M3 Hysteria and a Look M2, MZM, GDP and PPI

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has a bold headline US Money Supply Plunges at 1930s Pace that is sure to provide much referential action for the UK Telegraph.

I like to read AEP, but have to admit that he is given to sensational headlines on rare occasion. That is because it sells papers, and also draws blog clicks, as posters on the web are sometimes wont to emulate. Fear sells. The financial sectors also thrives on rumours and panic selling. It clears the decks for new Ponzi rallies. And it seems as though fear has become an inseparable partner and helpmate to central governments these days.

But there were some mildly disappointing elements to this particular piece in addition to its somewhat overstated headline. The US stopped publishing M3 several years ago. At the time I was not happy about this, and complained quite a bit.

Several enterprising fellows, including my friend Bart over at Now and Futures, as well as John Williams at Shadowstats, have been attempting to extrapolate the M3 figures, and doing a fine job given what they have to work with. In an added footnote, AEP says he is using John Williams' service. He also incorrectly states that the still Fed publishes all the components. They do not disclose eurodollars. The basis for discontinuing M3 was to eliminate the 'inordinate expense.' Obviously if they still published all the components, that could not be a credible case. This is not just being picky. Eurodollars are a remarkably volatile component these days, and also a method of buying Treasuries via London if one were so inclined to monetize US sovereign debt that way. Could the BoE and the Fed be scratching each other's backs as they say? The BoJ has already paid for one false US recovery, so they deserve a break.

Here is a quick review of the components of the Monetary Supply figures including M3 for your review. You may also wish to refresh your knowledge here: Money Supply a Primer.

The chief component that is 'missing' these days which must be estimated is "eurodollars," which as you may recall are US dollars being held overseas. You know, those dollars that Bernanke has been sending over to Europe en masse lately through the swaplines.

The fellows can estimate this, but the reporting of eurodollars lags by a quarter or more, the only reliable source of information being the forex commercial banking reports from BIS.

I would very much like to have M3 back, but in particular I would like the Fed to be releasing a more accurate and contemporary measure of Eurodollars, the dollar overhang overseas, particularly in light of the huge swings in the DX index, and its almost undeniable relationship to the recent dollar short squeezes on the European banks. The Dollar Rally and the Deflationary Imbalances in the US Dollar Holdings of Overseas Banks.

But alas, we do not have this, so we can only estimate M3, particularly the eurodollar component. But the good news is that we still have both M2 and MZM.

Here are the most recent figures for MZM and M2 from the St. Louis Fed, expressed as a percent of change YoY, not adjusted for seasonality. For good measure I have added GDP and PPI Finished Consumer Goods in the mix.



It might also be wise also to keep in mind that after a period of sharp growth in response to a developing recession that flattens out afterward, the year over year percentage growth can fall precipitously and look quite impressive on a growth chart without necessarily providing a meaningful decline in the nominal values. This can be seen in the M2 chart below.

And it is also true that during a period of slack growth in GDP the demand for money is lessened such that normal or even flat money supply growth would seem to the Fed monetarists to be 'inflationary.' This does not mean that they have forgotten where the 'ON' button to printing press is located. Of all the things that might concern us about the Bernanke Fed, the least of them is that they will be too stringent in supplying liquidity when and where it might be needed, in substantial volumes, at least to the banking system.



MZM is the broadest measure of liquidity, and is very much a creature of the Adjusted Monetary Base. As one can see from the chart, the Fed, using their various policy tools, jams the short term money supply higher in response to a lagging economy, and the broader measures like M2 tend to follow with a lag.

The Fed then backs off, and waits to see the effect of their actions, as well as any accompanying fiscal programs, on the real economy as measured by GDP, with an eye on inflation. In this case I am using PPI, but I greatly prefer John Williams' unadulterated CPI measure. Unfortunately I do not have it in the proper format for this study. But PPI finished goods will do.

Now, looking at this chart, it appears that the Fed is following their usual gameplan. The excess reserves that the banks are holding, at least indirectly in response to the balance sheet expansion and interest rate payments on their own deposits by the Fed, are enormous and unprecedented. If the Fed were to start pulling some levers to motivate those reserves into the real economy through loans, the impact could be dramatic. The Fed will do this if their fear of inflation begins to be overcome by their fear of deflation.

For the moment, the great bulk of liquidity is being used by the banks to bolster their reserves, and their unresolved bad debt, as if the bad debt itself was the cause of the problem. The problem is that a credit bubble left consumers with the inability to pay their debts, and while nothing is done for the median wage, and the bad debt is not written off, the problem continues. This was the story of the zombie economy of Japan's lost decade, because their kereitsu corporate combines would not take the 'hit' for their land bubble.

Right now it appears to me that they are overly preoccupied with the status of the biggest of the banks and their asset quality problems an under stimulating the real economy. I think this will be regarded as a policy error as were the actions of the Federal Reserve in 1932 wherein the Fed overreacted to a spike in CPI and tightened prematurely. The Fed may be engaged now in a policy error of a different sort.



I am not saying what MUST or WILL happen. I am not arguing from theory. I am just attempting to demonstrate what is happening now based on the data. And right now Ben is indeed printing money, and figuratively dropping it from helicopters. The problem is that the helicopters are hovering over Wall and Broad Streets, and not Main Street. And so we obtain asset bubbles in paper favored by the denizens of the Street.

If you want to know the theory, in a perfectly fiat system (no external standard constraint) deflation and inflation are always the outcome of policy decisions amongst a number of variables and competing interests. Period. That is how it is, and that is why central banks prefer it to the discipline of an external standard like gold.

Once the US relaxed its adherence to the gold standard and devalued the dollar, deflation became a moot point. What was not handled well was the continuing lack of organic aggregate demand, and velocity of money, because of the resistance of the Republican minority in Congress to jobs creation, and the overturning the New Deal minimum wage initiatives and labor reforms by the US Supreme Court. Consumers cannot generate healthy demand when they are unemployed, or being paid near starvation wages. But if you are in a well-to-do minority, things couldn't seem better, unless of course you were living in Germany, Italy, or perhaps even Japan.





I am not saying what the 'right thing' to do is. But what I am attempting to get across is that one way or the other, excess financial sector debt is going to be liquidated, either through default, or through inflation, or through a mixture of higher taxes and sluggish growth with a disparity of income that increasingly resembles 19th century serfdom and political instabilty, the rise of demagogues, and some vicious ghosts from the past.

At some point this dynamic is going to become less 'economic' and more political and the equilibrium will be reached. A good leading example of this is found in Iceland.

See also The Case for Deflation, Stagflation, and Implosion

For those relying on the Output Gap and slack Aggregate Demand please see Price, Demand, and Money Supply as They Relate to Inflation and Deflation

People tend to become very emotional over this sort of topic. There are many who are afraid that what they have will be taken, and there is even a vocal minority of the self-identified elite who wishes to obtain greater power and riches by leveling the middle class and the poor to improve their own supreme vistas. The funny thing is that to the genuinely powerful these 'elites' are about as significant as a bug on the wall, and their turn will come if that is the way it goes.

The most touching example of delusion that I have witnessed recently was an unwavering prediction about what will happen in the future because 'the majority of the people on the this chatboard have agreed on it.' Well, perhaps history gives a hoot. But I suspect that we are in His hands now more than ever. And you might do well to prepare yourself accordingly.

By the way, and this is just a stab at my own theory, a strawman as opposed to an examination of the data, I think the US is hammering the ECB to devalue the Euro, because they wish to further devalue the US dollar. If the major fiat currencies can be devalued in a relatively uniform manner, and some other statistics and prices controlled, the people can be subtly relieved of their savings and wealth, and be none the wiser. But those stubborn Germans had to be brought to heel first. And so it is.

Here is something from an old trading acquaintance of ours. Stage Set For Another Bernanke Adventure - Brady Willett of FallStreet

Why There is Fear and Resentment of Gold's Ability to Reveal the True Value of Financial Assets

There were a few questions raised about the note on the long term chart of the SP 500 deflated by gold which was posted last night, and which is reproduced here on the right, which read "This is why the financial engineers like Bernanke hate and fear gold; it defies their plans and powers."

