission from Dochow, according to Freedman.

"That struck us as very unusual," said Freedman. "Typically transactions are to be recorded in the period in which they occur, not afterwards. So it was very unusual."

One former regulator says Dochow's actions illustrate the cozy relationship between banks and government regulators.

"He did nothing to protect taxpayers in losses," former federal bank regulator William Black told ABC News. "Instead of correcting it [Dochow] made it worse by increasing the accounting fraud."

Meanwhile, IndyMac customers who lost their savings are demanding answers and are further infuriated after learning Dochow was also the regulator in 1989 who oversaw the failed Lincoln Savings and Loan, a scandal that sent its CEO Charles Keating to prison.

"He's the person who claimed that he looked into Charles Keating's eyes and knew that Keating was a good guy and therefore ignored all of the professional staff that told him that Keating was a fraud, and he produced the worst failure of the Savings and Loan Crisis at $3.4 billion. Now he's managed more than triple that," said Black, now an economics professor at the University of Missouri in Kansas City, Missouri.

Following the Lincoln scandal, Dochow was demoted and placed into a relatively obscure office, but later, inexplicably was brought back into the Office of Thrift Supervision.

Dochow declined to answer questions from ABC News.

After Ronnie Lopez was killed in Iraq, his mother Elaine invested the life insurance proceeds at IndyMac. She lost $37,000 of it.

"I was hysterical," she told ABC News. "I literally thought I was going to kill myself that day, because I felt so bad that I had let him down. I remember going to his grave and telling him "don't worry, I'm going to get that money back,' and I feel like he was saying, 'Hey, Mom, don't let them take that. I did the ultimate for that.'"

A group of angry investors has started a website, demanding answers on the extent of Dochow's actions.

"It's just the strife and anger," said IndyMac customer Lisa Marshall. "That this Dochow person is still employed. It's unbelievable, it's shocking."

While Dochow could end up losing his job, neither he nor his colleagues are expected to go to prison.

"This is criminal with the small 'c,'" said Black. "No one within the regulatory ranks may go to jail, but they have done the worst possible disservice to the taxpayers of America."

Merrill Lynch: Infamia!

Apologies for the lapse into Italian, but it is a remnant of my childhood. My father had a remarkable talent for expressing strong emotion in this language as in no other way.

Until serious reforms are made in the banking system, and the accounts are squared with those who brought us to this misfortune, there can be no recovery, and no sustained return to individual liberty.

So, what would we like to do about this latest outrage?


Merrill Execs Pay Selves Bonuses Ahead of Schedule (and
Before BofA Closing)
Naked Capitalism

Playing fast and loose seems to be the theme of the evening... now we have the eleventh hour stealing of the silver by Merrill's top executives as one of the firm's final acts.

Let us remember the fact set: Merrill managed to get Bank of America to agree to buy it in September, elbowing aside Lehman. The deal is subject to shareholder approval, however. BofA, realizing it has acquired a garbage barge, threatens to scuttle the deal unless Uncle Sam lends a helping hand. Negotiations proceed behind closed doors (and neither Merrill nor BofA shareholders are told prior to the shareholder vote that BofA has agreed to do the deal subject to some form of government support).

Now we learn that after it was evident that the US taxpayer was going to subsidize the Merrill acquisition, the Merrill compensation committee accelerated bonus payments by a month to make sure they were paid out before the BofA deal closed.

Efforts are being made to minimize the amount involved (it is claimed to be only $3-$4 billion, but the fact is amounts were reserved in prior quarters that are excessive in light of full year performance. So the fact that some of the amounts were allowed for in previous quarters is misleading).

Were Merrill bankrupt, the bonus payments could be deemed fraudulent conveyance and clawed back. But we don't do either financial firm bankruptcies or clawbacks in this country...

A Question Worth Considering for the New Year...

What is at the heart of the US financial crisis?

