2008 Was the Third Worst Year for US Stocks Since 1896

1931 was the worst, but notice that 1930 was not far behind.

Ten Things We Might Expect to See in 2009

Madoffed: Dr. Doom of Solly's Heyday

Economist may be latest hurt in Madoff scheme
Wed Dec 31, 2008 6:05am GMT

(Reuters) - A prominent Wall Street economist... the latest people to have lost money on investments connected to accused swindler Bernard Madoff, according to media reports.

Economist Henry Kaufman lost several million dollars, which he had in a brokerage account with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities for more than five years, the Wall Street Journal said, citing Kaufman in an interview on Tuesday.

The president of financial consulting firm Henry Kaufman & Co said his Madoff loss was no more than a couple of percent of his entire net worth and immaterial to his financial well-being, the paper said.

Kaufman became known for correctly forecasting higher inflation and interest rates when he was chief economist with Salomon Brothers in the 1970s and 1980s, when he acquired the moniker "Doctor Doom."

Must Have Titles for the Deflation Section of Your Financial Library

Deflation by A. Gary Shilling (Paperback - 2002)

Deflation: How to Survive and Thrive in the Coming Wave of Deflation by A. Gary Shilling (Paperback - 1999)

Deflation: Why It's Coming, Whether It's Good or Bad, and How It Will Affect Your Investments, Business, and Personal Affairs by A. Gary Shilling, 1998

After the Crash : Recession or Depression : Business and Investment Stategies for a Deflationary World by A. Gary Shilling (Paperback - Mar 1988)

The World Has Definitely Changed by A. Gary Shilling ( Hardcover - 1986)

Is Inflation Ending: Are You Ready? A Sober Look At the Prospects for a Decline in Inflation by A. Gary Shilling and Kiril Sokoloff (Hardcover - Mar 1983)
20 Used & new from $0.01

The Fuel for a Speculative Rally but Not a Recovery

At some point we may stop confusing asset bubbles with economic growth.

In the meantime, we might expect the shallow and immature stewardship of the economy to continue, unreformed and unconstrained. We may get quite a bear market rally in the first quarter of 2009. Whether it is the bottom or a bottom will remain to be seen.

Without a sustained increase in the median hourly wage and significant reform in the financial system and a sustainable construct for international currency exchange and trade there can be no sustained recovery in the real economy.

Excess liquidity and a corrupt financial system provides the fuel for a speculative rally, but it is also the fuel for a greater crisis to come, the longer we maintain this monetary charade. The Fed is pouring gasoline on damp wood.

Still, we ought not to underestimate the power of the Fed, having recently witnessed a counter trend reflationary rally after the Crash of 2000-2 that lasted three years and reached new stock market highs, and a housing bubble that almost crashed the world economy. They appear to have a lot of fuel, from a variety of unconventional sources, and Bernanke has the willingness to use it.

Cash at 18-Year High Makes Stocks a Buy at Leuthold
By Eric Martin and Michael Tsang

Dec. 29 (Bloomberg) -- There’s more cash available to buy shares than at any time in almost two decades, a sign to some of the most successful investors that equities will rebound after the worst year for U.S. stocks since the Great Depression.

The $8.85 trillion held in cash, bank deposits and money- market funds is equal to 74 percent of the market value of U.S. companies, the highest ratio since 1990, according to Federal Reserve data compiled by Leuthold Group and Bloomberg.

Leuthold, Invesco Aim Advisors Inc., Hennessy Advisors Inc. and BlackRock Inc., which together oversee almost $1.7 trillion, say that’s a sign the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index will rise after $1 trillion in credit losses sent the benchmark index for American equities to the biggest annual drop since 1931. The eight previous times that cash peaked compared with the market’s capitalization the S&P 500 rose an average 24 percent in six months, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

“There is a store of cash out there that is able to take the market higher,” said Eric Bjorgen, who helps oversee $3.4 billion at Leuthold in Minneapolis. “The same dollar you had last year buys you twice as much S&P 500 as it did a year ago.”

Leuthold Group, whose Grizzly Short Fund returned 83 percent in 2008 thanks to bets against equities, said in its December bulletin to investors that stocks offer “one of the great buying opportunities of your lifetime...”

The ratio of cash on hand to U.S. market capitalization jumped 86 percent in the first 11 months of the year, the biggest increase since the Fed began keeping records in 1959, as the U.S., Europe and Japan fell into the first simultaneous recessions since World War II.

So-called money of zero maturity, the central bank’s measure of U.S. assets available for immediate spending, is mostly held by households, according to Richard G. Anderson, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis....

Any recovery will depend on a rebound in corporate profits and the economy after $30 trillion was wiped out from world equities this year, according to Frederic Dickson, chief market strategist at D.A. Davidson & Co. in Lake Oswego, Oregon. (At that's the rub, a speculative rally fueled by excess liquidity will fizzle and die if it is not accompanied by a recovery in real corporate profits, and that depends on an increase in consumption that is not dependent on additional consumer debt - Jesse)

Jobless claims reached a 26-year high this month, while economists surveyed by Bloomberg estimate household spending will fall 1 percent next year, the most since the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor. A 13 percent slump in the median home resale price in November from a year earlier was likely the largest since the 1930s, the National Association of Realtors said last week, damping speculation the housing market is close to a bottom.

‘Biggest Cannon’

Analysts estimate profits at S&P 500 companies will shrink 10.3 percent in the first three months of 2009 and 5.8 percent in the second quarter, bringing the stretch of earnings declines to a record eight quarters, Bloomberg data show. Gross domestic product will contract in the first half of the year before growth resumes in the third quarter, according to a Bloomberg survey of economists.

“The fuel supply is there, but people have to have a reason to use it,” said Dickson, who helps oversee about $19 billion. “The Fed fired the shot out of the biggest cannon they know. Now the question is, will it hit the right mark?”

This year’s slump has left S&P 500 companies valued at an average of 12.6 times operating profit, the cheapest since at least 1998, monthly data compiled by Bloomberg show...

The last time cash accounted for a larger proportion of market value was 1990. The ratio peaked at 75 percent in October of that year, after the savings and loan industry collapsed, Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. was forced into bankruptcy and the U.S. fell into a recession. The S&P 500 rallied 23 percent in six months and almost 30 percent in a year...

Dollar Assets and Liabilities in the International Banking System Update

On 2 October 2008 in The Dollar Rally and Imbalances in the US Dollar Holdings of Overseas Banks we said that:

When a multinational company deposits US dollar receipts from an export business in their domestic banks those deposits are frequently held in dollars... If those dollar assets decline because of a financial event as we are seeing today, the depositors may choose to withdraw their dollar deposit from the bank as they mature. This places the bank in an awkward position since the corresponding assets have deteriorated in value, but the nominal value of the certificate of deposit liability remains the same with the requisite interest accrual. As a result, a demand for dollars can be generated in the foreign country that is artificial but very real in terms of day to day banking operations. This is the 'artificial dollar short'

In the chart below we have updated the data from the BIS report to June of 2008, and the DX dollar index to today. In our October blog entry we forecasted that:

The resulting sharp rally in the US dollar is therefore likely to be an anomaly which will correct, and perhaps quite sharply, once the effect of the short term imbalances dissipates.

Although it is too early to say with certainty, it does appear that the hypothesis may be valid, and that the correlation is significant. The recent dollar rally was as the result of an artificial short squeeze resulting in an anomalous demand for dollars primarily in Europe.

The actions by the Federal Reserve and the foreign central banks to open their swap lines to relieve the dollar liquidity short squeeze appears to have been successful. We will see in the next series of BIS data how effective that effort has been, and if it will need to be continued as the imbalances are worked out of the system. As the ECB announced on September 13:

In order to facilitate the functioning of financial markets and provide liquidity in dollars, the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) have agreed on a swap arrangement. Under the agreement, the ECB would be eligible to draw up to $50 billion, receiving dollar deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; in exchange, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will receive euro deposits of an equivalent amount at the ECB. The ECB will make these dollar deposits available to national central banks of the Eurosystem, which will use them to help meet dollar liquidity needs of European banks, whose operations have been affected by the recent disturbances in the United States.

We assume that at some point the ECB and BIS will take steps to modernize the international currency system to remove its exposure to the fluctuations of a single currency and the need for ad hoc arrangements to facilitate the proper functioning of international trade. Although a crisis has apparently been averted for now, it serves to expose the artificiality of the existing currency regime which may exist but not be as noticeable or measurable under more common conditions.

Madoffed: Kevin Bacon and Kyra Sedgwick

Why do people trust enormous sums of money to a stranger without due diligence, often on the word of another person who they may know only indirectly?

A good part of it is reputation and past performance, and who that person knows.

So Kevin Bacon and Kyra Sedgwick, in a lapse of sound portfolio theory, entrusted a sizable share of their wealth to Bernie Madoff, and are now apparently regretting that decision.

The average person likes to read about celebrity events. It provides an excitement to what might otherwise be a dull period of life. It also makes the ordinary person seem fortunate, smart, to hear of the misfortunes of the rich and famous. Misery loves company, and there is a bit of the voyeur in all of us.

Who would trust their wealth to an opaque and inherently arbitrary store of wealth, based solely on past performance and general reputation?

You would of course.

Don't believe it? Check you wallet and you bank accounts. Where is the majority of your wealth being held, if not in US dollars and dollar related financial assets?

Its not the same thing eh? Let's see how you feel about it at this time next year when Zimbabwe Ben has the monetization machine up to ramming speed.


New York Magazine
Madoff’s Latest Victims: Kevin Bacon and Kyra Sedgwick
12/30/08 at 10:15 AM

...We'd heard that along with Hollywood boldfacers Jeffrey Katzenberg and Steven Spielberg, Bacon and his wife, Kyra Sedgwick, lost money in Madoff's devastating $50 billion Ponzi scheme, and Bacon's rep, Allen Eichorn, confirmed it for us.

"Unfortunately, your report is true," he wrote. He wouldn't elaborate on whether, as we'd heard, they'd lost everything except for their checking accounts and the land they own. "I can confirm that they had investments with Mr. Madoff — no further specifics or comment beyond that," he said, adding: "Please, let's not speculate or rely on hearsay."

But we can't help but speculate! Just think about it: Footloose money: gone. Wild Things residuals: gone. The Singles stash: obliterated. If there's anyone in Hollywood who didn't deserve this, it's Kevin Bacon and Kyra Sedgwick. Those two have worked. It sincerely pains us. At least they have The Closer to fall back on. (For the record I take absolutely no joy in their misfortune. They seem like fine people. I feel genuinely saddened by their misfortune, in the same way I would feel sorry for your misfortune if I knew you. They have a strong cash flow and will recover. You may not be as lucky. Take away a message. Diversify. - Jesse)

The United States of Ennui

Our friend at Some Assembly Required had an interesting reaction to the Wall Street Journal story about the Russian Professor who is predicting the breakup of the US into several independent groups of states:

"Some are predicting the USA will erupt and split in six or seven smaller nations. Nope, there is not enough gumption left in the US citizenry to mount a decent protest, much less massive separatists movements. More likely the US will simply thrash around a bit and then fade into irrelevance. Governments will be overthrown, in more places than you might suspect (think Europe). But the US populace will sit in front of the TV, waiting for someone to reward them with their god-given right to happiness and success."

We doubt that the US will become irrelevant for a long time, but it is hard to disagree with such a frank and insightful analysis of the American public. Our hallmark seems to be a deep and abiding boredom and self-absorption, a walking amnesia with an historical perspective measured in days, if not hours.

At times like these the Almighty will often send His people a wake-up call.

Dancing on a Precipice: The Tenuous Balance in Global Finance

“If you owe the bank $100 that's your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem.” Jean Paul Getty

We imagine J. Paul Getty would probably like to update that quotation to billions if he were still alive. We knew some people who subscribed to this notion that you keep borrowing until you gain a measure of control over your banks, since your default would be so painful to them. It is a tool of financial engineering roughly related to a passive form of extortion, a long con.

Here is an extended quote from a 29 December 2008 essay by Brad Setser titled The collapse of financial globalization...

"Both private capital inflows to the US and private capital outflows from the US have fallen sharply. They have gone from a peak of around 15% of US GDP to around zero in a remarkably short period of time …

Direct investment flows have continued. Other financial flows though have largely gone in reverse, with investors selling what they previously bought. In the third quarter foreign investors sold about $90b of US securities (excluding Treasuries) and Americans sold about $85 billion of foreign securities. And the reversal in bank flows on both sides (as past loans have been called) has been absolutely brutal.

This sharp fall has bearing on the bigger debate over the role global capital, global savings and foreign central banks played in helping to to create the conditions that allowed US households to sustain a large deficit for so long — and whether American and other policy makers should have paid more attention to the risks that came with the surge in foreign demand for US financial assets earlier this decade...

I think we now more or less know that the strong increase in gross capital inflows and outflows after 2004 (gross inflows and outflows basically doubled from late 2004 to mid 2007) was tied to the expansion of the shadow banking system.



It was a largely unregulated system. And it was largely offshore, at least legally. SIVs and the like were set up in London. They borrowed short-term from US banks and money market funds to buyer longer-term assets, generating a lot of cross border flows but little net financing. European banks that had a large dollar book seem to have been doing much the same thing. The growth of the shadow banking system consequently resulted in a big increase in gross private capital outflows and gross private capital inflows... (Hence the subsequent spike in the value of the dollar from the eurodollar short squeeze we have recently seen - Jesse)

Why didn’t the total collapse in private flows lead financing for the US current account deficit to dry up? That, after all, is what happened in places like Iceland — and Ukraine.

My explanation is pretty straightforward.

Central banks were the main source of financing for the US deficit all along. Setting Japan aside, the big current account surplus countries were all building up their official reserves and sovereign funds — and they were the key vector providing financing to the deficit countries."

The implications of this are rather profound. The much touted notion that the US is the preferred destination for private wealth, thus sustaining an out of balance trade deficit through a financial services economy, is rubbish at best, and propaganda at worst. It is rooted in the Dick Cheney nostrum that "Reagan proved that deficits don't matter."

What we have today is a very lopsided vendor financing arrangement, wherein the US is largely supported by China and Japan whose industrial policy currently recommends their support of a US debt that is increasingly unpayable.

If and when China and Japan are no longer able to support the continued growth of US deficit financing, the dollar and the bonds will contract (decrease) in value, and perhaps precipitously, like a house of cards. It is much worse than we had imagined, and more concentrated on these two countries, along with Saudi Arabia, than we had thought.

For now the balance is maintained because of self-interest and fear. But we cannot stress enough the highly artificial nature of the arrangement, and its inherent instability, now that the charade of sustained private investment flow is shown for what it is. There is no economic theory to support this model other than a distorted form of neo-colonial parasitism. Substitute US paper dollars for opium and you get the idea.

Japan and Saudi Arabia are understandable as virtual client states under US military protection, but we struggle with how China was taken into this arrangement which is so potentially destabilizing of their internal political and economic stability.

This is why the world has not developed a sound replacement for the dollar hegemony. It is because if they do, they must navigate around the probability, not possibility, of a collapse of their dollar reserves, and a dislocation of their own export driven economies, much worse than we might have imagined. It is not a matter of economic inventiveness; it has become a matter of will.

Who will be the first to flinch? History shows it is rarely a conscious decision, but rather some incident, an accident, some trigger event, even one so small, that it creates astonishment at the size of the avalanche it unleashes.

To make it clear and simple, this is the first evidence we have seen to suggest that hyperinflation is in fact possible in the US. As you know, we have been strongly adverse to the extremes in outcomes, both in terms of a sustained deflation and a significant hyperinflation.

That has now changed. The dollar is a Ponzi scheme, the waters of debt are overflowing the dam of artificial support, and only a few countries, two of them somewhat unstable, are holding back the deluge.

GMAC: Its Good to Be a Bank

"The bondage of fifteenth century serfdom has become the catalyst for causing the middle-class to grovel for survival. They mistakenly assumed that the business and political leaders would maintain a minimum concern for those whom they serve or lead." Warren B. Eller, 1931

“This country is governed for the richest, for the corporations, the bankers, the land speculators, and for the exploiters of labor.” Helen Keller

Without banking reforms and an equitable median hourly wage, the development of new variations of debt creation for the people to support the corporate status quo is futile, if not cruel.

Bloomberg
Treasury to Buy $5 Billion GMAC Stake, Expand GM Loan
By Rebecca Christie and Hugh Son

Dec. 29 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Treasury said it will purchase a $5 billion stake in GMAC LLC, the financing arm of General Motors Corp.

Treasury will also lend an additional $1 billion to GM so the automaker can participate in a rights offering at GMAC to support the lender’s reorganization as a bank holding company, the Treasury announced today. The loan is in addition to $13.4 billion the Treasury agreed earlier this month to lend to GM and Chrysler LLC.

Separately, GMAC said it has accepted all bonds tendered in a debt swap designed to reduce its debt load.

“Once the offers are settled, which we expect to do promptly, results will be disclosed,” said spokeswoman Gina Proia in an e-mail.

“The company intends to act quickly to resume automotive lending to a broader spectrum of customers to support the availability of credit to consumers and businesses for the purchase of automobiles,” GMAC said in statement.

GMAC had limited loans to buyers with the best credit ratings, cutting into GM’s sales.

The credit from the Treasury is under its Troubled Asset Relief Program and comes after the Federal Reserve last week approved GMAC’s application to become a bank holding company.

“This is part of our strategy to position GMAC for long term stability,’’ said Toni Simonetti, a spokeswoman for GMAC. “The reason we’re doing this is so we can provide credit to consumers; we’ll put these funds to use right away.’’

FDIC Guaranty

GMAC will “continue to pursue’’ other ways to boost liquidity, including applying for an Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. guaranty program and attracting retail deposits from consumers, Simonetti said. (We are all banks now - Jesse)

Becoming a bank makes it easier for GMAC to get federal aid and eases the threat of a collapse, which threatened to dry up credit for purchases of GM cars. Dealers depend on GMAC to finance about three-quarters of their inventory. Analysts have said the lender’s survival is a crucial step toward saving GM, which has said it may run out of cash.

GMAC joins more than 190 regional banks, commercial lenders, insurers and credit-card issuers seeking funds from the Treasury’s bailout program for financial firms. American Express Co., the biggest U.S. card company by sales, and CIT Group Inc., the biggest independent commercial lender last year, won capital infusions last week after converting into banks.

Slow Sales

With GM selling cars at the slowest pace in 26 years and the country in its worst housing crisis since the Great Depression, GMAC and its Residential Capital LLC unit have no way to revive their own revenue and have been shut out of credit markets. GMAC has $540 million of bonds due this month and another $11.6 billion that mature in 2009 and previously said it would cancel plans to become a bank if the debt swap failed.

The Fed has since granted approval before the swap was finished....

Japanese Economist Urges Selective Default on US Treasury Debt

Here is an intriguing proposal for a 'selective default' of US Treasury debt to head off a massive devaluation of the dollar, and to promote the US recovery from the ravages of its self-inflicted financial damage.

No matter how one wishes to describe it, the US will have to default on its sovereign debt, most likely on a selective basis, writing down the rest through an inflated dollar. The Japanese recognize this and are volunteering a tentative plan to accomplish it to support their industrial policy.

Although there is a potential for a voluntary debt forgiveness from Japan as a loyal client state, we wonder if the rest of the world will be inclined to accept an unreformed dollar hegemony.

Can the economic world so woefully lack the will, knowledge, and the imagination to develop a more equitable mechanism for international trade?

Financial reforms, although not even on the table yet, are certain to come with any sustained recovery. There has been nothing even seriously proposed yet as Bernanke and Paulson rush to supply fresh capital to prop up the status quo and aid their cronies on Wall Street.

We can surely do better than this.


Bloomberg
Japan Should Scrap U.S. Debt; Dollar May Plummet, Mikuni Says
By Stanley White and Shigeki Nozawa

Dec. 24 (Bloomberg) -- Japan should write-off its holdings of Treasuries because the U.S. government will struggle to finance increasing debt levels needed to dig the economy out of recession, said Akio Mikuni, president of credit ratings agency Mikuni & Co.

The dollar may lose as much as 40 percent of its value to 50 yen or 60 yen from the current spot rate of 90.40 today in Tokyo unless Japan takes “drastic measures” to help bail out the U.S. economy, Mikuni said. Treasury yields, which are near record lows, may fall further without debt relief, making it difficult for the U.S. to borrow elsewhere, Mikuni said. (We struggle a bit with the notion of Treasury yields falling without a substantial debt relief. One would think they would be increasing to uncomfortable levels as the risk of an involuntary default increases, unless the Fed plans to aggressively monetize them to peg the yield curve, trashing the Dollar in the process. - Jesse)

“It’s difficult for the U.S. to borrow its way out of this problem,” Mikuni, 69, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television broadcast today. “Japan can help by extending debt cancellations.” (We seem to have surpassed the Ponzi viability boundary. - Jesse)

The U.S. budget deficit may swell to at least $1 trillion this fiscal year as policy makers flood the country with $8.5 trillion through 23 different programs to combat the worst recession since the Great Depression. Japan is the world’s second-biggest foreign holder of Treasuries after China.

The U.S. government needs to spend on infrastructure to maintain job creation as it will take a long time for banks to recover from $1 trillion in credit-market losses worldwide, Mikuni said. The U.S. also needs to launch public works projects as the Federal Reserve’s interest rate cut to a range of zero to 0.25 percent on Dec. 16. won’t stimulate consumer spending because households are paying down debt, he said. (One would look for policies to increase the median hourly wage to facilitate this. So far we are seeing nothing, if not the opposite, to support this. - Jesse)

U.S. President-elect Barack Obama wants to create 3 million jobs over the next two years, more than the 2.5 million jobs originally planned, an aide said on Dec. 20. Obama takes office on Jan. 20.

Marshall Plan

Japan should also invest in U.S. roads and bridges to support personal spending and secure demand for its goods as a global recession crimps trade, Mikuni said.

Japan’s exports fell 26.7 percent in November from a year earlier, the Finance Ministry said on Dec. 22. That was the biggest decline on record as shipments of cars and electronics collapsed.

Combining debt waivers with infrastructure spending would be similar to the Marshall Plan that helped Europe rebuild after the destruction of World War II, Mikuni said.

“U.S. households simply won’t have the same access to credit that they’ve enjoyed in the past,” he said. “Their demand for all products, including imports, will suffer unless something is done.”

The plan was named after George Marshall, the U.S. secretary of state at the time, and provided more than $13 billion in grants and loans to European countries to support their import of U.S. goods and the rebuilding of their industries

Currency Reserves

The Japanese government could use a new Marshall Plan as a chance to shrink its $976.9 billion in foreign-exchange reserves, the world’s second-largest after China’s, and help reduce global economic imbalances, Mikuni said.

The amount of foreign assets held by the Japanese government and the private sector total around $7 trillion, Mikuni said.

Japan will also have to accept that a stronger yen is good for the country in order to reduce excessive trade surpluses and deficits, he said. The yen has appreciated 23 percent versus the dollar this year, the most since 1987, as the credit crisis prompted investors to flee riskier assets and repay loans in the Japanese currency.

“Japan’s economic model has been dependent on external demand since the Meiji Period” that began in 1868, Mikuni said. “The model where the U.S. relies on overseas borrowing to fuel its property market is over. A strong yen will spur Japanese domestic spending and reduce import prices, thereby increasing purchasing power.”

Yellow Dawg Howling

Cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of .... ?

Ponzi Nation

America has become more a debt 'junkie' - - than ever before
with total debt of $53 Trillion - - and the highest debt ratio in history.

That's $175,154 per man, woman and child - - or $700,616 per family of 4,
$33,781 more debt per family than last year.

Last year total debt increased $4.3 Trillion, 5.5 times more than GDP.
External debt owed foreign interests increased $2.2 Trillion;
Household, business and financial sector debt soared 7-11%.

80% ($42 trillion) of total debt was created since 1990,
a period primarily driven by debt instead of by productive activity.

And, the above does not include un-funded pensions and medical promises.

America's Total Debt Report - Grandfather's Economic Series

Since a picture is 'worth a 1000 words" here are a few charts for your consideration.

In a simple handwave estimate, one might say that the debt will have to be discounted by at least half. That includes inflation and selective defaults. The seductiveness of this chart is that things have continued on in their frenzied pace for so long, it seems like the norm. That is always a problem with chronic drunks and addicts; they rarely know when to quit, or can't, until they really hit the wall.



Nine out of ten Americans might understand that when the growth of your debt outrageously outstrips your income for so long, that something has got to give. The givers will most likely be all holders of US financial assets, responsible middle class savers, and a disproportionate share of foreign holders of US debt.



While the debtors hold the means of payment in dollars and the power to decide who gets paid, where do you think the most likely impact will be felt?

This is not intended as a rant, a screed in the pejorative sense, or anything else but a reasoned diagnosis based on the data as we find it.

We could be wrong, and we hope we are. Show us better data. The prognosis is not optimistic.

Here is a view of the debt data that is "optimistic" if you are willing to ignore the relative historic context and the huge amount of debts that are off the Federal balance sheet.



A dismissive reaction to this kind of forecast is understandable.

The doctor is always viewed as a 'party pooper' and a gloomy sort when he informs the uber-alpha hard drinking, stress generating, self-medicating, recreational drug=binging forty-something patient that their shortness of breath is emphysema, their blood pressure is soaring as quickly as their self-absorption, and that chest discomfort is a warning sign of a rapidly developing heart problem that could be a deal breaker if they do not change their lifestyle.

But, like most prognostic warnings go, it will be ignored with the dawn of a new day, a successful if awkward commute to work, and the anticipation of another evening's delight and binges yet to come. Until they don't.

It might be a good idea not to be a passenger with a recklessly self-destructive debt junkie at the wheel of your financial assets. Unless you are c0-dependent like Saudi Arabia, China and Japan or are one of the kids in the backseat. Then you have some serious decisions to make.

In the meantime buckle up, because Uncle Sugar-Daddy still has the keys to the car.

The Predator Class

Its interesting to read this essay from early 2006 today in the light of what we have seen in the intervening period. A number of people who might have dismissed this out of hand back then might see a little more truth behind the rhetoric today.

So, how can the political system reform itself? How can we reestablish checks, balances, countervailing power, and a sense of public purpose? How can we get modern economic predation back under control, restoring the possibilities not only for progressive social action but also—just as important—for honest private economic activity? Until we can answer those questions, the predators will run wild.

It is something to think about for the New Year, for all parties involved. FDR was denounced as a 'traitor to his class' at the time, but in reality he was one of the most insightful of leaders. If one views outcomes in other contemporary governments from 1916 to 1940, and considers what a Huey Long administration might have been as an example, the New Deal seems like a wise and appropriate political move for all involved.

Why are people so reluctant to believe that sociopaths and narcissists can use the power of the pen to prey on people? Because they are well spoken and organized? We would contend that these are the most dangerous of the emotionally warped with a need to acquire, dominate and control, because they are smarter and more calculating than the impulse murderers, burglars, rapists, thieves, and pedophiles.

There is a need for economic law and enforcement as there is a need for the less cerebral, hairy knuckled criminal law and enforcement. The notion that people become naturally good, rational and well-adjusted because they are wearing a suit is ludicrous, especially to anyone who has worked with many of those who move in the upper echelons of money and power.

Some of the scariest people we have ever met were articulate and pathologically driven borderline psychopaths with a need to acquire political and economic power. It is the focus of their illness that makes them powerful. They are not distracted by the diffusion of emotional responses that color most people's actions. They have a need, and the will to satisfy it, no matter what it takes.

As an aside, we have met many kind and gentle and thoughtful people in all walks of life, rich and poor. It is not the office that makes the person; it is their character. Class prejudice is mistaken and unjust, and there is always someone less fortunate than you who might view you as the object of their anger, no matter who you might be. The hypocrisy and injustice of prejudice and 'class warfare' knows few limits.