The chart shows something that most investors have suspected. There has been no genuine recovery in the price of stocks since the decline that cannot be fully explained by the monetary inflation of the dollar, as can be discovered by the ultimate store of value, which is gold.

I thought that this was a fairly straightforward observation, but it apparently jarred a few people and their thinking. So perhaps we have some new readers who are not familiar with the long standing animosity towards gold that is uniformly expressed by all those who promote centralized command and control economies, from both the left and the right.

Can any astute observer doubt the Fed's desire to act in secret and privacy? Their obsession with this is almost unbelievable and beyond comprehension, unless one understands that they are in a 'confidence game,' and use persuasion and even illusion to shape perceptions, especially at the extremes of their financial and monetary engineering of the real economy.

This animosity and desire for secrecy was described by Alan Greenspan in his famous essay, Gold and Economic Freedom, first published in 1966. In a fairly amusing exchange between Congressman Ron Paul and the former Chairman a couple of years ago, Mr. Paul asked Sir Alan about this essay, and if he had any corrections or misgivings about it after so many years. Would he change anything?

"Not one word." replied Greenspan, in one of his few candidly honest and straightforward statements.

It helps to understand the dynamics of the money world, which appear so mysterious to those who do not specialize in it, even economists, although some may feign ignorance to promote their cause or avoid unpleasant disclosures.

Money is power. Ownership of the means of production may provide for the control of groups of disorganized labor.  But the power of the issuance of money allows for the control of whole peoples and governments, through the distribution and transference of wealth, by the most subtle of means. And this is why the US Constitution relegated this power to the Congress and by their explicit appropriation, and denied it to the States and private parties except in the form of specie, that is, gold and silver which have intrinsic value.

It might be useful to review a prior post in reaction to the self-named maverick economist Willem Buiter, who wrote a few attacks on gold, prior to his leaving academia and the Financial Times to take a senior position with Citibank. Willem Buiter Apparently Does Not Like Gold

It may seem a bit perverse, but I do not favor a return to a gold, or a bi-metallic gold and silver standard at this time.   Each nation can be free to devalue or deflate their own money supply as their needs require, with the consent and knowledge of the people and their representatives.

What I do promote is for gold and silver to trade freely without restraint or manipulation as a refuge from monetary manipulation, and a secure store of value for private wealth. When nations adopt the gold standard, they invariably seek to 'fix' and manipulate its price, and reserve the ownership to themselves, with the tendency to seize the wealth of their citizen under the rationale of such an ownership, or dominant privilege.

Let those who have a mind to it have the means of securing their labor and efforts, and let the state do as it will, with the open knowledge and consent of the world.

"Gold is not necessary. I have no interest in gold. We will build a solid state, without an ounce of gold behind it. Anyone who sells above the set prices, let him be marched off to a concentration camp. That's the bastion of money."

Adolf Hitler

A draconian approach no doubt. It is much more common for the ruling parties to debase the coinage secretively while advantaging their friends and supporters, thereby manipulating the value of gold and silver covertly.

 In modern times of non-specie currency one might choose to select a few cooperative banks and the central money authority to manipulate the price using paper and markets, and hope that this scheme will remain undiscovered. But it always comes out, the truth is always known in the end.

"With the exception only of the period of the gold standard, practically all governments of history have used their exclusive power to issue money to defraud and plunder the people."

F. A. Von Hayek

There are any number of amateur economists and investing pundits around these days who betray an almost irrational opposition to gold, becoming jubilant in every decline, and despondent at every rally. And some of them even take the label of 'Austrianism' in their thoughts which is quite odd given that it is one of their schools strongest bulwarks.

Most often this can simply explained as the envy of those who have not prepared for a crisis, and wish ill upon those who have, regretting and hoping for another chance to provide for their own security. And yet they will fail to take advantage of every opportunity to do so, as they are creatures betrayed alternatively by their own fear and greed.

One of the best indications of quack advice on the question of investing in precious metals is when one of the reasons against it includes the scurrilous non sequitur, 'You can't eat it,' as if nutritional content is a valid measure of the durability of wealth. It betrays a lowness of argument and intellectual integrity that should promptly urge one to run in the other direction.

And regrettably, there are always those who will say almost anything for money, and the profession of economist seems to be particularly infested with that sort, given the stochastic nature of the discipline, and its lack of scientific rigor, being based on principles which do not easily lend themselves to objectification with serious damage to the data being made by the assumptions in their equations and proofs.

But most of all, the financial engineers, politicians, and Wall Street Banks fear gold because it is the antidote to their frauds, and the informant to their confiscation of wealth.

Do not expect them to capitulate once and for all, but only slowly and grudgingly as it becomes more difficult for them to sustain their illusions and persuasion. Protecting wealth against official adventurism is never easy.

Here is Alan Greenspan's famous essay on Gold and Economic Freedom. I suggest your read it, because it will help you to understand much of what is said and done as the global reserve currency system changes and evolves.

Gold and Economic Freedom
by Alan Greenspan

Published in Ayn Rand's "Objectivist" newsletter in 1966, and reprinted in her book, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, in 1967.

An almost hysterical antagonism toward the gold standard is one issue which unites statists of all persuasions. They seem to sense - perhaps more clearly and subtly than many consistent defenders of laissez-faire - that gold and economic freedom are inseparable, that the gold standard is an instrument of laissez-faire and that each implies and requires the other.

In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is necessary first to understand the specific role of gold in a free society.

Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It is that commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is universally acceptable to all participants in an exchange economy as payment for their goods or services, and can, therefore, be used as a standard of market value and as a store of value, i.e., as a means of saving.

The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division of labor economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective value which was generally acceptable as money, they would have to resort to primitive barter or be forced to live on self-sufficient farms and forgo the inestimable advantages of specialization. If men had no means to store value, i.e., to save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be possible.

What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in an economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of exchange should be durable. In a primitive society of meager wealth, wheat might be sufficiently durable to serve as a medium, since all exchanges would occur only during and immediately after the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to store. But where store-of-value considerations are important, as they are in richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be a durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen because it is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same as every other and it can be blended or formed in any quantity. Precious jewels, for example, are neither homogeneous nor divisible. More important, the commodity chosen as a medium must be a luxury. Human desires for luxuries are unlimited and, therefore, luxury goods are always in demand and will always be acceptable. Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not in a prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as money, but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were considered a luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and high unit value. Having a high unit value, such a good is easily portable; for instance, an ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of pig iron.

In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media of exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities would fulfill the foregoing conditions. However, one of the commodities will gradually displace all others, by being more widely acceptable. Preferences on what to hold as a store of value will shift to the most widely acceptable commodity, which, in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift is progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of exchange. The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for the same reasons that a money economy is superior to a barter economy: it makes exchanges possible on an incalculably wider scale.

Whether the single medium is gold, silver, seashells, cattle, or tobacco is optional, depending on the context and development of a given economy. In fact, all have been employed, at various times, as media of exchange. Even in the present century, two major commodities, gold and silver, have been used as international media of exchange, with gold becoming the predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses and being relatively scarce, has significant advantages over all other media of exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been virtually the sole international standard of exchange. If all goods and services were to be paid for in gold, large payments would be difficult to execute and this would tend to limit the extent of a society's divisions of labor and specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a medium of exchange is the development of a banking system and credit instruments (bank notes and deposits) which act as a substitute for, but are convertible into, gold.

A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and thus to create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to the production requirements of the economy. Individual owners of gold are induced, by payments of interest, to deposit their gold in a bank (against which they can draw checks). But since it is rarely the case that all depositors want to withdraw all their gold at the same time, the banker need keep only a fraction of his total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the banker to loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security of his deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is not arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and to the status of his investments.

When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally available. But when the business ventures financed by bank credit are less profitable and slow to pay off, bankers soon find that their loans outstanding are excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin to curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates. This tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires the existing borrowers to improve their profitability before they can obtain credit for further expansion. Thus, under the gold standard, a free banking system stands as the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth. When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all nations, an unhampered free international gold standard serves to foster a world-wide division of labor and the broadest international trade. Even though the units of exchange (the dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from country to country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of the different countries act as one — so long as there are no restraints on trade or on the movement of capital. Credit, interest rates, and prices tend to follow similar patterns in all countries. For example, if banks in one country extend credit too liberally, interest rates in that country will tend to fall, inducing depositors to shift their gold to higher-interest paying banks in other countries. This will immediately cause a shortage of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing tighter credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest rates again.