Is it that the US has been precipitously cut off from some foreign source of funding? Has there been an oil embargo, a supply shock imposed such as the one that triggered the financial crisis of the 1970's? Are the problems caused by some external change, some actor outside the system?

I think most will say the answer is 'no.' The problems are internal to the US, to its financial system.

So, how would you fix a system that has broken from an internal flaw in this way? Try more of the same, business as usual, apply fresh debt to a failed system based on a growing pyramid of debt without making any substantial changes?

The US financial system, the housing, equity and Treasury markets, are all Ponzi schemes, with the need for a constantly increasing source of fresh money to keep going. That funding is new debt, new dollars based on nothing produced, just the trust and confidence of the participants.

Would you fix the Madoff Ponzi scheme by giving Bernie more money, public money, to keep his payments flowing to his 'investors?'

I think most of us would say, no, no more money.

But what is the difference between that and what Paulson and Bernanke are doing today? Is there a graceful exit strategy? Have any serious reforms or changes been made or even proposed? Has there even been a frank disclosure and discussion of exactly what happened, and what is continuing to happen, beyond blaming the victims, or cynically hiding behind 'well that's how things are?'

No. The key participants in the Ponzi scheme are continuing to take their gains out, in dividends and bonuses, front running the final collapse and admission that "its all gone; we're bankrupt."

Think about it.

What would you do if it is a Ponzi scheme, teetering on the edge?

Speculation Nation Part 2

Our national priorities favor financial engineering, financial speculation, consumption on credit.

They penalize manufacturing, savings, and the median wage of labor.

It could not be any clearer.


Financial Times
Hedge funds gain access to $200bn Fed aid
By Krishna Guha in Washington
December 20 2008 05:01

Hedge funds will be allowed to borrow from the Federal Reserve for the first time under a landmark $200bn programme intended to support consumer credit.

The Fed said on Friday it would offer low-cost three-year funding to any US company investing in securitised consumer loans under the Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). This includes hedge funds, which have never been able to borrow from the US central bank before, although the Fed may not permit hedge funds to use offshore vehicles to conduct the transactions.

The asset-backed securities to be funded under the programme are pools of credit card receivables, automobile loans and student loans.

The idea is to increase the supply of these loans and reduce borrowing rates by ensuring that the companies that make the loans can sell them on to investors who have guaranteed access to low-cost funding from the Fed.

The TALF is a key plank of the unorthodox strategy set out by the Fed last week as it cut interest rates virtually to zero. Washington insiders expect the programme will be dramatically expanded next year with further capital support from Treasury once the Obama administration takes office.

A senior official in the outgoing Bush administration told the Financial Times it could also be broadened to include new commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities.

The Fed thinks risk premiums or “spreads” for consumer loans are much higher than would be justified by likely default rates, even assuming a nasty recession.

It attributes this to a lack of buying interest in the secondary market where the loans are sold on to investors. By making loans to these investors on attractive terms it aims to increase market liquidity.

Making the scheme open to all US companies is a radical departure for the Fed, which normally supports financial market liquidity indirectly by ensuring banks have adequate liquidity to make loans to other investors.

However, the liquidity the Fed is providing to banks is not flowing through to financial markets, because banks are balance-sheet constrained and risk-averse. So it is channelling funds directly to investors.

The scheme is not designed specifically for hedge funds and a wide range of financial institutions are likely to participate.

Nonetheless, Fed officials hope that hedge funds will be among those investors that take advantage of the low-cost finance to drive down spreads.

The loans will be secured only against the securities and not the borrower. However, the Fed will lend slightly less than the value of the securities pledged as collateral. The Treasury has committed $20bn to cover potential losses.

Since the credit crisis erupted, hedge funds have complained that they cannot get the leverage they need to arbitrage away excessive spreads and meet high hurdle rates of return.

“Demand is there for leverage but not supply,” said Sylvan Chackman, head of global equity financing at Merrill Lynch.