There will always be those at the extremes who need to 'take it to the limit,' with a well stocked foreign retreat in case things get ugly. But for most of us, restoring a sense of justice and order and putting the nation back into some kind of working balance will be high on the priority list, if not for ourselves, then for our families. Violence does not work, ever. The Constitution is a restraint that works both ways, against the predations of the powerful, but also as a shield against would-be Robespierres with their dark reigns of terror.

It is going to take a lot of hard work, and time. Its been a long time coming, it will be a long time gone. But it has been done before by those who created this nation, and it can be done to restore it again.

We are not doomed. Our situation is not hopeless. But the system is badly out of balance, and will have to be restored by meaningful reform. There will be inflation and selective defaults, real justice and show trials, innovation and false starts, disproportionate suffering, uncertainty and even some level of conflict. But eventually the accounts will be squared and we will gather ourselves together an move forward. The sooner we start, the sooner it will be over.

Mother Jones
The Predator State
By James K. Galbraith
May/June 2006 Issue


WHAT IS THE REAL NATURE of American capitalism today? Is it a grand national adventure, as politicians and textbooks aver, in which markets provide the framework for benign competition, from which emerges the greatest good for the greatest number? Or is it the domain of class struggle, even a “global class war,” as the title of Jeff Faux’s new book would have it, in which the “party of Davos” outmaneuvers the remnants of the organized working class?

The doctrines of the “law and economics” movement, now ascendant in our courts, hold that if people are rational, if markets can be “contested,” if memory is good and information adequate, then firms will adhere on their own to norms of honorable conduct. Any public presence in the economy undermines this. Even insurance—whether deposit insurance or Social Security—is perverse, for it encourages irresponsible risktaking. Banks will lend to bad clients, workers will “live for today,” companies will speculate with their pension funds; the movement has even argued that seat belts foster reckless driving. Insurance, in other words, creates a “moral hazard” for which “market discipline” is the cure; all works for the best when thought and planning do not interfere. It’s a strange vision, and if we weren’t governed by people like John Roberts and Sam Alito, who pretend to believe it, it would scarcely be worth our attention.

The idea of class struggle goes back a long way; perhaps it really is “the history of all hitherto existing society,” as Marx and Engels famously declared. But if the world is ruled by a monied elite, then to what extent do middle-class working Americans compose part of the global proletariat? The honest answer can only be: not much. The political decline of the left surely flows in part from rhetoric that no longer matches experience; for the most part, American voters do not live on the Malthusian margin. Dollars command the world’s goods, rupees do not; membership in the dollar economy makes every working American, to some degree, complicit in the capitalist class.

In the mixed-economy America I grew up in, there existed a post-capitalist, post-Marxian vision of middle-class identity. It consisted of shared assets and entitlements, of which the bedrock was public education, access to college, good housing, full employment at living wages, Medicare, and Social Security. These programs, publicly provided, financed, or guaranteed, had softened the rough edges of Great Depression capitalism, rewarding the sacrifices that won the Second World War. They also showcased America, demonstrating to those behind the Iron Curtain that regulated capitalism could yield prosperity far beyond the capacities of state planning. (This, and not the arms race, ultimately brought down the Soviet empire.) These middle-class institutions survive in America today, but they are frayed and tattered from constant attack. And the division between those included and those excluded is large and obvious to all.

Today, the signature of modern American capitalism is neither benign competition, nor class struggle, nor an inclusive middle-class utopia. Instead, predation has become the dominant feature—a system wherein the rich have come to feast on decaying systems built for the middle class. The predatory class is not the whole of the wealthy; it may be opposed by many others of similar wealth. But it is the defining feature, the leading force. And its agents are in full control of the government under which we live.

Our rulers deliver favors to their clients. These range from Native American casino operators, to Appalachian coal companies, to Saipan sweatshop operators, to the would-be oil field operators of Iraq. They include the misanthropes who led the campaign to abolish the estate tax; Charles Schwab, who suggested the dividend tax cut of 2003; the “Benedict Arnold” companies who move their taxable income offshore; and the financial institutions behind last year’s bankruptcy bill. Everywhere you look, public decisions yield gains to specific private entities.

For in a predatory regime, nothing is done for public reasons. Indeed, the men in charge do not recognize that “public purposes” exist. They have friends, and enemies, and as for the rest—we’re the prey. Hurricane Katrina illustrated this perfectly, as Halliburton scooped up contracts and Bush hamstrung Kathleen Blanco, the Democratic governor of Louisiana. The population of New Orleans was, at best, an afterthought; once dispersed, it was quickly forgotten.

The predator-prey model explains some things that other models cannot: in particular, cycles of prosperity and depression. Growth among the prey stimulates predation. The two populations grow together at first, but when the balance of power shifts toward the predators (through rising interest rates, utility rates, oil prices, or embezzlement), both can crash abruptly. When they do, it takes a long time for either to recover.

The predatory model can also help us understand why many rich people have come to hate the Bush administration. For predation is the enemy of honest business. In a world where the winners are all connected, it’s not only the prey who lose out. It’s everyone who hasn’t licked the appropriate boots. Predatory regimes are like protection rackets: powerful and feared, but neither loved nor respected. They do not enjoy a broad political base.

In a predatory economy, the rules imagined by the law and economics crowd don’t apply. There’s no market discipline. Predators compete not by following the rules but by breaking them. They take the business-school view of law: Rules are not designed to guide behavior but laid down to define the limits of unpunished conduct. Once one gets close to the line, stepping over it is easy. A predatory economy is criminogenic: It fosters and rewards criminal behavior.

Why don’t markets provide the discipline? Why don’t “reputation effects” secure good behavior? Economists have been slow to answer these questions, but now we have a full-blown theory in a book by my colleague William K. Black, The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One. Black was the lawyer/whistle-blower in the Savings and Loan and Keating Five scandals; he later took a degree in criminology. His theory of “control fraud” addresses the situation in which the leader of an organization uses his company as a “weapon” of fraud and a “shield” against prosecution—a situation with which law and economics cannot cope.

For instance, law and economics argues that top accounting firms will protect their own reputations by ferreting out fraud in their clients. But, as with Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom, at every major S&L control fraud was protected by clean audits from top accountants: You hire the top firm to get the clean opinion. Moral hazard theory shifts the blame for financial collapse to the incentives implicit in insurance, but Black shows that the large frauds were nearly all committed in institutions taken over for that purpose by criminal networks, often by big players like Charles Keating, Michael Milken, and Don Dixon. And there’s another thing about predatory institutions. They invariably fail in the end. They fail because they are meant to fail. Predators suck the life from the businesses they command, concealing the fact for as long as possible behind fraudulent accounting and hugely complex transactions; that’s the looter’s point.

That a government run by people rooted in this culture should also be predatory isn’t surprising—and the link between George H.W. Bush, who led the deregulation of the S&Ls, his son Neil, who ran a corrupt S&L, and Neil’s brother George, for whom Ken Lay sent thugs to Florida in 2000 on the Enron plane, could hardly be any closer. But aside from occasional references to “kleptocracy” in other countries, economic opinion has been slow to recognize this. Thinking wistfully, we assume that government wants to do good, and its failure to do so is a matter of incompetence.

But if the government is a predator, then it will fail: not merely politically, but in every substantial way. Government will not cope with global warming, or Hurricane Katrina, or Iraq—not because it is incompetent but because it is willfully indifferent to the problem of competence. The questions are, in what ways will the failure hit the population? And what mechanisms survive for calling the predators to account? Unfortunately, at the highest levels, one cannot rely on the justice system, thanks to the power of the pardon. It’s politics or nothing, recognizing that in a world of predators, all established parties are corrupted in part.

So, how can the political system reform itself? How can we reestablish checks, balances, countervailing power, and a sense of public purpose? How can we get modern economic predation back under control, restoring the possibilities not only for progressive social action but also—just as important—for honest private economic activity? Until we can answer those questions, the predators will run wild.

James K. Galbraith teaches economics at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin. He previously served in several positions on the staff of the U.S. Congress, including executive director of the Joint Economic Committee.

A Question Worth Considering for the New Year...

What is at the heart of the US financial crisis?

Is it that the US has been precipitously cut off from some foreign source of funding? Has there been an oil embargo, a supply shock imposed such as the one that triggered the financial crisis of the 1970's? Are the problems caused by some external change, some actor outside the system?

I think most will say the answer is 'no.' The problems are internal to the US, to its financial system.

So, how would you fix a system that has broken from an internal flaw in this way? Try more of the same, business as usual, apply fresh debt to a failed system based on a growing pyramid of debt without making any substantial changes?

The US financial system, the housing, equity and Treasury markets, are all Ponzi schemes, with the need for a constantly increasing source of fresh money to keep going. That funding is new debt, new dollars based on nothing produced, just the trust and confidence of the participants.

Would you fix the Madoff Ponzi scheme by giving Bernie more money, public money, to keep his payments flowing to his 'investors?'

I think most of us would say, no, no more money.

But what is the difference between that and what Paulson and Bernanke are doing today? Is there a graceful exit strategy? Have any serious reforms or changes been made or even proposed? Has there even been a frank disclosure and discussion of exactly what happened, and what is continuing to happen, beyond blaming the victims, or cynically hiding behind 'well that's how things are?'

No. The key participants in the Ponzi scheme are continuing to take their gains out, in dividends and bonuses, front running the final collapse and admission that "its all gone; we're bankrupt."

Think about it.

What would you do if it is a Ponzi scheme, teetering on the edge?

The CFTC Is Failing to Regulate Commodity Market Ponzi Schemes

Christopher Cox recently admitted that the SEC has willfully overlooked significant abuses in the equity markets. One thing on which we agreed with John McCain was that his tenure at the SEC is a national disgrace and he should have been dismissed. Given the US stock market bubbles over the past eight years one can hardly disagree.

It is becoming obvious that there is significant price manipulation in the commodity markets, to the point where they have become nothing more than Ponzi schemes in which the object of the investment will never be delivered, and a market roiling default will occur.

Below is one example in the oil markets. Silver is an even better example. Ted Butler has documented the abuse on numerous occasions, and has been ignored in the same way those exposing the Madoff Ponzi scheme to the SEC were also willfully and repeatedly ignored.

The problem with commodities price manipulation is even worse than the manipulation of stock prices since it involves the capital formation of the means of production with significant lead times. Not only does this manipulation cheat investors and small speculators, but it causes significant, damaging misalignments in supply and demand in the real economy. The example of the electricity markets in California and the Enron fraud was the wake up call that was ignored.

It is beyond simple fraud. This has disproportionate and severely damaging effects on other countries in the global economy.

The perfect solution, the complete market restructuring is complex, and is detailed below. Expect the market manipulators to wallow in the complexity and create loopholes for future exploitation.

However, there is an 80% effective solution that is simple. Transparency of positions is a first step. The second step is to impose strict position limits for those who are not hedging actual and verifiable inventory and production.

The position limits for the 'naked shorting' is appropriate for those who believe that the market price is incorrect. But there comes a time when the naked shorting becomes so large that it IS the market, and the consequences of such outrageous manipulation are real and significant.

Constantly tinkering with regulations and making them more complex is not the answer. The root of the problem has been the lack of enforcement and the bad actions of a handful of banks that have become serial market manipuators since the overturn of Glass-Steagall. There really are no new financial products or frauds. There are just variations on familiar themes.

It is not clear that the solution can come from within the US. Violence never works, and writing our Congress and voting for a reform candidate have now been done, although we should continue this.

A practical solution may be ultimately imposed on the US by the rest of the world, and that is a less attractive prospect than an internal solution.



Reuters
NYMEX oil benchmark again in question
By John Kemp
December 23rd, 2008

The record differential between the front-month and more liquid second-month contracts at expiry last week once again raised pointed questions about whether the NYMEX light sweet contract is serving as a good benchmark for the global oil market, or sending misleading signals about the state of supply and demand.

The expiring January 2009 contract ended down $2.35 on Friday at $33.87, while the more liquid February contract actually rose 69 cents to settle at $42.36 - an unprecedented contango from one month to the next of $8.49.

Criticism of the contract is not new, and past calls for reform have been successfully sidelined. But with policymakers taking a keener interest as a result of wild gyrations in oil prices this year, and a continued focus on regulatory changes to improve market functioning in future, there is at least a chance changes will be adopted as part of a wider package of futures market adjustments.

AN UNREPRESENTATIVE PRICE

During the surge to $147 per barrel earlier this year, OPEC repeatedly criticized the NYMEX reference price for overstating the real degree of tightness in the physical market and causing prices to overshoot on the upside. (That was the point, see Enron for details - Jesse)

While rallying NYMEX prices seemed to point to an acute physical shortage and need for more oil, Saudi Arabia could not find buyers for the 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) of extra oil promised to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon or the 300,000 bpd promised to U.S. President George Bush in June.

Bizarrely, rather than acknowledge there was something wrong with the reference price, some market participants suggested Saudi Arabia should increase the already large discounts for its physical crude to achieve sales in a market that clearly did not need the oil, and was not paying enough contango to make storing it economic (contango is where the futures price is above the spot market). (There is nothing bizarre about it. That is standard disinformation by the frauds and their mouthpieces - Jesse)

The NYMEX WTI price may have achieved unprecedented media fame as a result of the “super-spike”, but a futures price to which producers and consumers were paying ever larger discounts for actual barrels was clearly not a good indication of where the market as a whole was trading. (It was a fraud. Lots of people lost lots of money in it. It was a great excuse to build a Ponzi scheme in a market price, raise the price of gasoline to $4 gallon, and then take the market down. This is the 1929 model of market manipulation pure and simple - Jesse)

Now the market risks overshooting in the other direction. Intense pressure on the front month in recent weeks has more to do with the contract’s peculiarities (in particular storage restrictions at the delivery point) than a further deterioration in oil demand or a market vote of no-confidence in the 2.2 million barrels per day further cut in oil production announced by OPEC at the end of last week. (The beauty about price manipulation is that it works in both directions. Different damage, but the same jokers get to pocket their fraudulent gains - Jesse)

The collapse in NYMEX prices nearby risks exaggerating the real degree of oversupply and demand destruction, sending the wrong signal to producers and consumers about the wider availability of crude in the petroleum economy. (It may take a few countries along with it. But that may be by intent. Chavez and Putin are not on the Friends of W list - Jesse)

DOMESTIC PRICE, GLOBAL BENCHMARK

The NYMEX contract is for a very special type of crude oil (light sweet) delivered at a very special location (Cushing, Oklahoma) in the interior of the United States. It is not representative of the majority of crude oil traded internationally (most of which is heavier and sourer) and delivered by ocean-going tankers.

These specifications made sense when the contract was introduced as a benchmark for the U.S. domestic market.

U.S. refiners have a strong preference for light oils, for which they were prepared to pay a premium, because of their much higher yield to gasoline. The inland delivery location, centrally located and near the main Texas oilfields, rather than one on the coast, made sense for a contract that tried to capture the “typical” base price for crude oil paid by refiners across the continental United States.

But these specifications make much less sense now the NYMEX price is increasingly used a benchmark for the global petroleum economy, in which light sweet crudes are only a small fraction of total output. Just as NYMEX prices sent the wrong signals about physical oil availability on the way up, distorting the market and triggering more demand destruction than was really necessary, they now risk sending the wrong ones on the way down.

Earlier this year, the problem was a relative shortage of light sweet crude oils at Cushing, while all the extra barrels being offered to the market by Saudi Arabia were heavier, sourer crudes that could not be delivered against the contract. Moreover, extra Saudi crudes would have arrived by ship, and the pipeline and storage configurations around Cushing would have made it difficult to deliver them quickly against the contract.

Financial speculators were able to push NYMEX higher safe in the knowledge Saudi Arabia could not take the other side and overwhelm them by delivering physical barrels to bring prices down. The resulting spike exhibited all the characteristics of a technical squeeze: tight contract specifications ensured there could be shortage of NYMEX light sweet inland oils even while the global market was oversupplied by heavier, sourer seaborne ones.

Now the opposite problem is occurring. Crude stocks at Cushing have doubled from 14.3 million barrels to 27.5 million since mid-October. Stocks around the delivery point are at a near-record levels and approaching the maximum capacity of local tank and pipeline facilities (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/CUSHING.pdf).

As a result, the market has been forced into a huge contango as storage becomes increasingly expensive and difficult to obtain, ensuring the expiring futures trade at a substantial discount.

But Cushing inventories are not typical of the rest of the U.S. Midwest (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/PADD2_EX_CUSHING.pdf) or along the U.S. Gulf Coast (https://customers.reuters.com/d/graphics/PADD3.pdf), where stock levels are high relative to demand but nowhere near as overfull as in Oklahoma.

Once again the problem is geography. Coastal refiners have responded to the downturn by cutting imports of seaborne crude, limiting the stock build. But the inland market is the destination for some Canadian crudes that have nowhere else to go, and the pipeline configuration means they cannot be trans-shipped to other locations readily.

Light sweet crude has been piling up in the region, with refiners choosing to deliver the unwanted excess to the market by delivering it into Cushing.

NEW GRADES, NEW DELIVERY POINTS

The easiest way to make NYMEX more representative would be to widen the number of crude grades that can be delivered, and open a new delivery point along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Both reforms would link the contract more tightly into the global petroleum economy. (The easiest way would be to do exactly as I suggested above. It can be done with the stroke of a pen and the kick of a few asses - Jesse)

NYMEX already permits some flexibility in delivery grades. Sellers can deliver UK Brent and Norwegian Oseberg at small fixed discounts to the settlement price, and Nigerian Bonny Light and Qua Iboe, as well as Colombia’s Cusiana at small premiums.

In principle, there is no reason the contract cannot be modified further to allow a wider range of foreign oils to be delivered at larger discounts to the settlement price.

More importantly, NYMEX could open a second delivery location along the Gulf Coast, increasing the amount of storage capacity available, and linking it more closely into the tanker market.

If prices spiked again, a coastal delivery location would make it much easier for Saudi Arabia to short the market and deliver its own barrels into the rally. By widening the physical basis, it would also make it easier to support the market by cutting international production and avert a glut trapped around the delivery location.

So far, the market has continued to resist change. But there are signs policymakers might enforce one. (No one likes to give up a successful fraud voluntarily until the clock runs out - Jesse)

Earlier in the year, Saudi Arabia strongly hinted western governments should look at reforming their own futures markets rather than call for production of even more barrels of oil that could not be sold at the prevailing (unrealistic) price. (Saudi Arabia is the US's creature so any criticism is coming from a loyal source and credible - Jesse)

Naturally, some of the reform impetus has ebbed along with prices and demand. But policymakers continue to show interest in structural reforms, as was evident at last week’s London Energy Meeting, and there is an increased willingness to challenge unfettered market dynamics.

It is still possible the incoming Obama administration might force contract changes as part of a wider package of reforms designed to improve the functioning of commodity markets, reduce volatility and send clearer, more consistent price signals to the industry and consumers.

US Monetary Deflation

There isn't any monetary deflation visible in the data, at least so far.

This is despite the drop in the Consumer Price Index which appears to be driven by quickly weakening aggregate demand, as reflected in the National GDP numbers, in conjunction with a powerful short squeeze in the eurodollar which we have documented earlier that had a dampening effect on key import prices, in particular oil.

Whether a true monetary deflation develops later is another matter. We are still early in this economic downsizing of the financial sector and a massive credit bubble created by lax banking regulation and an over-accommodative Federal Reserve.

Granted there is credit creation outside of the banking system that was and still is significant, particularly with regard to feeding asset bubbles. But the role of the banks has been underplayed in this. The banks, in conjunction with the Fed, were key enablers of this series of credit and asset bubbles we have seen. Fannie and Freddie were bagmen, to borrow an analogy, but the banks were the capos with Greenspan as consigliere.

The growth of credit (indebtedness) is not money supply. It is potential money that feeds into inflationary expectations, most obviously in asset prices and consumption based on debt taken on against inflated assets. Whether my house if valued at $690,000 or $500,000 means little unless one is a speculator, or financing their daily consumption through HELOCs rather than productive growth in the median wage.

Along the same line of thought, the liquidity being added by the Treasury and the Fed to the banking system, reflected in the spike in the Adjusted Monetary base, is not feeding a monetary inflation yet either, but rather a parabolic bubble in Treasuries, and perhaps the Dollar although this is not yet demonstrable given the many degrees of freedom in the calculation.

There is an even more sophisticated linkage, with the expected lags, which we will be exploring in future charts and discussions. But if one considers the percentage growth in money supply and credit shown below against the growth in GDP which is now negative the hand of the Fed and Treasury in the economy is pronounced.

As a warning however, there are lags, and we still will expect a contraction in money supply to show up next year, probably coindicent with a trough in financial asset prices as occurred in 2002.

US Dollar Weekly Chart with Commitments of Traders

The 'small speculators' are doing a remarkably good job of moving with the market in the dollar which is unusual.

The funds long positions and the Open Interest dropped precipitously as of the market close on Tuesday December 16. They do however remain net long, so we will have to see if the selling continues on.

Notice how neatly the dollar came down and tagged key support. We suspect strongly that unless there is significant official intervention, probably from Japan, that we will go back down and retest that low.

The Problems Which Banks Face in a Post Credit Bubble World

Fear and Loathing in Financial Products
Banks – The “V”, “U” or “L” Recovery
By Satyajit Das
December 21, 2008

In 2007, equity markets fell out of love with financial institutions, especially those with large investment banking operations. 2008 saw something of reconciliation - the bigger the write-off, the bigger the dividend cut, the bigger the capital raising, perversely the greater the investor buying interest. By the end of 2008, there seems to have been an irreconciliable breakdown in relationships that no counsellor could fix.

The outlook for banks remains grim.

The asset quality of major banks remains uncertain. Svein Andresen, secretary general of the Financial Stability Forum, which is made up of global regulators and central bankers, recently told a conference of bankers in Cannes: “We are now 10 months through this crisis and some of the major banks have yet to make disclosure in [crucial] areas.”

Despite significant writedowns, sub-prime assets remain vulnerable. Other assets - consumer credit, SME loans, corporate lending and high yield leverage loans to private equity transactions- all look vulnerable as the real economy slows. Banks have increased provisions but it is not clear whether they will be adequate.

Bank balance sheets have changed significantly. Traditional commercial bank assets consisted primarily of loans and high quality securities. Traditional investment bank assets consisted of government securities and the inventory of trading securities.

In recent years, asset credit quality has deteriorated. High quality borrowers have dis-intermediated the banks financing directly from investors. Banks also hold lower quality assets to boost returns.

Bank balance sheets also now hold investments – private equity stakes, principal investments, hedge fund equity, different slices of risk in structured finance transaction and derivatives (of varying degrees of complexity). Sometimes, the assets don’t appear on balance sheet being held in complex off-balance sheet structures with various components of risk being retained by the bank. Further write-downs in asset values cannot be discounted.

Banks require re-capitalisation. The capital is required to cover losses. Capital is also needed for assets returning onto their balance sheet (as the vehicles of the “shadow banking system” are unwound). This capital is required to restore bank balance sheets. Additional capital will be needed to support future growth. Availability of capital, high cost of new capital and dilution of earnings will impinge upon future performance.

Earning growth in recent years has been driven by a rapid expansion of lending – both traditional and disguised forms such as securitisation and derivatives activity. Bank balance sheets have expanded at rates well above GDP expansion. Lower volumes in the future will mean lower earnings. (The desire for banks to grow profits faster than GDP becomes a drag on the real economy when the financial sector is outsized - Jesse)

Lack of lending capacity may also affect other activities. Corporate finance and advisory fees are driven by the capacity to finance transactions and also co-investing in risk positions. Lower origination of lending driven deals may reduce this income significantly. Banking fees for leveraged finance deals are down 90%.

Structured finance has contributed strongly to earnings in recent years. Securitisation, including CDO activity, has been a major growth area. Volumes have collapsed. The slowdown in structured finance has complex effects. Banks generated large earnings from off balance sheet vehicles in the shadow banking system. The vehicles provided banks with the ability to “park” assets and reduce capital. They also provided significant revenue – management fees; debt issuance fees and trading revenues. Recovery in these earnings is unlikely any time soon.

Trading revenue has been a bright spot. Increased volatility and much wider bid-offer spread have generated increases in both client driven and proprietary trading earnings. Volatility and the need to adjust trading positions created strong trading flows and earnings. As the markets stabilise, trading flows and earnings decline.

Several factors may limit trading income. Derivatives and structured investments, especially complex products, generated significant earnings. Problems in structured finance highlighted concerns about complexity, transparency and valuation. Market volatility has resulted in significant losses in some structured investments. Revenues may diminish as investors and borrowers curtail their use of such instruments preferring simpler products that are less profitable to the bank.

Trading revenues relied heavily on hedge funds and financial sponsors. Hedge fund activity is likely to slow through consolidation, investor redemptions and reduced leverage. Derivatives and hedging activity from private equity transactions and structured finance has been significant. Hedging revenues typically contribute 50% or more of bank earnings from a private equity transaction. Reduction in financial sponsor activity will limit revenue from this source.

Banks have increasingly relied on proprietary trading to supplement earnings. This increases risk and depends on the availability of capital. It relies on availability of counterparties and liquidity. Concern about counterparty risk and reduction in market liquidity in some products increases the risk of this activity and reduces its earning potential.

Future earnings will be affected by the availability of risk capital. The banks may not be able to access capital to the extent needed. The demise of the shadow banking system will mean that purchased capital will not be available. Regulators may also increase capital levels for some transactions exacerbating the capital problem.

Risk models in banks are a function of market volatility. The low volatility regime of recent years reduced the amount of capital needed. Increased market volatility will increase the amount of capital needed. This may restrict the level of risk taking and therefore earnings potential.

Higher costs will also increase limiting earning recovery. Bank funding costs have increased. Most firms have been forced to issue substantial amounts of term debt to fund assets returning to balance sheet and protect against liquidity risk. To the extent, that these costs cannot be passed through to borrowers, the higher funding costs will affect future funding.

Banks have issued high cost equity to re-capitalise their balance sheets. Hybrid capital issues paying between 7.00% and 14.00 % pa will be drag on future earnings. Highly dilutionary equity issues (often at a discount to a share price that had fallen significantly) will impede earnings per share growth and return on capital.

Accounting factors may also affect any earnings recovery. FAS157 allows the entity's own credit risk to be used in establishing the value of its liabilities. Changes in the entity's credit standing are therefore reflected as changes in fair value. This results in gains for credit downgrades and losses for credit upgrades.

As credit spreads increased, banks have taken substantial profits to earnings from revaluing their own liabilities. If markets stabilise and the credit spreads for banks improves then banks will have to reverse these gains. There may be significant mark-to-market losses especially on new debt issues by banks at high credit spreads since mid-2007. Investors are looking for a rapid recovery in bank earnings. Earnings may recover but the “gilded age” of bank profits may be difficult to recapture.

Glamorous banks reliant on “voodoo banking” may find it difficult to achieve the high performance of the “go-go” years. (Goldman Sachs is the poster child - Jesse)

Banks with sound traditional franchises that have avoided the worst excesses of the last 10-15 years will do well in the changed market environment. Such old fashioned banking may ironically do well in the “new” environment. Interest rates that they charge customers have increased. Bank deposits have become far more attractive than other investments. Stronger banks have also benefited from a “flight to quality”.

Will the recovery in bank stocks take the form of “V” or “U”? It may be a “L”. With the Northern Rock and Bear Stearns bailouts, central banks and governments have signaled that major banks are “too big to fail”. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for recovery of bank earnings and stock prices. The recovery might take the form of a “L” (Kirsten ITC font) – note the small upturn at the far right of the flat bottom.

US Dollar Daily Chart

The commitments of traders has not turned negative on the Dollar for the funds, but has decreased sufficiently to indicate the Eurodollar short squeeze has been relieved, at least for now. The TED Spread will indicate any reversal.

We will have to see how this plays out, but we are now bearish on the dollar again for at least the short term, and remain bearish in the long term still despite the strong counter trend rally. Our intermediate term objective of 66 remains unfilled.

While the Obama Administration cannot take a 'weak dollar' policy it is the only practical way to correct the imbalances brought about by the last 20 years of systemic manipulation. It is either that, or the selective default on sovereign debt, most likely through conflict, a hot or cold war.