A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard have not as yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the banking system in the United States (and in most of the world) was based on gold and even though governments intervened occasionally, banking was more free than controlled. Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion, banks became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest rates rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went into a sharp, but short-lived recession. (Compared with the depressions of 1920 and 1932, the pre-World War I business declines were mild indeed.) It was limited gold reserves that stopped the unbalanced expansions of business activity, before they could develop into the post-World War I type of disaster. The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.

But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if shortage of bank reserves was causing a business decline — argued economic interventionists — why not find a way of supplying increased reserves to the banks so they never need be short! If banks can continue to loan money indefinitely — it was claimed — there need never be any slumps in business. And so the Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private bankers, but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and supported. Credit extended by these banks is in practice (though not legally) backed by the taxing power of the federal government. Technically, we remained on the gold standard; individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued to be used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit extended by the Federal Reserve banks ("paper reserves") could serve as legal tender to pay depositors.

When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous, however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain who had been losing gold to us because the Bank of England refused to allow interest rates to rise when market forces dictated (it was politically unpalatable). The reasoning of the authorities involved was as follows: if the Federal Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks, interest rates in the United States would fall to a level comparable with those in Great Britain; this would act to stop Britain's gold loss and avoid the political embarrassment of having to raise interest rates. The "Fed" succeeded; it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world, in the process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock market, triggering a fantastic speculative boom. Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted to sop up the excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom. But it was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching and a consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a result, the American economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than absorb the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in 1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.

With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued, Britain's abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the gold standard in any form — from a growing number of welfare-state advocates — was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare expenditures on a large scale.

Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can support is determined by the economy's tangible assets, since every credit instrument is ultimately a claim on some tangible asset. But government bonds are not backed by tangible wealth, only by the government's promise to pay out of future tax revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial markets. A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government deficit spending under a gold standard is severely limited. The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. They have created paper reserves in the form of government bonds which — through a complex series of steps — the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what was formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond or of a bank deposit created by paper reserves believes that he has a valid claim on a real asset. But the fact is that there are now more claims outstanding than real assets. The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods. When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for welfare or other purposes with the money proceeds of the government bonds financed by bank credit expansion.

In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.

This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.

Given his Randian audience and the mood at the time, it is interesting that Greenspan defines the culprits in the scheme of fiat monetization as 'welfare statists.' How ironic, that over a period of time there is indeed a group of welfare statists behind the latest debasement of the currency, the US dollar, but the recipients of this welfare are the Banks and the financial elite, who through transfer payments, financial fraud, and federally sanctioned subsidies are systematically stripping the middle class of their wealth. Perhaps they decided that if you cannot beat them, beat them to the trough and take the best for themselves until the system collapses through their abuse.

Curtain of Tragedy Will Be Raised Soon Enough, But Perhaps Not Next in Japan

"Ninety-five percent of Japan's debt is domestically owned. Fickle foreigners have almost no sway. Indeed, Japan's problem is still an excess of savings ." (at abormally low rates of return that serve to subsidize government mismanagement and malinvestment.)

An interesting piece from the Japan Times below, raising the issue of a hyperinflationary collapse of their economy and the yen. As you know, I forecast in 2005 that a new school of economic thought is likely to rise out of the financial crisis which the world is in today. The crisis is certainly not over, despite the government propaganda and economic window dressing that is being applied. Quite likely we have only seen the end of the first Act in what is going to be a three part drama lasting about nine more years.

In particular, the understanding of money and monetary theory is still in its infancy, having been sidetracked by the ideologues in the service of corporatism and big government. In fairness, economics is difficult because there are an enormous amount of variables, and the time lags are highly significant and varied. The fact that economics is a social science with a profound impact on public policy decisions does not help advance academic research. It does seem that the field has a surfeit of economists for hire who often seem to produce studies in order to support pre-ordained conclusions and biases. The average person can only mouth the opinions given to them by television and these studies as 'proofs' of the opinions they hold so dear. Their judgement is easily led in this, since it has no depth.

Economics is a subject rarely taught in the general curriculum. A person reads a few articles by supposedly learned men, and thinks themselves in a position to pronounce broad judgements for or against anything. Those who would appear informed enjoy repeating slogans and cartoons of thought to support their biases, which they themselves do not really understand, but draw emotional comfort from them. The irony is that they are so often arguing nonsense, and against their own best interests. Such is the power of propaganda to hold up caricatures and denounce them, and energize the public to enslave themselves.

Most discussions which I read get the Japanese economic experience all wrong. There is a complete misunderstanding of the roots of their deflation, the bubble as it was occurring, their long deflation and national stagnation, the single party political system and oligarchic economic structure, and the tremendous psychological impact which defeat had on the Japanese national psyche at the end of World War II.

As I have pointed out before, deflation and inflation are part of a policy decision in a purely fiat regime. The bias is to expansion as it is in all Ponzi schemes. People constantly create artificial rules regarding the inability to expand the money supply at will. Their minds cannot accept that something which they value so highly is created out of thin air by the monied interests.

The assumptions one makes when engaging in economic analysis are all important. Data is often sketchy and selective. People take naive examples and extrapolate them into real-life scenarios, crushing their complexity. This is due to the weakness of their model.

I think the field will progress more quickly once some new insights are made, and a new model, or skeleton if you will, is struck that allows the mathematicians to begin to flesh it out again.

For now, at least in my opinion, most economic thought is impoverished since the revolutionary insights of Keynes and so many others in response to the world depression of the 1930's. The jargon that currently passes for knowledge is a sign of decadence. I find all of the schools to offer little more than caricatures of what is a highly complex and richly interactive system.

My personal opinion is that Japan will not collapse until its export mercantilism collapses, or the average age of the overly homogeneous population strangles its ability to maintain a high savings rate and a ready market for government debt at artificially low prices.

I expect the UK and a portion of the european region to founder first, and then perhaps China, which appears to be an enormous bubble, an accident waiting to happen. Its collapse may be a precipitant to collapses in the developed world. The US dollar will have its day to devalue into a reissuance, but perhaps not until Europe and the UK are sorted out first. But the dollar is a doomed currency, the vanity of vanities. All fiat currencies are doomed; they are invariably the victims of human willfulness.

The adulation which the media and financiers had showered on Mussolini and Hitler and their economic recoveries in the 1930's was widespread, as it was for Japan Inc. in the 1980's, and for China today. The crowd always gets it wrong, but it is surprising how often the monied interests and the professionals get it wrong as well, and remain stubborn in their misjudgement until they are overwhelmed by its consequences. Or perhaps that is their intention. Who can say, who can truly 'think like a criminal.' You are a prisoner of reason, balance, and natural restraint. These are creatures of their own appetites, with a hole in their being which one can barely appreciate.

The Bankers will make the world an offer which they think it will not be able to refuse. One currency, and then one government. People being irrational are not likely to take that deal, once again.

There are those who say that they very sure what is coming, what will happen, what the future will bring. For the most part they are speaking out of fear and false pride. The only certainty is that if they really knew what is going to happen, they would cast themselves down from high places in despair.

Grab something solid and hang on to it, and to the faith that sustains you. Do not be distressed if it feels as though the world has lost its reason, and is made blind, and all is deception and trial, for this is part of the process which has begun. If a war comes, then the world will lose its ability to reason in its temporary madness. We are in for a rough ride, and revelations of what is life and what is nothingness, what is true and what is false.

“When pride comes, then comes disgrace. But with disgrace comes humility, and with humility comes wisdom. The humility of the righteous will guide them, but the sly illusions of the proud will destroy them." Prov 11

People will ask, and I can only say that I do not know if this is the end time, as no one can know this. What does it matter, since surely we are all heading towards the last things and a judgement, at our own pace. But it may certainly feel like it is something more general, more momentous, at some point before our blasphemous generation puts itself back into balance with God and nature again, and the crisis has past.