In effect, the Fed will now take on the role of prime broker – the lead bank that lends to a hedge fund – for specific assets.

Five Critical Decisions Leading to Our Financial Crisis: Joe Stiglitz Presents His Analysis

This is a benchmark document, a starting point, for finding our way out of the wilderness.

It validates the points that quite a few economic bloggers have been making for some time, with great effect because of Joe Stiglitz' reputation and accomplishments in his field.

Here is a summation of the Five Major Causes of our financial crisis. As Joe so correctly observes:

"What were the critical decisions that led to the crisis? Mistakes were made at every fork in the road—we had what engineers call a “system failure,” when not a single decision but a cascade of decisions produce a tragic result. Let’s look at five key moments."

1. Reagan's nomination of Alan Greenspan to replace Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman
2. The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Cult of Self-Regulation
3. Bush Tax Cuts for Upper Income Individuals, Corporations, and Speculation
4. Failure to Address Rampant Accounting Fraud Driven by Excessive and Flawed Compensation Models
5. Providing Enormous Bailouts to the Banks without Engaging Systemic Reform for the Underlying Causes of the Failure

There are other points that might be added, some that are not strictly financial in nature.

An international monetary exchange system that facilitates manipulation to create de facto barriers and subsidies in support of industrial trade policies. This creates destabilizing surpluses and deficits which may be the source of the next stage of the financial crisis.

The concentration of the ownership of the mainstream media in a handful of corporations has had a chilling effect on the newsrooms and commentators.

The lack of Congressional courage in exercising its obligations with regard to the extra-Constitutional excesses of the Executive Office. Certain mechanisms and instruments that facilitate the unilateral exercise of presidential power are tipping the balance of powers.

The existing system of funding inordinately expensive political campaigns is a breeding ground for favors and corruption.

The undue influence on prices, particularly global commodity prices, that is exercised by a handful of US banks operating far outside of traditional banking charters. This is a dangerously destabilizing influence on the real world economy and industrial growth and investment. A significant step forward would be the imposition of position limits, greater and more timely transparency for those with more than 10% of any market's open interest, and an uptick rule with stronger enforcement against naked shorting and other forms of short term price manipulation.

Vanity Fair
The Economic Crisis:
Capitalist Fools
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
January 2009

Behind the debate over remaking U.S. financial policy will be a debate over who’s to blame. It’s crucial to get the history right, writes a Nobel-laureate economist, identifying five key mistakes—under Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II—and one national delusion.

There will come a moment when the most urgent threats posed by the credit crisis have eased and the larger task before us will be to chart a direction for the economic steps ahead. This will be a dangerous moment. Behind the debates over future policy is a debate over history—a debate over the causes of our current situation. The battle for the past will determine the battle for the present. So it’s crucial to get the history straight.

What were the critical decisions that led to the crisis? Mistakes were made at every fork in the road—we had what engineers call a “system failure,” when not a single decision but a cascade of decisions produce a tragic result. Let’s look at five key moments.

No. 1: Firing the Chairman

In 1987 the Reagan administration decided to remove Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and appoint Alan Greenspan in his place. Volcker had done what central bankers are supposed to do. On his watch, inflation had been brought down from more than 11 percent to under 4 percent. In the world of central banking, that should have earned him a grade of A+++ and assured his re-appointment. But Volcker also understood that financial markets need to be regulated. Reagan wanted someone who did not believe any such thing, and he found him in a devotee of the objectivist philosopher and free-market zealot Ayn Rand.

Greenspan played a double role. The Fed controls the money spigot, and in the early years of this decade, he turned it on full force. But the Fed is also a regulator. If you appoint an anti-regulator as your enforcer, you know what kind of enforcement you’ll get. A flood of liquidity combined with the failed levees of regulation proved disastrous.