Ironically enough, we think all of this is unnecessary and without good purpose, excepting the pathological greed for power of the elite in all the nations involved.

Just as a reminder of where it stands...

Speculation Nation Part 2

Our national priorities favor financial engineering, financial speculation, consumption on credit.

They penalize manufacturing, savings, and the median wage of labor.

It could not be any clearer.


Financial Times
Hedge funds gain access to $200bn Fed aid
By Krishna Guha in Washington
December 20 2008 05:01

Hedge funds will be allowed to borrow from the Federal Reserve for the first time under a landmark $200bn programme intended to support consumer credit.

The Fed said on Friday it would offer low-cost three-year funding to any US company investing in securitised consumer loans under the Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). This includes hedge funds, which have never been able to borrow from the US central bank before, although the Fed may not permit hedge funds to use offshore vehicles to conduct the transactions.

The asset-backed securities to be funded under the programme are pools of credit card receivables, automobile loans and student loans.

The idea is to increase the supply of these loans and reduce borrowing rates by ensuring that the companies that make the loans can sell them on to investors who have guaranteed access to low-cost funding from the Fed.

The TALF is a key plank of the unorthodox strategy set out by the Fed last week as it cut interest rates virtually to zero. Washington insiders expect the programme will be dramatically expanded next year with further capital support from Treasury once the Obama administration takes office.

A senior official in the outgoing Bush administration told the Financial Times it could also be broadened to include new commercial and residential mortgage-backed securities.

The Fed thinks risk premiums or “spreads” for consumer loans are much higher than would be justified by likely default rates, even assuming a nasty recession.

It attributes this to a lack of buying interest in the secondary market where the loans are sold on to investors. By making loans to these investors on attractive terms it aims to increase market liquidity.

Making the scheme open to all US companies is a radical departure for the Fed, which normally supports financial market liquidity indirectly by ensuring banks have adequate liquidity to make loans to other investors.

However, the liquidity the Fed is providing to banks is not flowing through to financial markets, because banks are balance-sheet constrained and risk-averse. So it is channelling funds directly to investors.

The scheme is not designed specifically for hedge funds and a wide range of financial institutions are likely to participate.

Nonetheless, Fed officials hope that hedge funds will be among those investors that take advantage of the low-cost finance to drive down spreads.

The loans will be secured only against the securities and not the borrower. However, the Fed will lend slightly less than the value of the securities pledged as collateral. The Treasury has committed $20bn to cover potential losses.

Since the credit crisis erupted, hedge funds have complained that they cannot get the leverage they need to arbitrage away excessive spreads and meet high hurdle rates of return.

“Demand is there for leverage but not supply,” said Sylvan Chackman, head of global equity financing at Merrill Lynch.

In effect, the Fed will now take on the role of prime broker – the lead bank that lends to a hedge fund – for specific assets.

Japan Government to Buy 20 Trillion Yen in Stock to Support Their Markets

You have to wonder why they just don't give money directly to their people, and allow them to use their discretion to invest and consume, rather than use the money to prop up a zombie market at the direction of a central planning bureaucracy.

It probably speaks volumes about their priorities in valuing the keiretsu and its crypto-medieval organization over the individual. The artificial composition of their economy is remarkable, and understood by few economists in the West with the cultural bias of their models.

You have to wonder if there will be any auto stocks in that share festival.

Japan plans to buy $227 billion in shares to boost market
By Michael Kitchen
8:11 a.m. EST Dec. 18, 2008

NEW YORK (MarketWatch) -- Japan's government said Thursday it is submitting a bill to parliament allowing for the purchase of 20 trillion yen ($227 billion) in stock to help stabilize the Japanese stock market, Kyodo news reported.

Under the bill, the Banks' Shareholding Acquisition Corporation, originally created in January 2002, would resume buying shares from banks and other entities, the Japanese news agency reported.

The bill would be introduced early next month "with an eye to implementing the measure by the end of March," the report quoted lawmakers as saying. The Liberal Democratic Party had intially considered just 10 trillion in stock purchases, but the size was roughly doubled to 20 trillion yen at the request of its ruling coalition partner, the New Komeito party, the report said.

Black Swan Dive: Life On the Tails

The worst case scenario is if the Dollar, Bond, and Equities start going down together as the world repudiates the US Dollar Reserve Currency and Credit Bubble.

This is not a probable scenario.

The last time it happened was in 1933 in the trough of the Great Depression.

But we may have the opportunity to see something as once-in-a-lifetime and memorable as John Law's Banque Générale and the Mississipi Bubble.

Let's hope the Federal Reserve can reach deeper in its pockets for a better class of tricks than just front running the dollar and the bonds until they fall over.

Certainly anything is possible, but it does appear as though the US Long Bond is hitting a 'high note' of improbable valuation unless the world accepts a single currency dollar regime.

Too Big to Fail, Too Well-Connected to Jail: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit

In her brilliant essay, NY Times Pulls Punches on Wall Street Bubble Era Pay, Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism quotes a 1993 research paper from the Brookings Institution titled Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit.

"Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.

Bankruptcy for profit occurs most commonly when a government guarantees a firm's debt obligations. The most obvious such guarantee is deposit insurance, but governments also implicitly or explicitly guarantee the policies of insurance companies, the pension obligations of private firms, virtually all the obligations of large or influential firms. These arrangements can create a web of companies that operate under soft budget constraints.

To enforce discipline and to limit opportunism by shareholders, governments make continued access to the guarantees contingent on meeting specific targets for an accounting measure of net worth. However, because net worth is typically a small fraction of total assets for the insured institutions (this, after all, is why they demand and receive the government guarantees), bankruptcy for profit can easily become a more attractive strategy for the owners than maximizing true economic values...

Unfortunately, firms covered by government guarantees are not the only ones that face severely distorted incentives. Looting can spread symbiotically to other markets, bringing to life a whole economic underworld with perverse incentives. The looters in the sector covered by the government guarantees will make trades with unaffiliated firms outside this sector, (such as Enron, and even the 'deep capture' of agencies like the SEC, and the placement of your people in key government positions - J) causing them to produce in a way that helps maximize the looters' current extractions with no regard for future losses...."

We wonder if the authors Akerlof and Romer realized that their paper of appropriate warning would become a prophetic, virtual guidebook for an historic looting of the United States economy by a few financial institutions under the government guarantee of 'too big to fail' and 'too well-connected to jail.'

Impossible? Who would have believed that a paper from a neo-conservative think-tank, The Project for the New American Century titled Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategies, Forces And Resources For A New Century would become a blueprint for a program of deception and invasion?

The conclusions and the title of this blog are our own. Yves is one of the most level-headed of economic commentators. Her site is a 'must read' for the serious every day. We do not wish to put words in her mouth.

Having said that, the solution for non-US investors is simple. Do not hold US dollars or dollar assets to any significant degree until it proves itself to be responsible again. Bring your money back to your home economy. Build something useful for yourself and your children. Do not be a renter in your own house. If you are not for yourselves, who will be?

Do not allow your own bureaucracies to enforce an industrial policy of domestic deprivation and low wages to support an aggressive expansion of exports in return for increasingly worthless paper. When will the benefits come if not when times are good?

If your country is large enough you may become self-sufficient. If not, you can join one of the regional trade associations such as the European Union.

Commodities such as oil and industrial raw materials will continue to be pivotal, highly manipulated and disputed, for quite some time until the world regains its economic and political balance. Why would you allow one country to essentially set all the prices with its own paper?

For US investors the solution is not as easy. The dollar is an essential component of any portfolio and almost all day to day transactions.

There is promise in the new administration, despite early disappointment in some of the appointments to date. Let's give them time to show progress and programs. One needs capable individuals in place to act quickly. How can we forget the stumbling missteps of the Jimmy Carter administration?

However, too many of the appointments are cyncial verging on the outrageous for a government with a mandate to reform. Actions will speak much louder than words.

Excessive secrecy is incompatible with a democracy. More transparency in government is a reform of the first order.

It took years to lose our integrity, and to regain it is the work of a generation, one day at a time. There has been an ongoing program of overturning all the reforms and regulations of the 1930's, one by one, to discredit and repeal them, and to ultimately put the country under the control of an oligopoly. The pattern is unmistakable.

If you would like to give your children and grandchildren something worthwhile and lasting at this holiday season, then resolve to reform and replenish the Republic that your parents and grandparents gave to you, and not trade it away for some short term security and profit.

Deutsche Bank Surprises Bond Markets By Failing to Redeem its Bonds

It really doesn't seem all that bad to us, compared with the US banking tradition of throwing yourself on the doorstep of the New York Fed and ringing the bell, threatening to collapse the economy until you are bailed out.


The Financial Post
Deutsche stuns market by delaying bond redemption
By John Greenwood and Jonathan Ratner
Wednesday, December 17, 2008

A move by Deutsche Bank to go against industry practice by passing up an opportunity to redeem a chunk of subordinated debt has escalated the level of turmoil in financial markets as investors worry that problems at the German financial services giant might be greater than imagined.

Meanwhile, at least one analyst is speculating that Canadian banks could follow suit on a portion of the more than $3-billion of bonds that they have coming due in the next few months.

Deutsche Bank stunned the market when it said on Wednesday it will not redeem 1-billion euros of callable bonds at the first opportunity. The debt does not mature until 2014, but it has a call date of January 2009, meaning the debt can be paid back as early as next month.

It is a long-time industry practice for banks to redeem such bonds on the earliest possible date, as proof of the soundness of their balance sheets.

Analysts said Deutsche is the first major player to break the tradition.

The move "raises some awkward questions about [the German bank's] financial position," said CreditSights analyst Simon Adamson. "But more than that, it is a signal that banks do not see a return to more normal funding conditions in the foreseeable future, and that is a damaging statement for the banking sector."

"This is a big deal in the bond market," said another analyst who asked not to be named, pointing out that investors have always taken for granted that such debt always gets paid back at the earliest opportunity.

Banks around the world are under the spotlight as investors try to figure out how this episode of the credit crisis will play out, whether other banks will copy Deutsche or whether it will end up as an isolated occurrence.

"We will see if any of the Canadian banks follow suit," said the analyst, adding that they will do so if they believe they can gain by it.

He said there could be several reasons for Deutsche's decision not to redeem. One possibility is that it simply needs the cash and is willing to pay the penalty for later payment in order to hold onto the money longer. A second possibility is that it already has sufficient funding to keep it going for a considerable period and can afford to take a step that would make it much more expensive to access the credit markets. (Oh yeah number two sounds likely - NOT - Jesse)

"Do you want to shut yourself out of the market, which is what you would do?" the analyst said.

You would also shut your competitors out of the market because the whole sector would likely be tainted....

Nasdaq 100 March Futures Hourly Chart

Here is a simplified screenshot of one of the futures charts I watch during the day. This one is for the Nasdaq 100 futures basis March.

I am not showing the other trends I watch on this chart for the sake of simplicity, but you will get the idea if you look at the nightly updates.

The trends with support and resistance may be a little clearer when one looks at them this way.

For short term traders I would recommend the AlphaTrends website which is listed on the left under educational links. Brian is a very good technical daytrader.

Consumer Price Inflation Chart from the Propagandaministerium

From the New York Times

Looks like we are experiencing a really serious deflation.

Print faster Ben. Bail out those banks. Do whatever it takes. Save us!




This is from ShadowStats.com

Here is the Consumer Price Index calculated using the sames rules that were in place in 1990 before Daddy Bush, Slick Willy and Junior worked their changes on it.

We like the drop in gasoline prices. We'll like the deflation even more if and when it shows up in healthcare, food costs, tuition, electricity, insurance, appliances, and automobiles.

Until then, be happy and keep eating your government recommended Dog Chow.





We beieve we are seeing significant price declines in key commodities like oil and some building materials. Price and narrow money deflation is a natural phenomenon in periods of swift asset declines, as we had seen in 2002 before the Fed started their reflation which led to the housing and equity bubbles.

But to hold this out as an 'apples to apples' comparison back to 1920, which many will do because it either supports their econo-religious theories, or promotes an atmosphere favorable to the government interventions, is reprehensible.

AIG Has Another $30 to $200 Billion in Uncovered Losses to be Bailed Out

This is getting so brazen and so out of bounds that the atmosphere is starting to feel charged, like a college cafeteria after finals, or a big football win, or before the holidays.

You just know that at some point someone is going to throw the first piece of pie...

Bloomberg
AIG Writedowns May Rise $30 Billion on Swaps Not in U.S. Rescue
By James Sterngold

Dec. 17 (Bloomberg) -- American International Group Inc., which already has suffered more than $60 billion in writedowns and losses, may have to absorb almost $30 billion more because of flaws in the way its holdings are valued.

An examination of AIG’s credit-default swaps guaranteeing more than $300 billion of corporate loans, mortgages and other assets not covered by a $152.5 billion federal rescue shows the New York-based insurer may value some of its positions at levels that don’t reflect distress in the markets, according to an analyst at Gradient Analytics Inc. and a tax consultant who teaches at Columbia University Business School in New York. Executives at two firms that have similar investments say they account for the securities differently than AIG does....

Rescue Package

The U.S. rescue plan announced in November, the government’s second effort to save AIG, covers only its most troubled credit-default swaps, about 20 percent of the $377 billion on the insurer’s books as of Sept. 30. Under the plan, a new government-backed entity will acquire collateralized debt obligations with a face value of $72 billion that had been insured by AIG swaps. An initial transfer of $46.1 billion of CDOs was announced on Dec. 2. A second fund bought troubled residential mortgage-backed securities with a face value of $39.3 billion, AIG said on Dec. 15.

Wider losses may cast new doubt on whether the federal funds will be enough to prop up AIG, the biggest U.S. insurer by assets. The U.S. package almost doubled from the $85 billion approved in September to save the company from bankruptcy. Previous miscalculations about the swaps contributed to the ouster of Chief Executive Officer Robert Willumstad and his predecessor, Martin Sullivan.

In November 2007, when AIG reported a $352 million loss on its swaps, it said it was “highly unlikely” the insurer would have to make payments on them. And last December Sullivan assured investors that losses from swaps on U.S. subprime mortgages were “manageable.”

European Banks

Credit-default swaps are contracts that protect investors who buy bonds or other securities. If a debt issuer or borrower misses payments, the seller of the contract -- in this case, AIG -- covers some or all of the losses. Even if a borrower doesn’t default, accounting rules may require insurers to write down the swap contracts when the value of the underlying assets drops.

AIG swaps not covered by the government program include guarantees on $249.9 billion of corporate loans and residential mortgages, most of them made by banks in Europe, according to the company’s third-quarter 10-Q filing. There are also swaps covering $51 billion of collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs, and $5 billion of lower-rated mezzanine tranches.

Writedowns on these AIG holdings total less than $1.5 billion so far this year, according to company filings, compared with $20 billion for the swaps guaranteeing the $72 billion of CDOs being acquired under the federal rescue....

Even if the credit markets were to stabilize, the valuations of structured securities are still far from where they should be, said Laurie Goodman, a former head of fixed- income research at UBS Securities LLC, who recently left to join Amherst Holdings LLC in Austin, Texas.

“The losses we’ve seen so far are a fraction of what we’ll be seeing,” she said.

Goldman Sachs Offshores Its Profits and Reduces Its Taxes to 1%

"With the right hand out begging for bailout money, the left is hiding it offshore."

In fairness to Goldman, if there can be such a thing, they are taking a lot of writeoffs to reduce their taxes this year, in addition to offshoring their profits into foreign venues with favorable tax rates. That is just globalization, right?

As an aside, for some time now I have wondered if globalization has become just another enabler, wherein multinational financial corporations can play a larger set of jurisdictions and peoples against one another for the benefit of an elite minority. International trade based on an exchange of competitive advantage and surplus is a good idea.

Using globalization to undermine the values of certain countries with regard to the environment, healthcare, child labor, living standards, and the domestic laws is exploitation and victimization of the many by the few.

It is a way to reduce free nations to the lowest common denominator of victimization and indentured servitude. It does not have to be this way, but it all too often give rise to the slave and opium trade.

Without regulation free trade swiftly degenerates into manipulation and exploitation. Free trade is not a natural good in and of itself. It can be a highly destructive force, devastating entire economies.

It is never surprising anymore to see how many initiatives promoted by a certain political class like deregulation, globalization, and competitiveness are nothing more than facades for campaigns of organized looting.

We can comfort ourselves with the knowledge that most of the bailout money is being given out in bonuses anyway, and surely those multi-millionaire employees will be paying some income tax. Unless they are engaging in aggressive management of their tax returns. You think?

Goldman Sachs’s Tax Rate Drops to 1%, or $14 Million
By Christine Harper

Dec. 16 (Bloomberg) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc., which got $10 billion and debt guarantees from the U.S. government in October, expects to pay $14 million in taxes worldwide for 2008 compared with $6 billion in 2007.

The company’s effective income tax rate dropped to 1 percent from 34.1 percent, New York-based Goldman Sachs said today in a statement. The firm reported a $2.3 billion profit for the year after paying $10.9 billion in employee compensation and benefits.

Goldman Sachs, which today reported its first quarterly loss since going public in 1999, lowered its rate with more tax credits as a percentage of earnings and because of “changes in geographic earnings mix,” the company said.

The rate decline looks “a little extreme,” said Robert Willens, president and chief executive officer of tax and accounting advisory firm Robert Willens LLC.

“I was definitely taken aback,” Willens said. “Clearly they have taken steps to ensure that a lot of their income is earned in lower-tax jurisdictions.”

U.S. Representative Lloyd Doggett, a Texas Democrat who serves on the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee, said steps by Goldman Sachs and other banks shifting income to countries with lower taxes is cause for concern.

“This problem is larger than Goldman Sachs,” Doggett said. “With the right hand out begging for bailout money, the left is hiding it offshore.”

In the first nine months of the fiscal year, Goldman had planned to pay taxes at a 25.1 percent rate, the company said today. A fourth-quarter tax credit of $1.48 billion was 41 percent of the company’s pretax loss in the period, higher than many analysts expected. David Trone, an analyst at Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia Waller, expected the fourth-quarter tax credit to be 28 percent.

The tax-rate decline may raise some eyebrows because of the support the U.S. government has provided to Goldman Sachs and other companies this year, Willens said.

“It’s not very good public relations,” he said.

Bernanke Unleashes the Power of the Monetary Force

The Fed will lead us out of deflation, but how many years will we spend in the wilderness?

Federal Reserve Open Market Committee
Release Date: December 16, 2008
For immediate release

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent. (That's it, we're effectively at ZERO - Jesse)

Since the Committee's last meeting, labor market conditions have deteriorated, and the available data indicate that consumer spending, business investment, and industrial production have declined. Financial markets remain quite strained and credit conditions tight. Overall, the outlook for economic activity has weakened further.

Meanwhile, inflationary pressures have diminished appreciably. In light of the declines in the prices of energy and other commodities and the weaker prospects for economic activity, the Committee expects inflation to moderate further in coming quarters.

The Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote the resumption of sustainable economic growth and to preserve price stability. In particular, the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time.

The focus of the Committee's policy going forward will be to support the functioning of financial markets and stimulate the economy through open market operations and other measures that sustain the size of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet at a high level. As previously announced, over the next few quarters the Federal Reserve will purchase large quantities of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities to provide support to the mortgage and housing markets, and it stands ready to expand its purchases of agency debt and mortgage-backed securities as conditions warrant. The Committee is also evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term Treasury securities.

Early next year, the Federal Reserve will also implement the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility to facilitate the extension of credit to households and small businesses. The Federal Reserve will continue to consider ways of using its balance sheet to further support credit markets and economic activity. (TASLF for homes and businesses. Will that be a two-page form like TARP? Can I fill it out online? - Jesse)

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; Christine M. Cumming; Elizabeth A. Duke; Richard W. Fisher; Donald L. Kohn; Randall S. Kroszner; Sandra Pianalto; Charles I. Plosser; Gary H. Stern; and Kevin M. Warsh. (Did Ben threaten them with martial law? Or just scare the hell out of them? - Jesse)

In a related action, the Board of Governors unanimously approved a 75-basis-point decrease in the discount rate to 1/2 percent. In taking this action, the Board approved the requests submitted by the Boards of Directors of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. The Board also established interest rates on required and excess reserve balances of 1/4 percent.

Madoff Enablers: Everyone Was Getting Paid

As we said the other day in Rogue Nation, schemes like this continue on because everyone is getting paid, directly or indirectly, not to look closely.

Go along to get along with plausible deniability. The 'dumb CEO' and 'overworked civil servant' chasing kittens and alley cats while the lions are on the prowl.


Financial Times
Madoff feeder funds levied high fees
By Henny Sender
December 16 2008

The “feeder” funds that channelled money to Bernard Madoff charged their investors high fees that in some cases exceeded the norms of the hedge fund industry, people familiar with the matter say.

Mr Madoff received much of his funding from feeder funds run by so-called funds of hedge funds. These funds of funds are paid by investors to perform due diligence on hedge funds and allocate money among approved managers.

Typically, funds of hedge funds charge a 1 per cent management fee and take 0-10 per cent of the profits. This would be in addition to the fees charged by the underlying hedge funds – which usually take a 2 per cent management fee plus 20 per cent of the profits, above a certain level, known as the hurdle rate.

Fairfield Greenwich, a feeder fund that invested $7.5bn with Mr Madoff, charged a 1 per cent management fee and took 20 per cent of the profits, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Suzanne Murphy, managing director of Tri-Artisan, a hedge fund consultancy, said she believes other Madoff feeder funds charged fees similar to those at Fairfield Greenwich. At such levels, she claimed, “These organisations were more partners of Mr Madoff than clients.”

In general, generous arrangements such as large performance fees “raise questions about conflicts of interest and caveat emptor,” according to the general counsel of the alternative investment division of one bank. The head of the hedge fund practice at one law firm, added: “At a certain point, if you get outsize compensation, you can argue that you lose the incentive to do due diligence.”

In many cases, the feeder funds that worked with Mr Madoff also did so with few conditions, such as ones requiring that minimum returns be reached before fees would be paid, according to people familiar with the matter.

In some cases, the private wealth arms of banks that channelled money to such feeder funds also received payments from these funds.

Mr Madoff did not charge his investors fees but was paid through commissions on his trades, all of which went through the broker-dealer he controlled. Because he did not charge typical fund performance fees, he earned a reputation among some investors for being a lower-cost manager. (But severely back end loaded. Jesse)

Did the New Deal Fail?

Most people informed by our modern educational system would respond that the New Deal was ineffective, and that only World War II resolved the Great Depression with its massively non-productive consumption. This is sometimes called "military Keynesianism."

As evidence of this they will point to the renewed slump in US GDP and the equity markets that occurred in 1937.

Here is some perspective on what caused that slump from Paul Kasriel.

In 1937, CPI inflation was running in excess of 4%. So, in 1937, the Fed doubled reserve requirements to soak up excess reserves and prevent even higher inflation. It worked. The economy entered the second leg of the Great Depression in 1937 and deflation re-appeared.

The New Deal was so "ineffective" that the Fed panicked and doubled reserve requirements in a draconian pre-emptive response because they feared inflation! And this was with the unremitting opposition to the reforms of the New Deal by the Republican minority, the Business interests, and their appointees on the Supreme Court.



In a fiat regime inflation and deflation are primarily a policy decision, or perhaps more clearly, the end result of a series of policy, fiscal, and political decisions. Japan is a good example of that combination. There is a lag between the implementation of policy decisions and the desired result. There are also secular events such as a oil embargo or an asset crash that may significantly impact prices and measures of the money supply, although somewhat unevenly.

They are not perfectly controllable, and there is difficulty stimulating aggregate demand and the velocity of money. It cannot be done by monetary policy alone but an accumulation of decisions by the entire national leadership.

But where there is no exogenous constraints such as a monetary standard inflation and deflation are a choice among priorities, essentially a policy decision.

A Brief History of the Greatest Financial Fraud in History

It is essential to realize and remember that this is no accident, no unhappy confluence of disparate elements that just happened to come together.

This was a deliberate and methodical attempt to overturn long standing regulations and safeguards to recreate the banking conditions that helped to create the bubble economy of the 1920's.

The purpose was to allow the inordinate increase in wealth of a few greedy individuals driven by a rapacious will to power.

They did not care what havoc they wreaked on the rest of the world in the process. We have been here before when certain personality types have been able to hijack a society. Sometimes it is financial, at other times criminal, and too often political, with even an occasional coup d'etat.

Laws exist to protect society from the actions of aberrant personalities. It does not shock us when they wield a gun. Why then does it surprise us when they utilize a pen, a glib personal patina, a reckless disregard for others, and a persistent, amoral cunning?

The strength of the professional conman is that emotions do not cloud the force of their actions because they have long since ceased to listen to their conscience. And this is their weakness because, dulled by excess, their judgement allows them to go too far. Thereby they expose their unbridled greed and undermine their schemes, which operate best behind closed doors and under cover of darkness. Transparency and the light of exposure are their enemies.

Until there is reform and a restoration of justice there will be no sustained and genuine recovery.

PBS Frontline: The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall

Fear and Loathing in Financial Products
Banking on Steriods
By Satyajit Das
December 15, 2008

Earlier in 2008, CitiGroup announced that it was seeking Board members who had “expertise in finance and investments”. What was the experience and expertise of the Citi Board and senior management that has registered over US$50 billion in losses? Shareholders and taxpayers, that have provided over billions in new capital, will be hoping that the new recruits also possess “magic” to restore Citi’s fortunes. The same applies to the banking sector generally.

Until the late 1970s/ early 1980s, banking was highly regulated. It was the world of George Bailey (played by Jimmy Stewart) in It’s A Wonderful Life. Community banking was the rule. The banker could dip into his “honeymoon money” to stave of a potential bank run. It also fueled jokes - the “3-6-3” rule; borrow at 3%; lend at 6%; hit the golf course at 3 p.m.

Once de-regulated, banks evolved into complex organisations providing varied financial services. De-regulation brought benefits for the economy (better access to capital and more varied investment opportunities) and the banks (growth and higher profits).

Over the last 15 years, increased competition (within the industry and increasingly from non-banking institutions) and the reduction of earning from the commoditisation of products forced banks to rely on “voodoo banking” - performance enhancement to boost returns.

Traditionally banks made loans that tied up their capital for long periods e.g. up to 25/30 years in a mortgage. In the new “originate to distribute” model, banks “underwrote” the loan, “warehoused” it on balance sheet for a short time and then parceled them up with other loans and created securities that could be sold to investors (“securitisation”). The bank tied up capital for a short time (until the loans were sold off) and then the same capital could be reused and the process repeated. Interest earnings over the life of the loan could be discounted back and recognised immediately. Banks increased the “velocity of capital” – effectively sweating the same capital harder to increase returns.

In the traditional model, banks earned the net interest rate margin over the life of the loan – “annuity” income. When loan assets are sold off and the earnings recognised up-front, banks need to make new loans to be sold off to maintain earnings. This created pressure on banks to find “new” borrowers. Initially, creditworthy borrowers without access to credit in the regulated banking environment entered the market. Over time, banks were forced to “innovate” to maintain lending volumes.

Banks created substantial new markets for borrowing: ? Retail clients – expanding traditional lending (housing and car finance) and developing new credit facilities (credit cards and home equity loans). ? Private equity – providing borrowings in leveraged buyouts and sundry other highly leveraged transactions. ? Hedge funds/ private investors – providing (often) high levels of debt against the value of assets.

Banks increasingly also out sourced the origination of the loans to brokers, incentivised by large “upfront” fees.

The expansion in debt provision relied increasingly on quantitative models for assessing risk. It also relied on collateral - the borrower put up a portion of the price of the asset and agreed to cover any fall in value with additional cash cover.

The model allowed banks to expand the quantum of loans and allowed extension of credit to lower rated borrowers. Banks did not plan to hold the loan long term and were only exposed to “underwriting” risk in the period before the loans were sold off. Where the loan was collateralised, the value of the asset and the agreement to “top up” the collateral where the asset value fell was considered to provide ample protection.