As the song says, "You ain't seen nothing yet."

How to Live Before You Die by Steve Jobs

Japan Times
Government Debt Crisis: Bubble prophet fears new disaster
By REIJI YOSHIDA
March 19, 2010

Economist Noguchi warns soaring public debt may bankrupt Japan, bring back hyperinflation

Prominent economist Yukio Noguchi is one of the few who correctly predicted the collapse of Japan's bubble economy in 1987, warning the preceding euphoria was based on a major distortion in land prices.

Now the doomsday prophet is making another terrifying prediction: Japan is likely to be devastated by a snowballing public debt that will bankrupt its government and trigger catastrophic hyperinflation.

"There is little hope," Noguchi said in an interview with The Japan Times at Waseda University's Graduate School of Finance in Tokyo. "Japan's fiscal conditions are so bad, it can no longer be fixed without causing inflation. I'm very pessimistic."

Noguchi is not the only one deeply fretting the debt.

They may still be a minority, but an increasing number of economists and market players are voicing deep concerns about Japan's fiscal sustainability and fear catastrophe may strike in the near future.

Compared with Greece, Japan's gross government debt is far worse, at 181 percent of gross domestic product — the highest among the developed countries. Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio is 115 percent.

Japan's present debt-to-GDP ratio is only comparable with what it was at the end of World War II. At that time, the only way the government could reduce the debt was through hyperinflation, which wiped out much of the people's wealth with skyrocketing prices.

"I can't tell exactly what will happen (this time), but what actually happened after the war was that the price level surged 60 times in just over four years," Noguchi said.

"If the same thing happens again, a ¥10 million bank account will have the same net value of just ¥100,000 today. It's actually possible," he warned.

The alarmists even include Ikuo Hirata, chief editorial writer of the Nikkei business daily.

Hirata predicts the huge debt will eventually force the Bank of Japan to purchase Japanese government bonds on a massive scale, eroding market confidence and pushing up long-term interest rates.

A rise in long-term interest rates of even a few percentage points would sharply increase debt-servicing costs on the bonds and critically damage the government's already precarious finances.

"The curtain of the tragedy will be raised next year," Hirata warned in a Nikkei article on Dec. 21.

Pessimists like Noguchi and Hirata are still in the minority — at least for now. The yield on 10-year JGBs, their barometer, hasn't indicated any trouble yet.

"Talk of a massive JGB bubble — let alone default — is far-fetched," the Financial Times said in its Feb. 8 editorial titled "Japan's debt woes are overstated."

The editorial pointed out that, for a long time, JGB yields have been effectively fixed at the ultralow level of around 1.3 percent — compared with the 3.6 percent yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds and the 4 percent for its counterpart in Britain as of Thursday.

"Ninety-five percent of Japan's debt is domestically owned. Fickle foreigners have almost no sway. Indeed, Japan's problem is still an excess of savings," the FT said.

"For some time yet, the government will not find it hard to secure buyers for JGBs. Japan's debt problem will be worked out in the family."

But most experts, including those at the International Monetary Fund, agreed that Japan's midterm future is shaky, and that the government could face difficulty financing its public debt in around 10 years.

In a July report, the IMF warned that Japan may find it "difficult" to finance its debt domestically toward 2020 because household savings are expected to keep falling in line with its rapidly graying population and declining birthrate.

Households maintained an average savings rate of more than 10 percent in the 1990s, much higher than in other developed countries. But as the aging workforce started tapping their assets to support retirement life, the savings rate — which supports Japan's fiscal deficit — fell to 2.2 percent in fiscal 2007, according to IMF figures.

Households directly and indirectly account for the financing of at least 50 percent of all outstanding JGBs, mainly through accounts and other assets at banks, Japan Post Bank and pension funds, the IMF said.

The IMF simulation indicates gross public debt could exceed household financial assets as early as 2019, which would likely force the government to seek more JGB buyers abroad, probably with a higher interest rate, since foreign investors in general demand a higher return on bonds than the ultralow 1.3 percent offered by Japan.

"The results indicate that domestic financing will likely become more difficult toward 2020, while other sources of fundings are available, including from overseas," the report said.

Masaya Sakuragawa, professor of finance at Keio University in Tokyo, recently conducted a simulation on the sustainability of the nation's public debt. His conclusion is that the only way to save Japan from bankruptcy is to drastically raise the politically unpopular consumption tax to at least 15 percent — a level he describes as "a rather optimistic scenario."

"If the debts keep increasing at the current pace, there is a possibility that (Japan) will face big trouble in around 10 years," Sakuragawa said.

The simulation examined two scenarios. The first hikes theconsumption tax to 10 percent by raising it a point a year from fiscal 2014 to 2018. The second hikes it to 15 percent, raising it over a longer period, from fiscal 2014 to 2023.

Under the 10 percent tax scenario, the debt expands forever, making sovereign bankruptcy inevitable. But the 15 percent scenario starts bringing the debt to heel in 2025.

Sakuragawa admitted the simulations weren't that realistic because they are based on some optimistic assumptions: that the social security budget won't drastically expand, interest rates will remain low, and the economy will keep growing at an annual pace of 1.5 percent.

The professor argued that a more drastic increase in tax revenues will be needed to save Japan from going insolvent, a crisis he says would wipe out much of the value of JGBs and trigger a domestic financial panic.

"The possibility is high that panic like a run on banks would break out. People would try to withdraw their money, but banks would go insolvent because they wouldn't have enough assets anymore," Sakuragawa said.

According to Sakuragawa, a dramatic rise in the consumption tax is the only viable option. Economists agree that, compared with other taxes, the sales tax would have the least impact on potential economic growth because the burden would be thinly spread to all taxpayers, he said.

Tax hikes, especially in the sales levy, are always a political taboo. When the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party introduced and then later hiked the consumption tax, it took a drubbing at election time. Even the LDP's Junichiro Koizumi — the most popular prime minister in recent memory — pledged not to touch the sales tax for fear of triggering a voter backlash.

"Koizumi should have raised the consumption tax. He had such high popularity, but he still did not want to raise the tax," said a former senior government official who was one of his closest aides.

"Japan's finances are in a stalemate. There will be no way out," he said.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, head of the ruling Democratic Partyof Japan, has pledged not to raise the consumption tax for at least four years, although key politicians in both the ruling and opposition camps have started discussing the urgency of fiscal reconstruction.

Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Naoto Kan surprised the public last month by floating the idea of starting discussions as early as this month on a sales tax hike.

Kan has pledged to adopt a midterm fiscal policy framework by June and reach a conclusion on "fundamental tax reforms" by the end of March 2012. Market players are keen to see what strategy the government maps out for fiscal reconstruction.

Kan, however, told the Upper House Budget Committee on March 4 that he will stick with an expansionary budget to prop up the economy for at least "one or a few more years." He also said it is still too early in the global slump to start talking of an "exit strategy" to mop up liquidity.

"If we shift to an exit strategy too early, the results will be much worse," Kan told NHK on March 8, signaling that an immediate switch to fiscal austerity could throw cold water on the economy and reducetax revenues even further.

Keio University's Sakuragawa and many other fiscal experts remain skeptical about the government's financial future. He said the public and politicians will avoid taking bold action on government finances until a shock hits the JGB market and starts pushing up long-term interest rates.

"So the scenario that I hope will happen is that Japan will face a minor crisis first, and the people will finally realize that a government bankruptcy will have a catastrophic impact on them," he said.

"Basically, Japanese people are good (at grasping situations). So they will eventually be willing to accept a rise in the tax," Sakuragawa said.

Debt Saturation in the US Dollar Economy

The debt must be liquidated and income in the form of real wages must increase to bring this relationship back into balance.

This is going to be a dangerous path for the US monetary authority to tread, because a misstep will lead to an inflationary spiral that will surprise most economists as did the stagflation of the 1970's, which up until that point was considered to be almost impossible according to the prevailing theory of that day.

The financial engineers will keep at this until they hit they wall. If we were not in the car with them it might be a more interesting exercise to observe. The answer of course is to get out of the car as best you can.

Think of debt as a surrogate for the creation of money, in its various forms, for that is what it is. What this chart is showing is that money being creating is aenemic, and a trend that looks very much like the 'law of diminishing returns.'