Greenspan presided over not one but two financial bubbles. After the high-tech bubble popped, in 2000–2001, he helped inflate the housing bubble. The first responsibility of a central bank should be to maintain the stability of the financial system. If banks lend on the basis of artificially high asset prices, the result can be a meltdown—as we are seeing now, and as Greenspan should have known. He had many of the tools he needed to cope with the situation. To deal with the high-tech bubble, he could have increased margin requirements (the amount of cash people need to put down to buy stock). To deflate the housing bubble, he could have curbed predatory lending to low-income households and prohibited other insidious practices (the no-documentation—or “liar”—loans, the interest-only loans, and so on). This would have gone a long way toward protecting us. If he didn’t have the tools, he could have gone to Congress and asked for them.

Of course, the current problems with our financial system are not solely the result of bad lending. The banks have made mega-bets with one another through complicated instruments such as derivatives, credit-default swaps, and so forth. With these, one party pays another if certain events happen—for instance, if Bear Stearns goes bankrupt, or if the dollar soars. These instruments were originally created to help manage risk—but they can also be used to gamble. Thus, if you felt confident that the dollar was going to fall, you could make a big bet accordingly, and if the dollar indeed fell, your profits would soar. The problem is that, with this complicated intertwining of bets of great magnitude, no one could be sure of the financial position of anyone else—or even of one’s own position. Not surprisingly, the credit markets froze.

Here too Greenspan played a role. When I was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, during the Clinton administration, I served on a committee of all the major federal financial regulators, a group that included Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. Even then, it was clear that derivatives posed a danger. We didn’t put it as memorably as Warren Buffett—who saw derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction”—but we took his point. And yet, for all the risk, the deregulators in charge of the financial system—at the Fed, at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and elsewhere—decided to do nothing, worried that any action might interfere with “innovation” in the financial system. But innovation, like “change,” has no inherent value. It can be bad (the “liar” loans are a good example) as well as good.

No. 2: Tearing Down the Walls

The deregulation philosophy would pay unwelcome dividends for years to come. In November 1999, Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act—the culmination of a $300 million lobbying effort by the banking and financial-services industries, and spearheaded in Congress by Senator Phil Gramm. Glass-Steagall had long separated commercial banks (which lend money) and investment banks (which organize the sale of bonds and equities); it had been enacted in the aftermath of the Great Depression and was meant to curb the excesses of that era, including grave conflicts of interest. For instance, without separation, if a company whose shares had been issued by an investment bank, with its strong endorsement, got into trouble, wouldn’t its commercial arm, if it had one, feel pressure to lend it money, perhaps unwisely? An ensuing spiral of bad judgment is not hard to foresee. I had opposed repeal of Glass-Steagall. The proponents said, in effect, Trust us: we will create Chinese walls to make sure that the problems of the past do not recur. As an economist, I certainly possessed a healthy degree of trust, trust in the power of economic incentives to bend human behavior toward self-interest—toward short-term self-interest, at any rate, rather than Tocqueville’s “self interest rightly understood.”

The most important consequence of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect—it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture. Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money—people who can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top. There was a demand for the kind of high returns that could be obtained only through high leverage and big risktaking.

There were other important steps down the deregulatory path. One was the decision in April 2004 by the Securities and Exchange Commission, at a meeting attended by virtually no one and largely overlooked at the time, to allow big investment banks to increase their debt-to-capital ratio (from 12:1 to 30:1, or higher) so that they could buy more mortgage-backed securities, inflating the housing bubble in the process. In agreeing to this measure, the S.E.C. argued for the virtues of self-regulation: the peculiar notion that banks can effectively police themselves. Self-regulation is preposterous, as even Alan Greenspan now concedes, and as a practical matter it can’t, in any case, identify systemic risks—the kinds of risks that arise when, for instance, the models used by each of the banks to manage their portfolios tell all the banks to sell some security all at once.