Favorable regulatory rules (the capital required was modest), optimistic views of market liquidity and faith in models underpinned this growth in lending.

Banks also increased their trading activities, especially in derivatives and other financial products. Initially, this was targeted at companies and investors seeking to manage financial risk. Over time it increasingly focused on creating risk allowing investors to increase returns and companies to lower borrowing costs or improve currency rates. As profits margins eroded, banks created ever more complex exotic products, usually incorporating derivatives. Derivatives also increasingly became a way to provide additional leverage to customers.

The development of hedge funds was especially important. They borrowed money (against securities offered as collateral) and were extensive users of derivatives. They also traded frequently and aggressively boosting volumes. Prime broking services (bundling settlement, clearing, financial and capital raising) emerged as a major source of earnings for some banks.

Banks also increased their own risk taking. Traditionally, banks took little or no risk other than credit risk. Over time, banks increasingly assumed market risk and investment risk. Originally, banks traded financial products primarily as “agents” standing between two closely matched counterparties. Over time banks became principals in order to provide clients with better, more immediate execution and also increase profit margins. (This is the model that existed in 1929 and which was prohibited by Glass-Steagall which the banks worked tirelessly to overturn led by Sandy Weill of Citigroup at the head of an army of lobbyists according to the PBS documentary. There were similar operation in the 1920's although the history has been painted over and buried more thoroughly over time - Jesse)

Increased risk taking was also dictated by business contingencies. Advisory mandates (mergers and acquisition; corporate finance work) were conditional on extension of credit. Banks increasingly “seeded” or invested in hedge funds to gain preferential access to business.

Clients often sought “alignment” of interests requiring banks to take risk positions in transactions. This evolved into the “principal” business as banks increasingly made high risk investment in transactions. In some banks, this evolved into a model where the bank acted purely as “principal” rolling back the clock to the days of J.P. Morgan. Banks convinced themselves of the strategy on the basis that the risks were acceptable (it was their deal after all!), the risk could be always sold off at a price (market were liquid) and (the real reason) high returns.

Enhanced revenues (growing volumes and increasing risk) were augmented by increased leverage and adroit capital management. “Regulatory arbitrage” evolved into a business model. Required risk capital was reduced by creating the “shadow” banking system – a complex network of off balance sheet vehicle and hedge funds. Risk was transferred into the “unregulated” shadow banking system. The strategies exploited bank capital rules. Some or all of the real risk remained indirectly with the originating bank.

Banks reduced “real” equity – common shares – by substituting creative hybrid capital instruments that reduced the cost of capital. The structures generally used high income to attract investors, especially retail investors, while disguising the (less obvious) equity price risk. In some cases, banks used these new forms of capital to repurchase shares to boost returns. For example, CitiGroup repurchased US$12.8 billion of its shares in 2005 and an additional US$7 billion in 2006.

Banks increasingly “hollowed out” capital and liquidity reserves – that is, they reduced these to minimum levels. Concepts of “purchased” capital and “purchased” liquidity gained in popularity. The theory was that banks did not need to hold equity and cash buffers as these items could always be purchased in the market at a price.

Bank profits in recent history were driven by rapid and large growth in lending, trading revenues and increased risk taking. Banking returns were underwritten by an extremely favourable economic environment (a long period of relatively uninterrupted expansion, low inflation, low interest rates and the “dividends” from the end of communism and growth in international trade). (The cooperation of the Federal Reserve in the person of Alan Greenspan was integral and essential. He was somehow persuaded into relinquishing his fiduciary responsibilities - Jesse)

Bankers would argue that the source of higher returns was “innovation”. John Kenneth Galbraith, in A Short History of Financial Euphoria, noted that: “ Financial operations do not lend themselves to innovation. What is recurrently so described and celebrated is, without exception, a small variation on an established design . . . The world of finance hails the invention of the wheel over and over again, often in a slightly more unstable version.” (This was no accident, a small knot of bankers with a good understanding of financial history hijacked the US financial system and the real economy to enrich themselves, fabulously, beyond all normal human need - Jesse)

Elite athletes often use performance enhancement drugs to boost performance. Voodoo banking operated similarly enabling banks to enhance short-term performance whilst risking longer-term damage.

Satyajit Das is a risk consultant and author of Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives (2006, FT-Prentice Hall).

Here Comes a Second Wave of Defaults and Losses

Incoming.

HousingWire
Fitch: Alt-A Mortgages Deteriorating More Rapidly than Expected
By PAUL JACKSON
December 15, 2008

Citing “a rapid deterioration of U.S. Alt-A RMBS performance,” Fitch Ratings again took the hatchet to its previous assumptions for Alt-A mortgages on Monday morning, revising its surveillance methodology and updating loss projections for all U.S. Alt-A RMBS.

Fitch said it now expects losses on all Alt-A collateral to far exceed the estimates of its ‘moderate stress’ scenario in its late ratings update earlier this year. “Market developments, ongoing home-price declines and loan performance trends in the Alt-A sector over the prior six months have effectively eliminated the possibility of this stress scenario,” said Fitch in a statement.

The rating agency said it now expects average cumulative losses om 2005, 2006 and 2007 vintage Alt-A transactions to hit 2.72, 6.78 and 9.58 percent, respectively, up dramatically from expectations at the agency earlier this year.

Fitch cited a “rapid increase in 60+ day delinquencies experienced over the past six months,” despite servicers’ collective efforts to hold off on actual foreclosure sales — likely implying that a halt to foreclosures is having little effect in resolving borrower delinquencies. Between May and October 2008, Fitch said that 60+ day delinquencies for the 2007 vintage increased from 8.80 percent to 14.65 percent; 2006 and 2005 vintages also experienced steep increases rising from 10.30 percent to 14.24 percent and 6.57 percent to 8.79 percent, respectively.

While delinquencies are continuing to pile up, cumulative losses are not — at least, not yet.. “The small increase in cumulative losses relative to the rising level of 60+ day delinquencies reflects, in part, the lengthening foreclosure/liquidation timeline being experienced throughout all vintages,” analysts at the agency wrote.

All of which means that it’s time to get ready for a whole new slew of downgrades to Alt-A in the coming few weeks. Fitch warned in its note Monday that it expects that it will downgrade many senior bonds to below investment grade — just in time for fourth quarter earnings.

Rogue Nation

Explanations of significant losses at investment firms are often attributed to rogue traders. These are traders who have schemed to defeat security measures. These rogues extended their trading portfolios credit exposure far beyond the limits of compliance, racking up substantial losses to be taken, if not risking the actual solvency of their firms. If they do not incur losses they are often not discovered. It is the losses that precipitate the collapse.

Nick Leeson of Barings, Toshihide Iguchi of Resona Holdings, Yashuo Hamanaka at Sumitomo, John Rusnak at Allied Irish Banks, Luke Duffy of Australia National, Chen Jiulin of China Aviation, and Jérôme Kerviel with Société Générale are examples of rogue traders operating since 1995 with combined losses of approximately $12 billion disclosed.

All of them together cannot begin to match one of the great Ponzi schemes in history. This was recently disclosed to be the work of Bernard Madoff, a highly respected executive and former chairman of the NASDAQ, who was apprehended when he confessed to losses of $50 billions.

Not all of his investors were innocents. His returns were literally too good and too mysterious to be true. Many thought that Madoff was trading on insider information or some other fraudulent scheme that was cheating the 'little people.' They did not realize it was they who were being cheated. It is the basic principle of a confidence scheme that you rely on naivete, or the greed and moral indifference of your victims.

The SEC was well aware of problems at Madoff from whistleblowers, and even a cursory examination of the fund's holdings would have exposed the fraud. The SEC was routinely blind to outrageous excesses on Wall Street in the past fifteen years because of the cult of deregulation and chronic underfunding from a Congress in the grip of lobbyists.

In a fraud this large, when it seems as though all those in the know are getting paid, people ignore it when they see it, discourage disclosures, and go along to get along. There is no better example of this on a private scale than the mortgage market in the US where fraudulent valuations and organized collusion were rampant among the banks, appraisers, title companies, the government agencies, Wall Street, and government regulators.

Is there a correlation between rogue traders and market bubbles? History seems to suggest that there is. Yet there are rogue traders every so often even in less ebullient times, but those tend to be isolated and specifically related to secular market innovations such as leveraged buyouts.

In a general monetary bubble rapid and steadily rising asset prices make compliance lax, trading stories that would otherwise be suspect believable, and of course when the money is flowing everyone is getting paid, so there is an atmosphere of general easiness, laissez-faire, and corruption.

Are we near the end of this? Is Bernard Madoff the ultimate rogue trader, the maestro of pyramid schemes, of well-heeled deception?

The status quo likes to blame a 'rogue' because it makes it seem as though the system itself is fundamentally sound. A clever individual acting alone has managed to outsmart the system and find some loophole to exploit until they are caught and exposed. This is a story to maintain confidence in the institution. It promotes unexamined, non-critical trust in the full faith and credit of a system that permits fraud to exist and flourish.

Sadly, this is not the end of the revelations, write-downs and losses.

Bernard Madoff was exposed because declining prices crippled the mechanism of his fraud, as they always do. To his detriment he was not an integral segment of the banking system. If he had been, he might have merely been declared insolvent, retained his honor and his bonuses, been backstopped by the NY Fed, and put into an arranged merger.

Bernie Madoff's mistake was in not incorporating his fraud on a broader scale. He operated on a relatively specialized area of turf in Palm Beach and New York, with collateral damage to the usual suspects on the international stage who are always willing to buy mislabeled American risk.

We believe that there are much greater deceptions being covered up now as we speak, not involving individuals so much as entire companies who have engaged in wanton accounting and securities fraud for the past twenty years.

The losses will eventually top 15 trillion dollars worldwide, and threaten to plunge the world economy into a serious economic dislocation.

Where will the losses come from that will break down the rest of the Ponzi schemes?

History informs us that most of the perpetrators will never be prosecuted, and even though exposed will eventually once again become respected members of society. This is how it was after the Crash of 1929.

The reason for this is that the frauds cut so deeply into the establishment and so far and wide beyond the financial system into the government that they are literally too big to jail.

Indeed, we are already see many of the characters who helped to set this credit bubble rolling in the 1990's coming back into government service with the new 'reform' administration.

The last bubble to fail that will expose these remaining Ponzi schemese is the US dollar and the Treasury bonds. They are the products of a nation that has been overtaken by a rogue culture of sociopaths and swindlers.

Bernie Madoff was no rogue trader. He was successful for as long as he was because he blended in, he was one of the crowd, he was an independent player within the greatest financial swindle in history, the US financial markets and ultimately the US dollar.

Experience suggests that you will ignore this warning, wishing to think of yourself as an insider. After all, it is the weak, the naive, the unsuspecting, the under-developed, the unsophisticated others that are the victims, and indeed they are. After all, what can stop this? The returns are so good, and have been paid steadily for so many years. And you are among the smart ones, the elect.

The endgame will come and strike the astonished like lightning.

You will not realize what has happened until you wake up one day and the accounts are empty, the returns cannot be paid, the promises are proven false, and the principal is gone.

And you will be facing the teeth of the storm with pockets full of empty promises and worthless paper, and no one will be able or willing to help.

And those responsible will say that you were lazy and foolish, and need to be smarter and work harder like them. Those who you imagined were shepherds will be revealed as ravening wolves.

How do we know this? It is already happening again.

Goldman and Morgan Set to Hit the Street with Losses this Week

Since a significant portion of the anticipated losses will be coming from writedowns in commercial real estate the projected reports are probably difficult to make with accuracy. The Banks have a great deal of accounting discretion, and it is probably tied to their tax and public relations strategy among other things.

As you may recall, there was quite a fuss when it was reported that Goldman was setting aside $7 billion of its $10 billion in TARP money to be paid out in bonuses this month. To put it into perspective, those bonuses are about half of the money required to put some health into the US automotive sector.

Goldman and Morgan have been paying more attention to the outrage in the public and the Congress since then, but they are still on a heady Masters-of-the-Universe fast track.

UK Telegraph
Goldman faces $2bn loss – its first since 1929
By Simon Evans
Sunday, 14 December 2008

As the banking giant prepares to unveil shock figures, Morgan Stanley braces itself to add its own bad news

Goldman Sachs, the US investment bank, is this week expected to post its first loss since the Wall Street crash of 1929 when it unveils full-year results on Tuesday.

In the week when many Square Mile bank staff find out if they have scooped a bonus this year, Morgan Stanley is expected to complete a miserable Christmas picture when it also reports a loss, one day later.

Alex Potter, banking analyst at stockbroker Collins Stewart, said: "For these two remaining November year-end reporters, the past three months will have been pivotal to their year as well as to the 2009 outlook. This period encompassed the Lehman failure, as well as the nationalisations of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG."

Analysts expect Goldman to say that it lost close to $2bn (£1.4bn) in the last quarter of 2008, compared to a $3.18bn profit during the same period last year.

Big losses are expected at the bank's proprietary property arm, Whitehall, which owns, among other investments, New York's Rockefeller Center. Sources suggest that Goldman will reveal writedowns of more than $2bn on the fund.

Big losses are also believed to have been recorded in its key principal investments portfolio, with some estimates suggesting they could come in as high as $3.5bn.

Goldman laid off 250 staff in Europe last week, the majority of the cuts coming at its London offices in Fleet Street, as part of a drive to slash the group's headcount by 10 per cent.

Morgan Stanley is expected to post only its second loss since it went public in 1986 – around $300m for the fourth quarter is forecast – although some estimates suggest that figure could be as high as $900m.

The ratings agency Standard and Poor's has estimated that Morgan Stanley owns $7.7bn of commercial real estate loan assets – none of which has been written down.

Morgan Stanley's numbers will come days after Bank of America's chief executive, Ken Lewis, revealed that the bank, which snapped up ailing rival Merrill Lynch earlier in the year, is looking to lay off as many as 35,000 jobs in the next three years. It is anticipated that the move will save as much as $7bn.

Prince Alwaleed Takes a Haircut

Prince Alwaleed Loses 19% of Wealth on Global Slump
By Shaji Mathew

Dec. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, Citigroup Inc.’s largest individual investor, lost 19 percent of his personal wealth in the past year as the global economic slump reduced the value of banking and property assets, according to Arabian Business.

The Saudi billionaire was ranked the wealthiest Arab with assets worth $17.08 billion as of Dec. 2, the 2008 Rich List, published on the Dubai-based magazine’s Web site today said. That compares with $21 billion a year ago, the magazine reported, citing Alwaleed’s private financial accounts.

“Everyone has been guessing for 20 years” about the assets, Alwaleed was quoted by Arabian Business as saying. “I want you to get it right -- to get it absolutely right.”

Financial firms worldwide have taken $980 billion of writedowns, losses and credit provisions since the start of the current turmoil in the financial markets, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. More than 200,000 jobs have been cut across the industry and the U.S. benchmark Standard & Poor’s 500 Index has dropped 40 percent this year.

Making Money

Alwaleed, a nephew of the late King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, stands out among more than 2,000 Saudi princes because he’s made money. After earning a bachelor’s degree from Menlo College near San Francisco, he returned to the Persian Gulf and parlayed an inheritance of less than $1 million into a billion- dollar fortune in the 1980s, mostly through real-estate investments, according to Riz Khan’s biography “Alwaleed: Businessman, Billionaire, Prince” (William Morrow, 2005.) (Meaning no offense, great Prince, but we are a little skeptical of these stated results and methods. - Jesse)

The Prince, 53, built his fortune by investing in brand-name companies he considered undervalued, including Apple Inc., News Corp. and Time Warner Inc. Forbes magazine estimated he was worth $21 billion in March, ranking him 19th among the world’s billionaires.

Alwaleed was lauded by Time magazine as the Middle East’s answer to Warren Buffett, the Sage of Omaha, after his 1991 investment in Citicorp, Citigroup Inc.’s predecessor, helped make the Saudi billionaire one of the world’s five richest people.

This year, Alwaleed’s investments haven’t kept pace with regional benchmarks. The shares of his Riyadh-based Kingdom Holding Co. have slumped 60 percent -- more than Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul All-Share Index or Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Kingdom Holding said Nov. 20 Alwaleed will boost his Citigroup stake, his largest holding, to 5 percent. The bank’s stock has fallen more than 70 percent since Jan. 1.

Assets

Kingdom Holding’s assets are valued at $7.98 billion, while the Prince owns real estate worth $3.196 billion and his media assets such as LBC and Rotana Holding are valued at $1.6 billion, Arabian Business said, citing financial accounts of the billionaire.

“The Prince keeps a significant amount of cash at all times, which is instantly accessible,” the magazine reported, without giving further details.

Alwaleed’s other major assets are valued at $1.679 billion, and include a Boeing 747, an Airbus A380, yachts and 400 vehicles, a collection of jewelry, and investments in a French port and stakes in Lebanese and Palestinian companies.

The billionaire is one of two Middle Eastern investors racing to build the world’s first kilometer-high skyscraper in the Persian Gulf. On Oct. 13, Kingdom Holding announced plans for the Kingdom Tower, part of the $27 billion Kingdom City real-estate project in the Red Sea city of Jeddah.

Capitalism II: Brave New World

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew." Abraham Lincoln

"All conservatism is based upon the idea that if you leave things alone you leave them as they are. But you do not. If you leave a thing alone you leave it twisting in a torrent of change." G.K.Chesteron

"If you don't like change, you are going to like irrelevance even less." US Army General Eric Shinseki

When you have thoroughly made a mess of things, and realize that it is time for a change, one goes to wise mentors and more experienced friends, if you are lucky enough to have them, for constructive and sound advice.

But there are times when hearing from your critics as well is a good idea, because they will often tell you things too difficult for a friend to say openly and directly.

This essay below by Michael Hudson and Jeffrey Sommers strikes me as such a critical analysis of the US economy as it exists today. It is useful because it looks at the US from the eyes of the non-G7 countries through the lenses of what the authors call 'Managed Capitalism' in contrast to what they call Neo-Liberalism but what I might refer to as "Financial Capitalism."

There are things with which I disagree in this essay especially in terms of recommended courses of action. But there are a significant number of observations "from the other guy's point of view" that makes it worth reading, carefully.

We need to recognize that Japan, China, and many countries today are not free markets, and that they embrace a very strong industrial policy formed by central bureaucracies. We may even have more of a structure such as this than we realize, with our outsized financial sector. These countries have a form of Managed Capitalism.

The argument against that form of economic structure is that centralized decision making, especially as it applies to the particular, tends to get it wrong much more often than consensus decisions widely spread among market participants if information is transparently dispersed.

This is because bias and temperament tend to be blended out to the tails in a broad consensus. Yes you may get a run of great leadership every so often in a centrally planned economy, but you will too often get a Hitler, Stalin, or a Mao, and the damage they can do to a country is measured in the millions of the dead in addition to economic and structural loss.

To me, financial capitalism is a clear excess, a distortion of free market capitalism in the same way that managed capitalism is. They both assert unbalancing forces on the course of the neural structure of natural decision making and transmission of values to productivity.

I do not think the US status quo is willing change yet. Why should it? The strong dollar has served the financial sector well. The change will first occur in the international trade mechanisms, with the displacement of that lynch pin of the Washington consensus, the dollar as reserve currency. More change and restructuring will necessarily flow from that.

It is useful to read this essay not because you agree with it, but because a number of other countries who are your critics will agree, and change is coming. That is without doubt. The current financial system is inherently unstable because the self-correcting market and price discovery mechanisms are broken.

The solution for the US will be to move back to a more progressive, less financially-oriented, more productive economy.

The cult of pervasive globalization is a hoax, an excuse to centralize power that is not compatible with a world in which people have choices, and wish to maintain societies with the values and policies of their choosing.

If the US stays on its current course and seeks to maintain the status quo, the next step will be an attempt to establish stronger central planning, and a New World Order. One can already see those in the Anglo-American establishment and the Neo-cons trying to pave the way for it.

It is true always and everywhere that if you surrender the management of your currency to another you have handed over the keys to your fiscal and societal freedom, because the control of the money supply strikes to the heart of your economy in ways that permeate interest rates, industrial production, health care, and personal freedoms. Social choices are also economic choices.

As an aside, it will be interesting to see how Europe progresses in this, and whether the European Union will grow and transform, or fragment. The great variable will be leadership and vision.

Change is coming, whether we like it or not. It will be coming from the outside if not from within.

The days of both Soviet and Dollar imperialism are ending. The latest attempt to establish a New World Order is already failing.

The world's superpowers are dismantling neo-colonial empires once again, and decision making will be moving from a central planning for the world at the Federal Reserve and Washington, as well as Moscow, and back to individual countries who for good or ill will be trying to manage their own economies for themselves.

"Few will have the greatness to bend history itself; but each of us can work to change a small portion of events, and in the total of all those acts will be written the history of this generation." Robert Kennedy

Counterpunch
What is to be Done?
The End of the Washington Consensus
By MICHAEL HUDSON and JEFFREY SOMMERS
December 12, 2008

Wall Street’s financial meltdown marks the end of an era. What has ended is the credibility of the Washington Consensus – open markets to foreign investors and tight money austerity programs (high interest rates and credit cutbacks) to “cure” balance-of-payments deficits, domestic budget deficits and price inflation. On the negative side, this model has failed to produce the prosperity it promises. Raising interest rates and dismantling protective tariffs and subsidies worsen rather than help the trade and payments balance, aggravate rather than reduce domestic budget deficits, and raise prices. The reason? Interest is a cost of doing business while foreign trade dependency and currency depreciation raise import prices.

But even more striking is the positive side of what can be done as an alternative to the Washington Consensus. The $700 billion U.S. Treasury bailout of Wall Street’s bad loans on October 3 shows that the United States has no intention of applying this model to its own economy. Austerity and “fiscal responsibility” are for other countries. America acts ruthlessly in its own economic interest at any given moment of time. It freely spends more than it earns, flooding the global economy with what has now risen to $4 trillion in U.S. government debt to foreign central banks.

This amount is unpayable, given the chronic U.S. trade deficit and overseas military spending. But it does pose an interesting problem: why can’t other countries do the same thing? Is today’s policy asymmetry a fact of nature, or is it merely voluntary and the result of ignorance (spurred by an intensive globalist ideological propaganda program, to be sure)? Does India, for instance, need to privatize its state-owned banks as earlier was planned, or is it right to pull back? More to the point, have the neoliberal programs imposed on the former Soviet Union succeeded in “Americanizing” their economies and raising production capacity and living standards as promised? Or, was it all a dream, indeed, a nightmare?

The three Baltic countries, for instance – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – have long been praised in the Western press as great success stories. The World Bank classifies them among the most “business friendly” countries, and their real estate prices have soared, fueled by foreign-currency mortgages from neighboring Scandinavian banks. Their industry has been dismantled, their agriculture is in ruins, their male population below the age of 35 is emigrating. But real estate prices added to the net worth on their national balance sheets for nearly a decade. Has a new “moment of truth” arrived? Just because the Soviet economic system culminated in bureaucratic kleptocracy, has the neoliberal model really been so much better? Most important of all, was there a better alternative all along?

We expect the post-Soviet economies to go the way of Iceland, having taken on foreign debt with no visible means of paying it off via exports (the same situation in which the United States finds itself), or even further asset sales. Emigrants’ remittances are becoming a mainstay of their balance of payments, reflecting their economic shrinkage at the hands of neoliberal “reformers” and the free-market international dependency that the Washington Consensus promotes. So, just as this crisis has led the U.S. government to shift gears, is it time for foreign countries to seek to become more in the character of “mixed economies”? This has been the route taken by every successful economy in history, after all. Total private-sector markets (in practice, markets run by the banks and money managers) have shown themselves to be just as destructive, wasteful and corrupt and, indeed, centrally planned as those of totally “statist” governments from Stalin’s Russia to Hitler’s Germany. Is the political pendulum about to swing back more toward a better public-private balance?

Washington’s idealized picture of how free markets operate (as if such a thing ever existed) promised that countries outside the United States would get rich faster, approaching U.S.-style living standards if they let global investors buy their key industries and basic infrastructure. For half a century, this neoliberal model has been a hypocritical exercise in poor policy at best, and deception at worst, to convince other economies to impose self-destructive financial and tax policies, enabling U.S. investors to swoop in and buy their key assets at distress prices. (And for the U.S. economy to pay for these investment outflows in the form of more and more U.S. Treasury IOUs, yielding a low or even negative return when denominated in hard currencies.)

The neoliberal global system never was open in practice. America never imposed on itself the kind of shock therapy that President Clinton’s Treasury Secretary (and now Obama’s advisor) Robert Rubin promoted in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet bloc, from the Baltic countries in the northwest to Central Asia in the southeast. Just the opposite! Despite the fact that America’s own balance of trade and payments is soaring, consumer prices are rising and financial and property markets are plunging, there are no calls among its power elite to let the system self-correct. The Treasury is subsidizing America’s financial markets so as to save its financial class (minus some sacrificial lambs) and support its asset prices. Interest rates are being lowered to re-inflate asset prices, not raised to stabilize the dollar or slow domestic price inflation.

The policy implications go far beyond the United States itself. If the United States can create so much credit so quickly and so freely – and if Europe can follow suit, as it has done in recent days – why can’t all countries do this? Why can’t they get rich by following that path that the United States actually has taken, rather than merely doing what its economic diplomats tell them to do with sweet self-serving rhetoric? U.S. experience itself provides the major reason why the free market, run by financial institutions allocating credit, is a myth, a false map of reality to substitute for actual gunboats in getting other countries to open their asset markets to U.S. investors and food markets to U.S. farmers.

By contrast, the financial and trade model that U.S. oligarchs and their allies are promoting is a double standard. Most notoriously, when the 1997 Asian financial crisis broke out, the IMF demanded that foreign governments sell out their banks and industry at fire-sale prices to foreigners. U.S. vulture capital firms were especially aggressive in grabbing Asian and other global assets. But the U.S. financial bailout stands in sharp contrast to what Washington Consensus institutions imposed on other countries. There is no intention of letting foreign investors buy into the commanding U.S. heights, except at exorbitant prices. And for industry, the United States has once more violated international trade rules by offering special bailout money and subsidies to its own Big Three U.S. automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler) but not to foreign-owned automakers in the United States. In thus favoring its own national industry and taking punitive measures to injure foreign-owned investments, the United States is once again providing an object lesson in nationalistic economic policy.

Most important, the U.S. bailout provides a model that is far preferable to the Washington Consensus-for-export. It shows that countries do not need to borrow credit from foreign banks at all. The government could have created its own money and credit system rather than leaving foreign creditors to accrue interest charges that now represent a permanent and seemingly irreversible balance-of-payments drain. The United States has shown that any country can monetize its own credit, at least domestic credit. A large part of the problem for Third World and post-Soviet economies is that they never experienced the successful model of managerial capitalism that predated the neoliberal model, advocated since the 1980s by Washington.

The managerial model of capitalism, predominating during the post-World War II period until the 1980s (with antecedents in 18th-century British mercantilism and 19th-century American protectionism), delivered high growth. Postwar planners, such as John Maynard Keynes in England and Harry Dexter White in the United States, favored production over finance. As Winston Churchill quipped, “nations typically do the right thing [pause], after exhausting all other options.” But it took two world wars, interspersed by an economic depression triggered by debts in excess of the ability to pay, to give the final nudge required to promote manufacturing over finance and finally do “the right thing.”

Finance was made subordinate to industrial development and full employment. When this economic philosophy reached its peak in the early 1960s, the financial sector accounted for only 2 per cent of U.S. corporate profits. Today, it is 40 per cent! Carrying charges on America’s exponentially growing debt are diverting income away from purchasing goods and services to pay creditors, who use the money mainly to lend out afresh to borrowers to bid up real estate prices and stock prices. Tangible capital investment is financed almost entirely out of retained corporate earnings – and these too are being diverted to pay interest on soaring industrial debt. The result is debt deflation – a shrinkage of spending power as the economic surplus is “financialized,” a new word, only recently added to the world’s economic vocabulary.