This is the well spring of monetary inflation, that is, the power of money to create some substance to back it. The more dollars that are printed, the weaker their backing, without an economic vitality created by savings, investment, and labor.

This is why I would say that the US dollar is an obvious death spiral. I would not say that its demise is inevitable, merely likely.



Chart from Nathan's Economic Edge

On Monetary Inflation and M3

From a chatboard frequented on the occasional break from the kitchen.

Q. A Question for the Inflationists

"The government no longer tracks M3 because of its expense to generate (yeah, right) but private groups still do and it has basically fallen since the stock market entered its bear market a couple of years back. So by definition, do we have inflation or deflation? Gold driven to new highs could be more about gold fever than real inflation."

I usually try to avoid conversations that start this way, with a label and a challenge, since it generally implies an exchange of what are more like religious beliefs, from the opposing 'isms.' As an monetary agnostic, I am usually in the middle of two groups with ardently held beliefs, and a range of impassioned arguments, good and bad. But knowing the person who asked it, I think it is a sincere question, and so here is my answer, for what it is worth.

Within a relatively pure fiat currency system the conditions of inflation and deflation, and the broad range in between, are largely the result policy and fiscal decisions, constrained for the most part only by the acceptability of the bond and the dollar and the tolerance of the people.

Regarding M3, it is the eurodollar component that is primarily missing, and Williams and my friend Bart estimate it. I have discussed the difficulty of that and their specific methods with them. I estimate the eurodollar s well, from the BIS and TIC reports, for another reason. It is my measure of dollar demand from overseas, the sole cause of the last dollar rally that was sustained, the eurodollar short squeeze. But one can look at MZM or M2 and see the same trends essentially. Money Supply: A Primer

Money supply alone is not the sufficient to measure monetary inflation or deflation. That is like asking if someone is overweight, if they weigh XX pounds, without specifying their height. Are they four feet or six feet tall? One meter or two meters? It obviously matters.

The measure of monetary inflation is by definition money supply in relation to something else. If nothing else, to population growth or decline, one might imagine, even if one cannot measure economic vitality, or stagnation. As an aside, it is a curious fact of history that the Plagues decimated the people of Europe, but hard wealth and the land remained. So the survivors were richer per capita, helping to create the relief and ebullience that sparked the Renaissance.

Money supply is relative to demand, and potential money supply to potential demand. Even though money supply may not be growing, demand may be contracting faster than it is not growing. If one looks at GDP, and the Velocity of Money which is nothing more than GDP divided by some nominal measure of defined money, domestic demand is slack. And from non-domestic sources, demand for the dollar reserve currency is weaker than in years past.

But there is a funny thing about potential money supply. It can grow quietly in assets, stored in investments and other less repositories of value, and then spring into action relatively more quickly, when wealth is converted to money, the medium of exchange.

Money as the medium of exchange, the note of zero duration, is a very imperfect store of wealth, when real short term rates of return are negative. So the market does not value it, except perhaps for the daily needs, diminished, and a safe haven from unknown risk, and a refuge from bonds of longer duration whose returns may be even worse.

Monetary inflation is deceptively simple, and immensely more complicated than the average person can allow, and the pundit will admit.

Credit is not money. Debt is not money. They are methods of creation of money, of financing the money used in an enterprise.

Money is the exchange, wealth in action, the others potential for transactions. Money bridges the gap between stores of supply and stores of wealth. Money moves, and goods and wealth are exchanged, and then stored again. Money supply is a snapshot of a dynamic process.

Credit/debt destruction are the preoccupation for the deflationary camp. Yes, they are important sources for the creation of money, over which the central bank exercises a remarkable degree of control, despite their occasional and highly disingenuous denials. As credit is destroyed, by writeoffs for example, potential sources of money are negated. But the real question is, what other mechanism for the creation of money remain, perhaps methods that have not been recently used, because they did not need to be used.

One very fine example of this is the method by which the Bernanke Fed expanded its monetary base, to a degree not seen since 1933. The monetary base is high powered money, because it is supposed to represent a pure financial asset, zero risk. Certainly more leveragable than a collaterized debt obligations. The Fed's balance sheet, and the Treasury's ability to issue sovereign debt based on that balance sheet, are the sorcerer's stone. Touch even the most toxic assets with them, as most recently seen in the case of AIG and Goldman Sachs, and they are now worth 100 cents on the dollar.

Debt/credit are one means of financing the enterprise. There is also equity. But a wise person will look at the organically generated flows of wealth in valuing the shares. Are you consuming more than you are creating? What are the future prospects for this flow of wealth? If there is no prospect of net positive wealth creation, then you are living on borrowed time, in a castle of sand, no matter how good the accounting tricks you are using to hide it from the shareholders.

One might look an an unconnected car battery and say, 'oh look it is benign.' But grab hold of each of its terminals with your bare hands while grounded, and see what happens then. And gold is in part measuring that potential, for the Fed and the monetary base and a resurgent economy to generate monetary expansion. There are lags of years involved in the process.

And this is the nature of Bernanke's challenge. He must at some point allow the economy greater access to his excess monetary reserves, and the swollen monetary base, but try to prevent the dollar and the bond from igniting. And gold is where the prudent seek at least a partial refuge while the central bankers conduct their experiments.

Is gold a bubble? It is said to be so by those who wish you to extend your willing hands, and grasp the poles of their mad experiment, without reserve, to help them measure the effect. And, of course, by those who merely to stand by and watch, and plan for their own per capita increase in wealth if you are subsequently reduced to toast.

"The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country." Edward Bernays, Propaganda, P.37

It's about confidence, isn't it? And perception, and custom, as in habit. The acceptability of the dollar and the bond by the world is the limiting factor on the ability of the Fed and Treasury to create money, managing its supply, by whatever means direct and indirect, by action or allowance, in a fiat currency.

The First Year of Obama's Failed Economic Policies: The Worst May Yet Be Avoided

"The banks must be restrained, the financial system reformed, and balance restored to the economy before there can be any sustained recovery."

We have been saying this for some time. The report below from Neil Barofsky says essentially the same thing.

"Even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car," Barofsky wrote.

The US is heading towards a double dip recession, and the next leg down may be more fundamentally damaging than before.

The reason for the decline will be the abject failure of the Obama Administration to address the roots of the problem, instead wasting trillions to prop up a banking system that is a useless distortion.

Worse than useless really, because it actually presents a huge negative influence by stifling the recovery, channeling funds to the crony capitalists and non-producing wealth extraction sector, who tax the people like feudal lords under license of a corrupt government.

So far, Obama has failed the people, but preserved the banks. A source of his failure has been his weakness in listening to Larry Summers and Tim Geithner, the Rubin-Clinton wing of Democrats, who have well established their incompetence and inability to act at a level suitable to their positions. They are captive to special interests, locked into the ways of thinking that brought the world to the point of crisis.

In response to the next leg down, Bernanke will monetize debt at an even more furious and clever pace, perhaps in alliance with the Bank of England and Bank of Japan. The ECB resists, and all who balk will be chastised by the monied powers and their demimonde, the ratings agencies and global banks. This is modern warfare of a sort.

We do not expect the corruption of the world's reserves to be so blatant that the inflation will immediately appear, except in more subtle manner. At some point it may explode, especially if Ben is particularly good at concealing its subtle growth.

Monetary inflation is the growth of the money supply in excess of the demands of the real economy, not nominal growth of the supply. The US has been shifting its growth into the reserves of other central banks for the past twenty years or so, and those eurodollar present an overhang that will egulf the Treasury should they come home to roost too quickly. The great nations see the US problem, most surely. The question is how to handle it, gracefully, since the US is still the world's sole superpower, and given to covert pre-emptive action when it feels threatened.

It is not a pretty picture. We had high hopes for Obama, because he was capable of rising to the challenge. He had the backing of his people. And he is choosing failure, for whatever reason. That is certainly is the template of a modern tragedy.

“Given the same amount of intelligence, timidity will do a thousand times more damage than audacity.” Karl von Clausewitz

ReviewJournal
Watchdog: Bailouts created more risk in system
By DANIEL WAGNER and ALAN ZIBEL
AP Business Writers

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The government's response to the financial meltdown has made it more likely the United States will face a deeper crisis in the future, an independent watchdog at the Treasury Department warned.