As we stripped back the old regulations, we did nothing to address the new challenges posed by 21st-century markets. The most important challenge was that posed by derivatives. In 1998 the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Brooksley Born, had called for such regulation—a concern that took on urgency after the Fed, in that same year, engineered the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose trillion-dollar-plus failure threatened global financial markets. But Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, his deputy, Larry Summers, and Greenspan were adamant—and successful—in their opposition. Nothing was done.

No. 3: Applying the Leeches

Then along came the Bush tax cuts, enacted first on June 7, 2001, with a follow-on installment two years later. The president and his advisers seemed to believe that tax cuts, especially for upper-income Americans and corporations, were a cure-all for any economic disease—the modern-day equivalent of leeches. The tax cuts played a pivotal role in shaping the background conditions of the current crisis. Because they did very little to stimulate the economy, real stimulation was left to the Fed, which took up the task with unprecedented low-interest rates and liquidity. The war in Iraq made matters worse, because it led to soaring oil prices. With America so dependent on oil imports, we had to spend several hundred billion more to purchase oil—money that otherwise would have been spent on American goods. Normally this would have led to an economic slowdown, as it had in the 1970s. But the Fed met the challenge in the most myopic way imaginable. The flood of liquidity made money readily available in mortgage markets, even to those who would normally not be able to borrow. And, yes, this succeeded in forestalling an economic downturn; America’s household saving rate plummeted to zero. But it should have been clear that we were living on borrowed money and borrowed time.

The cut in the tax rate on capital gains contributed to the crisis in another way. It was a decision that turned on values: those who speculated (read: gambled) and won were taxed more lightly than wage earners who simply worked hard. But more than that, the decision encouraged leveraging, because interest was tax-deductible. If, for instance, you borrowed a million to buy a home or took a $100,000 home-equity loan to buy stock, the interest would be fully deductible every year. Any capital gains you made were taxed lightly—and at some possibly remote day in the future. The Bush administration was providing an open invitation to excessive borrowing and lending—not that American consumers needed any more encouragement.

No. 4: Faking the Numbers

Meanwhile, on July 30, 2002, in the wake of a series of major scandals—notably the collapse of WorldCom and Enron—Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The scandals had involved every major American accounting firm, most of our banks, and some of our premier companies, and made it clear that we had serious problems with our accounting system. Accounting is a sleep-inducing topic for most people, but if you can’t have faith in a company’s numbers, then you can’t have faith in anything about a company at all. Unfortunately, in the negotiations over what became Sarbanes-Oxley a decision was made not to deal with what many, including the respected former head of the S.E.C. Arthur Levitt, believed to be a fundamental underlying problem: stock options. Stock options have been defended as providing healthy incentives toward good management, but in fact they are “incentive pay” in name only. If a company does well, the C.E.O. gets great rewards in the form of stock options; if a company does poorly, the compensation is almost as substantial but is bestowed in other ways. This is bad enough. But a collateral problem with stock options is that they provide incentives for bad accounting: top management has every incentive to provide distorted information in order to pump up share prices.

The incentive structure of the rating agencies also proved perverse. Agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are paid by the very people they are supposed to grade. As a result, they’ve had every reason to give companies high ratings, in a financial version of what college professors know as grade inflation. The rating agencies, like the investment banks that were paying them, believed in financial alchemy—that F-rated toxic mortgages could be converted into products that were safe enough to be held by commercial banks and pension funds. We had seen this same failure of the rating agencies during the East Asia crisis of the 1990s: high ratings facilitated a rush of money into the region, and then a sudden reversal in the ratings brought devastation. But the financial overseers paid no attention.

No. 5: Letting It Bleed

The final turning point came with the passage of a bailout package on October 3, 2008—that is, with the administration’s response to the crisis itself. We will be feeling the consequences for years to come. Both the administration and the Fed had long been driven by wishful thinking, hoping that the bad news was just a blip, and that a return to growth was just around the corner. As America’s banks faced collapse, the administration veered from one course of action to another. Some institutions (Bear Stearns, A.I.G., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) were bailed out. Lehman Brothers was not. Some shareholders got something back. Others did not.