Since the 1980s, the U.S. tax system has promoted rent seeking and speculation on credit to ride the wave of asset-price inflation. This strategy increased balance sheets as long as asset prices rose faster than debts (that is, until last year). But it did not add to industrial capacity. And meanwhile, tax cuts caused the national debt to soar, prompting U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney to comment, “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.”

On the international front, the larger the U.S. trade and payments deficit, the more dollars were pumped into foreign hands. Their central banks recycled them back to the U.S. economy in the form of purchases of Treasury bonds and, when the interest rates fell almost to zero, securitized mortgage packages. Current Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson assured Chinese and other foreign investors that the government would stand behind Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as privatized mortgage-packaging agencies, guaranteeing a $5.2 trillion supply of mortgages. This matched in size the U.S. public debt in private hands.

Meanwhile, the Treasury cut special deals with the Saudis to recycle their oil revenues into investments in Citibank and other U.S. financial institutions – investments, on which they have lost many tens of billions of dollars. To cap matters, pricing world oil in dollars kept the U.S. currency stronger than underlying economic fundamentals justified. The U.S. economy paid for its imports with government debt never intended to be repaid, even if it could be (which it can’t at today’s $4 trillion level, cited earlier). The American economy, thus, has seen its trade deficit and asset prices rise in accordance with economic laws that no other nation can emulate, topped by the ability to run freely into international debt without limit.

Managerial capitalism mobilized rising corporate net worth and equity value to build up in the real economy. But since the 1980s, a new breed of financial managers has pledged assets as collateral for new loans to buy back corporate stock and even to pay out as dividends. This has pushed up corporate stock prices and, with them, the value of stock options that corporate managers give themselves. But it has not spurred tangible capital formation.

A real estate bubble in all countries has been fueled by rising mortgage debt. To buy a new home, buyers must take on a lifetime of debt. This has made many employees afraid to go on strike or even to press for better working conditions, because they are “one check away from homelessness,” or mortgage foreclosure. Meanwhile, companies have been outsourcing and downsizing their labor force, eliminating benefits, imposing longer hours, and bringing more women and children into the workforce.

Today’s “new economy” is based not on new technology and capital investment, as former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan trumpeted in the late 1990s, but on price inflation generating capital gains (mainly in land prices, as land is still the largest asset in the U.S. and other industrial economies). The economic surplus is absorbed by debt service payments (and higher priced health care), not investment in production or in sharing productivity gains with labor and professionals. Wages and living standards are stagnant for most people, as the economy tries to get rich by “the miracle of compound interest,” while capital gains emanating from the financial sector provide a foundation for new credit to bid up asset prices, all the more in a seemingly perpetual motion credit-and-debt machine. But the effect has been for the richest 1 per cent of the population to increase its share of interest extraction, dividends and capital gains from 37 per cent ten years ago to 57 per cent five years ago, and nearly 70 per cent today. Savings remain high, but only the wealthiest 10 per cent are saving – and this money is being lent out to the bottom 90 per cent, so no net saving is occurring.

Internationally, too, the global economy has polarized rather than converged. Just as independence arrived for many Third World countries only after their former European colonial powers had put in place inequitable land tenure patterns (latifundia, owned by domestic oligarchies) and export-oriented production, so independence for the post-Soviet countries from Russia arrived after managerial capitalism had given way to a neoliberal model that viewed “wealth creation” simply as rising prices for real estate, stocks and bonds. Western advisors and former emigrants descended to convince these countries to play the same game that other countries were playing – except that real estate debt for many of these countries was denominated in foreign currency, as no domestic banking tradition had been developed. This became increasingly dangerous for economies that did not put in place sufficient export capacity to cover the price of imports and the mounting volume of foreign-currency debt attached to their real estate. And nearly all the post-Soviet countries ran structural trade deficit, as production patterns were disrupted with the breakup of the U.S.S.R.

Real estate and capital gains from asset-price inflation (not industrial capital formation) were promoted as the way to future prosperity in countries whose profits from manufacturing were low and wages were stagnant. The problem is this alchemy is not sustainable. An illusion of success could be maintained as long as Washington was flooding the globe with cheap money. This led Swedes and other Europeans to find capital gains by extending loans to feed neighboring countries from Iceland to Latvia, above all via their real estate markets. For some exporters (especially Russia), rising oil and metal export prices became the basis for capital outflows into Third World and post-Soviet financial markets. Some of the backwash, for example, flowed into the world’s burgeoning offshore banking and real estate sectors – only to stop abruptly when the real estate bubble burst.

In these circumstances, what is to be done? First, countries outside the United States need to recognize how dysfunctional the neoliberalized world economy has been made, and to decide which assumptions underlying the neoliberal model must be discarded. Its preferred tax and financial policies favor finance over industry and, hence, financial maneuvering and asset-price inflation over tangible capital formation. Its anti-labor austerity policies and un-taxing of real estate, stocks and bonds divert resources away from growth and rising living standards.

Likewise destructive are compound interest and capital gains over the long term. The real economy can grow only a few per cent a year at best. Therefore, it is mathematically impossible for compound interest to continue unabated and for capital gains to grow well in excess of the underlying rate of economic growth. Historically, economic crises wipe out these gains when they outpace real economic growth by too far a margin. The moral is that compound interest and hopes for capital gains cannot guarantee income for its retirees or continue attracting foreign capital. Over a period of a lifetime, financial investments may not deliver significant gains. For the United States, it took markets about twenty-five years, from 1929 to the mid-1950s, to recover their previous value.

Today’s desperate U.S. attempt to re-inflate post-crash prices cannot cure the bad-debt problem. Foreign attempts to do this will merely aid foreign bankers and financial investors, not the domestic economy. Countries need to invest in their real economy, to raise productivity and wages. Governments must punish speculation and capital gains that merely reflect asset-price inflation, not real value. Otherwise, the real economy’s productive powers and living standards will be impaired and, in the neoliberal model, loaded down with debt. Policies should encourage enterprise, not speculation. Investment seeks growing markets, which tend to be thwarted by macroeconomic targets such as low inflation and balanced budgets. We are not arguing that inflation and deficits can be ignored, but rather that inflation and deficits are not all created equally. Some variants hurt the economy, while others reflect healthy investment in real production. Distinguishing between the two effects is vital, if economies are to move forward to achieve self-dependency.

In sum, a much better economy can be created by rejecting Washington’s financial model of austerity programs, privatization selloffs and trade dependency, financed by foreign-currency credit. Prosperity cannot be achieved by creating a favorable climate for extractive foreign capital, or by tightening credit and balancing budgets, decade after decade. The United States itself has always rejected these policies, and foreign countries also must do this if they wish to follow the policies, by which America actually grew rich, not by what U.S. neoliberal advisors tell other countries to do to please U.S. banks and foreign investors.

Also to be rejected is the anti-labor neoliberal tax policy (heavy taxes on employees and employers, low or zero taxes on real estate, finance and capital gains) and anti-labor workplace policies, ranging from safety protection and health care to working conditions. The U.S. economy rose to dominance as a result of Progressive Era regulatory reforms prior to World War I, reinforced by popular New Deal reforms put in place in the Great Depression. Neoliberal economics was promoted as a means of undoing these reforms. By undoing them, the Washington Consensus would deny to foreign countries the development strategy that has best succeeded in creating thriving domestic markets, rising productivity, capital formation and living standards. The effect has been to decouple saving from tangible capital formation. They need to be re-coupled, and this can be achieved only by restoring the kind of mixed economy by which North America and Europe achieved their economic growth.


Michael Hudson is professor of Economics at the University of Missouri (Kansas City) and chief economic advisor to Rep. Dennis Kucinich. He has advised the U.S., Canadian, Mexican and Latvian governments, as well as the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). He is the author of many books, including Super Imperialism: The Economic Strategy of American Empire (new ed., Pluto Press, 2002). He can be reached via his website, mh@michael-hudson.com.

Jeffrey Sommers is a professor at Raritan Valley College, NJ, visiting professor at the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, former Fulbrighter to Latvia, and fellow at Boris Kagarlitsky’s Institute for Global Studies in Moscow. He can be reached at jsommers@sseriga.edu.lv.

Citadel Suspends Withdrawals to Halt the Run on Two Funds

Are the hedge fund runs the modern day equivalent of the bank runs of the 1930's or even the Panic of 1907?

That is not as glib an observation as you might think at first. The hedge funds like Citadel and Fortress resemble the private banks of New York in the early 1900's in many ways.

As in the case of Bernie Maddow, as a type of Richard Whitney, we're seeing echoes of certain periods in the past in many of the events today.

This is clearly not your father's recession, but we are not quite sure what it will be yet, and are often unpersuaded by those who think they do.

"Why can't you just accept that this is deflation?" It is clearly a deflation in terms of aggregate demand, no question. All one has to do is look at GDP. But we do not see it as a true straightforward money deflation with a sustainable increase in the value of the dollar. The dollar is a financial asset and not a store of value. It is an artifice.

Something is going to replace the dollar, but we cannot tell what it will be yet.

The Fed and Treasury have given away three trillion dollars at least so far, with commitments to give away five more. It only seems to be a deflation if you are not on the list of the chosen few, and take a shower before leaving for work instead of after. In the short term deleveraged cash is king, no doubt about it. Risk is still high, and we have much further to do to the downside. Stocks are poison and debt is unstable.

The dollar is decoupled from reality, far from the conventional mechanisms of savings and investment. Its all policy now in the short term, and then the next phase of this transformation will begin, and it will contain a surprisingly large portion of the unexpected, the unanticipated, on the order of the stagflation of the 1970's that left so many economists with their mouths gaping open.

The natural question is "But Jesse, this is all well and good, and it makes my head hurt. What is the endgame? Where should I put my money now?"

Cash. The safer stores of value of wealth. Its no coincidence that short term Treasuries have spiked to negative returns, and manageable forms of gold and silver bullion are in scarce supply. And then we wait and see what happens next. Take risks if you must, but only with a very small percentage of your portfolio, and sit on the rest, get out of debt, cut consumption, and wait.

There is no way to adequately measure and assess risk in a system in which the price discovery mechanisms are broken, and the standards of value are changing to something radically different, and success and failure can rely on the somewhat arbitrary policy decisions of a few politicians and bankers and the decisions of foreign governments.


Citadel Suspends Withdrawals in Two Hedge Funds After 50% Drop
By Saijel Kishan and Katherine Burton

Dec. 12 (Bloomberg) -- Citadel Investment Group LLC, the Chicago-based hedge-fund firm run by Kenneth Griffin, halted year- end withdrawals from its two biggest funds after investors sought to take out $1.2 billion, according to a letter sent to clients.

The Kensington and Wellington funds, which together manage about $10 billion, have lost 49.5 percent of their value this year through Dec. 5. Withdrawals may resume as early as March 31, said the letter, signed by Griffin and sent to investors today.

“We have not made this decision lightly,” Griffin wrote. “We recognize how a suspension impacts our investors, especially those with current financial obligations of their own to meet.”

Citadel joins hedge funds including Fortress Investment Group LLC and Tudor Investment Corp. in limiting withdrawals as hedge funds head for their biggest annual losses since at least 1990. Hedge funds have declined 18 percent, on average, this year through Nov. 30, according to Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.

As of October, 18 percent of hedge-fund assets, or about $300 billion, managed by 5 percent of hedge funds, were subject to some sort of restriction on withdrawals, according to Peter Douglas, principal of Singapore-based hedge-fund consulting firm GFIA Pte.

Citadel normally allows clients to withdraw up to 1/16th of their assets quarterly. If total withdrawals exceed 3 percent of the fund, investors must pay a fee back into the fund ranging from 5 percent to 9 percent. Redemptions have never before surpassed the limit.

Citadel will also absorb “a substantial portion” of the funds’ expenses this year, the letter said. Citadel clients usually pay these charges, which have traditionally amounted to about 3 percent to 4 percent of assets.

The fund is holding between 25 percent and 30 percent of its assets in cash.

Katie Spring, a spokeswoman for Chicago-based Citadel, declined to comment.

Before 2008, Citadel had posted just one losing year since Griffin started the firm in 1990, dropping 4 percent in 1994. Three Citadel funds, whose returns are tied to the firm’s market- making business, have climbed about 40 percent this year. Those funds manage about $3 billion.

US Dollar Weekly Chart with COT for the Week Ending 12 December

Comparison of 1928-32 and 2007-11

There are important differences in the nature of the declines. The current series looks like a bear market in the form of 1973-4 whereas 1929-32 was much more precipitous. This may be attributed to the extraordinary actions of the FED and Treasury. However, this may only soften the blow and not the outcome, most likely adjusted for inflation.




The Intraday Volatility matches up nicely so far as we have aligned them Peak to Peak without regard to pricing. It will be in the market action going forward where the model will be assessed here.

If You Use Levered ETFs Read This

Thanks to Paul Kedrosky for a clear and useful analysis.

Levered ETFs, with the various targeted multipliers, reset their basis at the end of each trading day, which means that you are levered up only for that day.

This can have some remarkable and counter-intuitive results over a trend.

There is also a signficant amount of intraday slippage in volatile markets.



More Fun with Levered ETFs - Paul Kedrosky - Seeking Alph

SP Monthly Chart Update

Charts in the Babson Style for 11 December

Former NASDAQ Chairman Charged in $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme

"Do you know where your money is?"


Bernard L Madoff Investment Securities is the 23rd largest market maker on the Nasdaq for hedge funds and banks handling about 50 million shares per day.

The firm specialized in handling orders from online brokers in some of the largest U.S. companies, including General Electric Co. and Citigroup Inc.

Their Financial Advisory Business is separate from their market-making business with approximately 20 customers.

The $50 billion in confessed total losses does not quite square up with $17 billion under management at the advisory firm, even in these heady days of leverage.

Where and when is the unidentified loss of $33 billion going to hit?

Naked shorts which cannot be covered? Levered positions that are now vaporized?

Who are the twenty or so customers of the Financial Advisory business?

Who was his auditor? Who in the NASD knew about this? Who was handling his back office work?

Is the ghost of Richard Whitney walking the floor of the Exchange tonight?

cf. Richard Whitney, President of the NYSE 1930-35

Richard Whitney Warning Against the Securities Act of 1934 - Video

Securities and Exchange Commission
SEC Charges Bernard L. Madoff for Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi Scheme
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-293

Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 2008 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Bernard L. Madoff and his investment firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, with securities fraud for a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that he perpetrated on advisory clients of his firm. The SEC is seeking emergency relief for investors, including an asset freeze and the appointment of a receiver for the firm.

The SEC's complaint, filed in federal court in Manhattan, alleges that Madoff yesterday informed two senior employees that his investment advisory business was a fraud. Madoff told these employees that he was "finished," that he had "absolutely nothing," that "it's all just one big lie," and that it was "basically, a giant Ponzi scheme." The senior employees understood him to be saying that he had for years been paying returns to certain investors out of the principal received from other, different investors. Madoff admitted in this conversation that the firm was insolvent and had been for years, and that he estimated the losses from this fraud were at least $50 billion. (From 17 billion under management? Offer him the position of Treasury Secretary. This guy is a financial genius! - Jesse)

"We are alleging a massive fraud — both in terms of scope and duration," said Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "We are moving quickly and decisively to stop the fraud and protect remaining assets for investors, and we are working closely with the criminal authorities to hold Mr. Madoff accountable."

Andrew M. Calamari, Associate Director of Enforcement in the SEC's New York Regional Office, added, "Our complaint alleges a stunning fraud that appears to be of epic proportions."

According to regulatory filings, the Madoff firm had more than $17 billion in assets under management as of the beginning of 2008. It appears that virtually all assets of the advisory business are missing.

Madoff founded the firm in 1960 and has been a prominent member of the securities industry throughout his career. Madoff served as vice chairman of the NASD, a member of its board of governors, and chairman of its New York region. He was also a member of NASDAQ Stock Market's board of governors and its executive committee and served as chairman of its trading committee.

The complaint charges the defendants with violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In addition to emergency and interim relief, the SEC seeks a final judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from future violations of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and ordering them to pay financial penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest.

The SEC's investigation is continuing.

The SEC acknowledges the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.

Moscow Memories of 1997

The last trip I had to Moscow was in the spring of 1997 as the ruble crisis was getting seriously underway towards the Russian debt default in August 1998.

US dollars were king, and you could buy almost anything except diamonds and gold with them as the public was beginning to panic out of the ruble and even basic commodities were in incredibly short supply. Our driver would take the windshield wipers off his car at night so that they would not be stolen.

The black market was alive and well. The city had the flavor of the Wild West as the Russkaya Mafiya was out in force in trademark long black woolen overcoats. A shipment of the coats had arrived the previous year at a local flea market and were impressively sinister, amenable to concealment, yet effective against the cold, thereby creating the signature gangsta look.

On that trip I had a driver/bodyguard, and an interpreter as I had no Russian, just a smattering of loosely related slavic languages from childhood. The Japanese immersion course just completed in Princeton for another long term project was not particularly useful. French was in slight demand, but it might have been more useful in Leningrad. I was able to read some instruction for a video camera that used SECAM, but that was about it.

The interpreter was a lady who mildly resembled Tatiana Romanova in From Russia with Love, but with the disposition of Odd Job. She was serious and highly professional, but did have a weakness for Dunhill cigarettes and the curious two tone bloody Mary's they serve there. Her boss was an Italian ex-pat who was a real character.

One should always treat the local associates well and with respect, because not only will they keep you out of trouble, but they will often slip you a bit of valuable information, even during an active translation. They take pride in their work, and are not servants. It is not only a matter of good manners but also good business sense. The way in which the average American businessman behaves is too often clumsily embarrassing, vacillating between boorish and aloof.

We switched hotels at the last minute as there was an unscheduled execution in the lobby of our intended lodgings the week before our arrival. The hotel we did have was nice, foreign owned out of Belgium as I recall, but the staff was a bit stiff if you know what I mean. It was more like a minimum security prison than a hotel. I'm sure our drivers and guards were getting kickbacks. Everyone was getting paid one way or the other.

That last trip was the culmination of a series of business trips in which we were opening up higher speed data and video communications to Moscow from the domestic US via reliable non-satellite connections. Keeping a lock on Sputnik from the US was a challenge given the inclination and its tendency to wobble somewhat erratically.

The 'last mile' in Moscow was a challenge given Moscow Telephone's tradition of non-attention to quality planning and somewhat eccentric layout of their central offices, as in the basement of an old house with a propensity for periodic flooding, generally during key events for ABC News or the State Department.

It may sound like a serious problem, but my team tended to take this sort of thing in stride, since it was a walk in the park, relatively speaking, compared to dropping satellite dishes into a simmering theater of war which we had often done before.

We teamed with another company named Sovintel instead, and chose to go with direct microwave shots from their tower to the multinational business and government locations who were the prime customers as they were the only ones who could still pay for premium services.

I liked Moscow and the people in particular. A walk in Red Square on a crisp night with falling snow, with St. Basil's ahead and GUM department store lit up on the left is very picturesqe. The Kremlin looks like the entrance to the kingdom of Mordor.

The Red Army guards were young and annoying, probably cranky because they were not getting paid. I remember walking through Lenin's tomb, which was utterly deserted, and being yelled at constantly to 'move along' by a young Russian soldier who looked like he had an urge to plant his jackboot on my face.

Ex-patriates in Moscow had an interesting time, living in $5000 per month apartments that were more indicative of their non-resident status than the amenities of their accommodations. We visited an apartment in one of the seven "Woolworth buildings" from the Stalin era that had a door which would have served for a very secure bank vault.

The ex-pats telex messages to us in the planning phase were concise: "Bring Western toilet paper." They tended to meet us every morning at the hotel, to take the toilet paper and soap out of our rooms and eat with us as our guests at the hotel breakfast buffet. It was a nice spread, and offered a more extensive fare than the grocery store we visited which offered only cabbages and big garishly orange boxes of Uncle Ben's rice.

We attended a performance at the Bolshoi Theater sponsored by some multinationals. Most notably, as a friend so slyly put it, the expats may be living poorly but it was nice to see them bring their attractive young daughters to the event. I don't think any of them were married, and we came away with the impression that people took assignments there to escape bad debts or bad marriages in the West.

There were a remarkable series of conversations with an interesting local acquaintances including one I called "Casper the Ghost," because of the promotional movie cap he always wore. From the way he spoke I became convinced that the primary occupation of those with savings was to convert it into hard currencies, gold and diamonds, and if possible get it out of the country.

Casper was busy amassing enough gold, while facilitating the efforts of others, in order to get out of Russia and move to the western US. He cynically wore the mafia signature black coat to scare off small time competition. "I go to same flea market and buy. Its no hard to do." He was a good source of information for a few drinks and the promise of a contact in Colorado. I think his real name was "Ben." That is how he answered the phone when I called him back from the States.

That, and multinationals with a local presence like McDonalds trying to figure out ways to work around currency controls or do something productive with their profits. I had the chance to visit the largest McDonald's in the world at that time, at the request again of the expats, and it was indeed impressive with 32 checkouts, but no customers.

They were desperate times, and you could see that there was a climactic crisis coming. It is easy to talk about this sort of thing, a thousand to one devaluation of your home currency, but harder to understand the impact. Imagine that you have $500,000 in savings for your retirement. Now imagine that within two years it is effectively reduced to $500 or less, and you will understand how disconcerting a currency crisis can be.

If you don't think a financial panic is possible here in the US, just take a look at the negative returns on short term T bills, and you will get a taste of the leading edge.

One of the best descriptions of the Weimar experience I have ever read was by Adam Fergusson titled "When Money Dies: The Nightmare of the Weimar Collapse." It is notoriously difficult to obtain, but it does the best job in describing how a currency collapse can come on like a lightning strike, although in retrospect everyone could have seen it coming. Denial is a strong narcotic. People believe in their institutions and ignore history until they are staring off the edge of the abyss.

But in Moscow as in everywhere life does go on. I left with pocketfuls of 1000 ruble notes which I *bought* along with the requisite matroyshka dolls and military medals, all for the kids to play with. Things became worse, much worse, and then eventually they became better.

I have often wondered if 'Casper' ever achieved his dream of taking his diamonds and gold and relocating to Colorado. I hope he did. If he is there, I wonder if he is thinking of moving again.

Bloomberg
Russians Buy Jewelry, Hoard Dollars as Ruble Plunges
By Emma O’Brien and William Mauldin

Dec. 11 (Bloomberg) -- ...Russians are shifting their cash into foreign currencies and buying things they don’t need as the economy stalls and the central bank weakens its defense of the ruble, signaling a larger devaluation may be on the way. The currency has fallen 16 percent against the dollar since August, when Russia’s invasion of neighboring Georgia helped spur investors to pull almost $200 billion out of the country, according to BNP Paribas SA.

The central bank today expanded the ruble’s trading band against a basket of dollars and euros, allowing it to drop 0.8 percent, said a spokesman who declined to be identified on bank policy.

With the specter of the 1998 debt default and devaluation in mind, Russians withdrew 355 billion rubles ($13 billion), or 6 percent of all savings, from their accounts in October, the most since the central bank started posting the data two years ago. Foreign-currency deposits rose 11 percent.

Oligarchs Pinched

Those withdrawals are increasing pressure for the ruble’s devaluation, according to Basil Issa, an emerging- markets analyst at BNP Paribas in London.

Property is now a protective investment, not just a status symbol, said Sergei Polonsky, founder of real estate developer Mirax Group, which is building Moscow’s tallest skyscraper.

“Lately our clients are mostly those who buy real estate not to live in but to secure their investments,” Polonsky said. “No one wants to be left with pieces of paper.”

The 25 wealthiest Russians on Forbes magazine’s list of billionaires, including Oleg Deripaska and Roman Abramovich, lost a combined $230 billion from May to October as asset values plummeted, according to Bloomberg calculations.

‘Feel Happy’

For the burgeoning middle class, investments of choice range from electronics to gold jewelry. Evroset, Russia’s largest mobile-phone chain, is telling people to buy anything they can.

“It’s better to feel happy that you own something than to fear losing the money you have earned,” Chairman Yevgeny Chichvarkin says in a letter posted at 5,200 Evroset stores. “If you need a car, buy a car! If you need an apartment, buy an apartment! If you need a fur coat, buy a fur coat!”

Sales at Technosila, the third-biggest consumer electronics chain, have doubled since September as customers rush to swap rubles for flat-screen TVs and laptops, spokeswoman Nadezhda Senyuk said by phone from Moscow, where the company is based.

Jewelry sales are also accelerating, particularly items made of gold and diamonds, said Vladimir Stankevich, advertising director at Adamas, Russia’s third-largest jewelry retailer.

“More cash appeared on the market and there’s an opinion among shoppers that gold is a good investment in times of crisis,” Stankevich said.

Natalya Kulikova has a different approach. The 31-year-old sales manager said she’s opened accounts in rubles, euros and dollars at three different banks -- one foreign and two domestic -- to guard her savings.

“My main goal is to save money,” she said.

Putin Pledge

Those who don’t want to spend are keeping more money at home or in safe-deposit boxes because the government guarantee on bank accounts is limited to 700,000 rubles, said Yulia Tsepliaeva, chief economist in Moscow at Merrill Lynch & Co.

Alfa Bank, Russia’s biggest non-state lender, said demand for boxes has increased about 40 percent since October, and there are few available.

“The Russian experience with saving is not that good and people prefer to consume and enjoy rather than save in pre-crisis situations,” Tsepliaeva said. “Buy cash dollars and put them in mattresses or safe deposit boxes but not in accounts because most crises are accompanied by banking crises.”

A decade ago, many lost their life savings after the ruble plunged 71 percent against the dollar. Those fears prompted Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to pledge not to allow “sharp jumps” in the exchange rate, during a call-in television show Dec. 4.

‘Ideal Time’

Troika Dialog, Russia’s oldest investment bank, is betting the central bank will allow a one-time devaluation of the ruble of about 20 percent in January, following New Year’s and Orthodox Christmas celebrations.

“With the holidays at the beginning of January, companies won’t be fully working and people will be spending more money,” said Evgeny Gavrilenkov, Troika’s chief economist and a former acting head of the government’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. “That means demand for rubles will increase and that means it’s an ideal time to allow a devaluation.”

Russia has drained almost a quarter of its foreign-currency reserves, the world’s third-largest, since August as it tries to slow the ruble’s decline. The central bank has widened the trading band five times in the past month, effectively reducing its defense of the currency amid plunging oil prices.

Devaluation Skeptic

Urals crude, Russia’s main export earner, has slumped 72 percent since reaching a record $142.94 a barrel July 4. It fell below $40 for the first time in three years last week, compared with the $70 needed to balance the country’s budget.

The government will avoid a large, one-step devaluation because it wants to prevent a run on the banks and lure back foreign investors, said Chris Weafer, chief strategist in Moscow at UralSib Financial Corp.

“I’m skeptical a 10 to 15 percent devaluation will provide a significant boost for the economy because the sector that it will most benefit, manufacturing, is just too small,” he said.

The ruble will probably be allowed to drop in small steps to as low as 33 per dollar by the middle of 2009, from about 28 now, Weafer estimates. It will end next year at 26.8 because of a recovery in oil prices and a weaker U.S. currency, he said.

Svetlana Guseva isn’t taking any chances.

The 32-year-old mother of two from the southern city of Sochi plans to take her 8-year-old daughter, Dasha, to Moscow for the New Year’s holiday, a trip that will cost twice her family’s monthly income of about 30,000 rubles.

“This way at least we’ll have some memories,” she said.

Are Markets Naturally Efficient? Are All People Naturally Rational and Good?

There is a ideology that would like to believe that all people are naturally good and rational, and that markets are therefore naturally efficient and free if just left alone to themselves and allowed to function without regulation or management.

This line of argument is often pursued by certain faux conservatives when arguing that the police should be dismissed and the locks removed from the doors, in advance of a period of sustained looting of the common folk by the wealthy elite.

One thing almost all idealists have in common is that their work exists largely on paper, and is rarely to be found in practical implementations over any sustained period.