The problems that led to the last crisis have not yet been addressed, and in some cases have grown worse, says Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general for the trouble asset relief program, or TARP. The quarterly report to Congress was released Sunday.

"Even if TARP saved our financial system from driving off a cliff back in 2008, absent meaningful reform, we are still driving on the same winding mountain road, but this time in a faster car," Barofsky wrote.

Since Congress passed $700 billion financial bailout, the remaining institutions considered "too big to fail" have grown larger and failed to restrain the lavish pay for their executives, Barofsky wrote. He said the banks still have an incentive to take on risk because they know the government will save them rather than bring down the financial system.

Barofsky also said his office is investigating 77 cases of possible criminal and civil fraud, including crimes of tax evasion, insider trading, mortgage lending and payment collection, false statements and public corruption.

One case concerns apparent self-dealing by one of the private fund managers Treasury picked to buy bad assets from banks at discounted prices. A portfolio manager at the firm apparently sold a bond out of a private fund, then repurchased it at a higher price for a government-backed fund. A rating agency had just downgraded the bond, so it likely was worth less, not more, when the government fund bought it. The company is not being named pending the outcome of Barofsky's investigation.

Barofsky renewed a call for Treasury to enact clearer walls so that such apparent conflicts are less likely.

Treasury said it welcomed Barofsky's oversight but resisted the call to erect new barriers against conflicts of interest. The new rules "would be detrimental to the program," Treasury spokeswoman Meg Reilly said in a statement. The existing compliance rules "are a rigorous and effective method of protecting taxpayers," she said.

Much of Barofsky's report focused on the government's growing role in the housing market, which he said has increased the risk of another housing bubble.

Over the past year, the federal government has spent hundreds of billions propping up the housing market. About 90 percent of home loans are backed by government controlled entities, mainly Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Housing Administration.

The Federal Reserve is spending $1.25 trillion to hold down mortgage rates, and millions of homeowners have refinanced at lower rates.

"The government has stepped in where the private players have gone away," Barofsky said in an interview. "If we take government resources and replace that market without addressing the serious (underlying) concerns, there really is a risk of" artificially pushing up home prices in the coming years.

The report warned that these supports mean the government "has done more than simply support the mortgage market, in many ways it has become the mortgage market, with the taxpayer shouldering the risk that had once been borne by the private investor."

Barofsky's report echoed concerns raised by housing experts in recent months, as home sales and prices rebounded. They warn that the primary reason for the turnaround last year has been billions of dollars in federal spending to lower mortgage rates and prop up demand.

Once that spigot of cash is turned off, they caution, the market will be vulnerable to a dramatic turn for the worse. Daniel Alpert, managing partner of investment bank Westwood Capital, wrote in a report that national home prices are bound to fall 8 to 10 percent below the lows of last spring.

"The lion's share of the remaining decline will occur in markets that saw sizable bubbles but have not yet retrenched," he wrote.

Officials from the Obama administration counter that massive federal intervention has helped the housing market stabilize and prevented more dire consequences.

Barofsky's report also disclosed that, while the Obama administration has pledged to spend $75 billion to prevent foreclosures, only a tiny fraction - just over $15 million - has been spent so far. Under the Making Home Affordable program, only about 66,500 borrowers, or 7 percent of those who signed up, had completed the process as of December.

He said the key to preventing future crises is to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, create and improve loan underwriting and supervision of banks. He stopped short of endorsing specific proposals for overhauling financial regulation, but said many of the proposals would go far to improving the system.

Ron Paul On Bernanke and the Fed

November Non-Farm Payroll Report - It's Alive!

It's Alive! Well, Ben at least made the frog jump in response to repeated jolts of the dollar electric.

As you may have already heard, the US Non-Farm Payrolls Report for November came in better than expected with a loss of only 11,000 jobs, as compared to expectations of a loss of 111,000. And on cue, right after the Jobs Summit. The One is in Pennsylvania today claiming Economic Mission Accomplished. Now that's entertainment!

The economy has responded to Ben's monetary lightning. It has moved after an expansion of the monetary base that has not been seen since the early stage Great Depression, and a dollar devaluation which is still working its way through the system.

More importantly this sets the trend that the government wishes to sustain. Remember, we are not adding jobs, and especially permanent jobs that pay a solid living wage; we are losing jobs less quickly, and adding back marginal and temporary jobs for manufacturing jobs that continue to bleed out.

But for now that is enough for the markets it appears.



Most importantly it creates a definite bottom in the long term jobs trend.



The imaginary jobs report, aka the BLS Birth Death Model, is ticking along as a 'plug' in the numbers without a corresponding reaction to the underlying economy. The number did have an inordinate impact this month of November because of the slight seasonal adjustment. As you know the Birth Death model is added to the raw number prior to seasonality.



This chart makes the trends clear, but also shows the convergence between the raw and adjusted numbers in November. This is divergence is going to become a yawning gap as the BLS adjusts for seasonal hiring. There is a lot of temporary hiring for the holiday season in the US, and these jobs are eliminated in January. So the BLS adjusts the raw number significantly higher.



The improvement in the unemployment rate was largely due to people dropping off the radar of the government as their benefits run out. You can see this if you look at their estimate of the population of available workers. The number is shrinking, and the people drop into the 'discouraged' category.

This is revealed by what is called the "Labor Participation Rate." It dropped in November from 65.1% to 65%. Less people are working against a more stable measure of the population, civilian workers over the age of 16 that have not disappeared, at least as far as the government is concerned.



The question now is sustainability. The Fed and Treasury have jolted the corpse of the US economy back into a semblance of life. But can it sustain itself without a continuing printing of money to the point of hyperinflation?

Watch the median wage, and the actual spending numbers. This will tell us if the monster has a pulse of its own, and can be taken off the Fed's lightning. And if it is, what is it most likely to do once it gains momentum?

Deflation is rather unlikely unless there is an exogenous shock or a major policy error of tightening rates too quickly, almost deliberately. As this would be economic suicide we assume Ben will not jump off the ledge.

We also assume this will help Ben's nomination for a second term. And will make it highly difficult for Obama to wring another stimulus out of the Congress.

But, has the Bernanke Fed discovered the means to permanent prosperity for all? Is it enough to print money and through it from helicopters, if even to only a select few corporations? What are the unintended consequences yet to emerge?

The stage is being set for stagflation, if not a hyperinflation as John Williams puts forward fairly well in his latest special report from 2 December. We are still skeptical of that outcome.

Draining the Swamp: The Fed's Tri Party Repo Machine

A triparty repo transaction is a transaction among three parties: a cash lender acting on behalf of all holders of dollars (the Fed), a borrower that will provide collateral (dodgy debt holder in shaky financial condition), and a clearing bank, most likely a primary dealer like J.P. Morgan, which is only too happy to collect its fees as an agent of the Fed.

The triparty clearing bank provides custody (agency) accounts for parties to the repo deal and collateral management services. These services include ensuring that pledged collateral meets the cash lenders’ requirements, pricing collateral, ensuring collateral sufficiency, and moving cash and collateral between the parties’ accounts. What if any liabilities the clearing bank such as J.P.Morgan might obtain for the mispricing of risk remain undisclosed, but are probably negligible at worst.

This is the method of obtaining toxic assets from the books of non-primary dealers, and providing stability and liquidity from the aggregate value of all dollar holders to cover the misdeeds of diverse financial institutions and other favored parties.

In other words, the Fed is draining the financial debt swamp and toxic waste dumps into your basement, if you hold Federal Reserve Notes. Your IRA's, your 401k's, your savings, as long as you hold Federal Reserve Notes, which are claims on their balance sheet loosely backed by the Treasury. When the Fed's balance sheet contained nothing but Treasuries and explicity backed agencies that relationship was firmer. Now, we are into the realm of make believe and Timmy's credibility.

The Fed pledges Morgan assure them that there will be no radioactive material in the sludge pond headed your way, and levels of carcinogenic and toxic contamination will be within levels that they believe are adequate based on the non-binding estimates.