The original proposal by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, a three-page document that would have provided $700 billion for the secretary to spend at his sole discretion, without oversight or judicial review, was an act of extraordinary arrogance. He sold the program as necessary to restore confidence. But it didn’t address the underlying reasons for the loss of confidence. The banks had made too many bad loans. There were big holes in their balance sheets. No one knew what was truth and what was fiction. The bailout package was like a massive transfusion to a patient suffering from internal bleeding—and nothing was being done about the source of the problem, namely all those foreclosures. Valuable time was wasted as Paulson pushed his own plan, “cash for trash,” buying up the bad assets and putting the risk onto American taxpayers. When he finally abandoned it, providing banks with money they needed, he did it in a way that not only cheated America’s taxpayers but failed to ensure that the banks would use the money to re-start lending. He even allowed the banks to pour out money to their shareholders as taxpayers were pouring money into the banks.

The other problem not addressed involved the looming weaknesses in the economy. The economy had been sustained by excessive borrowing. That game was up. As consumption contracted, exports kept the economy going, but with the dollar strengthening and Europe and the rest of the world declining, it was hard to see how that could continue. Meanwhile, states faced massive drop-offs in revenues—they would have to cut back on expenditures. Without quick action by government, the economy faced a downturn. And even if banks had lent wisely—which they hadn’t—the downturn was sure to mean an increase in bad debts, further weakening the struggling financial sector.

The administration talked about confidence building, but what it delivered was actually a confidence trick. If the administration had really wanted to restore confidence in the financial system, it would have begun by addressing the underlying problems—the flawed incentive structures and the inadequate regulatory system.

Was there any single decision which, had it been reversed, would have changed the course of history? Every decision—including decisions not to do something, as many of our bad economic decisions have been—is a consequence of prior decisions, an interlinked web stretching from the distant past into the future. You’ll hear some on the right point to certain actions by the government itself—such as the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to make mortgage money available in low-income neighborhoods. (Defaults on C.R.A. lending were actually much lower than on other lending.) There has been much finger-pointing at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two huge mortgage lenders, which were originally government-owned. But in fact they came late to the subprime game, and their problem was similar to that of the private sector: their C.E.O.’s had the same perverse incentive to indulge in gambling.

The truth is most of the individual mistakes boil down to just one: a belief that markets are self-adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal. Looking back at that belief during hearings this fall on Capitol Hill, Alan Greenspan said out loud, “I have found a flaw.” Congressman Henry Waxman pushed him, responding, “In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right; it was not working.” “Absolutely, precisely,” Greenspan said. The embrace by America—and much of the rest of the world—of this flawed economic philosophy made it inevitable that we would eventually arrive at the place we are today.

Avoiding a Great Depression: Rescue, Rebalance, Reform

The 1920's were marked by a credit expansion, a significant growth in consumer debt, the creation of asset bubbles, and the proliferation of financial instruments and leveraged investments. The Federal Reserve expanded the money supply and the Republican government pursued a laissez-faire approach to business.

This helped to create a greater wealth disparity, and saddled a good part of the public with debts on consumables that were vulnerable to an economic contraction.

The bursting of the credit bubble triggered the stock market Crash of 1929. The Hoover administration's response was guided by Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon. As noted by Herbert Hoover in his memoirs, "Mellon had only one formula: 'Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate.'"

Indeed, the collapse of consumption and credit, and the ensuing 'do nothing' policy of liquidation by the government crippled the economy and drove unemployment up to the incredible 24% level at the climax of the liquidation and deleveraging.

Although some assets fared better than others, virtually everything was caught up in the cycle of liquidation and everything was sold: stocks, bonds, farms, even long dated US Treasuries, all of them collapsing into the bottom in late 1932.

The Federal Reserve made tragic policy errors most certainly with regard to interest rates. They were hampered by a lack of coordinated effort because of the official US policy focus on liquidation and non-interference, along with mass bank failures which rendered their attempts to reflate the money supply as largely futile.