That is why there are so few farmers and women in this camp of free market idealists because their daily struggle with disorder and decay teaches them that nothing goes the way of order and productive results without plenty of hard work, repeated effort and at least occasional observation.

It is the man in his easy chair reading his books that believes that the dishes clean themselves, the clothes are self-folding and storing, and the children organize their rooms and personal hygiene willingly without 'interference.'

This romantic belief in natural goodness is a great fallacy underlying the Greenspan-Reagan doctrine of trickle down easy money and the prima facie good of boundless deregulation.

It is similar to the belief in the natural goodness of all men and the self-ordering of large societies towards justice and equality without effort. It sounds nice, but in practice it is just ridiculous and almost utterly without support except in the minds of its philosophical adherents. No one who has ever driven in a major metropolitan area can possible believe it.

What people forget is that it takes rules and referees and a great deal of hard work and repeated efforts to create and maintain a fair game and a level playing field for the many who may wish to play.

So too with the notion of a natural tendency to free markets. Its just not true. Markets tend to gravitate to oligopoly, insider dealing, fraud and utter inefficiency. Free market capitalists quickly come to hate competition with their success, and are always seeking to avoid the zero profit outcome through unfair market advantages and the stifling of competition.

Markets can be over-regulated by central planners, and it is always the road to ruin. But they can also be under-regulated and allowed to degenerate into the same awful excesses that governments and peoples fall into at various times in their history, periods of seemingly collective madness, disregard for the individual, and the rise of the will to power.

Government is best that governs least indeed, but with the appropriate level of government to uphold the principles under which people come together to interact in a society and avoid despotism and anarchy. There is a range of good and evil in people, and they join in society for their mutual protection, and the accomplishment of efforts requiring a broad participation.

It is no accident that Jefferson was one of the framers of the Constitution, which although remarkable in its simplicity is ingeniously complex in its design, and fine balances of powers that endure with the commitment and sacrifice for the greater good of each succeeding generation.

Five Critical Decisions Leading to Our Financial Crisis: Joe Stiglitz Presents His Analysis

This is a benchmark document, a starting point, for finding our way out of the wilderness.

It validates the points that quite a few economic bloggers have been making for some time, with great effect because of Joe Stiglitz' reputation and accomplishments in his field.

Here is a summation of the Five Major Causes of our financial crisis. As Joe so correctly observes:

"What were the critical decisions that led to the crisis? Mistakes were made at every fork in the road—we had what engineers call a “system failure,” when not a single decision but a cascade of decisions produce a tragic result. Let’s look at five key moments."

1. Reagan's nomination of Alan Greenspan to replace Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman



2. The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Cult of Self-Regulation



3. Bush Tax Cuts for Upper Income Individuals, Corporations, and Speculation



4. Failure to Address Rampant Accounting Fraud Driven by Excessive and Flawed Compensation Models



5. Providing Enormous Bailouts to the Banks without Engaging Systemic Reform for the Underlying Causes of the Failure

There are other points that might be added, some that are not strictly financial in nature.

An international monetary exchange system that facilitates manipulation to create de facto barriers and subsidies in support of industrial trade policies. This creates destabilizing surpluses and deficits which may be the source of the next stage of the financial crisis.

The concentration of the ownership of the mainstream media in a handful of corporations has had a chilling effect on the newsrooms and commentators.

The lack of Congressional courage in exercising its obligations with regard to the extra-Constitutional excesses of the Executive Office. Certain mechanisms and instruments that facilitate the unilateral exercise of presidential power are tipping the balance of powers.

The existing system of funding inordinately expensive political campaigns is a breeding ground for favors and corruption.

The undue influence on prices, particularly global commodity prices, that is exercised by a handful of US banks operating far outside of traditional banking charters. This is a dangerously destabilizing influence on the real world economy and industrial growth and investment. A significant step forward would be the imposition of position limits, greater and more timely transparency for those with more than 10% of any market's open interest, and an uptick rule with stronger enforcement against naked shorting and other forms of short term price manipulation.

We may also wish to keep in mind Voltaire's semi-satirical observation about the court martial of the English Admiral Byng for bungling the engagement with the French fleet at Minorca:

il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral, pour encourager les autres.

"It is good to shoot an admiral every now and then to encourage the others."

Vanity Fair
The Economic Crisis:
Capitalist Fools
by Joseph E. Stiglitz
January 2009

Behind the debate over remaking U.S. financial policy will be a debate over who’s to blame. It’s crucial to get the history right, writes a Nobel-laureate economist, identifying five key mistakes—under Reagan, Clinton, and Bush II—and one national delusion.

There will come a moment when the most urgent threats posed by the credit crisis have eased and the larger task before us will be to chart a direction for the economic steps ahead. This will be a dangerous moment. Behind the debates over future policy is a debate over history—a debate over the causes of our current situation. The battle for the past will determine the battle for the present. So it’s crucial to get the history straight.

What were the critical decisions that led to the crisis? Mistakes were made at every fork in the road—we had what engineers call a “system failure,” when not a single decision but a cascade of decisions produce a tragic result. Let’s look at five key moments.

No. 1: Firing the Chairman

In 1987 the Reagan administration decided to remove Paul Volcker as chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and appoint Alan Greenspan in his place. Volcker had done what central bankers are supposed to do. On his watch, inflation had been brought down from more than 11 percent to under 4 percent. In the world of central banking, that should have earned him a grade of A+++ and assured his re-appointment. But Volcker also understood that financial markets need to be regulated. Reagan wanted someone who did not believe any such thing, and he found him in a devotee of the objectivist philosopher and free-market zealot Ayn Rand.

Greenspan played a double role. The Fed controls the money spigot, and in the early years of this decade, he turned it on full force. But the Fed is also a regulator. If you appoint an anti-regulator as your enforcer, you know what kind of enforcement you’ll get. A flood of liquidity combined with the failed levees of regulation proved disastrous.

Greenspan presided over not one but two financial bubbles. After the high-tech bubble popped, in 2000–2001, he helped inflate the housing bubble. The first responsibility of a central bank should be to maintain the stability of the financial system. If banks lend on the basis of artificially high asset prices, the result can be a meltdown—as we are seeing now, and as Greenspan should have known. He had many of the tools he needed to cope with the situation. To deal with the high-tech bubble, he could have increased margin requirements (the amount of cash people need to put down to buy stock). To deflate the housing bubble, he could have curbed predatory lending to low-income households and prohibited other insidious practices (the no-documentation—or “liar”—loans, the interest-only loans, and so on). This would have gone a long way toward protecting us. If he didn’t have the tools, he could have gone to Congress and asked for them.

Of course, the current problems with our financial system are not solely the result of bad lending. The banks have made mega-bets with one another through complicated instruments such as derivatives, credit-default swaps, and so forth. With these, one party pays another if certain events happen—for instance, if Bear Stearns goes bankrupt, or if the dollar soars. These instruments were originally created to help manage risk—but they can also be used to gamble. Thus, if you felt confident that the dollar was going to fall, you could make a big bet accordingly, and if the dollar indeed fell, your profits would soar. The problem is that, with this complicated intertwining of bets of great magnitude, no one could be sure of the financial position of anyone else—or even of one’s own position. Not surprisingly, the credit markets froze.

Here too Greenspan played a role. When I was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, during the Clinton administration, I served on a committee of all the major federal financial regulators, a group that included Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin. Even then, it was clear that derivatives posed a danger. We didn’t put it as memorably as Warren Buffett—who saw derivatives as “financial weapons of mass destruction”—but we took his point. And yet, for all the risk, the deregulators in charge of the financial system—at the Fed, at the Securities and Exchange Commission, and elsewhere—decided to do nothing, worried that any action might interfere with “innovation” in the financial system. But innovation, like “change,” has no inherent value. It can be bad (the “liar” loans are a good example) as well as good.

No. 2: Tearing Down the Walls

The deregulation philosophy would pay unwelcome dividends for years to come. In November 1999, Congress repealed the Glass-Steagall Act—the culmination of a $300 million lobbying effort by the banking and financial-services industries, and spearheaded in Congress by Senator Phil Gramm. Glass-Steagall had long separated commercial banks (which lend money) and investment banks (which organize the sale of bonds and equities); it had been enacted in the aftermath of the Great Depression and was meant to curb the excesses of that era, including grave conflicts of interest. For instance, without separation, if a company whose shares had been issued by an investment bank, with its strong endorsement, got into trouble, wouldn’t its commercial arm, if it had one, feel pressure to lend it money, perhaps unwisely? An ensuing spiral of bad judgment is not hard to foresee. I had opposed repeal of Glass-Steagall. The proponents said, in effect, Trust us: we will create Chinese walls to make sure that the problems of the past do not recur. As an economist, I certainly possessed a healthy degree of trust, trust in the power of economic incentives to bend human behavior toward self-interest—toward short-term self-interest, at any rate, rather than Tocqueville’s “self interest rightly understood.”

The most important consequence of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect—it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture. Commercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they are supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have traditionally managed rich people’s money—people who can take bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top. There was a demand for the kind of high returns that could be obtained only through high leverage and big risktaking.

There were other important steps down the deregulatory path. One was the decision in April 2004 by the Securities and Exchange Commission, at a meeting attended by virtually no one and largely overlooked at the time, to allow big investment banks to increase their debt-to-capital ratio (from 12:1 to 30:1, or higher) so that they could buy more mortgage-backed securities, inflating the housing bubble in the process. In agreeing to this measure, the S.E.C. argued for the virtues of self-regulation: the peculiar notion that banks can effectively police themselves. Self-regulation is preposterous, as even Alan Greenspan now concedes, and as a practical matter it can’t, in any case, identify systemic risks—the kinds of risks that arise when, for instance, the models used by each of the banks to manage their portfolios tell all the banks to sell some security all at once.

As we stripped back the old regulations, we did nothing to address the new challenges posed by 21st-century markets. The most important challenge was that posed by derivatives. In 1998 the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Brooksley Born, had called for such regulation—a concern that took on urgency after the Fed, in that same year, engineered the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund whose trillion-dollar-plus failure threatened global financial markets. But Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, his deputy, Larry Summers, and Greenspan were adamant—and successful—in their opposition. Nothing was done.

No. 3: Applying the Leeches

Then along came the Bush tax cuts, enacted first on June 7, 2001, with a follow-on installment two years later. The president and his advisers seemed to believe that tax cuts, especially for upper-income Americans and corporations, were a cure-all for any economic disease—the modern-day equivalent of leeches. The tax cuts played a pivotal role in shaping the background conditions of the current crisis. Because they did very little to stimulate the economy, real stimulation was left to the Fed, which took up the task with unprecedented low-interest rates and liquidity. The war in Iraq made matters worse, because it led to soaring oil prices. With America so dependent on oil imports, we had to spend several hundred billion more to purchase oil—money that otherwise would have been spent on American goods. Normally this would have led to an economic slowdown, as it had in the 1970s. But the Fed met the challenge in the most myopic way imaginable. The flood of liquidity made money readily available in mortgage markets, even to those who would normally not be able to borrow. And, yes, this succeeded in forestalling an economic downturn; America’s household saving rate plummeted to zero. But it should have been clear that we were living on borrowed money and borrowed time.

The cut in the tax rate on capital gains contributed to the crisis in another way. It was a decision that turned on values: those who speculated (read: gambled) and won were taxed more lightly than wage earners who simply worked hard. But more than that, the decision encouraged leveraging, because interest was tax-deductible. If, for instance, you borrowed a million to buy a home or took a $100,000 home-equity loan to buy stock, the interest would be fully deductible every year. Any capital gains you made were taxed lightly—and at some possibly remote day in the future. The Bush administration was providing an open invitation to excessive borrowing and lending—not that American consumers needed any more encouragement.

No. 4: Faking the Numbers

Meanwhile, on July 30, 2002, in the wake of a series of major scandals—notably the collapse of WorldCom and Enron—Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The scandals had involved every major American accounting firm, most of our banks, and some of our premier companies, and made it clear that we had serious problems with our accounting system. Accounting is a sleep-inducing topic for most people, but if you can’t have faith in a company’s numbers, then you can’t have faith in anything about a company at all. Unfortunately, in the negotiations over what became Sarbanes-Oxley a decision was made not to deal with what many, including the respected former head of the S.E.C. Arthur Levitt, believed to be a fundamental underlying problem: stock options. Stock options have been defended as providing healthy incentives toward good management, but in fact they are “incentive pay” in name only. If a company does well, the C.E.O. gets great rewards in the form of stock options; if a company does poorly, the compensation is almost as substantial but is bestowed in other ways. This is bad enough. But a collateral problem with stock options is that they provide incentives for bad accounting: top management has every incentive to provide distorted information in order to pump up share prices.

The incentive structure of the rating agencies also proved perverse. Agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s are paid by the very people they are supposed to grade. As a result, they’ve had every reason to give companies high ratings, in a financial version of what college professors know as grade inflation. The rating agencies, like the investment banks that were paying them, believed in financial alchemy—that F-rated toxic mortgages could be converted into products that were safe enough to be held by commercial banks and pension funds. We had seen this same failure of the rating agencies during the East Asia crisis of the 1990s: high ratings facilitated a rush of money into the region, and then a sudden reversal in the ratings brought devastation. But the financial overseers paid no attention.

No. 5: Letting It Bleed

The final turning point came with the passage of a bailout package on October 3, 2008—that is, with the administration’s response to the crisis itself. We will be feeling the consequences for years to come. Both the administration and the Fed had long been driven by wishful thinking, hoping that the bad news was just a blip, and that a return to growth was just around the corner. As America’s banks faced collapse, the administration veered from one course of action to another. Some institutions (Bear Stearns, A.I.G., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) were bailed out. Lehman Brothers was not. Some shareholders got something back. Others did not.

The original proposal by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, a three-page document that would have provided $700 billion for the secretary to spend at his sole discretion, without oversight or judicial review, was an act of extraordinary arrogance. He sold the program as necessary to restore confidence. But it didn’t address the underlying reasons for the loss of confidence. The banks had made too many bad loans. There were big holes in their balance sheets. No one knew what was truth and what was fiction. The bailout package was like a massive transfusion to a patient suffering from internal bleeding—and nothing was being done about the source of the problem, namely all those foreclosures. Valuable time was wasted as Paulson pushed his own plan, “cash for trash,” buying up the bad assets and putting the risk onto American taxpayers. When he finally abandoned it, providing banks with money they needed, he did it in a way that not only cheated America’s taxpayers but failed to ensure that the banks would use the money to re-start lending. He even allowed the banks to pour out money to their shareholders as taxpayers were pouring money into the banks.

The other problem not addressed involved the looming weaknesses in the economy. The economy had been sustained by excessive borrowing. That game was up. As consumption contracted, exports kept the economy going, but with the dollar strengthening and Europe and the rest of the world declining, it was hard to see how that could continue. Meanwhile, states faced massive drop-offs in revenues—they would have to cut back on expenditures. Without quick action by government, the economy faced a downturn. And even if banks had lent wisely—which they hadn’t—the downturn was sure to mean an increase in bad debts, further weakening the struggling financial sector.

The administration talked about confidence building, but what it delivered was actually a confidence trick. If the administration had really wanted to restore confidence in the financial system, it would have begun by addressing the underlying problems—the flawed incentive structures and the inadequate regulatory system.

Was there any single decision which, had it been reversed, would have changed the course of history? Every decision—including decisions not to do something, as many of our bad economic decisions have been—is a consequence of prior decisions, an interlinked web stretching from the distant past into the future. You’ll hear some on the right point to certain actions by the government itself—such as the Community Reinvestment Act, which requires banks to make mortgage money available in low-income neighborhoods. (Defaults on C.R.A. lending were actually much lower than on other lending.) There has been much finger-pointing at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two huge mortgage lenders, which were originally government-owned. But in fact they came late to the subprime game, and their problem was similar to that of the private sector: their C.E.O.’s had the same perverse incentive to indulge in gambling.

The truth is most of the individual mistakes boil down to just one: a belief that markets are self-adjusting and that the role of government should be minimal. Looking back at that belief during hearings this fall on Capitol Hill, Alan Greenspan said out loud, “I have found a flaw.” Congressman Henry Waxman pushed him, responding, “In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right; it was not working.” “Absolutely, precisely,” Greenspan said. The embrace by America—and much of the rest of the world—of this flawed economic philosophy made it inevitable that we would eventually arrive at the place we are today.

Is the Fed Taking the First Steps to Selective Default and Devaluation?

We have been looking for an out-of-the-box move from the Fed, but this was not what we had expected.

The obvious game changing move would have been for the Treasury and the Fed to make an arrangement in which the Fed is able to purchase Treasury debt directly without subjecting it to an auction in the public market first. This is known as 'a money machine' and is prohibited by statute.

But as usual the Fed surprises us all with their lack of transparency. They are asking Congress about permission to issue their own debt directly, not tied to Treasuries.

This is known in central banking circles as 'cutting out the middleman.' Not only does the Treasury no longer issue the currency, but they also no longer have any control over how much debt backed currency the Fed can now issue directly.

If the Fed were able to issue its own debt, which is currently limited to Federal Reserve Notes backed by Treasuries under the Federal Reserve Act, it would provide Bernanke the ability to present a different class of debt to the investing public and foreign central banks.

The question is whether it would be backed with the same force as Treasuries, or is subordinated, or superior.

There will not be any lack of new Treasury debt issuance upon which to base new Fed balance sheet expansion. The notion that there might be a debt generation lag out of Washington in comparison with what the Fed issues as currency is almost frightening in its hyperinflationary implications.

This makes little sense unless the Fed wishes to be able to set different rates for their debt, and make it a different class, and whore out our currency, the Federal Reserve notes, without impacting the sovereign Treasury debt itself, leaving the door open for the issuance of a New Dollar.

What an image. The NY Fed as a GSE, the new and improved Fannie and Freddie. Zimbabwe Ben can simply print a new class of Federal Reserve Notes with no backing from Treasuries. BenBucks. Federal Reserve Thingies.

Perhaps we're missing something, but this looks like a step in anticipation of an eventual partial default or devaluation of US debt and the dollar.


Wall Street Journal
Fed Weighs Debt Sales of Its Own
By JON HILSENRATH and DAMIAN PALETTA
DECEMBER 10, 2008

Move Presents Challenges: 'Very Close Cousins to Existing Treasury Bills'

The Federal Reserve is considering issuing its own debt for the first time, a move that would give the central bank additional flexibility as it tries to stabilize rocky financial markets.

Government debt issuance is largely the province of the Treasury Department, and the Fed already can print as much money as it wants. But as the credit crisis drags on and the economy suffers from recession, Fed officials are looking broadly for new financial tools.

The Federal Reserve drained $25 billion in temporary reserves from the banking system when it arranged overnight reverse repurchase agreements.

Fed officials have approached Congress about the concept, which could include issuing bills or some other form of debt, according to people familiar with the matter.

It isn't known whether these preliminary discussions will result in a formal proposal or Fed action. One hurdle: The Federal Reserve Act doesn't explicitly permit the Fed to issue notes beyond currency.

Just exploring the idea underscores many challenges the ongoing problems are creating for the Fed, as well as the lengths to which the central bank is going to come up with new ideas.

At the core of the deliberations is the Fed's balance sheet, which has grown from less than $900 billion to more than $2 trillion since August as it backstops new markets like commercial paper, money-market funds, mortgage-backed securities and ailing companies such as American International Group Inc.

The ballooning balance sheet is presenting complications for the Fed. In the early stages of the crisis, officials funded their programs by drawing down on holdings of Treasury bonds, using the proceeds to finance new programs. Officials don't want that stockpile to get too low. It now is about $476 billion, with some of that amount already tied up in other programs.

The Fed also has turned to the Treasury Department for cash. Treasury has issued debt, leaving the proceeds on deposit with the Fed for the central bank to use as it chose. But the Treasury said in November it was scaling back that effort. The Treasury is undertaking its own massive borrowing program and faces legal limits on how much it can borrow.

More recently, the Fed has funded programs by flooding the financial system with money it created itself -- known in central-banking circles as bank reserves -- and has used the money to make loans and purchase assets.

Some economists worry about the consequences of this approach. Fed officials could find it challenging to remove the cash from the system once markets stabilize and the economy improves. It's not a problem now, but if they're too slow to act later it can cause inflation.

Moreover, the flood of additional cash makes it harder for Fed officials to maintain interest rates at their desired level. The fed-funds rate, an overnight borrowing rate between banks, has fallen consistently below the Fed's 1% target. It is expected to reduce that target next week.

Louis Crandall, an economist with Wrightson ICAP LLC, a Wall Street money-market broker, says the Fed's interventions also have the potential to clog up the balance sheets of banks, its main intermediaries.

"Finding alternative funding vehicles that bypass the banking system would be a more effective way to support the U.S. credit system," he says.

Some private economists worry that Fed-issued bonds could create new problems. Marvin Goodfriend, an economist at Carnegie Mellon University's Tepper School of Business and a former senior staffer at the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, said that issuing debt could put the Fed at odds with the Treasury at a time when it is already issuing mountains of debt itself.

"It creates problems in coordinating the issuance of government debt," Mr. Goodfriend said. "These would be very close cousins to existing Treasury bills. They would be competing in the same market to federal debt."

With Treasury-bill rates now near zero, it seems unlikely that Fed debt would push Treasury rates much higher, but it could some day become an issue.

There are also questions about the Fed's authority.

"I had always worked under the assumption that the Federal Reserve couldn't issue debt," said Vincent Reinhart, a former senior Fed staffer who is now an economist at the American Enterprise Institute. He says it is an action better suited to the Treasury Department, which has clear congressional authority to borrow on behalf of the government.

The Long Bond Is Holding a High Note

T-Bills Hit Zero

AP
Point of no return: Interest on T-bills hits zero
By MADLEN READ and MARTIN CRUTSINGER
December 9, 2008

NEW YORK – Investors are so nervous they're willing to accept the same return from government debt that they'd get from burying money in a coffee can — zero.

The Treasury Department said Tuesday it had sold $30 billion in four-week bills at an interest rate of zero percent, the first time that's happened since the government began issuing the notes in 2001.

And when investors traded their T-bills with each other, the yield sometimes went negative. That's how extreme the market anxiety is: Some are willing to give up a little of their money just to park it in a relatively safe place.

"No one wants to run the risk of any accidents," said Lou Crandall, chief economist at Wrightson ICAP, a research company that specializes in government finance.

At last week's government auction of the four-week bills, the interest rate was a slightly higher but still paltry 0.04 percent. Three-month T-bills auctioned by the government on Monday paid poorly, too — 0.005 percent.

While everyday people can keep their cash in an interest-earning CD or savings account at the bank, institutional investors with hundreds of millions of dollars on their hands often use government debt as part of their investment strategy.

In the Treasury market, the U.S. government, considered the most creditworthy of borrowers, issues IOUs of varying durations to raise money.

The zero percent interest rate is no reason to panic. As recently as Monday, investors were plowing cash into stocks, and averages like the Dow industrials are off their lows.

And long-term government bonds, while near record lows, are still paying decent money considering the tumultuous climate. The yield on a 30-year bond on Tuesday was a little higher than 3 percent.

There's good news in all this for taxpayers: Low interest rates on government debt mean the United States is financing its $700 billion bailout of the financial system very cheaply. The Treasury has sold mountains of debt to pay for it.

But the trend also underlines stubborn anxiety in the financial market that could keep the economy sluggish for years to come, and it translates into stagnant returns for people who have their money in places like money market funds.

"There's a price for safety," said Peter Crane, president of money market mutual fund information company Crane Data LLC. "Down slightly is the new up."

As the stock market has taken its alarming plunge, people have been moving money from riskier assets to safer ones. According to Crane Data, funds invested purely in Treasurys have surged more than 150 percent over the past year, to $726 billion.

Earning zero percent on an investment for a short while may not seem that dire for the average person. But a zero percent rate has serious consequences for the complex credit markets.

Those markets have been dysfunctional since Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. went bankrupt in September, scaring away investors who normally buy bonds from seemingly creditworthy borrowers. Lending, the lifeblood of the economy, has frozen up.

One corner of the credit markets is the repurchase markets, known as "repo," where banks and securities firms make and receive short-term loans backed by collateral, usually Treasury bills.

When those T-bills are yielding nothing, there's little incentive to deliver them on time. If the holder loses the interest, it's no big deal.

"This is a particular problem in a time like this, because people are buying Treasury securities for their security, for their safety. It's important that they're delivered," Crandall said. (You can bet the shorts are piling on - Jesse)

And high demand for government debt rather than corporate debt could stifle economic growth.

Corporate bond rates have been surging to record levels compared with Treasurys, which makes it more expensive for companies to raise money. And when companies can't raise money, they often have to cut costs, sometimes through layoffs.

Only a few corporate bond deals have been going through lately, and most have been through the government, which has agreed to guarantee financial institutions' bond sales. American Express Co., for one, said Tuesday it has issued $5.5 billion through the government program.

Many worry that the government will become the most attractive lender and borrower in the market — crowding out others in the private sector....

Oversight Panel Expected to Release Report Critical of TARP

Sortable List of TARP Recipients to Date

If they televise the Congressional testimony tomorrow it might be interesting to watch, especially if Bernanke becomes Sam-Kinison hysterical and Paulson jack-hammer stammers out a declaration of martial law.

Wall Street Journal
Oversight Panel to Criticize TARP
By DAMIAN PALETTA and DEBORAH SOLOMON
DECEMBER 9, 2008, 5:52 P.M. ET

WASHINGTON -- The panel set up to oversee the Treasury Department $700 billion financial-rescue fund is expected to release a report Wednesday highly critical of the government's handling of the bailout, people familiar with the matter said. It will also press the Bush administration to act more aggressively to prevent foreclosures, these people said.

The report isn't expected to contain any new findings but is expected to raise fresh questions about the program at a time when many lawmakers expect the Bush administration to seek access to the second half of the funds.

The panel's top official, Harvard Law School professor Elizabeth Warren, is scheduled to describe her findings to the House Financial Services Committee Wednesday.

Among other things, a draft of the report posed 10 questions to Treasury, which pressed officials for a clearer strategy, asked whether there is sufficient accountability, and why more hasn't been done to help prevent foreclosures.

The roughly 30-page report is also expected to press Treasury to describe whether the money used to inject capital into the banking sector is a "giveaway" or a "fair deal," according to one person familiar with the report.

A Treasury spokeswoman declined to comment on the report noting that the department has not seen its final findings.

Republicans have privately complained that the panel has taken a partisan bent. It isn't clear if one of its four members, Rep. Jeb Hensarling (R., Texas), is going to sign the report. Mr. Hensarling is scheduled to testify alongside Ms. Warren at the hearing.

Ms. Warren, who is noted for her longstanding push for tougher rules protecting consumers, is holding a field hearing next week in Nevada, where Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) is considering making remarks, people familiar with the matter said.

The Treasury Department has faced a steady drumbeat of criticism about the way it has handled the first half of the $700 billion fund, which Congress authorized in October to stabilize the financial system.

Government officials initially sold the program to lawmakers and the public as a way of purchasing troubled assets from financial institutions. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson quickly scrapped that plan and has instead decided to use most of the money to buy equity stakes in banks.

Congress could move to block Treasury's access to the second half of the $700 billion fund, a prospect that government officials fear could send financial markets reeling.

House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank (D., Mass.) said Monday that Treasury would have to commit to using a large amount of the money to help prevent foreclosures in order to satisfy him. He said it would still be a tough sell with other lawmakers.

"With most of my colleagues, they'll need police protection to even ask for the money," he said. (Go for it Barney. Jerry! Jerry! Jerry! Jerry!)

Illinois Governor Arrested on Federal Corruption Charges

The Senate seat that the highly unpopular Democratic Governor was attempting to 'sell' is the one being vacated by President-elect Barack Obama. There is no linkage to Senator Obama, and we are sure that if there was the slightest taint the Justice Department would be putting it forward vigorously. Or pocketing it for a rainy day. Obama must address this quickly.