In practice the Fed has a defaults account on its book for the shortfalls from fat valuations due to the toxic debt it has already assumed on your behalf.

The source and composition of the sludge will remain a secret among the bankers, without oversight. This seems like taxation without representation, at least for holders of dollars that are US citizens, since the Fed is engaging in the expenditure of public money without hearings, votes, public oversight, or controls. The Fed seeks to become a financial Star Chamber, dispensing 'justice' as it pleases.

WSJ
Tri-Party Repo Could See 1st Round Of Reforms By Year-End
By Deborah Lynn Blumberg
NOVEMBER 30, 2009, 5:20 P.M. ET.

NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--Progress is being made in reaching agreement on a first round of reforms for the crucial tri-party repo market and details could be revealed as early as the end of this year, according to people familiar with ongoing discussions.

The reforms, which focus on margin requirements and intraday credit, are a first step in making security repurchase transactions more secure and preventing this $4.3 trillion over-the-counter market, where firms raise cash against collateral, from becoming a source of instability for the broader financial system.

They also come at a time when the repo market will be in the spotlight as the Fed plans for the day when it will start to pull the massive amounts of cash it has extended to markets from the system. The Fed is planning to use reverse repo operations--selling dealers securities such as Treasurys for cash with the agreement to buy them back later at a higher price--as one tool to achieve that goal.

The drive to reform the repo market--whose smooth functioning is key to the health of the financial system--has recently gained traction, in part due to the expiry of the Fed's primary dealer credit facility in February 2010. The facility serves as the current borrowing backstop for the big banks that deal directly with the central bank. Without it, the banks will have to rely more on repo for funding, which adds to the need to strengthen its functioning.

According to one person involved with the talks, the New York Fed-sponsored Tri-Party Repurchase Agreement Infrastucture Task Force could issue a progress report on repo reform discussions and seek feedback from the broader market as early as December.

The New York Fed was unavailable for comment.

The reforms will focus on the tri-party repo market, which makes up the biggest chunk of the repo market. In this market, a clearing bank stands between the borrower and the lender, holding collateral and facilitating the trades. The two dominant clearing banks in the U.S. are J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and the Bank of New York (BK).

In a first step, reform will focus on steps that market participants can address without outside input: standardizing margin requirements and tackling the issue of the intraday extension of credit in the market. Longer-term reforms to reduce systemic risk in tri-party repo are still being debated.

Standardized, or minimum margin requirements, would add security for the two clearing banks. Higher margins could be required for certain types of securities, such as commercial paper, or high-yield debt, or for riskier banks.

Intraday credit has also been a top concern. Currently, for operational efficiency, the two clearing banks extend intraday credit on term repos, or repos longer than overnight, meaning they return cash to the lender and securities to the borrower each day even though the contract continues to run. That leaves the clearing bank on the line should either counterparty falter.

One possible solution is to bring the U.S. term repo market more in line with overseas markets, by not allowing term repos using less liquid securities, such as corporate debt, to unwind every day. Other transactions, such as those using the more liquid Treasury securities, would still unwind every day.

The need for repo reforms has been apparent to policymakers for years, but was paid greater heed after severe disruptions in the market during the recent financial crisis.

Borrowers, lenders, clearers, industry groups and the Fed came together in September to form the repo task force and have been meeting every few weeks since then. Members have been working on crafting an initial set of reforms that would help to protect the tri-party repo market from future financial market disruptions.

The Last Bubble

The purpose of monetary and fiscal stimulus in economics is similar to the use of anesthesia and antiseptics during an important surgical procedure to correct some systemic difficulty, some disease, some serious problem in a patient. They enable the procedure, help the patient get through it without excessive pain and death from infection or systemic shock.

To apply stimulus and the other monetization programs which the Treasury and the Fed and the Congress and the system of global trade settlements are now doing without enacting sigificant and serious systemic reform to correct the underlying problems, the disease itself, is like taking a patient with a life threatening condition, applying large amounts of anesthetic and antibiotics and antiseptics to keep them stable and quiet, but then refusing to perform the operation to correct the life threatening condition.

Because in this case the disease that is infecting the patient and consuming their life has bribed the physicians and hospital administrators and nurses to leave it alone. It wants to maintain the status quo as long as is possible.

The pulse of patient, their blood flow, is the dollar. And the dollar is laboring under serious difficulties. The disease is consuming it, and the Fed is adding clear plasma to replace it, but is unable to add vitality, the white and red blood cells. They cannot create life, only sustain its appearance.

The liquidationists, by the way, would simply take the patient off all medications, and see how well he can fight the disease while running on a treadmill, hoping his body can cure and correct itself on its own. If the patient is not too sick, this has worked in the past. But if the problem is systemic, if the disease is advanced, then the patient is likely to go critical and sustain a stroke, and a major loss of functionality, even death. Benign neglect might work, it might not. Sometimes the cure is worse than the disease when applied without a perceptive diagnosis.

The Obama Administration (the doctors) and the Congress of both parties (the hospital administrators) and banks (the hospital owners) and the mercantilist trade system most notably China and Japan (the medical suppliers) are failing to deal with the problems of the US economy at hand, merely applying the anesthetic and antiseptics, for which they are being paid handsomely as the hospital bills run higher and higher.

This may be the last bubble, the one that takes the patient to a hospice for long term care in a zombie like condition, or worse, to the morgue. It is the last bubble, malpractice of the highest order, the mother of all policy errors. Nothing is inevitable here except selective default most likely through inflation.

The banks must be restrained, and the financial system reformed, and balance restored to the economy before there can be any sustained recovery.

Associated Press
Third-Quarter U.S. Growth Revised Lower
November 24, 2009

WASHINGTON (AP) — The economy grew at a 2.8 percent pace last quarter, as the recovery got off to a slower start than first thought.

The government’s new reading on gross domestic product was not as energetic as the 3.5 percent growth rate for the July-September period estimated just a month ago.

The main factors behind the downgrade: consumers did not spend as much, commercial construction was weaker and the nation’s trade deficit was more of a drag on growth. Businesses also trimmed more of their stockpiles, another restraining factor.

The new reading on G.D.P., which measures the value of all goods and services produced in the United States — from machinery to manicures — was slightly weaker than the 2.9 percent growth rate economists surveyed by Thomson Reuters had expected.

Still, the good news is that the economy finally started to grow again, after a record four losing quarters. The bad news is that the rebound, now and in the months ahead, probably will be lethargic.

The worst recession since the 1930s is very likely over, but the economy’s return to good health will take time, Fed officials and economists say...

Money Supply and Demand, and the Monetization of Debt

The growth of the broad short term money supply remains strong for a slack economy, although not quite as robust as when there was a flight to quality out of equities and Ben did his moonshot with the Fed's balance sheet.



Demand for money? What demand? This is something new in the post World War II era.



Relative to the growth of bank credit, the growth of broad short term money as measured in MZM is outsized as the Fed intends it to be.



The limit of the Fed's ability to monetize various debt instruments already in existence is the value of the dollar relative to the purchasing power of the other major fiat currencies.



Do people realize that a monetization of the dollar is occurring? Some do.



As one might expect the velocity of money, which is the ratio of money supply to the aggregate demand for money (GNP), is very low. This is helping the Fed to keep inflation selectively low, because although there is a lot of money relative to bank credit demand, that increased money is not doing much chasing of goods. It seems to be flowing once again into financial assets, which is probably an artifact of where the money has been allocated. How many cars and meals can a wealthy person or corporation consume? They do not create consumption out of their excess, they increase their speculation and the acquisition of the means of future production.

As the velocity of money starts increasing then the Fed will have to change its stance on quantitative easing, which is really nothing more than the monetization of existing debt.

Krugman Declares "Mission Accomplished," Maginot Line Completed

The triumph of financial engineering based on an analysis of the past.

Conscience of a Liberal
The story so far, in one picture
By Paul Krugman
November 3, 2009

World industrial production in the Great Depression and now:

Jesse here. This chart is a bit deceptive because it compares two periods of time based on the start of the crisis. It would be interesting to compare the two crises from the start of the Fed's expansion of the monetary base. As I recall, the early 20th century Fed did not react this way until 1931 and did so in two stages. Ok, Ben was quick out of the starting gate with a massive quantitative easing. Score one for the Fed. They are quick on the draw when it comes to monetization.