Thrifty management of the credit and monetary levels when the economy is balanced in the manufacturing, service, export-import, and consumption distribution levels is a good policy to follow.

But good policies applied with vigor during a period of economic illness may be like forcing patients seriously ill with pneumonia to swim laps and run in marathons because you think such physical activity is inherently good and beneficial in itself at all times.

Additionally, monetary expansion alone also does not work, as can be seen in the early attempts by the Fed to expand the monetary base without policy initiatives to support expansion and consumption. Hoover's administration raised the income tax and cut spending for a balanced budget.

A combined monetary and government bias to stimulating consumption while restoring balance and correcting the errors that fostered the credit bubble is the more effective course of action.

Today it seems to us that the Fed and Treasury are trying to cure our current problems by filling the banks full of liquidity with the idea that it will eventually trickle down to the real economy through their toll gates.

We believe this will not work. The financial system is rotten, and not only in its toxic and fraudulent assets. It is a weakened, rotten timber that will provide scant leverage for the rescue attempts.

Better to cauterize the bleeds in the financial system and assume a 'trickle up' approach by reaching the econmy through the individual rather than the individual through the banks.

Provide secure FDIC insurance to everyone to a generous degree , and let those banks who must fail, fail. You will encourage reform and savings, we guarantee it. Stimulate work and wages, and then consumption, and the financial system will follow.

While the financial system as it is constituted today remains the centerpiece of our economy, we cannot sustainably recover since it is a source of recurring infection.



Globalists like to cite the introduction of the Smoot-Hawley tariffs as a major factor in the development of the Great Depression. This appears to be largely unsubstantiated, and attributable to a dogmatic bias to international trade as a panacea for failing domestic demand.

In fact, before Smoot-Hawley both exports and imports were in a steep decline as consumption collapsed around the world. If the US had declared itself open for free trade, to whom would they sell, and who in the US would buy? Consumption was in a general collapse around the world. Smoot Hawley did not help, but it also did not hurt because it was largely irrelevant.

It is a lesser discussed topic, but the US held the majority of the gold in the world in 1930 as the aftermath of their position as an industrial power in World War I and the expansion that followed. Since the majority of the countries were on some version of the gold standard, one could make a case that the US had an undue influence on the 'reserve currency of the world' at that time, and its mistaken policies were transmitted via the gold standard to the rest of the world.

The nations that exited the Great Depression the soonest, those who recovered more quickly and experienced a shallower economic downturn, were those who stimulated domestic consumption via public works and industrial policies: Japan, Germany, Italy, Sweden.



As a final point, we like to show this chart to draw a very strong line under the fact that the liquidationist policy of the Hoover Administration caused most assets to suffer precipitous declines. Certainly some fared better than others, such as gold which was pegged, and silver which declined but not nearly as much as industrial metals and certainly financial instruments like stocks which declined 89% from peak to trough.

FDR devalued the dollar by 40%, but he never followed Britain off the gold standard, maintaining fictitious support by outlawing domestic ownership. As the government stepped away from its liquidationist approach the economy gradually recovered and the money supply reinflated, despite the carnage delivered to the US economy and the world, provoking the rise of militarism and statist regimes in many of the developed nations.

There is a fiction that the economy never really recovered, and FDR's policies failed and only a World War caused the recovery. In fact, if one cares to look at the situation more closely, the recession of 1937 was a result of the aggressive military buildup for war in the world, the diversion of capital and resources to non-productive goods and services, and of course the general reversal of the New Deal by the US Supreme Court and the Republican minority in Congress.

As an aside, it is interesting to read about the efforts of some US industrialists to foster a fascist solution here in the US, as their counterparts and some of them had done in Europe.

What finally put the world on the permanent road to recovery was the savings forced by the lack of consumer goods during World War II and the rebuilding of Europe and Asia, devastated by war, significantly aided by the policies of the Allied powers.