The first Democrat to be elected governor of Illiniois in 30 years, Blagojevich has been the target of multiple federal investigations. If Blagojevich is found guilty he should be punished severely. We will not jump to any conclusions, but Chicago politicians are often notorious for playing it on the edge, similarly but more crudely than their more sophiticated northeastern and southern cousins.

As the administration, and the Justice Department, turns from Republican to Democratic, looks for an increasing series of indictments for Republican corruption. There will be a pre-emptive series of pardons by the outgoing President Bush.

Such are the ways in times of general corruption. Anyone who thinks this is the domain of either party in particular is greatly mistaken. We are in a cultural crisis of integrity and honesty, overwhelmed by greed.

“I want to make money,” adding later that he [Blagojevich] is interested in making $250,000 to $300,000 a year, the complaint alleges. (Joe the Governor? - Jesse)

Top Five Candidates for Obama's Senate Seat


US Department of Justice
ILLINOIS GOV. ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF JOHN HARRIS ARRESTED ON FEDERAL CORRUPTION CHARGES
Patrick Fitzgerald, US Attorney
December 9, 2008

Blagojevich and aide allegedly conspired to sell U.S. Senate appointment, engaged in “pay-to-play” schemes and threatened to withhold state assistance to Tribune Company for Wrigley Field to induce purge of newspaper editorial writers

CHICAGO – Illinois Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich and his Chief of Staff, John Harris, were arrested today by FBI agents on federal corruption charges alleging that they and others are engaging in ongoing criminal activity: conspiring to obtain personal financial benefits for Blagojevich by leveraging his sole authority to appoint a United States Senator; threatening to withhold substantial state assistance to the Tribune Company in connection with the sale of Wrigley Field to induce the firing of Chicago Tribune editorial board members sharply critical of Blagojevich; and to obtain campaign contributions in exchange for official actions – both historically and now in a push before a new state ethics law takes effect January 1, 2009.

Blagojevich, 51, and Harris, 46, both of Chicago, were each charged with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and solicitation of bribery. They were charged in a two-count criminal complaint that was sworn out on Sunday and unsealed today following their arrests, which occurred without incident, announced Patrick J. Fitzgerald, United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and Robert D. Grant, Special Agent-in-Charge of the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Both men were expected to appear later today before U.S. Magistrate Judge Nan Nolan in U.S. District Court in Chicago.

A 76-page FBI affidavit alleges that Blagojevich was intercepted on court-authorized wiretaps during the last month conspiring to sell or trade Illinois’ U.S. Senate seat vacated by President-elect Barack Obama for financial and other personal benefits for himself and his wife. At various times, in exchange for the Senate appointment, Blagojevich discussed obtaining:

- a substantial salary for himself at a either a non-profit foundation or an organization affiliated with labor unions;

- placing his wife on paid corporate boards where he speculated she might garner as much as $150,000 a year;

- promises of campaign funds – including cash up front; and

- a cabinet post or ambassadorship for himself.

Just last week, on December 4, Blagojevich allegedly told an advisor that he might “get some (money) up front, maybe” from Senate Candidate 5, if he named Senate Candidate 5 to the Senate seat, to insure that Senate Candidate 5 kept a promise about raising money for Blagojevich if he ran for re-election. In a recorded conversation on October 31, Blagojevich claimed he was approached by an associate of Senate Candidate 5 as follows: “We were approached ‘pay to play.’ That, you know, he’d raise 500 grand. An emissary came. Then the other guy would raise a million, if I made him (Senate Candidate 5) a Senator.”

On November 7, while talking on the phone about the Senate seat with Harris and an advisor, Blagojevich said he needed to consider his family and that he is “financially” hurting, the affidavit states. Harris allegedly said that they were considering what would help the “financial security” of the Blagojevich family and what will keep Blagojevich “politically viable.” Blagojevich stated, “I want to make money,” adding later that he is interested in making $250,000 to $300,000 a year, the complaint alleges.

On November 10, in a lengthy telephone call with numerous advisors that included discussion about Blagojevich obtaining a lucrative job with a union-affiliated organization in exchange for appointing a particular Senate Candidate whom he believed was favored by the President-elect and which is described in more detail below, Blagojevich and others discussed various ways Blagojevich could “monetize” the relationships he has made as governor to make money after leaving that office.

“The breadth of corruption laid out in these charges is staggering,” Mr. Fitzgerald said. “They allege that Blagojevich put a ‘for sale’ sign on the naming of a United States Senator; involved himself personally in pay-to-play schemes with the urgency of a salesman meeting his annual sales target; and corruptly used his office in an effort to trample editorial voices of criticism. The citizens of Illinois deserve public officials who act solely in the public’s interest, without putting a price tag on government appointments, contracts and decisions,” he added.

Mr. Grant said: “Many, including myself, thought that the recent conviction of a former governor would usher in a new era of honesty and reform in Illinois politics. Clearly, the charges announced today reveal that the office of the Governor has become nothing more than a vehicle for self-enrichment, unrestricted by party affiliation and taking Illinois politics to a new low.”

Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Grant thanked the Chicago offices of the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Inspector General for assisting in the ongoing investigation. The probe is part of Operation Board Games, a five-year-old public corruption investigation of pay-to-play schemes, including insider-dealing, influence-peddling and kickbacks involving private interests and public duties...

SP 500 Weekly Chart

There has been some interest expressed in seeing this chart in 'the Babson style'

A top in US Treasuries will mark and confirm a bottom in equities.

This ongoing series of crises will be done when bonds and stocks crash together and the dollar is out of favor. Then the rebuilding will begin.

Too Big to Jail

"Among a people generally corrupt, liberty cannot long exist."
Edmund Burke

Although Nassim Taleb makes some excellent points he is a bit narrow in his analysis because of his superior knowledge and experience in a highly specific area of the crisis, which in some ways is a broader cultural crisis.

There may be enough fraud involved in the US over the past twenty years for multiple prosecutions under the RICO statutes. Or it just may be the end result of a general breakdown in morals, from the top down by example perhaps.

One does find some institutions appearing as enablers at the heart of every crisis, from LTCM to Enron to the Accounting Frauds to the Tech Bubble to the Credit Bubble.

No, this was worse than the silence of the witnesses to the assault of Kitty Genovese that gave the label to the bystander effect.

In this case there were 'bystanders' who financially benefited from the assault and who not only kept quiet but actively intimidated and silenced other bystanders through ridicule and fear of retribution. But there are also many who simply did not care then and will not care once the markets rally once again. This is the sad commentary on a nation corrupted by easy money.

There were many bystanders who did call 911 and were ignored because those in the enforcement chain were either asleep on the job or had other competing interests.

The practical problem is that the institutions involved are probably too big to jail.

That is their strength, but ironically also their weakness.


The Financial Times
Bystanders to this financial crime were many
By Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Pablo Triana
December 7 2008 19:18

...Not surprisingly, the Genovese case earned the interest of social psychologists, who developed the theory of the “bystander effect”. This claimed to show how the apathy of the masses can prevent the salvation of a victim. Psychologists concluded that, for a variety of reasons, the larger the number of observing bystanders, the lower the chances that the crime may be averted.

We have just witnessed a similar phenomenon in the financial markets. A crime has been committed. Yes, we insist, a crime. There is a victim (the helpless retirees, taxpayers funding losses, perhaps even capitalism and free society). There were plenty of bystanders. And there was a robbery (overcompensated bankers who got fat bonuses hiding risks; overpaid quantitative risk managers selling patently bogus methods).

Let us start with the bystander. Almost everyone in risk management knew that quantitative methods – like those used to measure and forecast exposures, value complex derivatives and assign credit ratings – did not work and could provide undue comfort by hiding risks Few people would agree that the illusion of knowledge is a good thing. Almost everyone would accept that the failure in 1998 of Long Term Capital Management discredited the quantitative methods of the Nobel economists involved with it (Robert Merton and Myron Scholes) and their school of thought called “modern finance”. LTCM was just one in hundreds of such episodes.

Yet a method heavily grounded on those same quantitative and theoretical principles, called Value at Risk, continued to be widely used. It was this that was to blame for the crisis. Listening to us, risk management practitioners would often agree on every point. But they elected to take part in the system and to play bystanders. They tried to explain away their decision to partake in the vast diffusion of responsibility: “Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley use the model” or “it is on the CFA exam” or, the most potent argument, “modern finance and portfolio theory got Nobels”. Indeed, the same Nobel economists who helped blow up the system at least once, Professors Scholes and Merton, could be seen lecturing us on risk management, to the ire of one of the authors of this article. Most poignantly, the police itself may have participated in the murder. The regulators were using the same arguments. They, too, were responsible.

So how can we displace a fraud? Not by preaching nor by rational argument (believe us, we tried). Not by evidence. Risk methods that failed dramatically in the real world continue to be taught to students in business schools, where professors never lose tenure for the misapplications of those methods. As we are writing these lines, close to 100,000 MBAs are still learning portfolio theory – it is uniformly on the programme for next semester. An airline company would ground the aircraft and investigate after the crash – universities would put more aircraft in the skies, crash after crash. The fraud can be displaced only by shaming people, by boycotting the orthodox financial economics establishment and the institutions that allowed this to happen.

Bystanders are not harmless. They cause others to be bystanders. So when you see a quantitative “expert”, shout for help, call for his disgrace, make him accountable. Do not let him hide behind the diffusion of responsibility. Ask for the drastic overhaul of business schools (and stop giving funding). Ask for the Nobel prize in economics to be withdrawn from the authors of these theories, as the Nobel’s credibility can be extremely harmful. Boycott professional associations that give certificates in financial analysis that promoted these methods. Remove Value-at-Risk books from the shelves – quickly. Do not be afraid for your reputation. Please act now. Do not just walk by. Remember the scriptures: “Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil.”

Appearance versus Reality in the Prism of Economics

"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.

In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the laws scrupulously. Our government is the potent omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by it's example.

Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, Olmstead v. United States

"And they healed the pain of my people disgracefully, saying: Peace, prosperity, when there was no peace or prosperity." Jeremiah 6:12

The problem of official US statistics not fully reflecting the actual economic situation is reasonably well-documented and accessible to any literate person. It is remarkably underreported and unremarked upon by the economic and media establishment however.

It may often be crap, but it is the crap we use to buy and sell, trade, derive values, and base policy decisions. It does not matter to the buyers and sellers in the short term, but in the longer term it can be seriously misleading, as witnessed by our latest financial crisis.

Peer pressure discourages negativity and outlying opinions amongst many economists, so recognition of trend changes and innovation in ideas become particularly problematic. This is an issue in the leading edge of many sciences, particularly in those that are rapidly evolving such as theoretical physics. Exegesis succumbs more readily to eisigesis in what might be described as a nascent science like economics with so many conflicting opinions and theories influenced by political agendas and ideology.

Nouriel Roubini is hailed as a prophet for predicting a downturn that common sense and an examination of the statistics should have made obvious to a first year economics student in March at the latest. Roubini was a maverick in that as a tenured professor with a reputation he dared to state the obvious before it became painfully obvious to everyone.

There are others who were equally forthcoming, if not as famed, in "telling it like it is." Meredith Whitney and Yves Smith are two outstanding examples of those who are led by the data, who are remarkable in the integrity of their thought processes, even when they might be incorrect as we all are.

Why is there a reluctance to state the probable amongst the economic establishment? It is most likely the fear of appearing foolish, of being wrong, because the methods and measures underlying the work of all the economic schools is simply unreliable. In an atmosphere such as this, playing safe and building 'reputation' and a place in a pecking order becomes a higher priority than innovation and advancement of understanding.

It fosters an ideological balkanization of knowledge, and the tendency to impress and intimidate rather than illumnate, because the economic professional understands that they simply do not know the answer with certainty, but can never admit it or explain it sufficiently to a non-practioner or even worse, a client. Perhaps that is why some of the best information has been coming from those who have less vested interest in the established order. There is a certain freedom conferred by the glass ceiling or a lack of material need and ambition.

Then there are the economists who act as hired opinion slingers or unpaid angry villagers for ideological causes and think tanks, tending to dominate the landscape in the short term because it is easier to declare yourself and work for a group of true believers whose first principles you hold, whether in true love or a paid embrace. And you will be right every so often, and will always find a place to hang your hat and park your shoes.

And on the far end of the spectrum are the used car salesmen of the economic and financial industry, who appear in the news and on television program generally with a 'pretty' interviewer as a set piece to promote a view of reality that favors the pocketbook of their employers, with a shamelessness that is almost comic at times, and would almost certainly not be so tolerated in any other aspect of human endeavor.

Can you imagine the state of the food and drug industries if such blatantly fallacious claims and interpretations of the prognosis and prior results were tolerated? It recalls the early days of traveling medicine show salesmen.

Gratefully there are more independents these days, with a forum provided by the internet for their thoughts, who operate outside of the conventional journals and channels of economic orthodoxy. Independent minds like Mark Thoma's Economist's View, Paul Kedrosky's Infectious Greed, Barry Ritholz's Big Picture, Yves Smith's Naked Capitalism, Eric Janszen's iTulip, and of course the benchmark for all, Calculated Risk, among others listed in the Divertissement Éducatif section on the left side of this blog. Their task is too often thankless but a candle lit in the darkness nonetheless.

Change is coming, and a renewal of thought is in the air. Monetarism has clearly run its course, and Keynesianism needs a significant update if not transformation from a genius equal to the original. It also may be time for a radical change in rethinking old ideas of how an economy can operate efficiently, ironically by often viewing even older ideas and theories in the light of new experience.

Out of the destruction of our current system will arise new ideas, new concepts, new attempts to promote the advancement of knowledge, a difficult marriage of economic science and public policy which don't quite speak the same language or have the same core principles, and at least a new look at the operation of human financial interactions.


Numbers Racket: Why the Economy Is Worse Than We Know - Kevin Phillips 1 May 2008 - Harper's Magazine

Down and Out: Discouraged Workers - Time Magazine, 9 September 1991

NY Times
Grim Job Report Not Showing Full Picture
By DAVID LEONHARDT and CATHERINE RAMPELL
December 6, 2008

As bad as the headline numbers in Friday’s employment report were, they still made the job market look better than it really is.

The unemployment rate reached its highest point since 1993, and overall employment fell by more than a half million jobs. Yet that was just the beginning. Thanks to the vagaries of the way that the government’s best-known jobs statistics are calculated, they have overlooked many workers who have been deeply affected by the current recession.

The number of people out of the labor force — meaning that they were neither working nor looking for work and that the government did not consider them unemployed — jumped by 637,000 last month, the Labor Department said. The number of part-time workers who said they wanted full-time work — all counted as fully employed — rose by an additional 621,000.

Take these people into account, and the job market may be in its worst condition since the early 1980s. It is still deteriorating rapidly, too.

Already, the share of men older than 20 with jobs was at its lowest point last month since 1983, and very close to the low point of the last 60 years. The share of women with jobs is lower than it was eight years ago, which never happened in previous decades.

Liz Perkins, 24 and the mother of four young children in Colorado Springs, began looking for work in October after she learned that her husband, James, was about to lose his job at a bed-making factory.

But the jobs she found either did not pay enough to cover child care or required her to work overnight. “I can’t do overnight work with four children,” she said. She has since stopped looking for work.

The family has paid its bills by dipping into its savings and borrowing money from relatives. But Ms. Perkins said that unless her husband found a job in the next three months, she feared the family would become homeless.

Even Wall Street economists, whose analysis usually comes shaded in rose, seemed taken aback by the report. Goldman Sachs called the new numbers “horrendous.” Others said “dreadful” and “almost indescribably terrible.” In a note to clients, Morgan Stanley economists wrote, “Quite simply, there was nothing good in this report.” HSBC forecasters said they now expected the Federal Reserve to reduce its benchmark interest rate all the way to zero.

Such language may sound out of step with a jobless rate that, despite its recent rise, remains at 6.7 percent; the rate exceeded 10 percent in the early 1980s. But over the last few decades, the jobless rate has become a significantly less useful measure of the country’s economic health.

That is because far more people than in the past fall into the gray area of the labor market — not having a job and not looking for one, but interested in working. This group includes many former factory workers who have been unable to find new work that pays nearly as well and are unwilling to accept a job that pays much less. Some get by with help from disability payments, while others rely on their spouses’ paychecks.

For much of the last year, the ranks of these labor force dropouts were not changing rapidly, said Thomas Nardone, a Labor Department economist who oversees the collection of the unemployment data. People who had lost their jobs generally began looking for new work. But that changed in November.

Much as many stock market investors threw in the towel in early October, and consumers quickly followed suit by cutting their spending, job seekers seemed to turn darkly pessimistic about the American economy in November. Unless the numbers turn out to have been a one-month blip, large numbers of people seem to have decided that a job search is, for now, futile.

“It’s not only that there’s nothing out there,” said Lorena Garcia, an organizer in Denver for 9to5, National Association of Working Women, a group that helps low-wage women and women who are looking for work. “But it also costs money to job hunt.”

Just how bad is the labor market? Coming up with a measure that is comparable across decades is not easy.

The unemployment rate has been made less meaningful by the long-term rise in dropouts from the labor force. The simple percentage of people without jobs — including retirees, stay-at-home parents and discouraged would-be job seekers — can also be misleading, though. It has dropped in recent decades mainly because of the influx of women into the work force, not because the job market is fundamentally healthier than it used to be.

The Labor Department does publish an alternate measure of unemployment, which counts part-time workers who want full-time work, as well as anyone who has looked for work in the last year. (The official rate includes only people who told a government surveyor that they had looked in the last four weeks.)

This alternate measure rose to 12.5 percent in November. That is the highest level since the government began calculating the measure in 1994.

Perhaps the best historical measure of the job market, however, is the one set by the market itself: pay.

During the economic expansion that lasted from 2001 until December 2007, when the recession began, incomes for most households barely outpaced inflation. It was the weakest income growth in any expansion since World War II.

The one bit of good news in Friday’s jobs report, economists said, was that pay had not yet begun to fall sharply. Average weekly wages for rank-and-file workers, who make up about four-fifths of the work force, rose 2.8 percent over the last year, only slightly below inflation.

But economists said those pay gains would begin to shrink next year, if not in the next few weeks, given the rapid drop in demand for workers. “Wage increases of this magnitude will be history very soon,” said Joshua Shapiro, an economist at MFR Incorporated, a research firm in New York.

US Treasuries and our Horribly Distorted International Currency Exchange Mechanism

At some point as the Fed seeks to create inflation it will cut the reserve deposit returns to banks until they are forced to lend.

Can the Fed create monetary inflation? That is the question and Bernanke believes he has the answer.

It will require the cooperation of foreign buyers of US credit seeking to underwrite their mercantilism and low domestic wage and consumption policies.

The key to recovery is the median real hourly wage, not the further expansion of credit and the perpetuation of an economic system based on an inefficient drag on economic growth by percentage-taking banks and rent-seeking elites who add little or no productive value.

We have a 'chicken and egg' standoff between aggregate workers wages and profits at the moment which only the government can move forward, but with care.

The seemingly radical but all too obvious answer is to begin to tax imports from nations who continue to refuse to float their currencies. This merely reverses the decisions that were made by Clinton and Bush to allow China to devalue and fix their currency and still obtain favored nation trading status without consequence.

It was always the answer. It will disadvantage the global financial sector through the dollar, but will begin to breathe life into economic reform around the world. The key is not taxes, but a market free of draconian industrial policies such as that which spawned the long deflation in Japan.

Countries which discourage domestic consumption and wages to build up the wealth of the State on the backs of the workers in the name of growth, and manipulate their currencies to promote trade policies must be discouraged from doing so, as they will.

This seems a radical solution because it is a change from the accepted economic dogma of the past thirty years, more ingrained as slogans than sound thinking. Smoot-Hawley, classic error. It will make things worse. Rubbish. The tariffs and trade barriers are already in place because of currency manipulation and artificial fixes. Why do some countries accumulate destabilizing and enormous deficits and credit balances? Because of the artificial thwarting of the markets. One only has to work the math.

But the alternative to a structural reform is almost certainly economic stagnation and increasing global conflict.

At some point even mighty China will find itself sitting on a pile of useless bonds with fire in the cities, unless it accepts change and stops hiding behind a Great Wall of Paper.

This is not to say that the fault lies with China or Japan. The primary cause of our distorted global economy is in the dollar reserve currency arrangement that is the mother of commodity wars and artificial imbalances.

The solution may be the adoption of a trade balanced basket of currencies, including some commodities not so easily manipulated by the central banks such as gold and silver and oil, as the basis for continuing world trade based on market economics.

Financial Times
Insight: Return-free risk
By James Grant
December 4 2008

US Treasuries are the investment asset of the year. The less they yield, the more their fans adore them. Then, again, these fearful days, yield seems to have nothing to do with investment calculation. Purported safety is all.

“Super-safe Treasuries”, the papers call these emissions of a government that, this year, will take in $2,500bn but spend $3,500bn. “Toxic assets” is how the same papers characterise orphaned mortgage-backed securities—or, for that matter, secured bank loans, convertible bonds, junk bonds or almost any other kind of debt obligation not bearing the US imprimatur.

“There are no bad bonds, only bad prices,” the traders used to say. They should say it again, only louder. In the spring of 1984, long-dated Treasuries went begging at yields of nearly 14 per cent in the context of an inflation rate of just 4 per cent. Those, too, were fearful times, the recollected horror being the great inflation of the 1970s. Inflation was ineradicable, the bondphobes said. Now a new generation of creditors espouses the opposite proposition. Deflation is baked in the cake, they say.

The truth is that no investment asset is inherently safe. Risk or safety is an attribute of price. At the right price, a lowly convertible bond is a safer proposition than an exalted Treasury. Watching the government securities market zoom, many mistake price action for price.

Yes, Treasuries might conceivably redeem the hopes of their besotted admirers. Maybe a deflationary chasm is about to swallow us all. Never before has the US been so leveraged. And—just possibly—never before were lending standards so reckless as the ones that brought joy to so many astonished mortgage applicants in 2005 and 2006.

In their magnum opus Security Analysis Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd advise that “bonds should be bought on their ability to withstand depression”. They wrote that in 1934. So far is that rule from being honoured by today’s financiers that not a few bonds—and boxcars full of mortgages – could hardly withstand prosperity. Two urgent questions present themselves. One: does something far worse than recession loom? Two: does that certain something definitely spell much lower interest rates?

We can’t know, but we can at least observe. What I observe is a monumental push to reflate. The Federal Reserve is creating more credit in less time than it has ever done before – in the past three months the sum of its earning assets, known in the trade as Reserve Bank credit, has grown at the astounding annual rate of 2,922 per cent. Are the bond bulls quite sure that these exertions will raise no inflationary sweat?

Evidently, they are—at least, forward swap rates betray no such concern. The market’s best guess as to what the 10-year Treasury will yield in 10 years’ time is 2.78 per cent, never mind the famous (and now, as it seems, prophetic) remark of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke that the Fed could drop dollars out of a helicopter in a deflationary pinch.

The non-Treasury departments of the credit markets have crashed. No surprise then that prices and values are deranged. Market makers have closed up shop for the year, while hedge funds cower in fear of redemptions. You’d suppose that professional investors – doughty seekers of value – would be combing through the debris for bargains. Alas, no. Most seem content to lend money to Henry Paulson (subsequently to Timothy Geithner) at 2 per cent or 3 per cent.

In corporate debt and mortgages, anomalies and non sequiturs abound. They are especially prevalent in convertible bonds. More so than even the average stressed-out fund manager, convertible arbitrageurs have been through the mill. It was they—and almost they alone—who owned convertibles. Now many of these folk must sell them.

Few buyers are presenting themselves, however, though extraordinary bargains keep popping up. Thus, at the end of October, a Medtronic convertible bond with a 1.5 per cent coupon with the debt maturing in April 2011 briefly traded at 80.75. This was a price to yield 10.6 per cent, an adjusted spread of 1,600 basis points over the Treasury curve (adjusted, that is, for the value of the options embedded in the convert, notably the option to exchange it for common stock at the stipulated rate). Contrary to what such a yield might imply, A1/AA minus rated Medtronic, the world’s top manufacturer of medical devices for the treatment of heart disease, spinal injuries and diabetes, is no early candidate for insolvency. Almost every day brings comparable examples of risks not borne by people who, in this time of crisis, have come to define risk as “anything not guaranteed by Uncle Sam”.

“Risk-free return” is the standard tag attached to the government’s solemn obligations. An investor I know, repulsed by prevailing government yields, has a timelier description – “return-free risk”.

James Grant, editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, is an editor of the newly published sixth edition of “Security Analysis,” by Benjamin Graham and David L. Dodd.

Charts in the Babson Style for the Week Ending 5 December

US Dollar Weekly Chart with Commitments of Traders

See the US Dollar Very Long Term Chart for context.

Euro/Yen and the US Equity Markets Bubble: A Monetary Phenomenon

Here is an interesting comparison which we believe has some validity in that the credit and asset bubble
was significantly a Yen and Dollar, and possibly a Renminbi, monetary phenomenon.

The broadly manipulated currency markets in a fiat regime are the tail wagging the dog of the world economy.

The ultimate question might be who, if anyone, is doing the wagging?

Just to keep it interesting, and to drive home the point that these relationships are rarely simple and straightforward,
this chart shows the sharp decline in the euro/dollar cross with the decline of US financial assets.
We think we have previously shown a tight correlation between US asset values held by European banks and the eurodollar.
There may also be some 'flight to home currency' phenomenon amongst US investors.

One in Ten US Mortgages Are in Trouble

This problem will not be resolved by making more credit (debt) available.

The sustainable resolution will come with an increased in median hourly wages, and a rising payroll number.

Programs that do not contribute to this end are temporary patches at best, designed to forestall default.

We need to carefully consider those things that must be reduced in size, and those things that are infrastructure necessary to the generation of jobs and real wages.


Bloomberg
Mortgage Delinquencies, Foreclosures Rise to Record
By Kathleen M. Howley

Dec. 5 (Bloomberg) -- One in 10 American homeowners fell behind on mortgage payments or were in foreclosure during the third quarter as the world’s largest economy shed jobs and real estate prices tumbled.

The share of mortgages 30 days or more overdue rose to a seasonally adjusted 6.99 percent while loans already in foreclosure rose to 2.97 percent, both all-time highs in a survey that goes back 29 years, the Mortgage Bankers Association said in a report today. The gain in delinquencies was driven by an increase of loans with payments 90 days or more overdue.

“Until we see a turnaround in the job situation, we’re not going to see these numbers improve,” said Jay Brinkmann, chief economist of the Washington-based bankers group, in an interview. “We’re seeing more loans build up in the 90-days bucket as lenders work to modify loans and states put in place programs that delay foreclosures.”

The U.S. economy has shed 1.91 million jobs this year, while falling home prices have made it difficult for people who can’t pay their mortgages to sell their property. Payrolls declined in each month of 2008 through November, the Labor Department said today in Washington.

New foreclosures fell to 1.07 percent from 1.08 percent in the second quarter as some states enacted laws to temporarily stop home repossessions and lenders increased efforts to modify the terms of loans, Brinkmann said...

The Grapes of Graft

There seems to be a rush to help those who take a shower in the morning before going to work,
and not those who take a shower in the evening after a day's work.

The Grapes of Wrath

Bloomberg
California May Pay With IOUs for Second Time Since Depression
By Michael B. Marois and William Selway

Dec. 5 (Bloomberg) -- California, the world’s eighth largest economy, may pay vendors with IOUs for only the second time since the Great Depression, State Finance Director Mike Genest said.

In a letter to legislative leaders Dec. 2, Genest said the state “will begin delaying payments or paying in registered warrants in March” unless an $11.2 billion deficit is closed or reduced. California, which approved its budget less than three months ago, may run out of cash by March, state officials say.

Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger warned that he may issue the warrants, which are a promise to pay with interest, to suppliers and contractors as the seizure in credit markets may make it too costly to borrow.