And there is little hazard that Ben will tighten prematurely out of fear of inflationary forces, having learned at least that lesson from what might prove to be a simplistic historical comparison.

It would be unjust not to note that the 1930's Fed struggled a bit with the difficulties of an entirely different type of commercial banking structure and regulatory structure, and the restraints of a gold standard.

But at the heart of it, the comparison may be irrelevant. The genuine challenge in this era of fiat currency will be to avoid the 'zombification' of the economy, the appearance of vitality with none of the self-sustaining growth.

It may be discovered that the key to coming out of a crisis permanently is not how quickly and dramatically one inflates the money supply, or even how long one maintains it, and how many stimulus programs one can create, but rather how quickly and capably a country can reform, can change the underlying structures that caused the problem in the first place.

Japan has been doing it slowly because of its embedded kereitsu structure and government bureaucracy supported by a de facto one party system under the LDP. In the 1930's the impetus for reform was overturned by a strict constructionist Supreme Court and an obstructionist Republican Congress. The story of our time might be the perils of regulatory and political capture.
Before this Administration declares "Mission Accomplished" and high fives its victorious recovery, they may wish to consider that they have done the obvious quickly in one dimension, but have done very little to change the dynamics which created the crisis in the first place, choosing instead to support the status quo to a fault, partly out of ignorance and to some extent because of a pervasive and endemic corruption of the political process.

There are three traits that make a nominal bounce in production fueled by a record expansion in the monetary base a success: sustainable growth without subsidy, sustainable growth without subsidy, and sustainable growth without subsidy. And this can only be achieved by changing the game, reforming what was wrong with the system in the first place, if this is what caused the crisis.

Our forecast is that Ben and Team Obama are failing badly because they are fighting the last war, in the almost classic style of incompetent generals who lost the early stages of the Second World War because they were using the game plan from the First. And plans for a Vichy-style government establishing l'état financière seem to be well underway, in a general surrender of the goverance of the nation to the econorati.

For all its flaws, at least the Clinton Administration used to conduct polls to see which way the public was leaning, and took its cues from that. The Obama Administration blatantly ignores public outrage, and takes its calls from Wall Street, literally, and forms its policy and laws around what they want, or at most, will grudgingly accept.

Here Comes the Monetary Expansion Bubble

The best looking economy that debt money can buy. We have included some graphs to put this in perspective. But the bottom line is that the economy may be growing nominally based on an explosion in Federal Debt. We are almost certain that the debt is being applied in ways that will do no good, provide no sustained benefit, to anyone except a few narrow sectors and especially the FIRE sector.

Too bad the chain deflator is broken, but it may catch up on adjustments. These positive numbers, especially if there is an upside surpise, are due to an unprecedented monetary inflation, not seen since the early 1930's, and a bringing forward of future sales in automobiles through government programs.

We would submit that despite the myths that have been spread, the programs instituted by FDR were significantly effective in providing the impetus to lift the US out of the Depression. However, most of the programs were later overturned by the Supreme Court, and the Fed prematurely tightened its monetary policy, caused an 'echo slump' in the late 1930's.

There is a difference this time. FDR had accompanied his dollar devaluation (vis a vis its then gold standard, about 40%) and stimulus with programs that targeted job creation and reforms of the financial sector. There was the creation of the SEC, the advent of Glass-Steagall, and widespread investigations of the corruption of the late 1920's.

We are seeing little to none of that today, since the stimulus is largely in the form of monetary inflation and debt creation, with a small amount going to jobs, and the vast majority of the money flowing to a relatively few Wall Street banks.

Stay out of the way of the propaganda rally, but watch for the double dip W in real life.

Bloomberg
GDP Probably Grew as Stimulus Took Hold: U.S. Economy Preview
By Timothy R. Homan

Oct. 25 (Bloomberg) -- The economy in the U.S. probably grew in the third quarter at the fastest pace in two years as government stimulus helped bring an end to the worst recession since the 1930s, economists said before reports this week.

The world’s largest economy grew at a 3.2 percent pace from July through September after shrinking the previous four quarters, according to the median estimate of 65 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News. Other reports may show sales of new homes and orders for long-lasting goods increased.

Americans flocked to auto showrooms and real-estate offices last quarter to take advantage of government programs such as “cash-for-clunkers” and tax credits for first-time homebuyers. Growing demand caused stockpiles to keep falling, which will prompt companies to rev up assembly lines and help sustain the recovery into 2010 even as unemployment climbs.

“The recovery is off to a decent but unspectacular start,” said Joe Brusuelas, a director at Moody’s Economy.com in West Chester, Pennsylvania. “While another large drawdown in inventories will be a drag on third-quarter growth, it sets the stage for a longer and stronger upturn in manufacturing.”

The Commerce Department’s report on gross domestic product is due Oct. 29. The four consecutive decreases through the second quarter marks the longest stretch of declines since quarterly records began in 1947. The economy shrank 3.8 percent in the 12 months to June, the worst performance in seven decades.

Stocks Climb

Stocks have rallied as earnings at companies from Caterpillar Inc. to Morgan Stanley topped estimates. Profits exceeded expectations at about 80 percent of the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index that have released results, according to Bloomberg data. That marks the highest proportion in data going back to 1993. The S&P 500 closed at a one-year high on Oct. 19.
Consumer spending last quarter probably jumped at a 3.1 percent annual rate from the previous three months, the biggest gain since the first quarter of 2007, the GDP report is also projected to show.

September readings on household purchases, due from the Commerce Department on Oct. 30, may show the quarter ended on a soft note after the Obama administration’s car incentive expired the month before. Spending probably fell 0.5 percent last month as car sales slowed after jumping 1.3 percent in August, the biggest gain since 2001.

The so-called cash-for-clunkers program offered buyers discounts of as much as $4,500 to trade in older cars and trucks for new, more fuel-efficient vehicles. The plan boosted sales by about 700,000 vehicles, according to a Transportation Department estimate.

Homebuyer Credit

The administration’s $787 billion stimulus package, signed into law in February, included an $8,000 tax credit for first- time homebuyers that expires at the end of November.

New-home sales last month increased 2.6 percent to an annual pace of 440,000, the highest level since August 2008 and reflecting the boost from the credit, according to economists surveyed. The Commerce Department’s report is due Oct. 28.

Lawmakers in Washington are debating an extension of the credit through June, and are discussing expanding it to all buyers under an income cap.

A report from S&P/Case-Shiller home-price index due Oct. 27 may show home values in 20 U.S. metropolitan areas declined in the year ended August at the slowest pace since January 2008, according to the survey median.

More Orders

Orders for durable goods rose 1 percent in September, economists project the Commerce Department will report Oct. 28. A gain would be the fourth in the last six months and indicates companies are starting to invest in new equipment.

Business spending and housing “stand ready to provide the oomph necessary to generate continued optimism until consumer activity stabilizes,” said Guy LeBas, chief fixed-income strategist at Janney Montgomery Scott LLC in Philadelphia.

Optimism among U.S. consumers in October is forecast to rise even as unemployment probably also increased, economists said. The Conference Board’s confidence index, due Oct. 27, climbed to 53.5 from 53.1, according to the survey median.

The economy will likely grow at a 2.4 percent annual rate from October through December, according to a Bloomberg survey earlier this month. GDP will also expand 2.4 percent next year and 2.8 percent in 2011, the survey showed, compared with an average of 3.4 percent growth over the past six decades.

“This has been the mother of all recessions in our working lifetime,” Jim Owens, Caterpillar’s chief executive officer, said on a conference call last week. The Peoria, Illinois-based company, the world’s largest producer of backhoes and bulldozers, predicted on Oct. 20 that sales may rise as much as 25 percent next year.



You might be surprised to see this chart of GDP in the United States from 1929 to 1940. See The FDR-Failed Myth for more information. If there is a difference with our current monetary expansion, which is on a par with the Fed actions in 1933 and the exit from the domestic gold standard, it is that the vast majority of the liquidity is going directly to the banks this time, and not to the public and for specific employment projects. It is a New Deal for the wealthy financiers.