A Depression following a Crash caused by an asset bubble collapse is a terrible thing indeed. But it does not have to be a prolonged ordeal.

Governments can and do make policy errors that prolong the period of adjustment, most notably instituting an industrial policy that discourages domestic consumption and money supply growth in a desire to obtain foreign reserves through exports.

From what we have seen thus far, we believe that the Russian experience in the 1990's is going to be closer to what lies ahead for the US. Unless the US adopts an export driven, low domestic consumption, high savings policy bias, non-productive military buildup and public works, and discourages population growth we don't believe the Japanese experience will be repeated.

Preventing the banking system from collapsing is a worthy objective. Perpetuating the symptom of fraud and abuse and 'overreach' that was becoming pervasive in the system before the collapse is not sustainable, instead leading to more frequent and larger collapses.

Balance will be restored, and a reversion to the means will occur, one way or the other. It would be most practical to accomplish this in a peaceful, sustainable manner, with justice and toleration.

Europe and Asia Seek a Consensus Ahead of Washington Meeting

Sounds as though a consensus is forming, without the United States, to set the agenda for the upcoming meeting in Washington on November 15.

One step closer to a world currency, and a world government.
Tonight I am sick at heart for the damage that has been done to the world over the last eight years. We have squandered the sacrifice of a generation.

ἐδάκρυσεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς


The Economic Times
Leaders call for new rules for financial system
25 Oct, 2008, 0644 hrs IST

BEIJING: Asian and European leaders agreed that the rules guiding the global economy should be rewritten and the International Monetary Fund should be given a lead role in aiding countries hit hardest by the financial crisis.

On a day when stock markets plunged around the world, leaders from nations including China, France, Germany and Japan said Friday that they were moving toward consensus ahead of next month's meeting of the 20 largest economies in Washington.

``Europe would like Asia to support our efforts and would like to make sure that on the 15th of November we can face the world together and say that the causes of this unprecedented crisis will never be able to happen again,'' French President Nicolas Sarkozy said in remarks to the opening ceremony of the Asia-Europe Meeting in Beijing.

A draft of a meeting statement on the crisis seen by The Associated Press called on the IMF and similar institutions to act immediately to help stabilize struggling banks and staunch the flood of red ink on regional stock bourses.

``Leaders agreed that the IMF should play a critical role in assisting countries seriously affected by the crisis, upon their request,'' the draft said.

If adopted, the statement would be among the strongest calls yet for a leading role in the crisis for the Washington-based fund, long known as the international lender of last resort.

Countries as varied as Hungary, Ukraine, Iceland and Pakistan have already turned to the IMF for help bridging their liquidity crunches.

The draft statement also states that leaders agreed to ``undertake effective and comprehensive reform of the international monetary and financial systems.''

Among the first to publicly endorse the proposal was Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, head of the world's second-largest economy. Aso ``strongly supports'' a critical role for the IMF, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kazuo Kodama said.

The biennial gathering, known as ASEM, has no mandate to issue decisions and participants differ widely on their views toward international cooperation and intervention by global bodies. Free-trading Singapore and economic powerhouse Germany are attending, along with isolated, impoverished Myanmar and landlocked, authoritarian Laos.

Responses to the crisis have varied widely so far. Europe has already approved a plan under which the 15 euro countries and Britain put up a total of $2.3 trillion in guarantees and emergency aid to help banks.

Asian financial systems are less shaky, having had less direct exposure to the toxic sub-prime mortgages that are wreaking havoc on US and European markets. Showing a notable lack of urgency, South Korea, China, Japan and the 10-country Association of Southeast Asian Nations recommitted themselves to an $80 billion emergency fund to help those facing liquidity problems - to be established by next June.

China and other Asian economies are, however, expected to take a major hit from a drop in exports and foreign investment.

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed,
and everywhere the ceremony of innocence is drowned...