“It’s getting worse very quickly,” Schwarzenegger, a 61- year-old Republican, told reporters Dec. 1 after declaring a fiscal emergency and ordering the Legislature into a special session to find ways to close the deficit. “It’s like an avalanche in that it gains momentum. And that’s what we’re in right now, so it’s a real crisis.”

California is reeling more than any other state from budget woes that pushed the nation’s governors to seek help from Congress. States say federal money is needed to ease the pain from spending cuts and tax increases that would be a further blow to an economy in the throes of a recession.

The warrants would be given to landscapers, carpet cleaners, construction firms, food services companies and other state vendors. They would pay an interest rate of as much as 5 percent, based on state law. California last issued the IOUs in 1992 when lawmakers and then-Governor Pete Wilson deadlocked on a budget for 61 days past the start of the fiscal year...

The Baited Banker Thus Desponds: Citadel Loses 47%

Bloomberg
Citadel Funds Lose 13% in November, 47% This Year
By Saijel Kishan and Katherine Burton

Dec. 4 (Bloomberg) -- Citadel Investment Group LLC, the Chicago-based hedge-fund firm run by Kenneth Griffin, lost 13 percent in November, bringing the decline for the year to 47 percent, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Losses at the Citadel’s two biggest funds came from investments in convertible bonds, high-yield bonds and bank loans, and investment-grade bonds, which were hedged with credit default swaps that protect the buyer in the event of a default. These same wagers started the funds’ tumble in mid-September.

“Digging out of this hole may be tough for them,” given the lack of trading in the credit markets, said Michael Rosen, principal at Santa Monica, California-based Angeles Investment Advisors LLC, which advises clients on hedge-fund investments....


"A baited banker thus desponds,
From his own hand foresees his fall,
They have his soul, who have his bonds;
'Tis like the writing on the wall. "

THE RUN UPON THE BANKERS
Jonathan Swift

The bold encroachers on the deep
Gain by degrees huge tracts of land,
Till Neptune, with one general sweep,
Turns all again to barren strand.

The multitude's capricious pranks
Are said to represent the seas,
Breaking the bankers and the banks,
Resume their own whene'er they please.

Money, the life-blood of the nation,
Corrupts and stagnates in the veins,
Unless a proper circulation
Its motion and its heat maintains.

Because 'tis lordly not to pay,
Quakers and aldermen in state,
Like peers, have levees every day
Of duns attending at their gate.

We want our money on the nail;
The banker's ruin'd if he pays:
They seem to act an ancient tale;
The birds are met to strip the jays.

"Riches," the wisest monarch sings,
"Make pinions for themselves to fly;" [1]
They fly like bats on parchment wings,
And geese their silver plumes supply.

No money left for squandering heirs!
Bills turn the lenders into debtors:
The wish of Nero now is theirs, [2]
"That they had never known their letters.

"Conceive the works of midnight hags,
Tormenting fools behind their backs:
Thus bankers, o'er their bills and bags,
Sit squeezing images of wax.

Conceive the whole enchantment broke;
The witches left in open air,
With power no more than other folk,
Exposed with all their magic ware.

So powerful are a banker's bills,
Where creditors demand their due;
They break up counters, doors, and tills,
And leave the empty chests in view.

Thus when an earthquake lets in light
Upon the god of gold and hell,
Unable to endure the sight,
He hides within his darkest cell.

As when a conjurer takes a lease
From Satan for a term of years,
The tenant's in a dismal case,
Whene'er the bloody bond appears.

A baited banker thus desponds,
From his own hand foresees his fall,
They have his soul, who have his bonds;
'Tis like the writing on the wall. [3]

How will the caitiff wretch be scared,
When first he finds himself awake
At the last trumpet, unprepared,
And all his grand account to make!

For in that universal call,
Few bankers will to heaven be mounters;
They'll cry, "Ye shops, upon us fall!
Conceal and cover us, ye counters!

"When other hands the scales shall hold,
And they, in men's and angels' sight
Produced with all their bills and gold,
"Weigh'd in the balance and found light!"

1. Proverbs 23:5

2. Nero, signing the death sentence of a condemned criminal, exclaimed:
"Quam vellem nescire litteras!" ("How I wish I'd never learned to write!") Suetonius, 10;

3. Daniel 5:25 מנא ,מנא, תקל, ופרסין (Mene, Mene, Tekel u'Pharsin)

A Fair and Reasonable Proposal for Federal Bailouts

Senator Chris Dodd made an interesting proposal this afternoon, and on thinking further it seems to be one of the most reasonable and practical suggestions that we've heard during this crisis.

The Senator proposed that whatever givebacks, restrictions, haircuts, penalties, oversight, pay cuts and equity arrangements that are written into the bridge loans and funds to the automakers be applied in principle to all recipients of Federal bailout money including the Wall Street banks, and financials institutions like AIG and GE. This would include requiring written proposals for the restructuring and the use of this money and the adoption of a set of business reforms of the financial industry without exception.

This should include any funds provided by the Federal Reserve and Treasury. The Fed does not have any independent funds, all of them being provided and sustained by the US taxpayers through their debt and tax obligations. Oversight for this program would be conducted by an independent board set up by the GAO, and not the Fed or Treasury to avoid a conflict of interest.

It is a superb idea, and deserves the support of other Senators and congressmen.

We suggest that you write to your Senators about this today and express your support for a more even treatment of all businesses and people including the Wall Street banks. We sent the above wording to ours. Whatever is done must be fair and equitable.

Write to Your Senator

Citigroup and Key Officers including Prince and Rubin Named in Suit Charging Fraud

NY Post
'PONZI SCHEME' AT CITI
By PAUL THARP
December 4, 2008

A new Citigroup scandal is engulfing Robert Rubin and his former disciple Chuck Prince for their roles in an alleged Ponzi-style scheme that's now choking world banking.

Director Rubin and ousted CEO Prince - and their lieutenants over the past five years - are named in a federal lawsuit for an alleged complex cover-up of toxic securities that spread across the globe, wiping out trillions of dollars in their destructive paths.

Investor-plaintiffs in the suit accuse Citi management of overseeing the repackaging of unmarketable collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that no one wanted - and then reselling them to Citi and hiding the poisonous exposure off the books in shell entities.

The lawsuit said that when the bottom fell out of the shaky assets in the past year, Citi's stock collapsed, wiping out more than $122 billion of shareholder value.

However, Rubin and other top insiders were able to keep Citi shares afloat until they could cash out more than $150 million for themselves in "suspicious" stock sales "calculated to maximize the personal benefits from undisclosed inside information," the lawsuit said.

The latest troubles for Rubin, Prince and others emerged in a 500-page investigation by Citigroup investors represented by law firm Kirby McInerney.

The probe was used to amend and add new details to a blanket investor lawsuit filed against Citigroup a year ago. The amended suit called the actions of Citi leaders "a quasi-Ponzi scheme" to hide troubles - and keep Citi stock afloat while insiders unloaded about 3 million shares between Jan. 1, 2004 and Feb. 22, 2008 for huge profits.

In addition to Citigroup, Rubin and Prince, the complaint names Vice Chairman Lewis Kaden, ex-CFO Sallie Krawcheck and her successor CFO Gary Crittenden.

Rubin cleared $30.6 million on his stock sales, while Prince got $26.5 million, former COO Robert Druskin got nearly $32 million and former Global Wealth Management unit chief Todd Thomson got $25.7 million, the suit said.

Citi denied the allegations and said it "will defend against it vigorously."

Breaking the ZIRP barrier

From Across the Curve:

T Bills
December 4th, 2008 11:42 am

I just spoke to a bill trader who noted that a large chunk of the bill list is trading at zero percent. He mentioned a point that I had forgotten but is worth noting. Bills always trade well in December because at year end there is demand for them as investors of every ilk dress up their balance sheets. He has seen that demand to a far greater extent than normal.

He says that given all that has transpired this year there will be enormous demand for bill through the entire month of December. He has seen demand from an eclectic group of investors from around the globe. He expects the treasury to announce shortly a series of cash management bills which would total about $100 billion.

In his opinion if they do not issue bills will scream through zero.

So get used to these low rates they are here for a while.

Let's revisit the current situation.



The comparisons are not quite focused with today in terms of bills and bonds, since the funding preferences of Treasury are different now than they were back then, but you get the general idea of 'Treasuries' and their role in a flight to safety in a portfolio allocation.

Credit Crisis Storms the Walls of Fortress the Hedge Fund

NY Times
Fortress, the Hedge Fund, Is Crumbling
By MICHAEL J. DE LA MERCED
December 4, 2008

When Wesley R. Edens and his partners founded their investment firm a decade ago, they chose a name that evoked unshakeable bastions: Fortress.

But now their stronghold is under siege — and some of its investors are running for cover.

Cracks are spreading throughout the Fortress Investment Group, once a leading player in the worlds of hedge funds and leveraged buyouts. On Wednesday, Fortress’s shares fell 25 percent to $1.87, a new low, after the company temporarily suspended withdrawals from its largest hedge fund. Investors had asked to withdraw $3.51 billion from the money-losing fund, Drawbridge Global Macro.

But Wednesday’s slide was just the latest turn in a long, downward spiral for Fortress. The once-celebrated company has lost 89 percent of its market value over the last year as hedge funds and private equity, once lucrative businesses that helped define an era of unrivaled Wall Street wealth, have crumbled in the credit crisis.

It is a remarkable turnabout for Fortress, which less than two years ago was soaring along with the rest of Wall Street. Its debut as a public company, in February 2007, was heralded as the dawn of a new age of big hedge funds and buyout firms. Mr. Edens, a former executive at Lehman Brothers and BlackRock, and his fellow founders became instant billionaires. Their deal paved the way for even splashier initial public offerings by the likes of the Blackstone Group.

But life as public companies has proved treacherous for Fortress, Blackstone and the other so-called alternative investment firms that sold stock to the public shortly before the credit crisis erupted. They have had to contend with the harsh judgment of stockholders as the credit on which they depend has grown increasingly scarce.

“Frankly, it’s very difficult to say anything other than that I would have no interest as an investor in holding or buying these shares,” Jackson Turner, an analyst at Argus Research, said. Mr. Turner has a sell rating on Fortress shares.

A Fortress spokeswoman declined to comment.

Fortress’s plight reflects the ills plaguing much of high finance. Investors are abandoning hedge funds in growing numbers, and the industry, once so profitable, is now in the midst of a wrenching shakeout.

Even before Fortress lowered the gates on redemptions at its Drawbridge Global Macro fund, other big-name hedge funds had done so. More are expected to follow suit. Some investors fear that a rush of withdrawals could force funds to dump investments en masse, unsettling already shaky financial markets.

Fortress’s biggest fund is withering. In a regulatory filing on Wednesday, Fortress said that Drawbridge Global would have about $3.7 billion in assets under management as of Jan. 1, compared to the $8 billion it reported having as of Sept. 30.

But while Fortress’s earnings will suffer because of the redemptions — hedge funds earn fees based on both the amount of assets they manage and the performance of those funds — the withdrawals alone do not necessarily spell the company’s doom. Less than 30 percent of Fortress’s $34 billion in assets under management are subject to investor redemptions. Most are locked up in private equity funds that do not allow quick withdrawals of capital.

Still, private equity firms have been hurt by the near-freeze in the credit markets, which has limited their ability to strike new deals and dealt a severe blow to many of the debt-laden companies they own.

Fortress dodged a major setback when it managed to refinance IntraWest, the big Canadian ski resort. But investors worry that Fortress has taken damage from its exposure to the commercial real estate market, which is coming under severe stress. Fortress was a major lender to Harry Macklowe, the real estate mogul, who had to sell off trophy properties like the General Motors Building in Manhattan to pay back his creditors.

Just as it was the first major alternative-investment manager to go public, Fortress is now being watched closely as a canary in the coal mine. The Drawbridge fund’s nearly 50 percent redemption rate far outpaces the 20 to 30 percent that the market had expected at hedge funds on average, said Roger Freeman, an analyst at Barclays Capital.

“From my standpoint, I wonder how many other funds are seeing similar redemption rates,” he said. “This is definitely a negative indicator for the industry.”

For months, Fortress has been the subject of gallows humor suggesting that it might simply buy back its shares and take itself private once more. While the company’s executives have asserted their commitment to remaining public, several analysts said that Fortress’s problems were clearly intensified by the brighter light that comes with being a public company.

“It forces their problems to be out in the open,” Mr. Turner said. “It made the issues that they have much more amplified.”

US Dollar Very Long Term Chart

Legg Mason's Bill Miller Calls 'the Bottom'

Presumably this is a different bottom than the one he called in April 2008.

"The worst is behind us." 23 April 2008 - Bill Miller

Bill Miller of Legg Mason Calls a Bottom

Reuters
Legg Mason's Miller: "Bottom's been made" in stocks
By Jennifer Ablan and Herbert Lash
Wed Dec 3, 2008 3:56pm EST

NEW YORK, Dec 3 (Reuters) - Legg Mason's Bill Miller, a celebrated investor but whose stock picking is far off the mark this year, said on Wednesday the "bottom has been made" in U.S. equities.

He recommends that the Federal Reserve buy stocks and junk bonds to avert a deeper financial crisis, adding "the taxpayer would make a killing" as markets rebound. (Yikes! - Jesse)

Speaking at Legg Mason's annual luncheon for media, Miller said that all long-term investors believe that stocks today are cheap, but credit markets must regain health before equity markets can rally.

It "looks as if the bottom has been made" in U.S. stocks, he said.

Miller told Reuters the year has been "terrible, a disaster and awful," yet he held out his past performance in down markets as a reason why he should not be counted out.

"We've performed in most of the financial panics that we've had -- the last one being the three-year bear market ending in 2002 -- we outperformed all the way through that," he said.

"So even though we lost money, we lost a lot less money than the market did," Miller added.

However, Miller acknowledged that his performance has been worse than in past downturns.

"When you're underperforming and losing more money than the market in a down market, then that's a much more problematic situation. We've performed far worse than I would've predicted we would," he said.

For the year, Miller's flagship Value Trust LMVTX.O fund was down 59.7 percent as of Tuesday, compared to a 41 percent decline in the reinvested returns of the S&P 500 index, according to Lipper Inc., a unit of Thomson Reuters.

Performance over the year-to-date, one-, three- and five-year periods for Value Trust put it at the bottom of the barrel among its peers, Lipper data shows.

The severe sell-off has provided ample opportunities. (Yes. Like a plague creates plenty of vacancies in hotels - Jesse)

"This market is very unusual because since the end of the second quarter, it has been a pure scramble for liquidity which accelerated obviously post-Lehman Brothers and people sold without regard to value at all," Miller said.

"So at the end of the end of this quarter, every sector in the market has companies that represent what we think are exceptional value."

A Few Charts in the Babson Style for Midweek 3 December

November Payrolls Report Preview

The Non-Farm Payrolls Report for November will be released on Friday 5 December at 8:30 AM EST.

The consensus of economists is for a loss of 325,000 jobs, as compared to October's loss of 240,000 and September's loss of 284,000 which are likely to be revised with this report.

Here are our projections with the usual caveat that the numerous large 'adjustments' and revisions to this report make it very difficult to forecast with any reliability.

The imaginary jobs added, alternatively known as the "Birth-Death Model" of phantom businesses should be a relatively inconsequentional addition of 29,000 jobs into the pre-seasonally adjusted number. If it were added to the seasonally adjusted number it would be significant.



More important is the seasonally adjusted 'headline number' which we think will come in close to consensus with a loss of about 305,000 to 320,000 jobs. There is potential downside to this number depending on how they revise the October loss of 240,000. As you can see we are assuming they revise it much lower to a loss of around 310,000. The spin will be that the job losses are 'bottoming.'

The Bush Administration might choose to hit the numbers quite hard with a worst case adjustment down to the -400,000 level and then show a gradual improvement into the end of the term of office to make the case that the economy was bottoming and improving when handed over to the Democrats.

Conversely, a 'hot number' of a decline of only 260,000 or thereabouts with a stiff downward revision to October would set up the spin of a 'market bottom' and a strong rally. If you have not notice the smart money has been unloading stocks with some initiative the past few months, taking profits where possible in anticipation of an increase in taxes on capital gains and the wealthy under the incoming presidential administration, which is not a bad assumption.

The first scenario of a 'bottoming' around the 300,000 lost jobs level seems most probable despite these other possible outcomes. We won't be willing to bet on it however.

Its Machiavellian we know, but that's the way it is, and has been, and the way we see it based on everything we know.


And finally, the projected adjusted and actual numbers just to emphasize the huge seasonal adjustments that are being made, beside the historical revisions.



The government numbers have become distorted and less reliable over time, starting with some vigor in the Clinton Administration. Reacting to single number events is almost nonsensical but that is how the Wall Street speculation game is played these days. As Dr. Greg House says, "everyone lies" and that seems to be the case more often in these times, especially for those in positions of power.

The most important number is the longer term trend, which we suspect will remain lower until the economy bottoms. In fact, we expect a real bottom here to be an indicator of a nascent recovery as it was a sign of the top.

Is Goldman Sachs Managing Its Earning Expectations?

An interesting story from the Columbia School of Journalism regarding the Goldman Sachs story featured at The Wall Street Journal the other day suggest some oddness in the WSJ story on Goldman Sachs newly expected losses.

Did Goldman Sachs leak its own results? Are they accurate? Or was this a setup to dampen expectations on the results?

Or merely to provide 'guidance' to the Street? Note the stories at the bottom that shows analysts turning increasingly bearish on Goldman in October, and that Katzke of Credit Suisse actually cut estimates precipitously the day before the WSJ story, from a decent gain to a sharp loss. What precipitated her reversal?

Let's see how Goldman's numbers and follow-on stories come out, and judge accordingly. For now it looks like a simple case of follow the leader, the leader being Katzke from Credit Suisse who did a remarkable turnaround on her earnings projections from a gain of $2.47 to a loss of $4.00.

The Audit
Columbia Journalism Review
December 02, 2008 10:06 PM
Weird Goldman Sourcing at the Journal
By Ryan Chittum

A [Wall Street] Journal scoop this morning—or at least its sourcing—may have confused some readers.

The paper reported that Goldman Sachs’s loss this quarter would be much worse than expected, news it attributed to “industry insiders.”

That’s funny attribution, but okay. But scan the rest of the story and you’ll find that it appears nobody from Goldman was ever given an opportunity to comment. (Odd because the follow on stories indicate Goldman declined comments to other news outlets - Jesse)

Now, it’s highly unlikely that these experienced reporters got a story on A1 in the WSJ without calling the company for comment.

What the lack of a Goldman attribution signals to us is that Goldman Sachs itself leaked this to the Journal as a way to feed hungry beat reporters and get bad news into its stock price before it reports earnings.

The Journal has a nearly iron-clad internal rule that says a story can’t say a source declined to comment if that source is quoted elsewhere in the story. That can make for awkward negotiations if a reporter is trying to protect the identity of a source who doesn’t want to be named. (Apparently the WSJ broke that rule because Goldman declined to comment, so who leaked the insider information? - Jesse)

I don’t know why Goldman was so finicky that it wouldn’t let the Journal use its standard “people familiar with the matter” phrasing, but I’ve dealt with similarly skittish/irrational sources.

But for what it’s worth as an insiderism, that’s your likely explanation.

The Wall Street Journal
Goldman Faces Loss of $2 Billion for Quarter
DECEMBER 2, 2008

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., known for avoiding many of the blowups that have battered its Wall Street rivals, now is likely to report a net loss of as much as $2 billion for its quarter ended Nov. 28, according to industry insiders.

The loss, equal to about $5 a share, would be more than five times as steep as the current analyst consensus for the Wall Street firm, as it faces write-downs on everything from private equity to commercial real estate.

Though analysts and investors already were bracing for Goldman's first quarterly loss since it went public in 1999, the ...


Reuters
Goldman shares fall as analysts see bigger loss
Tue Dec 2, 2008 12:26pm EST
By Joseph A. Giannone

NEW YORK, Dec 2 (Reuters) - Goldman Sachs Group Inc shares fell Tuesday on speculation the bank's fourth-quarter loss could be much larger than expected -- more than $2.5 billion -- fueled by the plunging value of many Goldman investments.

The shares fell as much as 6 percent, rose briefly in volatile trading, then settled at $64.78, off 1.5 percent. They are down 70 percent this year.

For the past month, Goldman has been widely expected to post its first quarterly loss since going public in 1999. But poor market conditions got even worse last month as the U.S. Treasury abandoned its proposal to buy hard-to-trade mortgage securities and other debt from hard-hit banks.

Atlantic Equities analyst Richard Staite on Tuesday widened his loss forecast for Goldman to $4.65 a share, or $2.3 billion, for the fiscal fourth quarter ended Nov. 28. Staite forecast that falling equity and debt values will trigger more than $9 billion of writedowns.

Within hours, veteran UBS brokerage analyst Glenn Schorr forecast an even bigger loss -- $5.50 a share, or $2.7 billion -- driven by writedowns approaching $5 billion. S&P Equity Research cut its forecast to a loss of $3.25 a share.

That's a big change from a month ago, when the average Wall Street forecast was a profit of $2.34 a share; six months ago, the average estimate was a profit of more than $5.40 a share.

Currently, analysts' average forecast is a loss of $1.46 a share excluding one-time items, according to Reuters Estimates. Individual forecasts range from a profit of 23 cents at Wachovia Securities to a loss of $5.50 at UBS.

The average loss forecast will only deepen as Wall Street analysts try to estimate the impact of market weakness on a range of assets held in Goldman's investment portfolio and by its traders.

Goldman has long been the industry's most aggressive player in deploying its capital into everything from power plants and Japanese golf courses to ethanol makers and distressed debt.

As a group, analysts turned bearish on Goldman at the end of October, with industry watchers like UBS' Schorr and Merrill Lynch's Guy Moszkowski predicting small losses

AP
Ahead of the Bell: Goldman Sachs faces $2B loss
Tuesday December 2, 9:09 am ET

Report: Goldman Sachs could lose as much as $2 billion for its fiscal 4th quarter

NEW YORK (AP) -- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. could face losses totaling $2 billion when it reports its fiscal fourth-quarter results because of continued market turmoil and the expectation for large write-downs, according to a report in The Wall Street Journal on Tuesday.

The report, citing industry insiders and analysts, said the potential loss of about $5 per share would be largely due to write-downs on a wide array of assets that have increasingly lost value over the past three months.

A spokesman for Goldman declined to comment, noting that Goldman does not provide earnings guidance and does not comment on outside forecasts.

It would be Goldman's first quarterly loss since it went public in 1999....

AP
Goldman falls with market, analysts cut estimates
Monday December 1, 8:29 pm ET

Goldman Sachs falls as analysts cut 4Q 2008 and 2009 estimates

CHARLOTTE, N.C. (AP) -- Shares of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. dropped sharply on Monday as the broader market tumbled on concern about the economy and analysts cut their earnings estimates to reflect a dismal quarter.

Shares of Goldman fell $13.23, or 16.8 percent, to $65.76.

Goldman's decline came as the Dow Jones industrial average fell 680 points to about 8,149 and the Standard & Poor's 500 stock index lost nearly 9 percent. The decline was the result of investors' concerns about holiday shopping and new reports showing manufacturing activity fell to a 26-year low in November and construction spending fell by larger-than-expected amount in October.

In a note to investors Monday, Credit Suisse analyst Susan Roth Katzke said she now expects the New York-based firm will lose $4 per share in the fourth quarter. She had previously forecast a profit of $2.47 per share.

She also lowered her 2009 earnings estimate to $12 per share from $14.50 per share.

Analysts polled by Thomson Reuters, on average, forecast a quarterly loss of 62 cents per share and $10.38 per share for 2009.

Katzke lowered her target price on the stock to $140 from a range of $175-$200...

UN Economic Team Warns of a Dollar Crash

"Denial is the most predictable of all human responses. But, rest assured, this will be the sixth time we have destroyed it, and we have become exceedingly efficient at it."
The Architect of the Matrix

We have an hypothesis that what is learned from this series of financial crises, from 2000 to 2012, and the failure of the dollar reserve currency experiment, is going give rise to a new school of economics as the Great Depression lifted Keynesianism over classical economics, and the bear market and stagflation of the 1970's sparked the ascendancy of monetarism.

2009 is going to be a pivotal, volatile year, and most likely, interesting.

The Financial Times
UN team warns of hard landing for dollar
By Harvey Morris in New York
December 1 2008 08:48

The current strength of the dollar is temporary and the US currency risks a hard landing in 2009, according to a team of United Nations economists who foresaw a year ago that a US downturn would bring the global economy to a near standstill.

In their annual report on the world economy published on Monday, the economists said the dollar’s sharp rebound this autumn had been driven mainly by a flight to the safety of the international reserve currency as the financial crisis spread beyond the US.

The overall trend remained a downward one, however, reflecting perceptions that the US debt position was approaching unsustainable levels. An accelerated fall of the dollar could bring new turmoil to financial markets.

“Investors might renew their flight to safety, though this time away from dollar-denominated assets, thereby forcing the US economy into a hard landing and pulling the global economy into a deeper recession,” the report said.

Publication of the annual survey by the UN’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs, its trade organisation Unctad and UN regional bodies, was brought forward by a month in the light of the financial crisis. It was launched in Doha to coincide with the UN-sponsored development financing conference in the Qatari capital.

The UN team said that, as the financial crisis spread beyond the US, there had been a massive shift of global financial assets into US Treasury bills, driving their yields almost to zero and pushing the dollar sharply higher. At the same time, however, the US’s external debt had risen to new heights that could provoke a dollar collapse.

The report recommends reform of the international reserve system away from almost exclusive reliance on the dollar and towards a globally backed multi-currency system.

Rob Vos, a Dutch economist who heads the UN’s policy and analysis division and who is responsible for the annual economic review, said the global economic pain could be eased if governments co-ordinated a spate of stimulus packages that were already under way.

“There has been a sea change in attitudes in favour of intervention and concerted action,” he told the Financial Times. He welcomed statements from US president-elect Barack Obama’s transition team in support of spending on infrastructure.

Worst Fifteen Dow Days in Percentage Decline

Its Official: National Bureau of Economic Research Says US Recession

Recession in U.S. Started in December 2007, NBER Says
By Timothy R. Homan and Steve Matthews

Dec. 1 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. economy entered a recession in December 2007, the panel that dates American business cycles said today.

The declaration was made by the National Bureau of Economic Research, a private, nonprofit group of economists based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The last time the U.S. was in a recession was from March through November 2001, according to NBER.

We feel vindicated in our prediction of this in February of this year.

Here is the chart we used at the time to mark the top, and to forecast the coming decline.



Here is a chart with the monthly actuals added to it. The decline has progressed more quickly than anticipated.



If you start reading the blog entries in 2007, one can see how the case for recession was carefully built up based on the indicators, and the probability steadily increased from an estimate of 65% in early December.

Although fundamentals don't work in the short term, in the longer term the markets work, and the fundamentals count, probabilities pay off, and there is a reversion to the means. The trick in trading is not to be trapped by leverage, timeframes and capital risk.

Once again a special thanks to our friend Elvis_Knows for his excellent graphics.

Pimco Cancels Dividends

Pimco cancels dividend payments for 6 funds
December 01, 2008: 10:03 AM EST

NEW YORK (Associated Press) - Pacific Investment Management Company Inc. on Monday canceled announced dividend payments for six of its funds, saying the weak market has pushed the value of those funds below legal thresholds.

The dividends declared Nov. 3 that were scheduled for payment Monday will not be paid for Pimco New York Municipal Income Fund, Pimco Municipal Income Fund II, Pimco California Municipal Income Fund II, Pimco Municipal Income Fund III, Pimco California Municipal Income Fund III and Pimco New York Municipal Income Fund III.

"Continued severe market dislocations and recent further erosions in the municipal bond market have caused the values of the Funds' portfolio securities to decline," the company said. As a result, the funds' asset coverage ratios have fallen below 200 percent, it explained, and federal law prohibits a fund from paying or declaring common share dividends below that threshold.

The funds intend to resume paying and declaring dividends as soon as possible, Pimco said. The company said it may consider options including redemption of a por